Refactor secret conditions (#350)

* refactor spending conditions and add comments

* fix kind enum deserialization

cashu/core/base.py

@@ -132,17 +132,12 @@ class Proof(BaseModel):
 
     @property
     def p2pksigs(self) -> List[str]:
-        assert self.witness, "Witness is missing"
+        assert self.witness, "Witness is missing for p2pk signature"
         return P2PKWitness.from_witness(self.witness).signatures
 
-    @property
-    def p2shscript(self) -> P2SHWitness:
-        assert self.witness, "Witness is missing"
-        return P2SHWitness.from_witness(self.witness)
-
     @property
     def htlcpreimage(self) -> Union[str, None]:
-        assert self.witness, "Witness is missing"
+        assert self.witness, "Witness is missing for htlc preimage"
         return HTLCWitness.from_witness(self.witness).preimage
 
 
@@ -162,7 +157,7 @@ class BlindedMessage(BaseModel):
 
     @property
     def p2pksigs(self) -> List[str]:
-        assert self.witness, "Witness is missing"
+        assert self.witness, "Witness missing in output"
         return P2PKWitness.from_witness(self.witness).signatures
 
 

cashu/core/htlc.py

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ from .secret import Secret, SecretKind
 class HTLCSecret(Secret):
     @classmethod
     def from_secret(cls, secret: Secret):
-        assert secret.kind == SecretKind.HTLC, "Secret is not a HTLC secret"
+        assert SecretKind(secret.kind) == SecretKind.HTLC, "Secret is not a HTLC secret"
         # NOTE: exclude tags in .dict() because it doesn't deserialize it properly
         # need to add it back in manually with tags=secret.tags
         return cls(**secret.dict(exclude={"tags"}), tags=secret.tags)

cashu/core/p2pk.py

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 import hashlib
 import time
+from enum import Enum
 from typing import List, Union
 
 from loguru import logger
@@ -8,23 +9,26 @@ from .crypto.secp import PrivateKey, PublicKey
 from .secret import Secret, SecretKind
 
 
-class SigFlags:
+class SigFlags(Enum):
-    SIG_INPUTS = (  # require signatures only on the inputs (default signature flag)
+    # require signatures only on the inputs (default signature flag)
-        "SIG_INPUTS"
+    SIG_INPUTS = "SIG_INPUTS"
-    )
+    # require signatures on inputs and outputs
-    SIG_ALL = "SIG_ALL"  # require signatures on inputs and outputs
+    SIG_ALL = "SIG_ALL"
 
 
 class P2PKSecret(Secret):
     @classmethod
     def from_secret(cls, secret: Secret):
-        assert secret.kind == SecretKind.P2PK, "Secret is not a P2PK secret"
+        assert SecretKind(secret.kind) == SecretKind.P2PK, "Secret is not a P2PK secret"
         # NOTE: exclude tags in .dict() because it doesn't deserialize it properly
         # need to add it back in manually with tags=secret.tags
         return cls(**secret.dict(exclude={"tags"}), tags=secret.tags)
 
     def get_p2pk_pubkey_from_secret(self) -> List[str]:
-        """Gets the P2PK pubkey from a Secret depending on the locktime
+        """Gets the P2PK pubkey from a Secret depending on the locktime.
+
+        If locktime is passed, only the refund pubkeys are returned.
+        Else, the pubkeys in the data field and in the 'pubkeys' tag are returned.
 
         Args:
             secret (Secret): P2PK Secret in ecash token
@@ -54,8 +58,9 @@ class P2PKSecret(Secret):
         return int(locktime) if locktime else None
 
     @property
-    def sigflag(self) -> Union[None, str]:
+    def sigflag(self) -> Union[None, SigFlags]:
-        return self.tags.get_tag("sigflag")
+        sigflag = self.tags.get_tag("sigflag")
+        return SigFlags(sigflag) if sigflag else None
 
     @property
     def n_sigs(self) -> Union[None, int]:

cashu/core/secret.py

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 import json
+from enum import Enum
 from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional, Union
 
 from loguru import logger
@@ -7,7 +8,7 @@ from pydantic import BaseModel
 from .crypto.secp import PrivateKey
 
 
-class SecretKind:
+class SecretKind(Enum):
     P2PK = "P2PK"
     HTLC = "HTLC"
 

cashu/mint/conditions.py

@@ -19,11 +19,184 @@ from ..core.secret import Secret, SecretKind
 
 
 class LedgerSpendingConditions:
+    def _verify_p2pk_spending_conditions(self, proof: Proof, secret: Secret) -> bool:
+        """
+        Verify P2PK spending condition for a single input.
+
+        We return True:
+        - if the secret is not a P2PKSecret spending condition
+        - if the locktime has passed and no refund pubkey is present
+
+        We raise an exception:
+        - if the pubkeys in the secret are not unique
+        - if no signatures are present
+        - if the signatures are not unique
+        - if n_sigs is not positive
+        - if n_sigs is larger than the number of provided signatures
+        - if no valid signatures are present
+        - if the signature threshold is not met
+        """
+        if SecretKind(secret.kind) != SecretKind.P2PK:
+            # not a P2PK secret
+            return True
+
+        p2pk_secret = P2PKSecret.from_secret(secret)
+
+        # extract pubkeys that we require signatures from depending on whether the
+        # locktime has passed (refund) or not (pubkeys in secret.data and in tags)
+        # This is implemented in get_p2pk_pubkey_from_secret()
+        pubkeys = p2pk_secret.get_p2pk_pubkey_from_secret()
+        # we will get an empty list if the locktime has passed and no refund pubkey is present
+        if not pubkeys:
+            return True
+
+        assert len(set(pubkeys)) == len(pubkeys), "pubkeys must be unique."
+        logger.trace(f"pubkeys: {pubkeys}")
+
+        # verify that signatures are present
+        if not proof.p2pksigs:
+            # no signature present although secret indicates one
+            logger.error(f"no p2pk signatures in proof: {proof.p2pksigs}")
+            raise TransactionError("no p2pk signatures in proof.")
+
+        # we make sure that there are no duplicate signatures
+        if len(set(proof.p2pksigs)) != len(proof.p2pksigs):
+            raise TransactionError("p2pk signatures must be unique.")
+
+        # we parse the secret as a P2PK commitment
+        # assert len(proof.secret.split(":")) == 5, "p2pk secret format invalid."
+
+        # INPUTS: check signatures proof.p2pksigs against pubkey
+        # we expect the signature to be on the pubkey (=message) itself
+        n_sigs_required = p2pk_secret.n_sigs or 1
+        assert n_sigs_required > 0, "n_sigs must be positive."
+
+        # check if enough signatures are present
+        assert (
+            len(proof.p2pksigs) >= n_sigs_required
+        ), f"not enough signatures provided: {len(proof.p2pksigs)} < {n_sigs_required}."
+
+        n_valid_sigs_per_output = 0
+        # loop over all signatures in output
+        for input_sig in proof.p2pksigs:
+            for pubkey in pubkeys:
+                logger.trace(f"verifying signature {input_sig} by pubkey {pubkey}.")
+                logger.trace(f"Message: {p2pk_secret.serialize().encode('utf-8')}")
+                if verify_p2pk_signature(
+                    message=p2pk_secret.serialize().encode("utf-8"),
+                    pubkey=PublicKey(bytes.fromhex(pubkey), raw=True),
+                    signature=bytes.fromhex(input_sig),
+                ):
+                    n_valid_sigs_per_output += 1
+                    logger.trace(
+                        f"p2pk signature on input is valid: {input_sig} on {pubkey}."
+                    )
+
+        # check if we have enough valid signatures
+        assert n_valid_sigs_per_output, "no valid signature provided for input."
+        assert n_valid_sigs_per_output >= n_sigs_required, (
+            f"signature threshold not met. {n_valid_sigs_per_output} <"
+            f" {n_sigs_required}."
+        )
+
+        logger.trace(
+            f"{n_valid_sigs_per_output} of {n_sigs_required} valid signatures found."
+        )
+        logger.trace(proof.p2pksigs)
+        logger.trace("p2pk signature on inputs is valid.")
+
+        return True
+
+    def _verify_htlc_spending_conditions(self, proof: Proof, secret: Secret) -> bool:
+        """
+        Verify HTLC spending condition for a single input.
+
+        We return True:
+        - if the secret is not a HTLCSecret spending condition
+
+        We first verify the time lock. If the locktime has passed, we require
+        a valid signature if a 'refund' pubkey is present. If it isn't present,
+        anyone can spend.
+
+        We return True:
+        - if 'refund' pubkeys are present and a valid signature is provided for one of them
+        We raise an exception:
+        - if 'refund' but no valid signature is present
+
+
+        We then verify the hash lock. We require a valid preimage. We require a valid
+        signature if 'pubkeys' are present. If they aren't present, anyone who provides
+        a valid preimage can spend.
+
+        We raise an exception:
+        - if no preimage is provided
+        - if preimage does not match the hash lock in the secret
+
+        We return True:
+        - if 'pubkeys' are present and a valid signature is provided for one of them
+
+        We raise an exception:
+        - if 'pubkeys' are present but no valid signature is provided
+        """
+
+        if SecretKind(secret.kind) != SecretKind.HTLC:
+            # not a P2PK secret
+            return True
+        htlc_secret = HTLCSecret.from_secret(secret)
+
+        # time lock
+        # check if locktime is in the past
+        if htlc_secret.locktime and htlc_secret.locktime < time.time():
+            refund_pubkeys = htlc_secret.tags.get_tag_all("refund")
+            if refund_pubkeys:
+                assert proof.witness, TransactionError("no HTLC refund signature.")
+                signature = HTLCWitness.from_witness(proof.witness).signature
+                assert signature, TransactionError("no HTLC refund signature provided")
+                for pubkey in refund_pubkeys:
+                    if verify_p2pk_signature(
+                        message=htlc_secret.serialize().encode("utf-8"),
+                        pubkey=PublicKey(bytes.fromhex(pubkey), raw=True),
+                        signature=bytes.fromhex(signature),
+                    ):
+                        # a signature matches
+                        return True
+                raise TransactionError("HTLC refund signatures did not match.")
+            # no pubkeys given in secret, anyone can spend
+            return True
+
+        # hash lock
+        assert proof.htlcpreimage, TransactionError("no HTLC preimage provided")
+
+        # first we check whether a correct preimage was included
+        if not hashlib.sha256(
+            bytes.fromhex(proof.htlcpreimage)
+        ).digest() == bytes.fromhex(htlc_secret.data):
+            raise TransactionError("HTLC preimage does not match.")
+
+        # then we check whether a signature is required
+        hashlock_pubkeys = htlc_secret.tags.get_tag_all("pubkeys")
+        if hashlock_pubkeys:
+            assert proof.witness, TransactionError("no HTLC hash lock signature.")
+            signature = HTLCWitness.from_witness(proof.witness).signature
+            assert signature, TransactionError("HTLC no hash lock signatures provided.")
+            for pubkey in hashlock_pubkeys:
+                if verify_p2pk_signature(
+                    message=htlc_secret.serialize().encode("utf-8"),
+                    pubkey=PublicKey(bytes.fromhex(pubkey), raw=True),
+                    signature=bytes.fromhex(signature),
+                ):
+                    # a signature matches
+                    return True
+                # none of the pubkeys had a match
+                raise TransactionError("HTLC hash lock signatures did not match.")
+        # no pubkeys were included, anyone can spend
+        return True
+
     def _verify_input_spending_conditions(self, proof: Proof) -> bool:
         """
         Verify spending conditions:
-         Condition: P2PK - Witness: proof.p2pksigs
+         Condition: P2PK - Checks if signature in proof.witness is valid for pubkey in proof.secret
-         Condition: HTLC - Witness: proof.htlcpreimage, proof.htlcsignature
+         Condition: HTLC - Checks if preimage in proof.witness is valid for hash in proof.secret
         """
 
         try:
@@ -35,134 +208,118 @@ class LedgerSpendingConditions:
             return True
 
         # P2PK
-        if secret.kind == SecretKind.P2PK:
+        if SecretKind(secret.kind) == SecretKind.P2PK:
-            p2pk_secret = P2PKSecret.from_secret(secret)
+            return self._verify_p2pk_spending_conditions(proof, secret)
-            # check if locktime is in the past
-            pubkeys = p2pk_secret.get_p2pk_pubkey_from_secret()
-            assert len(set(pubkeys)) == len(pubkeys), "pubkeys must be unique."
-            logger.trace(f"pubkeys: {pubkeys}")
-            # we will get an empty list if the locktime has passed and no refund pubkey is present
-            if not pubkeys:
-                return True
 
-            # now we check the signature
+        # HTLC
-            if not proof.p2pksigs:
+        if SecretKind(secret.kind) == SecretKind.HTLC:
-                # no signature present although secret indicates one
+            return self._verify_htlc_spending_conditions(proof, secret)
-                logger.error(f"no p2pk signatures in proof: {proof.p2pksigs}")
-                raise TransactionError("no p2pk signatures in proof.")
 
-            # we make sure that there are no duplicate signatures
+        # no spending condition present
-            if len(set(proof.p2pksigs)) != len(proof.p2pksigs):
+        return True
-                raise TransactionError("p2pk signatures must be unique.")
 
-            # we parse the secret as a P2PK commitment
+    # ------ output spending conditions ------
-            # assert len(proof.secret.split(":")) == 5, "p2pk secret format invalid."
 
-            # INPUTS: check signatures proof.p2pksigs against pubkey
+    def _verify_output_p2pk_spending_conditions(
+        self, proofs: List[Proof], outputs: List[BlindedMessage]
+    ) -> bool:
+        """
+        If sigflag==SIG_ALL in proof.secret, check if outputs
+        contain valid signatures for pubkeys in proof.secret.
+
+        We return True
+        - if not all proof.secret are Secret spending condition
+        - if not all secrets are P2PKSecret spending condition
+        - if not all signature.sigflag are SIG_ALL
+
+        We raise an exception:
+        - if not all pubkeys in all secrets are the same
+        - if not all n_sigs in all secrets are the same
+        - if not all signatures in all outputs are unique
+        - if not all signatures in all outputs are valid
+        - if no valid signatures are present
+        - if the signature threshold is not met
+
+        We return True if we successfully validated the spending condition.
+        """
+
+        try:
+            secrets_generic = [Secret.deserialize(p.secret) for p in proofs]
+            p2pk_secrets = [
+                P2PKSecret.from_secret(secret) for secret in secrets_generic
+            ]
+        except Exception:
+            # secret is not a spending condition so we treat is a normal secret
+            return True
+
+        # check if all secrets are P2PK
+        # NOTE: This is redundant, because P2PKSecret.from_secret() already checks for the kind
+        # Leaving it in for explicitness
+        if not all(
+            [SecretKind(secret.kind) == SecretKind.P2PK for secret in p2pk_secrets]
+        ):
+            # not all secrets are P2PK
+            return True
+
+        # check if all secrets are sigflag==SIG_ALL
+        if not all([secret.sigflag == SigFlags.SIG_ALL for secret in p2pk_secrets]):
+            # not all secrets have sigflag==SIG_ALL
+            return True
+
+        # extract all pubkeys and n_sigs from secrets
+        pubkeys_per_proof = [
+            secret.get_p2pk_pubkey_from_secret() for secret in p2pk_secrets
+        ]
+        n_sigs_per_proof = [secret.n_sigs for secret in p2pk_secrets]
+
+        # all pubkeys and n_sigs must be the same
+        assert (
+            len(set([tuple(pubs_output) for pubs_output in pubkeys_per_proof])) == 1
+        ), "pubkeys in all proofs must match."
+        assert len(set(n_sigs_per_proof)) == 1, "n_sigs in all proofs must match."
+
+        # TODO: add limit for maximum number of pubkeys
+
+        # validation successful
+
+        pubkeys: List[str] = pubkeys_per_proof[0]
+        # if n_sigs is None, we set it to 1
+        n_sigs: int = n_sigs_per_proof[0] or 1
+
+        logger.trace(f"pubkeys: {pubkeys}")
+
+        # loop over all outputs and check if the signatures are valid for pubkeys with a threshold of n_sig
+        for output in outputs:
             # we expect the signature to be on the pubkey (=message) itself
-            n_sigs_required = p2pk_secret.n_sigs or 1
+            p2pksigs = output.p2pksigs
-            assert n_sigs_required > 0, "n_sigs must be positive."
+            assert p2pksigs, "no signatures in output."
+            # TODO: add limit for maximum number of signatures
 
-            # check if enough signatures are present
+            # we check whether any signature is duplicate
-            assert len(proof.p2pksigs) >= n_sigs_required, (
+            assert len(set(p2pksigs)) == len(
-                f"not enough signatures provided: {len(proof.p2pksigs)} <"
+                p2pksigs
-                f" {n_sigs_required}."
+            ), "duplicate signatures in output."
-            )
 
             n_valid_sigs_per_output = 0
             # loop over all signatures in output
-            for input_sig in proof.p2pksigs:
+            for sig in p2pksigs:
                 for pubkey in pubkeys:
-                    logger.trace(f"verifying signature {input_sig} by pubkey {pubkey}.")
-                    logger.trace(f"Message: {p2pk_secret.serialize().encode('utf-8')}")
                     if verify_p2pk_signature(
-                        message=p2pk_secret.serialize().encode("utf-8"),
+                        message=output.B_.encode("utf-8"),
                         pubkey=PublicKey(bytes.fromhex(pubkey), raw=True),
-                        signature=bytes.fromhex(input_sig),
+                        signature=bytes.fromhex(sig),
                     ):
                         n_valid_sigs_per_output += 1
-                        logger.trace(
+            assert n_valid_sigs_per_output, "no valid signature provided for output."
-                            f"p2pk signature on input is valid: {input_sig} on"
+            assert (
-                            f" {pubkey}."
+                n_valid_sigs_per_output >= n_sigs
-                        )
+            ), f"signature threshold not met. {n_valid_sigs_per_output} < {n_sigs}."
-                        continue
+
-                    else:
-                        logger.trace(
-                            f"p2pk signature on input is invalid: {input_sig} on"
-                            f" {pubkey}."
-                        )
-            # check if we have enough valid signatures
-            assert n_valid_sigs_per_output, "no valid signature provided for input."
-            assert n_valid_sigs_per_output >= n_sigs_required, (
-                f"signature threshold not met. {n_valid_sigs_per_output} <"
-                f" {n_sigs_required}."
-            )
             logger.trace(
-                f"{n_valid_sigs_per_output} of {n_sigs_required} valid signatures"
+                f"{n_valid_sigs_per_output} of {n_sigs} valid signatures found."
-                " found."
             )
-
+            logger.trace(p2pksigs)
-            logger.trace(proof.p2pksigs)
+            logger.trace("p2pk signatures on output is valid.")
-            logger.trace("p2pk signature on inputs is valid.")
-
-            return True
-
-        # HTLC
-        if secret.kind == SecretKind.HTLC:
-            htlc_secret = HTLCSecret.from_secret(secret)
-            # time lock
-            # check if locktime is in the past
-            if htlc_secret.locktime and htlc_secret.locktime < time.time():
-                refund_pubkeys = htlc_secret.tags.get_tag_all("refund")
-                if refund_pubkeys:
-                    assert proof.witness, TransactionError("no HTLC refund signature.")
-                    signature = HTLCWitness.from_witness(proof.witness).signature
-                    assert signature, TransactionError(
-                        "no HTLC refund signature provided"
-                    )
-                    for pubkey in refund_pubkeys:
-                        if verify_p2pk_signature(
-                            message=htlc_secret.serialize().encode("utf-8"),
-                            pubkey=PublicKey(bytes.fromhex(pubkey), raw=True),
-                            signature=bytes.fromhex(signature),
-                        ):
-                            # a signature matches
-                            return True
-                    raise TransactionError("HTLC refund signatures did not match.")
-                # no pubkeys given in secret, anyone can spend
-                return True
-
-            # hash lock
-            assert proof.htlcpreimage, TransactionError("no HTLC preimage provided")
-
-            # first we check whether a correct preimage was included
-            if not hashlib.sha256(
-                bytes.fromhex(proof.htlcpreimage)
-            ).digest() == bytes.fromhex(htlc_secret.data):
-                raise TransactionError("HTLC preimage does not match.")
-
-            # then we check whether a signature is required
-            hashlock_pubkeys = htlc_secret.tags.get_tag_all("pubkeys")
-            if hashlock_pubkeys:
-                assert proof.witness, TransactionError("no HTLC hash lock signature.")
-                signature = HTLCWitness.from_witness(proof.witness).signature
-                assert signature, TransactionError(
-                    "HTLC no hash lock signatures provided."
-                )
-                for pubkey in hashlock_pubkeys:
-                    if verify_p2pk_signature(
-                        message=htlc_secret.serialize().encode("utf-8"),
-                        pubkey=PublicKey(bytes.fromhex(pubkey), raw=True),
-                        signature=bytes.fromhex(signature),
-                    ):
-                        # a signature matches
-                        return True
-                    # none of the pubkeys had a match
-                    raise TransactionError("HTLC hash lock signatures did not match.")
-            # no pubkeys were included, anyone can spend
-            return True
-
-        # no spending condition present
         return True
 
     def _verify_output_spending_conditions(
@@ -170,86 +327,7 @@ class LedgerSpendingConditions:
     ) -> bool:
         """
         Verify spending conditions:
-         Condition: P2PK - Witness: output.p2pksigs
+         Condition: P2PK - If sigflag==SIG_ALL in proof.secret, check if outputs contain valid signatures for pubkeys in proof.secret.
         """
 
-        # P2PK
+        return self._verify_output_p2pk_spending_conditions(proofs, outputs)
-        pubkeys_per_proof = []
-        n_sigs = []
-        for proof in proofs:
-            try:
-                secret = P2PKSecret.deserialize(proof.secret)
-                # get all p2pk pubkeys from secrets
-                pubkeys_per_proof.append(secret.get_p2pk_pubkey_from_secret())
-                # get signature threshold from secrets
-                n_sigs.append(secret.n_sigs)
-            except Exception:
-                # secret is not a spending condition so we treat is a normal secret
-                return True
-        # for all proofs all pubkeys must be the same
-        assert (
-            len(set([tuple(pubs_output) for pubs_output in pubkeys_per_proof])) == 1
-        ), "pubkeys in all proofs must match."
-        pubkeys = pubkeys_per_proof[0]
-        if not pubkeys:
-            # no pubkeys present
-            return True
-
-        logger.trace(f"pubkeys: {pubkeys}")
-        # TODO: add limit for maximum number of pubkeys
-
-        # for all proofs all n_sigs must be the same
-        assert len(set(n_sigs)) == 1, "n_sigs in all proofs must match."
-        n_sigs_required = n_sigs[0] or 1
-
-        # first we check if all secrets are P2PK
-        if not all(
-            [Secret.deserialize(p.secret).kind == SecretKind.P2PK for p in proofs]
-        ):
-            # not all secrets are P2PK
-            return True
-
-        # now we check if any of the secrets has sigflag==SIG_ALL
-        if not any(
-            [
-                P2PKSecret.deserialize(p.secret).sigflag == SigFlags.SIG_ALL
-                for p in proofs
-            ]
-        ):
-            # no secret has sigflag==SIG_ALL
-            return True
-
-        # loop over all outputs and check if the signatures are valid for pubkeys with a threshold of n_sig
-        for output in outputs:
-            # we expect the signature to be on the pubkey (=message) itself
-            assert output.p2pksigs, "no signatures in output."
-            # TODO: add limit for maximum number of signatures
-
-            # we check whether any signature is duplicate
-            assert len(set(output.p2pksigs)) == len(
-                output.p2pksigs
-            ), "duplicate signatures in output."
-
-            n_valid_sigs_per_output = 0
-            # loop over all signatures in output
-            for output_sig in output.p2pksigs:
-                for pubkey in pubkeys:
-                    if verify_p2pk_signature(
-                        message=output.B_.encode("utf-8"),
-                        pubkey=PublicKey(bytes.fromhex(pubkey), raw=True),
-                        signature=bytes.fromhex(output_sig),
-                    ):
-                        n_valid_sigs_per_output += 1
-            assert n_valid_sigs_per_output, "no valid signature provided for output."
-            assert n_valid_sigs_per_output >= n_sigs_required, (
-                f"signature threshold not met. {n_valid_sigs_per_output} <"
-                f" {n_sigs_required}."
-            )
-            logger.trace(
-                f"{n_valid_sigs_per_output} of {n_sigs_required} valid signatures"
-                " found."
-            )
-            logger.trace(output.p2pksigs)
-            logger.trace("p2pk signatures on output is valid.")
-
-        return True

cashu/wallet/htlc.py

@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ class WalletHTLC(SupportsDb):
             tags["pubkeys"] = hashlock_pubkey
 
         return HTLCSecret(
-            kind=SecretKind.HTLC,
+            kind=SecretKind.HTLC.value,
             data=preimage_hash,
             tags=tags,
         )

cashu/wallet/p2pk.py

@@ -49,12 +49,14 @@ class WalletP2PK(SupportsPrivateKey, SupportsDb):
             tags["locktime"] = str(
                 int((datetime.now() + timedelta(seconds=locktime_seconds)).timestamp())
             )
-        tags["sigflag"] = SigFlags.SIG_ALL if sig_all else SigFlags.SIG_INPUTS
+        tags["sigflag"] = (
+            SigFlags.SIG_ALL.value if sig_all else SigFlags.SIG_INPUTS.value
+        )
         if n_sigs > 1:
             tags["n_sigs"] = str(n_sigs)
         logger.debug(f"After tags: {tags}")
         return P2PKSecret(
-            kind=SecretKind.P2PK,
+            kind=SecretKind.P2PK.value,
             data=pubkey,
             tags=tags,
         )
@@ -182,7 +184,9 @@ class WalletP2PK(SupportsPrivateKey, SupportsDb):
             return proofs
         logger.debug("Spending conditions detected.")
         # P2PK signatures
-        if all([Secret.deserialize(p.secret).kind == SecretKind.P2PK for p in proofs]):
+        if all(
+            [Secret.deserialize(p.secret).kind == SecretKind.P2PK.value for p in proofs]
+        ):
             logger.debug("P2PK redemption detected.")
             proofs = await self.add_p2pk_witnesses_to_proofs(proofs)
 

tests/test_wallet_htlc.py

@@ -73,7 +73,6 @@ async def test_htlc_split(wallet1: Wallet, wallet2: Wallet):
     preimage = "00000000000000000000000000000000"
     preimage_hash = hashlib.sha256(bytes.fromhex(preimage)).hexdigest()
     secret = await wallet1.create_htlc_lock(preimage=preimage)
-    # p2pk test
     _, send_proofs = await wallet1.split_to_send(wallet1.proofs, 8, secret_lock=secret)
     for p in send_proofs:
         assert HTLCSecret.deserialize(p.secret).data == preimage_hash
@@ -86,7 +85,6 @@ async def test_htlc_redeem_with_preimage(wallet1: Wallet, wallet2: Wallet):
     preimage = "00000000000000000000000000000000"
     # preimage_hash = hashlib.sha256(bytes.fromhex(preimage)).hexdigest()
     secret = await wallet1.create_htlc_lock(preimage=preimage)
-    # p2pk test
     _, send_proofs = await wallet1.split_to_send(wallet1.proofs, 8, secret_lock=secret)
     for p in send_proofs:
         p.witness = HTLCWitness(preimage=preimage).json()
@@ -102,7 +100,6 @@ async def test_htlc_redeem_with_wrong_preimage(wallet1: Wallet, wallet2: Wallet)
     secret = await wallet1.create_htlc_lock(
         preimage=preimage[:-5] + "11111"
     )  # wrong preimage
-    # p2pk test
     _, send_proofs = await wallet1.split_to_send(wallet1.proofs, 8, secret_lock=secret)
     for p in send_proofs:
         p.witness = HTLCWitness(preimage=preimage).json()
@@ -121,7 +118,6 @@ async def test_htlc_redeem_with_no_signature(wallet1: Wallet, wallet2: Wallet):
     secret = await wallet1.create_htlc_lock(
         preimage=preimage, hashlock_pubkey=pubkey_wallet1
     )
-    # p2pk test
     _, send_proofs = await wallet1.split_to_send(wallet1.proofs, 8, secret_lock=secret)
     for p in send_proofs:
         p.witness = HTLCWitness(preimage=preimage).json()
@@ -141,8 +137,6 @@ async def test_htlc_redeem_with_wrong_signature(wallet1: Wallet, wallet2: Wallet
     secret = await wallet1.create_htlc_lock(
         preimage=preimage, hashlock_pubkey=pubkey_wallet1
     )
-
-    # p2pk test
     _, send_proofs = await wallet1.split_to_send(wallet1.proofs, 8, secret_lock=secret)
     signatures = await wallet1.sign_p2pk_proofs(send_proofs)
     for p, s in zip(send_proofs, signatures):
@@ -166,7 +160,6 @@ async def test_htlc_redeem_with_correct_signature(wallet1: Wallet, wallet2: Wall
     secret = await wallet1.create_htlc_lock(
         preimage=preimage, hashlock_pubkey=pubkey_wallet1
     )
-    # p2pk test
     _, send_proofs = await wallet1.split_to_send(wallet1.proofs, 8, secret_lock=secret)
 
     signatures = await wallet1.sign_p2pk_proofs(send_proofs)
@@ -192,7 +185,6 @@ async def test_htlc_redeem_hashlock_wrong_signature_timelock_correct_signature(
         locktime_seconds=5,
         locktime_pubkey=pubkey_wallet1,
     )
-    # p2pk test
     _, send_proofs = await wallet1.split_to_send(wallet1.proofs, 8, secret_lock=secret)
 
     signatures = await wallet1.sign_p2pk_proofs(send_proofs)
@@ -226,7 +218,6 @@ async def test_htlc_redeem_hashlock_wrong_signature_timelock_wrong_signature(
         locktime_seconds=5,
         locktime_pubkey=pubkey_wallet1,
     )
-    # p2pk test
     _, send_proofs = await wallet1.split_to_send(wallet1.proofs, 8, secret_lock=secret)
 
     signatures = await wallet1.sign_p2pk_proofs(send_proofs)