mirror of
https://github.com/0xb100d/manifestos.git
synced 2025-12-17 08:04:20 +01:00
22310 lines
1.0 MiB
22310 lines
1.0 MiB
THE CYPHERNOMICON
|
||
|
||
1. Introduction
|
||
|
||
1.1. copyright
|
||
THE CYPHERNOMICON: Cypherpunks FAQ and More, Version 0.666,
|
||
1994-09-10, Copyright Timothy C. May. All rights reserved.
|
||
See the detailed disclaimer. Use short sections under "fair
|
||
use" provisions, with appropriate credit, but don't put your
|
||
name on my words.
|
||
|
||
1.2. Foreword
|
||
- The Cypherpunks have existed since September, 1992. In that
|
||
time, a vast amount has been written on cryptography, key
|
||
escrow, Clipper, the Net, the Information Superhighway, cyber
|
||
terrorists, and crypto anarchy. We have found ourselves (or
|
||
_placed_ ourselves) at the center of the storm.
|
||
- This FAQ may help to fill in some gaps about what we're
|
||
about, what motivates us, and where we're going. And maybe
|
||
some useful knowledge on crypto, remailers, anonymity,
|
||
digital cash, and other interesting things.
|
||
+ The Basic Issues
|
||
+ Great Divide: privacy vs. compliance with laws
|
||
+ free speech and privacy, even if means some criminals
|
||
cannot be caught (a stand the U.S. Constitution was
|
||
strongly in favor of, at one time)
|
||
- a man's home is his castle...the essence of the Magna
|
||
Carta systems...rights of the individual to be secure
|
||
from random searches
|
||
+ or invasive tactics to catch criminals, regulate
|
||
behavior, and control the population
|
||
- the legitimate needs to enforce laws, to respond to
|
||
situations
|
||
+ this parallels the issue of self-protection vs.
|
||
protection by law and police
|
||
- as seen in the gun debate
|
||
- crypto = guns in the sense of being an individual's
|
||
preemptive protection
|
||
- past the point of no return
|
||
- Strong crypto as building material for a new age
|
||
+ Transnationalism and Increased Degrees of Freedom
|
||
- governments can't hope to control movements and
|
||
communications of citizens; borders are transparent
|
||
+ Not all list members share all views
|
||
- This is not "the Official Cypherpunks FAQ." No such thing
|
||
can exist. This is the FAQ I wanted written. Views
|
||
expressed are my own, with as much input from others, as
|
||
much consensus, as I can manage. If you want a radically
|
||
different FAQ, write it yourself. If you don't like this
|
||
FAQ, don't read it. And tell your friends not to read it.
|
||
But don't bog down my mailbox, or the 500 others on the
|
||
list, with messages about how you would have worded Section
|
||
12.4.7.2 slightly differently, or how Section 6.9.12 does
|
||
not fully reflect your views. For obvious reasons.
|
||
- All FAQs are the products of a primary author, sometimes of
|
||
a committee. For this FAQ, I am the sole author. At least
|
||
of the version you are reading now. Future versions may
|
||
have more input from others, though this makes me nervous
|
||
(I favor new authors writing their own stuff, or using
|
||
hypertext links, rather than taking my basic writing and
|
||
attaching their name to it--it is true that I include the
|
||
quotes of many folks here, but I do so by explicitly
|
||
quoting them in the chunk they wrote....it will be tough
|
||
for later authors to clearly mark what Tim May wrote
|
||
without excessively cluttering the text. The revisionist's
|
||
dilemma.
|
||
- The list has a lot of radical libertarians, some anarcho-
|
||
capitalists, and even a few socialists
|
||
- Mostly computer-related folks, as might be expected. (There
|
||
are some political scientists, classical scholars, etc.
|
||
Even a few current or ex-lawyers.)
|
||
+ Do I Speak for Others?
|
||
- As I said, no. But sometimes I make claims about what
|
||
"most" list members believe, what "many" believe, or what
|
||
"some" believe.
|
||
- "Most" is my best judgment of what the majority believe,
|
||
at least the vocal majority in Cypherpunks discussions
|
||
(at the physical meetings, parties, etc.) and on the
|
||
List. "Many" means fewer, and "some" fewer still. "A few"
|
||
will mean a distinct minority. Note that this is from the
|
||
last 18 months of activity (so don't send in
|
||
clarifications now to try to "sway the vote").
|
||
- In particular, some members may be quite uncomfortable
|
||
being described as anarchists, crypto anarchists, money
|
||
launderers, etc.
|
||
+ My comments won't please everyone
|
||
- on nearly every point ever presented, some have disagreed
|
||
- feuds, battles, flames, idee fixes
|
||
- on issues ranging from gun control to Dolphin Encrypt to
|
||
various pet theories held dearly
|
||
- Someone once made a mundane joke about pseudonyms being
|
||
like multiple personality disorder--and a flame came back
|
||
saying: "That's not funny. I am MPD and my SO is MPD.
|
||
Please stop immediately!"
|
||
- can't be helped....can't present all sides to all arguments
|
||
+ Focus of this FAQ is U.S.-centric, for various reasons
|
||
- most on list are in U.S., and I am in U.S.
|
||
- NSA and crypto community is largely centered in the U.S.,
|
||
with some strong European activities
|
||
- U.S. law is likely to influence overseas law
|
||
+ We are at a fork in the road, a Great Divide
|
||
- Surveillance vs. Freedom
|
||
- nothing in the middle...either strong crypto and privacy is
|
||
strongly limited, or the things I describe here will be
|
||
done by some people....hence the "tipping factor" applies
|
||
(point of no return, horses out of the barn)
|
||
+ I make no claim to speaking "for the group." If you're
|
||
offended, write your own FAQ. My focus on things loosely
|
||
called "crypto anarchy" is just that: my _focus_. This focus
|
||
naturally percolates over into something like this FAQ, just
|
||
as someone primarily interested in the mechanics of PGP would
|
||
devote more space to PGP issues than I have.
|
||
- Gary Jeffers, for example, devotes most of his "CEB" to
|
||
issues surrounding PGP.
|
||
+ Will leave out some of the highly detailed items...
|
||
- Clipper, LEAF, escrow, Denning, etc.
|
||
- a myriad of encryption programs, bulk ciphers, variants on
|
||
PGP, etc. Some of these I've listed...others I've had to
|
||
throw my hands over and just ignore. (Keeping track of
|
||
zillions of versions for dozens of platforms...)
|
||
- easy to get lost in the details, buried in the bullshit
|
||
|
||
1.3. Motivations
|
||
1.3.1. With so much material available, why another FAQ?
|
||
1.3.2. No convenient access to archives of the list....and who could
|
||
read 50 MB of stuff anyway?
|
||
1.3.3. Why not Web? (Mosaic, Http, URL, etc.)
|
||
- Why not a navigable Web document?
|
||
- This is becoming trendy. Lots of URLs are included here, in
|
||
fact. But making all documents into Web documents has
|
||
downsides.
|
||
+ Reasons why not:
|
||
- No easy access for me.
|
||
- Many others also lack access. Text still rules.
|
||
- Not at all clear that a collection of hundreds of
|
||
fragments is useful
|
||
- I like the structured editors available on my Mac
|
||
(specifically, MORE, an outline editor)
|
||
-
|
||
1.3.4. What the Essential Points Are
|
||
- It's easy to lose track of what the core issues are, what
|
||
the really important points are. In a FAQ like this, a vast
|
||
amount of "cruft" is presented, that is, a vast amount of
|
||
miscellaneous, tangential, and epiphenomenal material.
|
||
Names of PGP versions, variants on steganograhy, and other
|
||
such stuff, all of which will change over the next few
|
||
months and years.
|
||
+ And yet that's partly what a FAQ is for. The key is just
|
||
not to lose track of the key ideas. I've mentioned what I
|
||
think are the important ideas many times. To wit:
|
||
- that many approaches to crypto exist
|
||
- that governments essentially cannot stop most of these
|
||
approaches, short of establishing a police state (and
|
||
probably not even then)
|
||
- core issues of identity, authentication, pseudonyms,
|
||
reputations, etc.
|
||
|
||
1.4. Who Should Read This
|
||
1.4.1. "Should I read this?"
|
||
- Yes, reading this will point you toward other sources of
|
||
information, will answer the most commonly asked questions,
|
||
and will (hopefully) head off the reappearance of the same
|
||
tired themes every few months.
|
||
- Use a search tool if you have one. Grep for the things that
|
||
interest you, etc. The granularity of this FAQ does not
|
||
lend itself to Web conversion, at least not with present
|
||
tools.
|
||
+ What _Won't_ Be Covered Here
|
||
+ basic cryptography
|
||
+ many good texts, FAQs, etc., written by full-time
|
||
cryptologists and educators
|
||
- in particular, some of the ideas are not simple, and
|
||
take several pages of well-written text to get the
|
||
point across
|
||
- not the focus of this FAQ
|
||
- basic political rants
|
||
|
||
1.5. Comments on Style and Thoroughness
|
||
1.5.1. "Why is this FAQ not in Mosaic form?"
|
||
- because the author (tcmay, as of 7/94) does not have Mosaic
|
||
access, and even if did, would not necessarily....
|
||
- linear text is still fine for some things...can be read on
|
||
all platforms, can be printed out, and can be searched with
|
||
standard grep and similar tools
|
||
1.5.2. "Why the mix of styles?"
|
||
+ There are three main types of styles here:
|
||
- Standard prose sections, explaining some point or listing
|
||
things. Mini-essays, like most posts to Cypherpunks.
|
||
+ Short, outline-style comments
|
||
- that I didn't have time or willpower to expand into
|
||
prose format
|
||
- that work best in outline format anyway
|
||
- like this
|
||
+ Quotes from others
|
||
- Cypherpunks are a bright group. A lot of clever things
|
||
have been said in the 600 days x 40 posts/day = 24,000
|
||
posts, and I am trying to use what I can.
|
||
+ Sadly, only a tiny fraction can be used
|
||
- because I simply cannot _read_ even a fraction of
|
||
these posts over again (though I've only saved
|
||
several thousand of the posts)
|
||
- and because including too many of these posts would
|
||
simply make the FAQ too long (it's still too long, I
|
||
suppose)
|
||
- I hope you can handle the changes in tone of voice, in
|
||
styles, and even in formats. It'll just too much time to
|
||
make it all read uniformly.
|
||
1.5.3. Despite the length of this thing, a vast amount of stuff is
|
||
missing. There have been hundreds of incisive analyses by
|
||
Cypherpunks, dozens of survey articles on Clipper, and
|
||
thousands of clever remarks. Alas, only a few of them here.
|
||
- And with 25 or more books on the Internet, hundreds of FAQs
|
||
and URLs, it's clear that we're all drowning in a sea of
|
||
information about the Net.
|
||
- Ironically, good old-fashioned books have a lot more
|
||
relevant and timeless information.
|
||
1.5.4. Caveats on the completeness or accuracy of this FAQ
|
||
+ not all points are fully fleshed out...the outline nature
|
||
means that nearly all points could be further added-to,
|
||
subdivided, taxonomized, and generally fleshed-out with
|
||
more points, counterpoints, examples
|
||
- like a giant tree...branches, leaves, tangled hierarchies
|
||
+ It is inevitable that conflicting points will be made in a
|
||
document of this size
|
||
- views change, but don't get corrected in all places
|
||
- different contexts lead to different viewpoints
|
||
- simple failure by me to be fully consistent
|
||
- and many points raised here would, if put into an essay
|
||
for the Cypherpunks list, generate comments, rebuttals,
|
||
debate, and even acrimony....I cannot expect to have all
|
||
sides represented fully, especially as the issues are
|
||
often murky, unresolved, in dispute, and generally
|
||
controversial
|
||
- inconsistencies in the points here in this FAQ
|
||
|
||
1.6. Corrections and Elaborations
|
||
+ "How to handle corrections or clarifications?"
|
||
- While I have done my best to ensure accuracy, errors will
|
||
no doubt exist. And as anyone can see from reading the
|
||
Cypherpunks list, nearly *any* statement made about any
|
||
subject can produce a flurry of rebuttals, caveats,
|
||
expansions, and whatnot. Some subjects, such as the nature
|
||
of money, the role of Cypherpunks, and the role of
|
||
reputations, produce dozens of differing opinions every
|
||
time they come up!
|
||
- So, it is not likely that my points here will be any
|
||
different. Fortunately, the sheer number of points here
|
||
means that not every one of them will be disagreed with.
|
||
But the math is pretty clear: if every reader finds even
|
||
one thing to disagree with and then posts his rebuttal or
|
||
elaboration....disaster! (Especially if some people can't
|
||
trim quotes properly and end up including a big chunk of
|
||
text.)
|
||
+ Recommendations
|
||
- Send corrections of _fact_ to me
|
||
- If you disagree with my opinion, and you think you can
|
||
change my mind, or cause me to include your opinion as an
|
||
elaboration or as a dissenting view, then send it. If
|
||
your point requires long debate or is a deep
|
||
disagreement, then I doubt I have the time or energy to
|
||
debate. If you want your views heard, write your own FAQ!
|
||
- Ultimately, send what you want. But I of course will
|
||
evaluate comments and apply a reputation-based filter to
|
||
the traffic. Those who send me concise, well-reasoned
|
||
corrections or clarifications are likelier to be listened
|
||
to than those who barrage me with minor clarifications
|
||
and elaborations.
|
||
- In short, this is not a group project. The "stone soup
|
||
FAQ" is not what this is.
|
||
+ More information
|
||
- Please don't send me e-mail asking for more information
|
||
on a particular topic--I just can't handle custom
|
||
research. This FAQ is long enough, and the Glossary at
|
||
the end contains additional information, so that I cannot
|
||
expand upon these topics (unless there is a general
|
||
debate on the list). In other words, don't assume this
|
||
FAQ is an entry point into a larger data base I will
|
||
generate. I hate to sound so blunt, but I've seen the
|
||
requests that come in every time I write a fairly long
|
||
article.
|
||
+ Tips on feedback
|
||
- Comments about writing style, of the form "I would have
|
||
written it _this_ way," are especially unwelcome.
|
||
+ Credit issues
|
||
- inevitable that omissions or collisions will occur
|
||
- ideas have many fathers
|
||
- some ideas have been "in the air" for many years
|
||
+ slogans are especially problematic
|
||
- "They can have my...."...I credit Barlow with this, but
|
||
I've heard others use it independently (I think; at least
|
||
I used it before hearing Barlow used it)
|
||
- "If crypto is outlawed, only outlaws will have crypto"
|
||
- "Big Brother Inside"
|
||
- if something really bothers you, send me a note
|
||
|
||
1.7. Acknowledgements
|
||
1.7.1. Acknowledgements
|
||
- My chief thanks go to the several hundred active
|
||
Cypherpunks posters, past and present.
|
||
- All rights reserved. Copyright Timothy C. May. Don't try to
|
||
sell this or incorporate it into anything that is sold.
|
||
Quoting brief sections is "fair use"...quoting long
|
||
sections is not.
|
||
|
||
1.8. Ideas and Notes (not to be printed)
|
||
1.8.1. Graphics for cover
|
||
- two blocks...plaintext to cryptotext
|
||
- Cypherpunks FAQ
|
||
- compiled by Timothy C. May, tcmay@netcom.com
|
||
- with help from many Cypherpunks
|
||
- with material from other sources
|
||
- <credited in angle brackets>
|
||
1.8.2. "So don't ask"
|
||
|
||
1.9. Things are moving quickly in crypto and crypto policy
|
||
1.9.1. hard to keep this FAQ current, as info changes
|
||
1.9.2. PGP in state of flux
|
||
1.9.3. new versions of tools coming constantly
|
||
1.9.4. And the whole Clipper thing has been turned on its head
|
||
recently by the Administration's backing off...lots of points
|
||
already made here are now rendered moot and are primarily of
|
||
historical interest only.
|
||
- Gore's letter to Cantwell
|
||
- Whit Diffie described a conference on key escrow systems in
|
||
Karlsruhe, Germany, which seemed to contain new ideas
|
||
- TIS? (can't use this info?)
|
||
|
||
1.10. Notes: The Cyphernomicon: the CypherFAQ and More
|
||
1.10.1. 2.3.1. "The Book of Encyphered Names"
|
||
- Ibn al-Taz Khallikak, the Pine Barrens Horror.
|
||
- Liber Grimoiris....Cifur???
|
||
- spreading from the Sumerian sands, through the gate of
|
||
Ishtar, to the back alleys of Damascus, tempered with the
|
||
blood of Westerners
|
||
- Keys of Solomon, Kool John Dee and the Rapping Cryps Gone
|
||
to Croatan
|
||
- Peter Krypotkin, the Russian crypto anarchist
|
||
- Twenty-nine Primes, California
|
||
1.10.2. 2.3.2. THE CYPHERNOMICON: a Cypherpunk FAQ and More---
|
||
Version 0.666
|
||
1.10.3. 1994-09-01, Copyright Timothy C. May, tcmay@netcom.com
|
||
1.10.4.
|
||
- Written and compiled by Tim May, except as noted by
|
||
credits. (Influenced by years of good posts on the
|
||
Cypherpunks list.) Permission is granted to post and
|
||
distribute this document in an unaltered and complete
|
||
state, for non-profit and educational purposes only.
|
||
Reasonable quoting under "fair use" provisions is
|
||
permitted. See the detailed disclaimer of responsibilities
|
||
and liabilities in the Introduction chapter.
|
||
|
||
2. MFAQ--Most Frequently Asked Questions
|
||
|
||
2.1. copyright
|
||
THE CYPHERNOMICON: Cypherpunks FAQ and More, Version 0.666,
|
||
1994-09-10, Copyright Timothy C. May. All rights reserved.
|
||
See the detailed disclaimer. Use short sections under "fair
|
||
use" provisions, with appropriate credit, but don't put your
|
||
name on my words.
|
||
|
||
2.2. SUMMARY: MFAQ--Most Frequently Asked Questions
|
||
2.2.1. Main Points
|
||
- These are the main questions that keep coming up. Not
|
||
necessarily the most basic question, just the ones that get
|
||
asked a lot. What most FAQs are.
|
||
2.2.2. Connections to Other Sections
|
||
2.2.3. Where to Find Additional Information
|
||
- newcomers to crypto should buy Bruce Schneier's "Applied
|
||
Cryptography"...it will save many hours worth of
|
||
unnecessary questions and clueless remarks about
|
||
cryptography.
|
||
- the various FAQs publishe in the newsroups (like sci.crypt,
|
||
alt.security.pgp) are very helpful. (also at rtfm.mit.edu)
|
||
2.2.4. Miscellaneous Comments
|
||
- I wasn't sure what to include here in the MFAQ--perhaps
|
||
people can make suggestions of other things to include.
|
||
- My advice is that if something interests you, use your
|
||
editing/searching tools to find the same topic in the main
|
||
section. Usually (but not always) there's more material in
|
||
the main chapters than here in the MFAQ.
|
||
|
||
2.3. "What's the 'Big Picture'?"
|
||
2.3.1. Strong crypto is here. It is widely available.
|
||
2.3.2. It implies many changes in the way the world works. Private
|
||
channels between parties who have never met and who never
|
||
will meet are possible. Totally anonymous, unlinkable,
|
||
untraceable communications and exchanges are possible.
|
||
2.3.3. Transactions can only be *voluntary*, since the parties are
|
||
untraceable and unknown and can withdraw at any time. This
|
||
has profound implications for the conventional approach of
|
||
using the threat of force, directed against parties by
|
||
governments or by others. In particular, threats of force
|
||
will fail.
|
||
2.3.4. What emerges from this is unclear, but I think it will be a
|
||
form of anarcho-capitalist market system I call "crypto
|
||
anarchy." (Voluntary communications only, with no third
|
||
parties butting in.)
|
||
|
||
2.4. Organizational
|
||
2.4.1. "How do I get on--and off--the Cypherpunks list?"
|
||
- Send a message to "cypherpunks-request@toad.com"
|
||
- Any auto-processed commands?
|
||
- don't send requests to the list as a whole....this will
|
||
mark you as "clueless"
|
||
2.4.2. "Why does the Cypherpunks list sometimes go down, or lose the
|
||
subscription list?"
|
||
- The host machine, toad.com, owned by John Gilmore, has had
|
||
the usual problems such machines have: overloading,
|
||
shortages of disk space, software upgrades, etc. Hugh
|
||
Daniel has done an admirable job of keeping it in good
|
||
shape, but problems do occur.
|
||
- Think of it as warning that lists and communication systems
|
||
remain somewhat fragile....a lesson for what is needed to
|
||
make digital money more robust and trustable.
|
||
- There is no paid staff, no hardware budget for
|
||
improvements. The work done is strictly voluntarily.
|
||
2.4.3. "If I've just joined the Cypherpunks list, what should I do?"
|
||
- Read for a while. Things will become clearer, themes will
|
||
emerge, and certain questions will be answered. This is
|
||
good advice for any group or list, and is especially so for
|
||
a list with 500 or more people on it. (We hit 700+ at one
|
||
point, then a couple of list outages knocked the number
|
||
down a bit.)
|
||
- Read the references mentioned here, if you can. The
|
||
sci.crypt FAQ should be read. And purchase Bruce Schneier's
|
||
"Applied Cryptography" the first chance you get.
|
||
- Join in on things that interest you, but don't make a fool
|
||
of yourself. Reputations matter, and you may come to regret
|
||
having come across as a tedious fool in your first weeks on
|
||
the list. (If you're a tedious fool after the first few
|
||
weeks, that may just be your nature, of course.)
|
||
- Avoid ranting and raving on unrelated topics, such as
|
||
abortion (pro or con), guns (pro or con), etc. The usual
|
||
topics that usually generate a lot of heat and not much
|
||
light. (Yes, most of us have strong views on these and
|
||
other topics, and, yes, we sometimes let our views creep
|
||
into discussions. There's no denying that certain
|
||
resonances exist. I'm just urging caution.)
|
||
2.4.4. "I'm swamped by the list volume; what can I do?"
|
||
- This is a natural reaction. Nobody can follow it all; I
|
||
spend entirely too many hours a day reading the list, and I
|
||
certainly can't follow it all. Pick areas of expertise and
|
||
then follow them and ignore the rest. After all, not seeing
|
||
things on the list can be no worse than not even being
|
||
subscribed to the list!
|
||
- Hit the "delete" key quickly
|
||
- find someone who will digest it for you (Eric Hughes has
|
||
repeatedly said anyone can retransmit the list this way;
|
||
Hal Finney has offered an encrypted list)
|
||
+ Better mailers may help. Some people have used mail-to-news
|
||
systems and then read the list as a local newsgroup, with
|
||
threads.
|
||
- I have Eudora, which supports off-line reading and
|
||
sorting features, but I generally end up reading with an
|
||
online mail program (elm).
|
||
- The mailing list may someday be switched over to a
|
||
newsgroup, a la "alt.cypherpunks." (This may affect some
|
||
people whose sites do not carry alt groups.)
|
||
2.4.5. "It's very easy to get lost in the morass of detail here. Are
|
||
there any ways to track what's *really* important?"
|
||
- First, a lot of the stuff posted in the Usenet newsgroups,
|
||
and on the Cypherpunks list, is peripheral stuff,
|
||
epiphenomenal cruft that will blow away in the first strong
|
||
breeze. Grungy details about PGP shells, about RSA
|
||
encryption speeds, about NSA supercomputers. There's just
|
||
no reason for people to worry about "weak IDEA keys" when
|
||
so many more pressing matters exist. (Let the experts
|
||
worry.) Little of this makes any real difference, just as
|
||
little of the stuff in daily newspapers is memorable or
|
||
deserves to be memorable.
|
||
- Second, "read the sources." Read "1984," "The Shockwave
|
||
Rider," "Atlas Shrugged," "True Names." Read the Chaum
|
||
article on making Big Brother obsolete (October 1985,
|
||
"Communications of the ACM").
|
||
- Third, don't lose sight of the core values: privacy,
|
||
technological solutions over legal solutions, avoiding
|
||
taxation, bypassing laws, etc. (Not everyone will agree
|
||
with all of these points.)
|
||
- Fourth, don't drown in the detail. Pick some areas of
|
||
interest and follow _them_. You may not need to know the
|
||
inner workings of DES or all the switches on PGP to make
|
||
contributions in other areas. (In fact, you surely don't.)
|
||
2.4.6. "Who are the Cypherpunks?"
|
||
- A mix of about 500-700
|
||
+ Can find out who by sending message to majordomo@toad.com
|
||
with the message body text "who cypherpunks" (no quotes, of
|
||
course).
|
||
- Is this a privacy flaw? Maybe.
|
||
- Lots of students (they have the time, the Internet
|
||
accounts). Lots of computer science/programming folks. Lots
|
||
of libertarians.
|
||
- quote from Wired article, and from "Whole Earth Review"
|
||
2.4.7. "Who runs the Cypherpunks?"
|
||
- Nobody. There's no formal "leadership." No ruler = no head
|
||
= an arch = anarchy. (Look up the etymology of anarchy.)
|
||
- However, the mailing list currently resides on a physical
|
||
machine, and this machine creates some nexus of control,
|
||
much like having a party at someon'e house. The list
|
||
administrator is currently Eric Hughes (and has been since
|
||
the beginning). He is helped by Hugh Daniel, who often does
|
||
maintenance of the toad.com, and by John Gilmore, who owns
|
||
the toad.com machine and account.
|
||
- In an extreme situation of abuse or neverending ranting,
|
||
these folks could kick someone off the list and block them
|
||
from resubscribing via majordomo. (I presume they could--
|
||
it's never happened.)
|
||
- To emphasize: nobody's ever been kicked off the list, so
|
||
far as I know. Not even Detweiler...he asked to be removed
|
||
(when the list subscribes were done manually).
|
||
- As to who sets policy, there is no policy! No charter, no
|
||
agenda, no action items. Just what people want to work on
|
||
themselves. Which is all that can be expected. (Some people
|
||
get frustrated at this lack of consensus, and they
|
||
sometimes start flaming and ranting about "Cypherpunks
|
||
never do anything," but this lack of consensus is to be
|
||
expected. Nobody's being paid, nobody's got hiring and
|
||
firing authority, so any work that gets done has to be
|
||
voluntary. Some volunteer groups are more organized than we
|
||
are, but there are other factors that make this more
|
||
possible for them than it is for us. C'est la vie.)
|
||
- Those who get heard on the mailing list, or in the physical
|
||
meetings, are those who write articles that people find
|
||
interesting or who say things of note. Sounds fair to me.
|
||
2.4.8. "Why don't the issues that interest me get discussed?"
|
||
- Maybe they already have been--several times. Many newcomers
|
||
are often chagrined to find arcane topics being discussed,
|
||
with little discussion of "the basics."
|
||
- This is hardly surprising....people get over the "basics"
|
||
after a few months and want to move on to more exciting (to
|
||
them) topics. All lists are like this.
|
||
- In any case, after you've read the list for a while--maybe
|
||
several weeks--go ahead and ask away. Making your topic
|
||
fresher may generate more responses than, say, asking
|
||
what's wrong with Clipper. (A truly overworked topic,
|
||
naturally.)
|
||
2.4.9. "How did the Cypherpunks group get started?"
|
||
2.4.10. "Where did the name 'Cypherpunks' come from?"
|
||
+ Jude Milhon, aka St. Jude, then an editor at "Mondo 2000,"
|
||
was at the earliest meetings...she quipped "You guys are
|
||
just a bunch of cypherpunks." The name was adopted
|
||
immediately.
|
||
- The 'cyberpunk' genre of science fiction often deals with
|
||
issues of cyberspace and computer security ("ice"), so
|
||
the link is natural. A point of confusion is that
|
||
cyberpunks are popularly thought of as, well, as "punks,"
|
||
while many Cyberpunks are frequently libertarians and
|
||
anarchists of various stripes. In my view, the two are
|
||
not in conflict.
|
||
- Some, however, would prefer a more staid name. The U.K.
|
||
branch calls itself the "U.K. Crypto Privacy
|
||
Association." <check this> However, the advantages of the
|
||
name are clear. For one thing, many people are bored by
|
||
staid names. For another, it gets us noticed by
|
||
journalists and others.
|
||
-
|
||
- We are actually not very "punkish" at all. About as punkish
|
||
as most of our cyberpunk cousins are, which is to say, not
|
||
very.
|
||
+ the name
|
||
- Crypto Cabal (this before the sci.crypt FAQ folks
|
||
appeared, I think), Crypto Liberation Front, other names
|
||
- not everybody likes the name...such is life
|
||
2.4.11. "Why doesn't the Cypherpunks group have announced goals,
|
||
ideologies, and plans?"
|
||
- The short answer: we're just a mailing list, a loose
|
||
association of folks interested in similar things
|
||
- no budget, no voting, no leadership (except the "leadership
|
||
of the soapbox")
|
||
- How could such a consensus emerge? The usual approach is
|
||
for an elected group (or a group that seized power) to
|
||
write the charter and goals, to push their agenda. Such is
|
||
not the case here.
|
||
- Is this FAQ a de facto statement of goals? Not if I can
|
||
help it, to be honest. Several people before me planned
|
||
some sort of FAQ, and had they completed them, I certainly
|
||
would not have felt they were speaking for me or for the
|
||
group. To be consistent, then, I cannot have others think
|
||
this way about _this_ FAQ!
|
||
2.4.12. "What have the Cypherpunks actually done?"
|
||
- spread of crypto: Cypherpunks have helped
|
||
(PGP)...publicity, an alternative forum to sci.crypt (in
|
||
many ways, better...better S/N ratio, more polite)
|
||
- Wired, Whole Earth Review, NY Times, articles
|
||
- remailers, encrypted remailers
|
||
+ The Cypherpunk- and Julf/Kleinpaste-style remailers were
|
||
both written very quickly, in just days
|
||
- Eric Hughes wrote the first Cypherpunks remailer in a
|
||
weekend, and he spent the first day of that weekend
|
||
learning enough Perl to do the job.
|
||
+ Karl Kleinpaste wrote the code that eventually turned
|
||
into Julf's remailer (added to since, of course) in a
|
||
similarly short time:
|
||
- "My original anon server, for godiva.nectar.cs.cmu.edu
|
||
2 years ago, was written in a few hours one bored
|
||
afternoon. It
|
||
wasn't as featureful as it ended up being, but it was
|
||
"complete" for
|
||
its initial goals, and bug-free."
|
||
[Karl_Kleinpaste@cs.cmu.edu, alt.privacy.anon-server,
|
||
1994-09-01]
|
||
- That other interesting ideas, such as digital cash, have
|
||
not yet really emerged and gained use even after years of
|
||
active discussion, is an interesting contrast to this
|
||
rapid deployment of remailers. (The text-based nature of
|
||
both straight encryption/signing and of remailing is
|
||
semantically simpler to understand and then use than are
|
||
things like digital cash, DC-nets, and other crypto
|
||
protocols.)
|
||
- ideas for Perl scripts, mail handlers
|
||
- general discussion, with folks of several political
|
||
persuasions
|
||
- concepts: pools, Information Liberation Front, BlackNet
|
||
-
|
||
2.4.13. "How Can I Learn About Crypto and Cypherpunks Info?"
|
||
2.4.14. "Why is there sometimes disdain for the enthusiasm and
|
||
proposals of newcomers?"
|
||
- None of us is perfect, so we sometimes are impatient with
|
||
newcomers. Also, the comments seen tend to be issues of
|
||
disagreement--as in all lists and newsgroups (agreement is
|
||
so boring).
|
||
- But many newcomers also have failed to do the basic reading
|
||
that many of us did literally _years_ before joining this
|
||
list. Cryptology is a fairly technical subject, and one can
|
||
no more jump in and expect to be taken seriously without
|
||
any preparation than in any other technical field.
|
||
- Finally, many of us have answered the questions of
|
||
newcomers too many times to be enthusiastic about it
|
||
anymore. Familiarity breeds contempt.
|
||
+ Newcomers should try to be patient about our impatience.
|
||
Sometimes recasting the question generates interest.
|
||
Freshness matters. Often, making an incisive comment,
|
||
instead of just asking a basic question, can generate
|
||
responses. (Just like in real life.)
|
||
- "Clipper sux!" won't generate much response.
|
||
2.4.15. "Should I join the Cypherpunks mailing list?"
|
||
- If you are reading this, of course, you are most likely on
|
||
the Cypherpunks list already and this point is moot--you
|
||
may instead be asking if you should_leave_ the List!
|
||
- Only if you are prepared to handle 30-60 messages a day,
|
||
with volumes fluctuating wildly
|
||
2.4.16. "Why isn't the Cypherpunks list encrypted? Don't you believe
|
||
in encryption?"
|
||
- what's the point, for a publically-subscribable list?
|
||
- except to make people jump through hoops, to put a large
|
||
burden on toad (unless everybody was given the same key, so
|
||
that just one encryption could be done...which underscores
|
||
the foolishness)
|
||
+ there have been proposals, mainly as a stick to force
|
||
people to start using encryption...and to get the encrypted
|
||
traffic boosted
|
||
- involving delays for those who choose not or can't use
|
||
crypto (students on terminals, foreigners in countries
|
||
which have banned crypto, corporate subscribers....)
|
||
2.4.17. "What does "Cypherpunks write code' mean?"
|
||
- a clarifying statement, not an imperative
|
||
- technology and concrete solutions over bickering and
|
||
chatter
|
||
- if you don't write code, fine. Not everyone does (in fact,
|
||
probably less than 10% of the list writes serious code, and
|
||
less than 5% writes crypto or security software
|
||
2.4.18. "What does 'Big Brother Inside' Mean?"
|
||
- devised by yours truly (tcmay) at Clipper meeting
|
||
- Matt Thomlinson, Postscript
|
||
- printed by ....
|
||
2.4.19. "I Have a New Idea for a Cipher---Should I Discuss it Here?"
|
||
- Please don't. Ciphers require careful analysis, and should
|
||
be in paper form (that is, presented in a detailed paper,
|
||
with the necessary references to show that due diligence
|
||
was done, the equations, tables, etc. The Net is a poor
|
||
substitute.
|
||
- Also, breaking a randomly presented cipher is by no means
|
||
trivial, even if the cipher is eventually shown to be weak.
|
||
Most people don't have the inclination to try to break a
|
||
cipher unless there's some incentive, such as fame or money
|
||
involved.
|
||
- And new ciphers are notoriously hard to design. Experts are
|
||
the best folks to do this. With all the stuff waiting to be
|
||
done (described here), working on a new cipher is probably
|
||
the least effective thing an amateur can do. (If you are
|
||
not an amateur, and have broken other people's ciphers
|
||
before, then you know who you are, and these comments don't
|
||
apply. But I'll guess that fewer than a handful of folks on
|
||
this list have the necessary background to do cipher
|
||
design.)
|
||
- There are a vast number of ciphers and systems, nearly all
|
||
of no lasting significance. Untested, undocumented, unused-
|
||
-and probably unworthy of any real attention. Don't add to
|
||
the noise.
|
||
2.4.20. Are all the Cypherpunks libertarians?
|
||
2.4.21. "What can we do?"
|
||
- Deploy strong crypto, to ensure the genie cannot be put in
|
||
the bottle
|
||
- Educate, lobby, discuss
|
||
- Spread doubt, scorn..help make government programs look
|
||
foolish
|
||
- Sabotage, undermine, monkeywrench
|
||
- Pursue other activities
|
||
2.4.22. "Why is the list unmoderated? Why is there no filtering of
|
||
disrupters like Detweiler?"
|
||
- technology over law
|
||
- each person makes their own choice
|
||
- also, no time for moderation, and moderation is usually
|
||
stultifying
|
||
+ anyone who wishes to have some views silenced, or some
|
||
posters blocked, is advised to:
|
||
- contract with someone to be their Personal Censor,
|
||
passing on to them only approved material
|
||
- subscribe to a filtering service, such as Ray and Harry
|
||
are providing
|
||
2.4.23. "What Can I Do?"
|
||
- politics, spreading the word
|
||
- writing code ("Cypherpunks write code")
|
||
2.4.24. "Should I publicize my new crypto program?"
|
||
- "I have designed a crypting program, that I think is
|
||
unbreakable. I challenge anyone who is interested to get
|
||
in touch with me, and decrypt an encrypted massage."
|
||
|
||
"With highest regards,
|
||
Babak Sehari." [Babak Sehari, sci.crypt, 6-19-94]
|
||
|
||
2.4.25. "Ask Emily Post Crypt"
|
||
+ my variation on "Ask Emily Postnews"
|
||
- for those that don't know, a scathing critique of
|
||
clueless postings
|
||
+ "I just invented a new cipher. Here's a sample. Bet you
|
||
can't break it!"
|
||
- By all means post your encrypted junk. We who have
|
||
nothing better to do with our time than respond will be
|
||
more than happy to spend hours running your stuff through
|
||
our codebreaking Crays!
|
||
- Be sure to include a sample of encrypted text, to make
|
||
yourself appear even more clueless.
|
||
+ "I have a cypher I just invented...where should I post it?"
|
||
+ "One of the very most basic errors of making ciphers is
|
||
simply to add
|
||
- layer upon layer of obfuscation and make a cipher which
|
||
is nice and
|
||
- "complex". Read Knuth on making random number
|
||
generators for the
|
||
- folly in this kind of approach. " <Eric Hughes, 4-17-
|
||
94, Cypherpunks>
|
||
+ "Ciphers carry the presumption of guilt, not innocence.
|
||
Ciphers
|
||
- designed by amateurs invariably fail under scrutiny by
|
||
experts. This
|
||
- sociological fact (well borne out) is where the
|
||
presumption of
|
||
- insecurity arises. This is not ignorance, to assume
|
||
that this will
|
||
- change. The burden of proof is on the claimer of
|
||
security, not upon
|
||
- the codebreaker. <Eric Hughes, 4-17-94, Cypherpunks>
|
||
+ "I've just gotten very upset at something--should I vent my
|
||
anger on the mailing list?"
|
||
- By all means! If you're fed up doing your taxes, or just
|
||
read something in the newspaper that really angered you,
|
||
definitely send an angry message out to the 700 or so
|
||
readers and help make _them_ angry!
|
||
- Find a bogus link to crypto or privacy issues to make it
|
||
seem more relevant.
|
||
2.4.26. "What are some main Cypherpunks projects?"
|
||
+ remailers
|
||
+ better remailers, more advanced features
|
||
- digital postage
|
||
- padding, batching/latency
|
||
- agent features
|
||
- more of them
|
||
- offshore (10 sites in 5 countries, as a minimum)
|
||
- tools, services
|
||
- digital cash in better forms
|
||
-
|
||
2.4.27. "What about sublists, to reduce the volume on the main list."
|
||
- There are already half a dozen sub-lists, devoted to
|
||
planning meetings, to building hardware, and to exploring
|
||
DC-Nets. There's one for remailer operators, or there used
|
||
to be. There are also lists devoted to similar topics as
|
||
Cypherpunks, including Robin Hanson's "AltInst" list
|
||
(Alternative Institutions), Nick Szabo's "libtech-l" list,
|
||
the "IMP-Interest" (Internet Mercantile Protocols) list,
|
||
and so on. Most are very low volume.
|
||
+ That few folks have heard of any of them, and that traffic
|
||
volumes are extremely low, or zero, is not all that
|
||
surprising, and matches experiences elsewhere. Several
|
||
reasons:
|
||
- Sublists are a bother to remember; most people forget
|
||
they exist, and don't think to post to them. (This
|
||
"forgetting" is one of the most interesting aspects of
|
||
cyberspace; successful lists seem to be Schelling points
|
||
that accrete even more members, while unsuccessful lists
|
||
fade away into nothingness.)
|
||
- There's a natural desire to see one's words in the larger
|
||
of two forums, so people tend to post to the main list.
|
||
- The sublists were sometimes formed in a burst of
|
||
exuberance over some topic, which then faded.
|
||
- Topics often span several subinterest areas, so posting
|
||
to the main list is better than copying all the relevant
|
||
sublists.
|
||
- In any case, the Cypherpunks main list is "it," for now,
|
||
and has driven other lists effectively out of business. A
|
||
kind of Gresham's Law.
|
||
|
||
2.5. Crypto
|
||
2.5.1. "Why is crypto so important?"
|
||
+ The three elements that are central to our modern view of
|
||
liberty and privacy (a la Diffie)
|
||
- protecting things against theft
|
||
- proving who we say we are
|
||
- expecting privacy in our conversations and writings
|
||
- Although there is no explicit "right of privacy" enumerated
|
||
in the U.S. Constitution, the assumption that an individual
|
||
is to be secure in his papers, home, etc., absent a valid
|
||
warrant, is central. (There has never been a ruling or law
|
||
that persons have to speak in a language that is
|
||
understandable by eavesdroppers, wiretappers, etc., nor has
|
||
there ever been a rule banning private use of encrption. I
|
||
mention this to remind readers of the long history of
|
||
crypto freedom.)
|
||
- "Information, technology and control of both _is_ power.
|
||
*Anonymous* telecommunications has the potential to be the
|
||
greatest equalizer in history. Bringing this power to as
|
||
many as possible will forever change the discourse of power
|
||
in this country (and the world)." [Matthew J Miszewski, ACT
|
||
NOW!, 1993-03-06]
|
||
2.5.2. "Who uses cryptography?"
|
||
- Everybody, in one form or another. We see crypto all around
|
||
us...the keys in our pockets, the signatures on our
|
||
driver's licenses and other cards, the photo IDs, the
|
||
credit cards. Lock combinations, door keys, PIN numbers,
|
||
etc. All are part of crypto (although most might call this
|
||
"security" and not a very mathematical thing, as
|
||
cryptography is usually thought to be).
|
||
- Whitticism: "those who regularly
|
||
conspire to participate in the political process are
|
||
already encrypting." [Whit Diffie]
|
||
2.5.3. "Who needs crypto? What have they got to hide?"
|
||
+ honest people need crypto because there are dishonest
|
||
people
|
||
- and there may be other needs for privacy
|
||
- There are many reasons why people need privacy, the ability
|
||
to keep some things secret. Financial, personal,
|
||
psychological, social, and many other reasons.
|
||
- Privacy in their papers, in their diaries, in their pesonal
|
||
lives. In their financial choices, their investments, etc.
|
||
(The IRS and tax authorities in other countries claim to
|
||
have a right to see private records, and so far the courts
|
||
have backed them up. I disagree.)
|
||
- people encrypt for the same reason they close and lock
|
||
their doors
|
||
- Privacy in its most basic forms
|
||
2.5.4. "I'm new to crypto--where should I start?"
|
||
- books...Schneier
|
||
- soda
|
||
- sci.crypt
|
||
- talk.politics.crypto
|
||
- FAQs other than this one
|
||
2.5.5. "Do I need to study cryptography and number theory to make a
|
||
contribution?"
|
||
- Absolutely not! Most cryptographers and mathematicians are
|
||
so busy doing their thing that they little time or interest
|
||
for political and entrepreneurial activities.
|
||
Specialization is for insects and researchers, as someone's
|
||
.sig says.
|
||
- Many areas are ripe for contribution. Modularization of
|
||
functions means people can concentrate in other areas,
|
||
just as writers don't have to learn how to set type, or cut
|
||
quill pens, or mix inks.
|
||
- Nonspecialists should treat most established ciphers as
|
||
"black boxes" that work as advertised. (I'm not saying they
|
||
do, just that analysis of them is best left to experts...a
|
||
little skepticism may not hurt, though).
|
||
2.5.6. "How does public key cryptography work, simply put?"
|
||
- Plenty of articles and textbooks describe this, in ever-
|
||
increasing detail (they start out with the basics, then get
|
||
to the juicy stuff).
|
||
+ I did find a simple explanation, with "toy numbers," from
|
||
Matthew Ghio:
|
||
- "You pick two prime numbers; for example 5 and 7.
|
||
Multiply them together, equals 35. Now you calculate the
|
||
product of one less than each number, plus one. (5-1)(7-
|
||
1)+1=21. There is a mathematical relationship that says
|
||
that x = x^21 mod 35 for any x from 0 to 34. Now you
|
||
factor 21, yeilds 3 and 7.
|
||
|
||
"You pick one of those numbers to be your private key and
|
||
the other one is your public key. So you have:
|
||
Public key: 3
|
||
Private key: 7
|
||
|
||
"Someone encrypts a message for you by taking plaintext
|
||
message m to make ciphertext message c: c=m^3 mod 35
|
||
|
||
"You decrypt c and find m using your private key: m=c^7
|
||
mod 35
|
||
|
||
"If the numbers are several hundred digits long (as in
|
||
PGP), it is nearly impossible to guess the secret key."
|
||
[Matthew Ghio, alt.anonymous, 1994-09-03]
|
||
- (There's a math error here...exercise left for the
|
||
student.)
|
||
2.5.7. "I'm a newcomer to this stuff...how should I get started?"
|
||
- Start by reading some of the material cited. Don't worry
|
||
too much about understanding it all.
|
||
- Follow the list.
|
||
- Find an area that interests you and concentrate on that.
|
||
There is no reason why privacy advocates need to understand
|
||
Diffie-Hellman key exchange in detail!
|
||
+ More Information
|
||
+ Books
|
||
- Schneier
|
||
- Brassard
|
||
+ Journals, etc
|
||
- Proceedings
|
||
- Journal of Cryptology
|
||
- Cryptologia
|
||
- Newsgroups
|
||
- ftp sites
|
||
2.5.8. "Who are Alice and Bob?"
|
||
2.5.9. "What is security through obscurity"?
|
||
- adding layers of confusion, indirection
|
||
- rarely is strong in a an infromation-theoretic or
|
||
cryptographic sense
|
||
- and may have "shortcuts" (like a knot that looks complex
|
||
but which falls open if approached the right way)
|
||
- encryption algorithms often hidden, sites hidden
|
||
- Make no mistake about it, these approaches are often used.
|
||
And they can add a little to the overall security (using
|
||
file encyption programs like FolderBolt on top of PGP is an
|
||
example)...
|
||
2.5.10. "Has DES been broken? And what about RSA?"
|
||
- DES: Brute-force search of the keyspace in chosen-plaintext
|
||
attacks is feeasible in around 2^47 keys, according to
|
||
Biham and Shamir. This is about 2^9 times easier than the
|
||
"raw" keyspace. Michael Wiener has estimated that a macine
|
||
of special chips could crack DES this way for a few
|
||
thousand dollars per key. The NSA may have such machines.
|
||
- In any case, DES was not expected to last this long by many
|
||
(and, in fact, the NSA and NIST proposed a phaseout some
|
||
years back, the "CCEP" (Commercial COMSEC Endorsement
|
||
Program), but it never caught on and seems forgotten today.
|
||
Clipper and EES seem to have grabbed the spotlight.
|
||
- IDEA, from Europe, is supposed to be much better.
|
||
- As for RSA, this is unlikely. Factoring is not yet proven
|
||
to be NP-co
|
||
2.5.11. "Can the NSA Break Foo?"
|
||
- DES, RSA, IDEA, etc.
|
||
- Can the government break our ciphers?
|
||
2.5.12. "Can brute-force methods break crypto systems?"
|
||
- depends on the system, the keyspace, the ancillary
|
||
information avialable, etc.
|
||
- processing power generally has been doubling every 12-18
|
||
months (Moore's Law), so....
|
||
- Skipjack is 80 bits, which is probably safe from brute
|
||
force attack for 2^24 = 1.68e7 times as long as DES is.
|
||
With Wiener's estimate of 3.5 hours to break DES, this
|
||
implies 6700 years using today's hardware. Assuming an
|
||
optimistic doubling of hardware power per year (for the
|
||
same cost), it will take 24 years before the hardware costs
|
||
of a brute force attack on Skipjack come down to what it
|
||
now costs to attack DES. Assuming no other weaknesses in
|
||
Skipjack.
|
||
- And note that intelligence agencies are able to spend much
|
||
more than what Wiener calculated (recall Norm Hardy's
|
||
description of Harvest)
|
||
2.5.13. "Did the NSA know about public key ideas before Diffie and
|
||
Hellman?"
|
||
+ much debate, and some sly and possibly misleading innuendo
|
||
- Simmons claimed he learned of PK in Gardner's column, and
|
||
he certainly should've been in a position to know
|
||
(weapons, Sandia)
|
||
-
|
||
+ Inman has claimed that NSA had a P-K concept in 1966
|
||
- fits with Dominik's point about sealed cryptosystem boxes
|
||
with no way to load new keys
|
||
- and consistent with NSA having essentially sole access to
|
||
nation's top mathematicians (until Diffies and Hellmans
|
||
foreswore government funding, as a result of the anti-
|
||
Pentagon feelings of the 70s)
|
||
2.5.14. "Did the NSA know about public-key approaches before Diffie
|
||
and Hellman?"
|
||
- comes up a lot, with some in the NSA trying to slyly
|
||
suggest that _of course_ they knew about it...
|
||
- Simmons, etc.
|
||
- Bellovin comments (are good)
|
||
2.5.15. "Can NSA crack RSA?"
|
||
- Probably not.
|
||
- Certainly not by "searching the keyspace," an idea that
|
||
pops up every few months . It can't be done. 1024-bit keys
|
||
implies roughly 512-bit primes, or 153-decimal digit
|
||
primes. There are more than 10^150 of them! And only about
|
||
10^73 particles in the entire universe.
|
||
- Has the factoring problem been solved? Probably not. And it
|
||
probably won't be, in the sense that factoring is probably
|
||
in NP (though this has not been proved) and P is probably
|
||
not NP (also unproved, but very strongly suspected). While
|
||
there will be advances in factoring, it is extremely
|
||
unlikely (in the religious sense) that factoring a 300-
|
||
digit number will suddenly become "easy."
|
||
- Does the RSA leak information so as to make it easier to
|
||
crack than it is to factor the modulus? Suspected by some,
|
||
but basically unknown. I would bet against it. But more
|
||
iffy than the point above.
|
||
+ "How strong is strong crypto?"
|
||
- Basically, stronger than any of the hokey "codes" so
|
||
beloved of thriller writers and movie producers. Modern
|
||
ciphers are not crackable by "telling the computer to run
|
||
through all the combinations" (more precisely, the number
|
||
of combinations greatly exceeds the number of atoms in
|
||
the universe).
|
||
2.5.16. "Won't more powerful computers make ciphers breakable?"
|
||
+ The effects of increasing computer power confer even
|
||
*greater* advantage to the cipher user than to the cipher
|
||
breaker. (Longer key lengths in RSA, for example, require
|
||
polynomially more time to use, but exponentially more time
|
||
to break, roughly speaking.) Stunningly, it is likely that
|
||
we are close to being able to use key lengths which cannot
|
||
be broken with all the computer power that will ever exist
|
||
in the universe.
|
||
+ Analogous to impenetrable force fields protecting the
|
||
data, with more energy required to "punch through" than
|
||
exists in the universe
|
||
- Vernor Vinge's "bobbles," in "The Peace War."
|
||
- Here I am assuming that no short cuts to factoring
|
||
exist...this is unproven, but suspected. (No major
|
||
shortcuts, i.e., factoring is not "easy.")
|
||
+ A modulus of thousands of decimal digits may require more
|
||
total "energy" to factor, using foreseeable approaches,
|
||
than is available
|
||
- reversible computation may help, but I suspect not much
|
||
- Shor's quantum-mechanical approach is completely
|
||
untested...and may not scale well (e.g., it may be
|
||
marginally possible to get the measurement precision to
|
||
use this method for, say, 100-digit numbers, but
|
||
utterly impossible to get it for 120-digit numbers, let
|
||
alone 1000-digit numbers)
|
||
2.5.17. "Will strong crypto help racists?"
|
||
- Yes, this is a consequence of having secure virtual
|
||
communities. Free speech tends to work that way!
|
||
- The Aryan Nation can use crypto to collect and disseminate
|
||
information, even into "controlled" nations like Germany
|
||
that ban groups like Aryan Nation.
|
||
- Of course, "on the Internet no one knows you're a dog," so
|
||
overt racism based on superficial external characteristics
|
||
is correspondingly harder to pull off.
|
||
- But strong crypto will enable and empower groups who have
|
||
different beliefs than the local majority, and will allow
|
||
them to bypass regional laws.
|
||
2.5.18. Working on new ciphers--why it's not a Cypherpunks priority
|
||
(as I see it)
|
||
- It's an issue of allocation of resources. ("All crypto is
|
||
economics." E. Hughes) Much work has gone into cipher
|
||
design, and the world seems to have several stable, robust
|
||
ciphers to choose from. Any additional work by crypto
|
||
amateurs--which most of us are, relative to professional
|
||
mathematicians and cipher designers--is unlikely to move
|
||
things forward significantly. Yes, it could happen...but
|
||
it's not likely.
|
||
+ Whereas there are areas where professional cryptologists
|
||
have done very little:
|
||
- PGP (note that PRZ did *not* take time out to try to
|
||
invent his own ciphers, at least not for Version
|
||
2.0)...he concentrated on where his efforts would have
|
||
the best payoff
|
||
- implementation of remailers
|
||
- issues involving shells and other tools for crypto use
|
||
- digital cash
|
||
- related issues, such as reputations, language design,
|
||
game theory, etc.
|
||
- These are the areas of "low-hanging fruit," the areas where
|
||
the greatest bang for the buck lies, to mix some metaphors
|
||
(grapeshot?).
|
||
2.5.19. "Are there any unbreakable ciphers?"
|
||
- One time pads are of course information-theoretically
|
||
secure, i.e., unbreakable by computer power.
|
||
+ For conventional ciphers, including public key ciphers,
|
||
some ciphers may not be breakable in _our_ universe, in any
|
||
amount of time. The logic goes as follows:
|
||
- Our universe presumably has some finite number of
|
||
particles (currently estimated to be 10^73 particles).
|
||
This leads to the "even if every particle were a Cray Y-
|
||
MP it would take..." sorts of thought experiments.
|
||
|
||
But I am considering _energy_ here. Ignoring reversible
|
||
computation for the moment, computations dissipate energy
|
||
(some disagree with this point). There is some uppper
|
||
limit on how many basic computations could ever be done
|
||
with the amount of free energy in the universe. (A rough
|
||
calculation could be done by calculating the energy
|
||
output of stars, stuff falling into black holes, etc.,
|
||
and then assuming about kT per logical operation. This
|
||
should be accurate to within a few orders of magnitude.)
|
||
I haven't done this calculation, and won't here, but the
|
||
result would likely be something along the lines of X
|
||
joules of energy that could be harnessed for computation,
|
||
resulting in Y basic primitive computational steps.
|
||
|
||
I can then find a modulus of 3000 digits or 5000 digits,
|
||
or whatever, that takes *more* than this number of steps
|
||
to factor. Therefore, unbreakable in our universe.
|
||
- Caveats:
|
||
|
||
1. Maybe there are really shortcuts to factoring. Certainly
|
||
improvements in factoring methods will continue. (But of
|
||
course these improvements are not things that convert
|
||
factoring into a less than exponential-in-length
|
||
problem...that is, factoring appears to remain "hard.")
|
||
|
||
2. Maybe reversible computations (a la Landauer, Bennett,
|
||
et. al.) actually work. Maybe this means a "factoring
|
||
machine" can be built which takes a fixed, or very slowly
|
||
growing, amount of energy. In this case, "forever" means
|
||
Lefty is probably right.
|
||
|
||
3. Maybe the quantum-mechanical idea of Peter Shor is
|
||
possible. (I doubt it, for various reasons.)
|
||
|
||
2.5.20. "How safe is RSA?" "How safe is PGP?" "I heard that PGP has
|
||
bugs?"
|
||
- This cloud of questions is surely the most common sort that
|
||
appears in sci.crypt. It sometimes gets no answers,
|
||
sometimes gets a rude answer, and only occasionally does it
|
||
lead to a fruiful discussion.
|
||
- The simple anwer: These ciphers appear to be safe, to have
|
||
no obvious flaws.
|
||
- More details can be found in various question elsewhere in
|
||
this FAQ and in the various FAQs and references others have
|
||
published.
|
||
2.5.21. "How long does encryption have to be good for?"
|
||
- This obviously depends on what you're encrypting. Some
|
||
things need only be safe for short periods of time, e.g., a
|
||
few years or even less. Other things may come back to haunt
|
||
you--or get you thrown in prison--many years later. I can
|
||
imagine secrets that have to be kept for many decades, even
|
||
centuries (for example, one may fear one's descendents will
|
||
pay the price for a secret revealed).
|
||
- It is useful to think _now_ about the computer power likely
|
||
to be available in the year 2050, when many of you reading
|
||
this will still be around. (I'm _not_ arguing that
|
||
parallelism, etc., will cause RSA to fall, only that some
|
||
key lengths (e.g., 512-bit) may fall by then. Better be
|
||
safe and use 1024 bits or even more. Increased computer
|
||
power makes longer keys feasible, too.).
|
||
|
||
2.6. PGP
|
||
2.6.1. There's a truly vast amount of information out there on PGP,
|
||
from current versions, to sites, to keyserver issues, and so
|
||
on. There are also several good FAQs on PGP, on MacPGP, and
|
||
probably on nearly every major version of PGP. I don't expect
|
||
to compete here with these more specialized FAQs.
|
||
- I'm also not a PGP expert, using it only for sending and
|
||
receiving mail, and rarely doing much more with it.
|
||
- The various tools, for all major platforms, are a specialty
|
||
unto themselves.
|
||
2.6.2. "Where do I get PGP?"
|
||
2.6.3. "Where can I find PGP?"
|
||
- Wait around for several days and a post will come by which
|
||
gives some pointers.
|
||
- Here are some sites current at this writing: (watch out for
|
||
changes)
|
||
2.6.4. "Is PGP secure? I heard someone had...."
|
||
- periodic reports, urban legend, that PGP has been
|
||
compromised, that Phil Z. has been "persuaded" to....
|
||
+ implausible for several reasons
|
||
- Phil Z no longer controls the source code by himself
|
||
- the source code is available and can be inspected...would
|
||
be very difficult to slip in major back doors that would
|
||
not be apparent in the source code
|
||
- Phil has denied this, and the rumors appear to come from
|
||
idle speculation
|
||
+ But can PGP be broken?
|
||
- has not been tested independently in a thorough,
|
||
cryptanalytic way, yet (opinion of tcmay)
|
||
- NSA isn't saying
|
||
+ Areas for attack
|
||
+ IDEA
|
||
- some are saying doubling of the number of rounds
|
||
should be donee
|
||
- the random number generators...Colin Plumb's admission
|
||
2.6.5. "Should I use PGP and other crypto on my company's
|
||
workstations?"
|
||
- machines owned by corporations and universities, usually on
|
||
networks, are generally not secure (that is, they may be
|
||
compromised in various ways)
|
||
- ironically, most of the folks who sign all their messages,
|
||
who use a lot of encryption, are on just such machines
|
||
- PCs and Macs and other nonnetworked machines are more
|
||
secure, but are harder to use PGP on (as of 1994)
|
||
- these are generalizations--there are insecure PCs and
|
||
secure workstations
|
||
2.6.6. "I just got PGP--should I use it for all my mail?"
|
||
- No! Many people cannot easily use PGP, so if you wish to
|
||
communicate with them, don't encrypt everything. Use
|
||
encryption where it matters.
|
||
- If you just want more people to use encryption, help with
|
||
the projects to better integrate crypto into existing
|
||
mailers.
|
||
2.6.7. NSA is apparently worried about PGP, worried about the spread
|
||
of PGP to other countries, and worried about the growth of
|
||
"internal communities" that communicate via "black pipes" or
|
||
"encrypted tunnels" that are impenetrable to them.
|
||
|
||
2.7. Clipper
|
||
2.7.1. "How can the government do this?"
|
||
- incredulity that bans, censorship, etc. are legal
|
||
+ several ways these things happen
|
||
- not tested in the courts
|
||
- wartime regulations
|
||
+ conflicting interpretations
|
||
- e.g., "general welfare" clause used to justify
|
||
restrictions on speech, freedom of association, etc.
|
||
+ whenever public money or facilities used (as with
|
||
churches forced to hire Satanists)
|
||
- and in this increasingly interconnnected world, it is
|
||
sometimes very hard to avoid overlap with public
|
||
funding, facilities, etc.
|
||
2.7.2. "Why don't Cypherpunks develop their won competing encryption
|
||
chip?"
|
||
+ Many reasons not to:
|
||
- cost
|
||
- focus
|
||
- expertise
|
||
- hard to sell such a competing standard
|
||
- better to let market as a whole make these choices
|
||
2.7.3. "Why is crypto so frightening to governments?"
|
||
+ It takes away the state's power to snoop, to wiretap, to
|
||
eavesdrop, to control
|
||
- Priestly confessionals were a major way the Church kept
|
||
tabs on the locals...a worldwide, grassroots system of
|
||
ecclesiastical narcs
|
||
+ Crypto has high leverage
|
||
+ Unlike direct assaults with bombs, HERF and EMP attacks,
|
||
sabotage, etc, crypto is self-spreading...a bootstrap
|
||
technology
|
||
- people use it, give it to others, put it on networks
|
||
- others use it for their own purposes
|
||
- a cascade effect, growing geometrically
|
||
- and undermining confidence in governments, allowing the
|
||
spread of multiple points of view (especially
|
||
unapproved views)
|
||
2.7.4. "I've just joined the list and am wondering why I don't see
|
||
more debate about Clipper?"
|
||
- Understand that people rarely write essays in response to
|
||
questions like "Why is Clipper bad?" For most of us,
|
||
mandatory key escrow is axiomatically bad; no debate is
|
||
needed.
|
||
- Clipper was thoroughly trashed by nearly everyone within
|
||
hours and days of its announcement, April 16, 1993.
|
||
Hundreds of articles and editorials have condemned it.
|
||
Cyperpunks currently has no active supporters of mandatory
|
||
key escrow, from all indications, so there is nothing to
|
||
debate.
|
||
|
||
2.8. Other Ciphers and Crypto Products
|
||
|
||
2.9. Remailers and Anonymity
|
||
2.9.1. "What are remailers?"
|
||
2.9.2. "How do remailers work?" (a vast number of postings have
|
||
dealt with this)
|
||
- The best way to understand them is to "just do it," that
|
||
is, send a few remailed message to yourself, to see how the
|
||
syntax works. Instructions are widely available--some are
|
||
cited here, and up to date instructions will appear in the
|
||
usual Usenet groups.
|
||
- The simple view: Text messages are placed in envelopes and
|
||
sent to a site that has agreed to remail them based on the
|
||
instructions it finds. Encryption is not necessary--though
|
||
it is of course recommended. These "messages in bottles"
|
||
are passed from site to site and ultimately to the intended
|
||
final recipient.
|
||
- The message is pure text, with instructions contained _in
|
||
the text_ itself (this was a fortuitous choice of standard
|
||
by Eric Hughes, in 1992, as it allowed chaining,
|
||
independence from particular mail systems, etc.).
|
||
- A message will be something like this:
|
||
|
||
::
|
||
Request-Remailing-To: remailer@bar.baz
|
||
|
||
Body of text, etc., etc. (Which could be more remailing
|
||
instructions, digital postage, etc.)
|
||
|
||
- These nested messages make no assumptions about the type of
|
||
mailer being used, so long as it can handle straight ASCII
|
||
text, which all mailers can of course. Each mail message
|
||
then acts as a kind of "agent," carrying instructions on
|
||
where it should be mailed next, and perhaps other things
|
||
(like delays, padding, postage, etc.)
|
||
- It's very important to note that any given remailer cannot
|
||
see the contents of the envelopes he is remailing, provided
|
||
encryption is used. (The orginal sender picks a desired
|
||
trajectory through the labyrinth of remailers, encrypts in
|
||
the appropriate sequence (last is innermost, then next to
|
||
last, etc.), and then the remailers sequentially decrypt
|
||
the outer envelopes as they get them. Envelopes within
|
||
envelopes.)
|
||
2.9.3. "Can't remailers be used to harass people?"
|
||
- Sure, so can free speech, anonymous physical mail ("poison
|
||
pen letters"), etc.
|
||
- With e-mail, people can screen their mail, use filters,
|
||
ignore words they don't like, etc. Lots of options. "Sticks
|
||
and stones" and all that stuff we learned in Kindergarten
|
||
(well, I'm never sure what the the Gen Xers learned....).
|
||
- Extortion is made somewhat easier by anonymous mailers, but
|
||
extortion threats can be made in other ways, such as via
|
||
physical mail, or from payphones, etc.
|
||
- Physical actions, threats, etc. are another matter. Not the
|
||
domain of crypto, per se.
|
||
|
||
2.10. Surveillance and Privacy
|
||
2.10.1. "Does the NSA monitor this list?"
|
||
- Probably. We've been visible enough, and there are many
|
||
avenues for monitoring or even subscribing to the List.
|
||
Many aliases, many points of presence.
|
||
- some concerns that Cypherpunks list has been infiltrated
|
||
and is a "round up list"
|
||
- There have even been anonymous messages purporting to name
|
||
likely CIA, DIA, and NSA spooks. ("Be aware.")
|
||
- Remember, the list of subscribers is _not_ a secret--it can
|
||
be gotten by sending a "who cypherpunks" message to
|
||
majordomo@toad.com. Anyone in the world can do this.
|
||
2.10.2. "Is this list illegal?"
|
||
- Depends on the country. In the U.S., there are very strong
|
||
protections against "prior restraint" for published
|
||
material, so the list is fairly well -protected....shutting
|
||
it down would create a First Amendment case of major
|
||
importance. Which is unlikely. Conspiracy and sedition laws
|
||
are more complex to analyze; there are no indications that
|
||
material here or on the list is illegal.
|
||
- Advocacy of illegal acts (subversion of export laws,
|
||
espionage, etc.) is generally legal. Even advocating the
|
||
overthrow of the government.
|
||
- The situation in other countries is different. Some
|
||
countries ban unapproved encryption, so this list is
|
||
suspect.
|
||
- Practically speaking, anyone reading this list is probably
|
||
in a place which either makes no attempt to control
|
||
encryption or is unable to monitor what crosses its
|
||
borders.
|
||
2.10.3. "Can keystrokes really be monitored remotely? How likely is
|
||
this?"
|
||
- Yes. Van Eck, RF, monitors, easy (it is claimed) to build
|
||
this
|
||
- How likely? Depends on who you are. Ames, the KGB spy, was
|
||
probably monitored near the end, but I doubt many of us
|
||
are. The costs are simply too high...the vans outside, the
|
||
personnel needed, etc.
|
||
- the real hazards involve making it "easy" and "almost
|
||
automatic" for such monitoring, such as with Clipper and
|
||
EES. Then they essentially just flip a switch and the
|
||
monitoring happens...no muss, no fuss.
|
||
2.10.4. "Wouldn't some crimes be stopped if the government could
|
||
monitor what it wanted to?"
|
||
- Sure. This is an old story. Some criminals would be caught
|
||
if their diaries could be examined. Television cameras in
|
||
all homes would reduce crimes of .... (Are you listening,
|
||
Winston?).
|
||
- Orwell, fascism, surveillance states, what have you got to
|
||
hide, etc.
|
||
|
||
2.11. Legal
|
||
2.11.1. "Can encryption be banned?"
|
||
- ham operators, shortwave
|
||
- il gelepal, looi to waptime aolditolq
|
||
+ how is this any different from requiring speech in some
|
||
language?
|
||
- Navaho code talkers of WW2,,,,modern parallel
|
||
2.11.2. "Will the government try to ban encryption?"
|
||
- This is of course the major concern most of us have about
|
||
Clipper and the Escrowed Encryption Standard in general.
|
||
Even if we think the banning of crypto will ultimately be a
|
||
failure ("worse than Prohibition," someone has said), such
|
||
a ban could make things very uncomfortable for many and
|
||
would be a serious abridgement of basic liberties.
|
||
- We don't know, but we fear something along these lines. It
|
||
will be difficult to enforce such a ban, as so many avenues
|
||
for communication exist, and encrypted messages may be hard
|
||
to detect.
|
||
- Their goal, however, may be _control_ and the chilling
|
||
effect that using "civil forfeiture" may have on potential
|
||
crypto users. Like the drug laws. (Whit Diffie was the
|
||
first to emphasize this motivation.)
|
||
2.11.3. "How could encryption be banned?"
|
||
- most likely way: restrictions on networks, a la airwaves or
|
||
postal service
|
||
- could cite various needs, but absent a mechanism as above,
|
||
hard to do
|
||
- an outright ban, enforced with civil forfeiture penalties
|
||
- wartime sorts of policies (crypto treated as sedition,
|
||
treason...some high-profile prison sentences)
|
||
- scenario posted by Sandfort?
|
||
2.11.4. "What's the situation about export of crypto?"
|
||
+ There's been much debate about this, with the case of Phil
|
||
Zimmermann possibly being an important test case, should
|
||
charges be filed.
|
||
- as of 1994-09, the Grand Jury in San Jose has not said
|
||
anything (it's been about 7-9 months since they started
|
||
on this issue)
|
||
- Dan Bernstein has argued that ITAR covers nearly all
|
||
aspects of exporting crypto material, including codes,
|
||
documentation, and even "knowledge." (Controversially, it
|
||
may be in violation of ITAR for knowledgeable crypto people
|
||
to even leave the country with the intention of developing
|
||
crypto tools overseas.)
|
||
- The various distributions of PGP that have occurred via
|
||
anonymous ftp sources don't imply that ITAR is not being
|
||
enforced, or won't be in the future.
|
||
2.11.5. "What's the legal status of digital signatures?"
|
||
- Not yet tested in court. Ditto for most crypto protocols,
|
||
including digital timestamping, electronic contracts,
|
||
issues of lost keys, etc.
|
||
2.11.6. "Can't I just claim I forgot my password?"
|
||
2.11.7. "Is it dangerous to talk openly about these ideas?"
|
||
- Depends on your country. In some countries, perhaps no. In
|
||
the U.S., there's not much they can do (though folks should
|
||
be aware that the Cypherpunks have received a lot of
|
||
attention by the media and by policy makers, and so a vocal
|
||
presence on this list very likely puts one on a list of
|
||
crypto trouble makers).
|
||
- Some companies may also feel views expressed here are not
|
||
consistent with their corporate policies. Your mileage may
|
||
vary.
|
||
- Sedition and treason laws are not likely to be applicable.
|
||
- some Cypherpunks think so
|
||
- Others of us take the First Amendment pretty seriously:
|
||
that _all_ talk is permissable
|
||
- NSA agents threatened to have Jim Bidzos killed
|
||
2.11.8. "Does possession of a key mean possession of *identity*?"
|
||
- If I get your key, am I you?
|
||
- Certainly not outside the context of the cryptographic
|
||
transaction. But within the context of a transaction, yes.
|
||
Additional safeguards/speedbumps can be inserted (such as
|
||
biometric credentials, additional passphrases, etc.), but
|
||
these are essentially part of the "key," so the basic
|
||
answer remains "yes." (There are periodically concerns
|
||
raised about this, citing the dangers of having all
|
||
identity tied to a single credential, or number, or key.
|
||
Well, there are ways to handle this, such as by adopting
|
||
protocols that limit one's exposure, that limits the amount
|
||
of money that can be withdrawn, etc. Or people can adopt
|
||
protocols that require additional security, time delays,
|
||
countersigning, etc.)
|
||
+ This may be tested in court soon enough, but the answer for
|
||
many contracts and crypto transactions will be that
|
||
possession of key = possession of identity. Even a court
|
||
test may mean little, for the types of transactions I
|
||
expect to see.
|
||
- That is, in anonymous systems, "who ya gonna sue?"
|
||
- So, guard your key.
|
||
|
||
2.12. Digital Cash
|
||
2.12.1. "What is digital money?"
|
||
2.12.2. "What are the main uses of strong crypto for business and
|
||
economic transactions?"
|
||
- Secure communications. Ensuring privacy of transaction
|
||
records (avoiding eavesdroppes, competitors)
|
||
- Digital signatures on contracts (will someday be standard)
|
||
- Digital cash.
|
||
- Reputations.
|
||
- Data Havens. That bypass local laws about what can be
|
||
stored and what can't (e.g., silly rules on how far back
|
||
credit records can go).
|
||
2.12.3. "What are smart cards and how are they used?"
|
||
+ Most smart cards as they now exist are very far from being
|
||
the anonymous digital cash of primary interest to us. In
|
||
fact, most of them are just glorified credit cards.
|
||
- with no gain to consumers, since consumes typically don't
|
||
pay for losses by fraud
|
||
- (so to entice consumes, will they offer inducements?)
|
||
- Can be either small computers, typically credit-card-sized,
|
||
or just cards that control access via local computers.
|
||
+ Tamper-resistant modules, e.g., if tampered with, they
|
||
destroy the important data or at the least give evidence of
|
||
having been tampered with.
|
||
+ Security of manufacturing
|
||
- some variant of "cut-and-choose" inspection of
|
||
premises
|
||
+ Uses of smart cards
|
||
- conventional credit card uses
|
||
- bill payment
|
||
- postage
|
||
- bridge and road tolls
|
||
- payments for items received electronically (not
|
||
necessarily anonymously)
|
||
|
||
2.13. Crypto Anarchy
|
||
2.13.1. "What is Crypto Anarchy?"
|
||
- Some of us believe various forms of strong cryptography
|
||
will cause the power of the state to decline, perhaps even
|
||
collapse fairly abruptly. We believe the expansion into
|
||
cyberspace, with secure communications, digital money,
|
||
anonymity and pseudonymity, and other crypto-mediated
|
||
interactions, will profoundly change the nature of
|
||
economies and social interactions.
|
||
|
||
Governments will have a hard time collecting taxes,
|
||
regulating the behavior of individuals and corporations
|
||
(small ones at least), and generally coercing folks when it
|
||
can't even tell what _continent_ folks are on!
|
||
|
||
Read Vinge's "True Names" and Card's "Ender's Game" for
|
||
some fictional inspirations. "Galt's Gulch" in cyberspace,
|
||
what the Net is rapidly becoming already.
|
||
|
||
I call this set of ideas "crypto anarchy" (or "crypto-
|
||
anarchy," as you wish) and have written about this
|
||
extensively. The magazines "Wired" (issue 1.2), "Whole
|
||
Earth Review" (Summer, 1993), and "The Village Voice" (Aug.
|
||
6th, 1993) have all carried good articles on this.
|
||
2.13.2. The Crypto Anarchist Manifesto
|
||
- a complete copy of my 1988 pastiche of the Communisto
|
||
Manifesto is included in the chapter on Crypto Anarchy.
|
||
- it needs rewriting, but for historical sake I've left it
|
||
unchanged.
|
||
- I'm proud that so much of it remains accurate.
|
||
2.13.3. "What is BlackNet?"
|
||
- BlackNet -- an experiment in information markets, using
|
||
anonymous message pools for exchange of instructions and
|
||
items. Tim May's experiment in guerilla ontology.
|
||
- BlackNet -- an experimental scheme devised by T. May to
|
||
underscore the nature of anonymous information markets.
|
||
"Any and all" secrets can be offered for sale via anonymous
|
||
mailers and message pools. The experiment was leaked via
|
||
remailer to the Cypherpunks list (not by May) and thence to
|
||
several dozen Usenet groups by Detweiler. The authorities
|
||
are said to be investigating it.
|
||
2.13.4. "What effect will crypto have on governments?"
|
||
- A huge topic, one I've been thinking about since late 1987
|
||
when it dawned on me that public key crypto and anonymous
|
||
digital cash systems, information markets, etc. meant the
|
||
end of governments as we know them. (I called this
|
||
development "crypto anarchy." Not everyone is a fan of it.
|
||
But it's coming, and fast.)
|
||
- "Putting the NSA out of business," as the NYT article put
|
||
it
|
||
- Espionage is changing. To pick one example, "digital dead
|
||
drops." Any message can be sent through an untraceable path
|
||
with remailers....and then posted in encrypted form in a
|
||
newsgroup readable in most countries, including the Former
|
||
Soviet Union. This means the old stand by of the microfilm
|
||
in a Coke can left by a certain tree on a rural road--a
|
||
method fraught with delays, dangers, and hassles--is now
|
||
passe. The same message can be send from the comfort of
|
||
one's home securely and untraceably. Even with a a digital
|
||
signature to prevent spoofing and disinformation. This spy
|
||
can be a Lockheed worker on the Aurora program, a SIGINT
|
||
officer at Woomera, or a disgruntled chip designer at
|
||
Motorola. (Yes, a countermeasure is to limit access to
|
||
personal computers, to run only standard software that has
|
||
no such crypto capability. Such embargoes may already apply
|
||
to some in sensitive positions, and may someday be a
|
||
condition of employment.)
|
||
- Money-laundering
|
||
- Tax collection. International consultants. Perpetual
|
||
tourists. Virtual corporations.
|
||
- Terrorism, assassination, crime, Triads, Yakuza, Jamaicans,
|
||
Russian Mafia...virtual networks... Aryan Nation gone
|
||
digital
|
||
2.13.5. "How quickly could something like crypto anarchy come?"
|
||
- Parts of it are happening already, though the changes in
|
||
the world are not something I take any credit for. Rather,
|
||
there are ongoing changes in the role of nations, of power,
|
||
and of the ability to coerce behaviors. When people can
|
||
drop out of systems they don't like, can move to different
|
||
legal or tax jurisdictions, then things change.
|
||
+ But a phase change could occur quickly, just as the Berlin
|
||
Wall was impregnable one day, and down the next.
|
||
- "Public anger grows quietly and explodes suddenly. T.C.
|
||
May's "phase change" may be closer than we think. Nobody
|
||
in Russia in 1985 really thought the country would fall
|
||
apart in 6 years." [Mike Ingle, 1994-01-01]
|
||
2.13.6. "Could strong crypto be used for sick and disgusting and
|
||
dangerous purposes?"
|
||
- Of course. So can locked doors, but we don't insist on an
|
||
"open door policy" (outside of certain quaint sorority and
|
||
rooming houses!) So do many forms of privacy allow
|
||
plotters, molestors, racists, etc. to meet and plot.
|
||
- Crypto is in use by the Aryan Nation, by both pro- and anti-
|
||
abortion groups, and probably by other kinds of terrorists.
|
||
Expect more uses in the future, as things like PGP continue
|
||
to spread.
|
||
- Many of us are explicity anti-democratic, and hope to use
|
||
encryption to undermine the so-called democratic
|
||
governments of the world
|
||
2.13.7. "What is the Dining Cryptographers Problem, and why is it so
|
||
important?"
|
||
+ This is dealt with in the main section, but here's David
|
||
Chaum's Abstract, from his 1988 paper"
|
||
- Abstract: "Keeping confidential who sends which messages,
|
||
in a world where any physical transmission can be traced
|
||
to its origin, seems impossible. The solution presented
|
||
here is unconditionally or cryptographically secure,
|
||
depending on whether it is based on one-time-use keys or
|
||
on public keys. respectively. It can be adapted to
|
||
address efficiently a wide variety of practical
|
||
considerations." ["The Dining Cryptographers Problem:
|
||
Unconditional Sender and Recipient Untraceability," David
|
||
Chaum, Journal of Cryptology, I, 1, 1988.]
|
||
-
|
||
- DC-nets have yet to be implemented, so far as I know, but
|
||
they represent a "purer" version of the physical remailers
|
||
we are all so familiar with now. Someday they'll have have
|
||
a major impact. (I'm a bigger fan of this work than many
|
||
seem to be, as there is little discussion in sci.crypt and
|
||
the like.)
|
||
2.13.8. "Why won't government simply ban such encryption methods?"
|
||
+ This has always been the Number One Issue!
|
||
- raised by Stiegler, Drexler, Salin, and several others
|
||
(and in fact raised by some as an objection to my even
|
||
discussing these issues, namely, that action may then be
|
||
taken to head off the world I describe)
|
||
+ Types of Bans on Encryption and Secrecy
|
||
- Ban on Private Use of Encryption
|
||
- Ban on Store-and-Forward Nodes
|
||
- Ban on Tokens and ZKIPS Authentication
|
||
- Requirement for public disclosure of all transactions
|
||
+ Recent news (3-6-92, same day as Michaelangelo and
|
||
Lawnmower Man) that government is proposing a surcharge
|
||
on telcos and long distance services to pay for new
|
||
equipment needed to tap phones!
|
||
- S.266 and related bills
|
||
- this was argued in terms of stopping drug dealers and
|
||
other criminals
|
||
- but how does the government intend to deal with the
|
||
various forms fo end-user encryption or "confusion"
|
||
(the confusion that will come from compression,
|
||
packetizing, simple file encryption, etc.)
|
||
+ Types of Arguments Against Such Bans
|
||
- The "Constitutional Rights" Arguments
|
||
+ The "It's Too Late" Arguments
|
||
- PCs are already widely scattered, running dozens of
|
||
compression and encryption programs...it is far too
|
||
late to insist on "in the clear" broadcasts, whatever
|
||
those may be (is program code distinguishable from
|
||
encrypted messages? No.)
|
||
- encrypted faxes, modem scramblers (albeit with some
|
||
restrictions)
|
||
- wireless LANs, packets, radio, IR, compressed text and
|
||
images, etc....all will defeat any efforts short of
|
||
police state intervention (which may still happen)
|
||
+ The "Feud Within the NSA" Arguments
|
||
- COMSEC vs. PROD
|
||
+ Will affect the privacy rights of corporations
|
||
- and there is much evidence that corporations are in
|
||
fact being spied upon, by foreign governments, by the
|
||
NSA, etc.
|
||
+ They Will Try to Ban Such Encryption Techniques
|
||
+ Stings (perhaps using viruses and logic bombs)
|
||
- or "barium," to trace the code
|
||
+ Legal liability for companies that allow employees to use
|
||
such methods
|
||
- perhaps even in their own time, via the assumption that
|
||
employees who use illegal software methods in their own
|
||
time are perhaps couriers or agents for their
|
||
corporations (a tenuous point)
|
||
2.13.9. "Could anonymous markets facilitate repugnant services, such
|
||
as killings for hire?"
|
||
- Yes, though there are some things which will help lessen
|
||
the full impact.
|
||
- To make this brutally concrete, here's how escrow makes
|
||
murder contracts much safer than they are today to
|
||
negotiate. Instead of one party being caught in an FBI
|
||
sting, as is so often the case when amateurs try to arrange
|
||
hits, they can use an escrow service to insulate themselves
|
||
from:
|
||
|
||
1. From being traced, because the exchanges are handled via
|
||
pseudonyms
|
||
|
||
2. From the killer taking the money and then not performing
|
||
the hit, because the escrow agent holds the money until the
|
||
murder is verified (according to some prototocol, such a
|
||
newspaper report...again, an area for more work,
|
||
thankfully).
|
||
|
||
3. From being arrested when the money is picked up, as this
|
||
is all done via digital cash.
|
||
|
||
There are some ways to reduce the popularity of this
|
||
Murder, Incorporated system. (Things I've been thinking
|
||
about for about 6 years, and which we discussed on the
|
||
Cypherpunks list and on the Extropians list.)
|
||
|
||
2.14. Miscellaneous
|
||
2.14.1. "Why can't people just agree on an approach?"
|
||
- "Why can't everyone just support my proposal?"
|
||
- "I've proposed a new cipher, but nobody's interested...you
|
||
Cypherpunks just never _do_ anything!"
|
||
- This is one of the most consistently divisive issues on the
|
||
list. Often a person will become enamored of some approach,
|
||
will write posts exhorting others to become similarly
|
||
enamored, urging others to "do something!," and will then,
|
||
when no interest is evidenced, become irate. To be more
|
||
concrete, this happens most often with various and sundry
|
||
proposals for "digital money." A close second is for
|
||
various types of "Cypherpunks activism," with proposals
|
||
that we get together and collect a few million dollars to
|
||
run Ross Perot-type advertisements urging people to use
|
||
PGP, with calls for a "Cypherpunks radio show," and so on.
|
||
(Nothing wrong with people doing these things, I suppose.
|
||
The problem lies in the exhortation of _others_ to do these
|
||
things.)
|
||
- This collective action is always hard to achieve, and
|
||
rightly so, in my opinion. Emergent behavior is more
|
||
natural, and more efficient. And hence better.
|
||
+ the nature of markets, agents, different agendas and goals
|
||
- real standards and markets evolve
|
||
- sometimes because of a compelling exemplar (the Walkman,
|
||
PGP), sometimes because of hard work by standards
|
||
committees (NTSC, electric sockets, etc.)
|
||
- but almost never by simple appeals to correctness or
|
||
ideological rightness
|
||
2.14.2. "What are some of the practical limits on the deployment of
|
||
crypto, especially things like digital cash and remailers?"
|
||
+ Lack of reliable services
|
||
- Nodes go down, students go home for the summer, downtime
|
||
for various reasons
|
||
- Lack of robustness
|
||
2.14.3. "Is crypto dominated by mistrust? I get the impression that
|
||
everything is predicated on mutual mistrust."
|
||
- We lock our doors...does this mean we are lacking in trust?
|
||
No, it means we understand there are _some_ out there who
|
||
will exploit unlocked doors. Ditto for the crypto world.
|
||
- "Trust, but verify," as Ronald Reagan used to say. Mutual
|
||
mistrust can actually make for a more trustworthy
|
||
environment, paradoxical as that may sound. "Even paranoids
|
||
have enemies."
|
||
- The danger in a trusting environment that lacks other
|
||
mechanisms is that "predators" or "defectors" (in game-
|
||
theoretic terms) can exploit this trusting environment.
|
||
Confidence games, scams, renegging on deals, and even
|
||
outright theft.
|
||
- Crypto offers the opportunity for "mutually suspicious
|
||
agents" to interact without explicit "trust."
|
||
2.14.4. "Who is Detweiler?"
|
||
+ S. Boxx, an12070, ldxxyyy, Pablo Escobar, Hitler, Linda
|
||
Lollipop, Clew Lance Simpleton, tmp@netcom.com, Jim
|
||
Riverman
|
||
- often with my sig block, or variants of it, attached
|
||
- even my phone number
|
||
- he lost his ColoState account for such tactics...
|
||
- electrocrisy
|
||
- cypherwonks
|
||
2.14.5. "Who is Sternlight?"
|
||
- A retired policy analyst who is often contentious in Usenet
|
||
groups and supportive of government policies on crypto
|
||
policy. Not nearly as bad as Detweiler.
|
||
|
||
2.15. More Information and References
|
||
2.15.1. "Where can I find more information?"
|
||
- Well, this is a start. Also, lots of other FAQs and Mosaic
|
||
home pages (URLs) exist, encompassing a vast amount of
|
||
knowledge.
|
||
- As long as this FAQ is, it can only scratch the surface on
|
||
many topics. (I'm especially amused when someone says
|
||
they've looked for a FAQ on some obscure topic. No FAQ is
|
||
likely to answer all questions, especially obcure ones.)
|
||
- Many articles and papers are available at the
|
||
ftp.csua.berkeley.edu
|
||
site, in pub/cypherpunks. Look around there. The 1981 Chaum
|
||
paper on untraceabel e-mail is not (too many equations for
|
||
easy scanning), but the 1988 paper on Dining Cryptographers
|
||
Nets is. (I laboriously scanned it and OCRed it, back when
|
||
I used to have the energy to do such thankless tasks.)
|
||
+ Some basic sources:
|
||
+ Sci.crypt FAQ, published regularly, Also available by
|
||
anonymous ftp at rtfm.mit.edu. And in various URLs,
|
||
including:
|
||
- URLs for sci.crypt FAQ: xxxxxx
|
||
- RSA Data Security Inc. FAQ
|
||
- Bruce Schneier's "Applied Cryptography" book, 1993. Every
|
||
reader of this list should get this book!
|
||
- The "online generation" tends to want all material online,
|
||
I know, but most of the good stuff is to be found in paper
|
||
form, in journals and books. This is likely to be the case
|
||
for many years to come, given the limitation of ASCII, the
|
||
lack of widespread standards (yes, I know about LaTex,
|
||
etc.), and the academic prestige associated with bound
|
||
journals and books. Fortunately, you can _all_ find
|
||
universit libraries within driving range. Take my advice:
|
||
if you do not spend at least an entire Saturday immersing
|
||
yourself in the crypto literature in the math section of a
|
||
large library, perusing the "Proceeedings of the Crypto
|
||
Conference" volumes, scanning the textbooks, then you have
|
||
a poor foundation for doing any crypto work.
|
||
2.15.2. "Things are changing quickly. Not all of the addresses and
|
||
URLs given here are valid. And the software versions... How
|
||
do I get the latest information?"
|
||
- Yes, things are changing quickly. This document can't
|
||
possibly keep up with the rapid changes (nor can its
|
||
author!).
|
||
- Reading the various newsgroups is, as always, the best way
|
||
to hear what's happening on a day to day basis. Web pages,
|
||
gopher, archie, veronica, etc. should show the latest
|
||
versions of popular software packages.
|
||
2.15.3. "FUQs: "Frequently Unanswered Questions"?"
|
||
- (more to be added)
|
||
- With 700 or more people on the Cypherpunks list (as of 94-
|
||
09), it is inevitable that some FAQs will go unanswered
|
||
when newbies (or others) ask them. Sometimes the FUQs are
|
||
ignored because they're so stale, other times because to
|
||
answer them is to continue and unfruitful thread.
|
||
+ "P = NP?"
|
||
- Steve Smale has called this the most important new
|
||
unsolved problem of the past half-century.
|
||
- If P were (unexpectedly) proved to be NP
|
||
+ Is RSA and factoring in NP?
|
||
- not yet proved
|
||
- factoring might be easier
|
||
- and RSA might be easier than factoring in general (e.g.,
|
||
chosen- and known-plaintext may provide clues)
|
||
- "Will encryption be outlawed? What will happen?"
|
||
+ "Is David Sternlight an NSA agent?"
|
||
- Seriously, David S. is probably what he claims: a retired
|
||
economist who was once very senior in government and
|
||
corporate policy circles. I have no reason to doubt him.
|
||
- He has views at odds with most of us, and a baiting style
|
||
of expressing his views, but this does not mean he is a
|
||
government agent as so many people claim.
|
||
- Not in the same class as Detweiler.
|
||
|
||
3. Cypherpunks -- History, Organization, Agenda
|
||
|
||
3.1. copyright
|
||
THE CYPHERNOMICON: Cypherpunks FAQ and More, Version 0.666,
|
||
1994-09-10, Copyright Timothy C. May. All rights reserved.
|
||
See the detailed disclaimer. Use short sections under "fair
|
||
use" provisions, with appropriate credit, but don't put your
|
||
name on my words.
|
||
|
||
3.2. SUMMARY: Cypherpunks -- History, Organization, Agenda
|
||
3.2.1. Main Points
|
||
- Cypherpunks formed in September, 1992
|
||
- formed at an opportune time, with PGP 2.0, Clipper, etc.
|
||
hitting
|
||
- early successes: Cypherpunks remailers, publicity
|
||
3.2.2. Connections to Other Sections
|
||
3.2.3. Where to Find Additional Information
|
||
- "Wired," issue 1.2, had a cover story on Cypherpunks.
|
||
- "Whole Earth Review," Summer 1993, had a long article on
|
||
crypto and Cypherpunks (included in the book "Out of
|
||
Control," by Kevin Kelly.
|
||
- "Village Voice," August 6th (?). 1993, had cover story on
|
||
"Crypto Rebels" (also reprinted in local weeklies)
|
||
- and numerous articles in various magazines
|
||
3.2.4. Miscellaneous Comments
|
||
- the best way to get a feel for the List is to simply read
|
||
it for a while; a few months should do.
|
||
|
||
3.3. The Cypherpunks Group and List
|
||
3.3.1. What is it?
|
||
+ Formal Rules, Charter, etc.?
|
||
- no formal rules or charter
|
||
- no agreed-upon mission
|
||
3.3.2. "Who are the Cypherpunks?"
|
||
- A mix of about 500-700
|
||
+ Can find out who by sending message to majordomo@toad.com
|
||
with the message body text "who cypherpunks" (no quotes, of
|
||
course).
|
||
- Is this a privacy flaw? Maybe.
|
||
- Lots of students (they have the time, the Internet
|
||
accounts). Lots of computer science/programming folks. Lots
|
||
of libertarians.
|
||
- quote from Wired article, and from "Whole Earth Review"
|
||
3.3.3. "How did the Cypherpunks group get started?"
|
||
+ History?
|
||
- Discussions between Eric Hughes and me, led to Eric's
|
||
decision to host a gathering
|
||
+ First meeting was, by coincidence, the same week that PGP
|
||
2.0 was released...we all got copies that day
|
||
- morning session on basics
|
||
- sitting on the floor
|
||
+ afternoon we played the "Crypto Game"
|
||
- remailers, digital money, information for sale, etc.
|
||
- John Gilmore offered his site to host a mailing list, and
|
||
his company's offices to hold monthly meetings
|
||
- The mailing list began almost immediately
|
||
- The Name "Cypherpunks"?
|
||
3.3.4. "Should I join the Cypherpunks mailing list?"
|
||
- If you are reading this, of course, you are most likely on
|
||
the Cypherpunks list already and this point is moot--you
|
||
may instead be asking if you should_leave_ the List!
|
||
- Only if you are prepared to handle 30-60 messages a day,
|
||
with volumes fluctuating wildly
|
||
3.3.5. "How can I join the Cypherpunk mailing list?"
|
||
- send message to "majordomo@toad.com" with a _body_ text of
|
||
"subscribe cypherpunks" (no quote marks in either, of
|
||
course).
|
||
3.3.6. "Membership?"
|
||
- about 500-700 at any given time
|
||
- many folks join, are overwhelmed, and quit
|
||
- other groups: Austin, Colorado, Boston, U.K.
|
||
3.3.7. "Why are there so many libertarians on the Cypherpunks list?"
|
||
+ The same question is often asked about the Net in general.
|
||
Lots of suggested reasons:
|
||
- A list like Cypherpunks is going to have privacy and
|
||
freedom advocates. Not all privacy advocates are
|
||
libertarians (e.g., they may want laws restricting data
|
||
collection), but many are. And libertarians naturally
|
||
gravitate to causes like ours.
|
||
- Net grew anarchically, with little control. This appeals
|
||
to free-wheeling types, used to making their own choices
|
||
and building their own worlds.
|
||
- Libertarians are skeptical of central control structures,
|
||
as are most computer programming types. They are
|
||
skeptical that a centrally-run control system can
|
||
coordinate the needs and desires of people. (They are of
|
||
course more than just "skeptical" about this.)
|
||
- In any case, there's not much of a coherent "opposition
|
||
camp" to the anarcho-capitalist, libertarian ideology.
|
||
Forgive me for saying this, my non-libertarian friends on
|
||
the list, but most non-libertarian ideologies I've seen
|
||
expressed on the list have been fragmentary, isolated, and
|
||
not coherent...comments about "how do we take care of the
|
||
poor?" and Christian fundamentalism, for example. If there
|
||
is a coherent alternative to a basically libertarian
|
||
viewpoint, we haven't seen it on the list.
|
||
- (Of course, some might say that the libertarians outshout
|
||
the alternatives...I don't think this is really so.)
|
||
3.3.8. "How did the mailing list get started?"
|
||
- Hugh Daniel, Eric Hughes, and I discussed this the day
|
||
after the first meeting
|
||
- mailing list brought together diverse interests
|
||
- How to hoin?
|
||
3.3.9. "How did Cypherpunks get so much early publicity?"
|
||
- started at the right time, just as PGP was gaining
|
||
popularity, as plans for key escrow were being laid (I
|
||
sounded an alarm in October, 1992, six months before the
|
||
Clipper announcement), and just as "Wired" was preparing
|
||
its first issue
|
||
- Kevin Kelly and Steven Levy attended some of our early
|
||
meetings, setting the stage for very favorable major
|
||
stories in "Wired" (issue 1.2, the cover story), and "Whole
|
||
Earth Review" (Summer, 1993)
|
||
- a niche for a "renegade" and "monkey-wrenching" group, with
|
||
less of a Washington focus
|
||
- publicity in "Wired," "The Whole Earth Review," "The
|
||
Village Voice"
|
||
+ Clipper bombshell occupied much of our time, with some
|
||
effect on policy
|
||
- climate of repudiation
|
||
- links to EFF, CPSR, etc.
|
||
3.3.10. "Why the name?"
|
||
- Jude Milhon nicknames us
|
||
- cypherpunkts? (by analogy with Mikropunkts, microdots)
|
||
3.3.11. "What were the early meetings like?"
|
||
- cypherspiel, Crypto Anarchy Game
|
||
3.3.12. "Where are places that I can meet other Cypherpunks?"
|
||
- physical meetings
|
||
- start your own...pizza place, classroom
|
||
+ other organizations
|
||
-
|
||
+ "These kind of meetings (DC 2600 meeting at Pentagon City
|
||
Mall, 1st Fri. of
|
||
- every month in the food court, about 5-7pm or so) might
|
||
be good places for
|
||
- local cypherpunks gatherings as well. I'm sure there
|
||
are a lot of other
|
||
- such meetings, but the DC and Baltimore ones are the
|
||
ones I know of. <Stanton McCandlish, 7 April 1994>
|
||
- (note that the DC area already meets...)
|
||
- Hackers, raves
|
||
- regional meetings
|
||
3.3.13. "Is the Cypherpunks list monitored? Has it been infiltrated?"
|
||
- Unknown. It wouldn't be hard for anyone to be monitoring
|
||
the list.
|
||
- As to infiltration, no evidence for this. No suspicious
|
||
folks showing up at the physical meetings, at least so far
|
||
as I can see. (Not a very reliable indication.)
|
||
3.3.14. "Why isn't there a recruiting program to increase the number
|
||
of Cypherpunks?"
|
||
- Good question. The mailing list reached about 500
|
||
subscribers a year or so ago and has remained relatively
|
||
constant since then; many subscribers learned of the list
|
||
and its address in the various articles that appeared.
|
||
- Informal organizations often level out in membership
|
||
because no staff exists to publicize, recruit, etc. And
|
||
size is limited because a larger group loses focus. So,
|
||
some stasis is achieved. For us, it may be at the 400-700
|
||
level. It seems unlikely that list membership would ever
|
||
get into the tens of thousands.
|
||
3.3.15. "Why have there been few real achievements in crypto
|
||
recently?"
|
||
+ Despite the crush of crypto releases--the WinPGPs,
|
||
SecureDrives, and dozen other such programs--the fact is
|
||
that most of these are straightforward variants on what I
|
||
think have been the two major product classes to be
|
||
introduced in the last several years"
|
||
- PGP, and variants.
|
||
- Remailers, and variants.
|
||
- These two main classes account for about 98% of all product-
|
||
or version-oriented debate on the Net, epitomized by the
|
||
zillions of "Where can I find PGP2.6ui for the Amiga?"
|
||
sorts of posts.
|
||
+ Why is this so? Why have these dominated? What else is
|
||
needed?
|
||
+ First, PGP gave an incredible impetus to the whole issue
|
||
of public use of crypto. It brought crypto to the masses,
|
||
or at least to the Net-aware masses. Second, the nearly
|
||
simultaneous appearance of remailers (the Kleinpaste/Julf-
|
||
style and the Cypherpunks "mix"-style) fit in well with
|
||
the sudden awareness about PGP and crypto issues. And
|
||
other simultaneous factors appeared:
|
||
- the appearance of "Wired" and its spectacular success,
|
||
in early 1993
|
||
- the Clipper chip firestorm, beginning in April 1993
|
||
- the Cypherpunks group got rolling in late 1992,
|
||
reaching public visibility in several articles in 1993.
|
||
(By the end of '93, we seemed to be a noun, as Bucky
|
||
might've said.)
|
||
+ But why so little progress in other important areas?
|
||
- digital money, despite at least a dozen reported
|
||
projects, programs (only a few of which are really
|
||
anything like Chaum's "digital cash")
|
||
- data havens, information markets, etc.
|
||
- money-laundering schemes, etc.
|
||
+ What could change this?
|
||
- Mosaic, WWW, Web
|
||
- A successful digital cash effort
|
||
|
||
3.4. Beliefs, Goals, Agenda
|
||
3.4.1. "Is there a set of beliefs that most Cypherpunks support?"
|
||
+ There is nothing official (not much is), but there is an
|
||
emergent, coherent set of beliefs which most list members
|
||
seem to hold:
|
||
* that the government should not be able to snoop into our
|
||
affairs
|
||
* that protection of conversations and exchanges is a basic
|
||
right
|
||
* that these rights may need to be secured through
|
||
_technology_ rather than through law
|
||
* that the power of technology often creates new political
|
||
realities (hence the list mantra: "Cypherpunks write
|
||
code")
|
||
+ Range of Beliefs
|
||
- Many are libertarian, most support rights of privacy,
|
||
some are more radical in apppoach
|
||
3.4.2. "What are Cypherpunks interested in?"
|
||
- privacy
|
||
- technology
|
||
- encryition
|
||
- politics
|
||
- crypto anarchy
|
||
- digital money
|
||
- protocols
|
||
3.4.3. Personal Privacy and Collapse of Governments
|
||
- There seem to be two main reasons people are drawn to
|
||
Cypherpunks, besides the general attractiveness of a "cool"
|
||
group such as ours. The first reason is _personal privacy_.
|
||
That is, tools for ensuring privacy, protection from a
|
||
surveillance society, and individual choice. This reason is
|
||
widely popular, but is not always compelling (after all,
|
||
why worry about personal privacy and then join a list that
|
||
has been identified as a "subversive" group by the Feds?
|
||
Something to think about.)
|
||
- The second major is personal liberty through reducing the
|
||
power of governments to coerce and tax. Sort of a digital
|
||
Galt's Gulch, as it were. Libertarians and
|
||
anarchocapitalists are especially drawn to this vision, a
|
||
vision which may bother conventional liberals (when they
|
||
realize strong crypto means things counter to welfare,
|
||
AFDC, antidiscrimination laws....).
|
||
- This second view is more controversial, but is, in my
|
||
opinion, what really powers the list. While others may
|
||
phrase it differently, most of us realize we are on to
|
||
something that will change--and already is changing--the
|
||
nature of the balance of power between individuals and
|
||
larger entities.
|
||
3.4.4. Why is Cypherpunks called an "anarchy"?
|
||
- Anarchy means "without a leader" (head). Much more common
|
||
than people may think.
|
||
- The association with bomb-throwing "anarchists" is
|
||
misleading.
|
||
3.4.5. Why is there no formal agenda, organization, etc.?
|
||
- no voting, no organization to administer such things
|
||
- "if it ain't broke, don't fix it"
|
||
- and it's how it all got started and evolved
|
||
- also, nobody to arrest and hassle, no nonsense about
|
||
filling out forms and getting tax exemptions, no laws about
|
||
campaign law violations (if we were a formal group and
|
||
lobbied against Senator Foo, could be hit with the law
|
||
limiting "special interests," conceivably)
|
||
3.4.6. How are projects proposed and completed?
|
||
- If an anarchy, how do things get done?
|
||
- The way most things get done: individual actions and market
|
||
decisions.
|
||
3.4.7. Future Needs for Cyberspace
|
||
+ Mark Pesci's ideas for VR and simulations
|
||
- distributed, high bandwidth
|
||
- a billion users
|
||
- spatial ideas....coordinates...servers...holographic
|
||
models
|
||
- WWW plus rendering engine = spatial VR (Library of
|
||
Congress)
|
||
- "The Labyrinth"
|
||
+ says to avoid head-mounted displays and gloves (bad for
|
||
you)
|
||
+ instead, "perceptual cybernetics".
|
||
- phi--fecks--psi (phi is external world,Fx = fects are
|
||
effectuators and sensors, psi is your internal state)
|
||
3.4.8. Privacy, Credentials without identity
|
||
3.4.9. "Cypherpunks write code"
|
||
- "Cypherpunks break the laws they don't like"
|
||
- "Don't get mad, get even. Write code."
|
||
3.4.10. Digital Free Markets
|
||
+ strong crypto changes the nature and visibility of many
|
||
economic transactionst, making it very difficult for
|
||
governments to interfere or even to enforce laws,
|
||
contracts, etc.
|
||
- thus, changes in the nature of contract enforcement
|
||
+ (Evidence that this is not hopeless can be found in
|
||
several places:
|
||
- criminal markets, where governments obviously cannot be
|
||
used
|
||
- international markets, a la "Law Merchant"
|
||
- "uttering a check"
|
||
- shopping malls in cyberspace...no identifiable national or
|
||
regional jurisdiction...overlapping many borders...
|
||
+ caveat emptor (though rating agencies, and other filter
|
||
agents, may be used by wary customers....ironically,
|
||
reputation will matter even more than it now does)
|
||
- no ability to repudiate a sale, to be an Indian giver
|
||
- in all kinds of information....
|
||
3.4.11. The Role of Money
|
||
- in monetarizing transactions, access, remailers---digital
|
||
postage
|
||
3.4.12. Reductions on taxation
|
||
- offshore entities already exempt
|
||
- tax havens
|
||
- cyberspace localization is problematic
|
||
3.4.13. Transnationalism
|
||
- rules of nations are ignored
|
||
3.4.14. Data Havens
|
||
- credit, medical, legal, renter, etc.
|
||
3.4.15. MOOs, MUDs, SVRs, Habitat cyberspaces
|
||
- "True Names" and "Snow Crash"
|
||
- What are
|
||
+ Habitat....Chip and Randy
|
||
- Lucasfilm, Fujitsu
|
||
- started as game environment...
|
||
- many-user environments
|
||
- communications bandwidth is a scarce resource
|
||
- object-oriented data representation
|
||
+ implementation platform unimportant...range of
|
||
capabilities
|
||
- pure text to Real ity Engines
|
||
- never got as far as fully populating the reality
|
||
- "detailed central planning is impossible; don't even try"
|
||
- 2-D grammar for layouts
|
||
+ "can't trust anyone"
|
||
- someone disassembled the code and found a way to make
|
||
themselves invisible
|
||
- ways to break the system (extra money)
|
||
+ future improvements
|
||
- multimedia objects, customizable objects, local turfs,
|
||
mulitple interfaces
|
||
- "Global Cyberspace Infrastructure" (Fujitsu, FINE)
|
||
+ more bandwidth means more things can be done
|
||
- B-ISDN will allow video on demand, VR, etc.
|
||
- protocol specs, Joule (secure concurrent operating
|
||
system)
|
||
- intereaction spaces, topological (not spatial)
|
||
+ Xerox, Pavel Curtis
|
||
+ LambdaMOO
|
||
- 1200 different users per day, 200 at a time, 5000 total
|
||
users
|
||
- "social virtual realities"--virtual communities
|
||
- how emergent properties emerge
|
||
- pseudo-spatial
|
||
- rooms, audio, video, multiple screens
|
||
- policing, wizards, mediation
|
||
- effective telecommuting
|
||
- need the richness of real world markets...people can sell
|
||
to others
|
||
+ Is there a set of rules or basic ideas which can form the
|
||
basis of a powerfully replicable system?
|
||
- this would allow franchises to be disctrubed around the
|
||
world
|
||
- networks of servers? distinction between server and
|
||
client fades...
|
||
- money, commercialization?
|
||
- Joule language
|
||
3.4.16. "Is personal privacy the main interest of Cypherpunks?"
|
||
- Ensuring the _right_ and the _technological feasibility_ is
|
||
more of the focus. This often comes up in two contexts:
|
||
- 1. Charges of hypocrisy because people either use
|
||
pseudonyms or, paradoxically, that they _don't_ use
|
||
pseudonyms, digital signatures
|
||
3.4.17. "Shouldn't crypto be regulated?"
|
||
- Many people make comparisons to the regulation of
|
||
automobiles, of the radio spectrum, and even of guns. The
|
||
comparison of crypto to guns is especially easy to make,
|
||
and especially dangerous.
|
||
-
|
||
+ A better comparison is "use of crypto = right to speak as
|
||
you wish."
|
||
- That is, we cannot demand that people speak in a language
|
||
or form that is easily understandable by eavesdroppers,
|
||
wiretappers, and spies.
|
||
+ If I choose to speak to my friends in Latvian, or in
|
||
Elihiuish, or in
|
||
- triple DES, that's my business. (Times of true war, as
|
||
in World War
|
||
- II, may be slightly different. As a libertarian, I'm
|
||
not advocating
|
||
- that, but I understand the idea that in times of war
|
||
speaking in code
|
||
+ is suspect. We are not in a time of war, and haven't
|
||
been.)
|
||
-
|
||
- Should we have "speech permits"? After all, isn't the
|
||
regulation of
|
||
+ speech consistent with the regulation of automobiles?
|
||
-
|
||
- I did a satirical essay along these lines a while back.
|
||
I won't
|
||
- included it here, though. (My speech permit for satire
|
||
expired and I
|
||
+ haven't had time to get it renewed.)
|
||
-
|
||
- In closing, the whole comparison of cryptography to
|
||
armaments is
|
||
- misleading. Speaking or writing in forms not readily
|
||
understandable to
|
||
- your enemies, your neighbors, your spouse, the cops, or
|
||
your local
|
||
- eavesdropper is as old as humanity.
|
||
3.4.18. Emphasize the "voluntary" nature of crypto
|
||
+ those that don't want privacy, can choose not to use crypto
|
||
- just as they can take the locks of their doors, install
|
||
wiretaps on their phones, remove their curtains so as not
|
||
to interfere with peeping toms and police surveillance
|
||
teams, etc.
|
||
- as PRZ puts it, they can write all their letters on
|
||
postcards, because they have "nothing to hide"
|
||
- what we want to make sure doesn't happen is _others_
|
||
insisting that we cannot use crypto to maintain our own
|
||
privacy
|
||
+ "But what if criminals have access to crypto and can keep
|
||
secrets?"
|
||
- this comes up over and over again
|
||
- does this mean locks should not exist, or.....?
|
||
3.4.19. "Are most Cypherpunks anarchists?"
|
||
- Many are, but probably not most. The term "anarchy" is
|
||
often misunderstood.
|
||
- As Perry Metzger puts it "Now, it happpens that I am an
|
||
anarchist, but that isn't what most people associated with
|
||
the term "cypherpunk" believe in, and it isn't fair to
|
||
paint them that way -- hell, many people on this mailing
|
||
list are overtly hostile to anarchism." [P.M., 1994-07-01]
|
||
- comments of Sherry Mayo, others
|
||
- But the libertarian streak is undeniably strong. And
|
||
libertarians who think about the failure of politics and
|
||
the implications of cryptgraphy generally come to the
|
||
anarcho-capitalist or crypto-anarchist point of view.
|
||
- In any case, the "other side" has not been very vocal in
|
||
espousing a consistent ideology that combines strong crypto
|
||
and things like welfare, entitlements, and high tax rates.
|
||
(I am not condemning them. Most of my leftist friends turn
|
||
out to believe in roughly the same things I believe
|
||
in...they just attach different labels and have negative
|
||
reactions to words like "capitalist.")
|
||
3.4.20. "Why is there so much ranting on the list?"
|
||
- Arguments go on and on, points get made dozens of times,
|
||
flaming escalates. This has gotten to be more of a problem
|
||
in recent months. (Not counting the spikes when Detweiler
|
||
was around.)
|
||
+ Several reasons:
|
||
+ the arguments are often matters of opinion, not fact, and
|
||
hence people just keep repeating their arguments
|
||
- made worse by the fact that many people are too lazy to
|
||
do off-line reading, to learn about what they are
|
||
expressing an opinion on
|
||
- since nothing ever gets resolved, decided, vote upon,
|
||
etc., the debates continue
|
||
- since anyone is free to speak up at any time, some people
|
||
will keep making the same points over and over again,
|
||
hoping to win through repetition (I guess)
|
||
+ since people usually don't personally know the other
|
||
members of the list, this promotes ranting (I've noticed
|
||
that the people who know each other, such as the Bay Area
|
||
folks, tend not to be as rude to each other...any
|
||
sociologist or psychologist would know why this is so
|
||
immediately).
|
||
+ the worst ranters tend to be the people who are most
|
||
isolated from the other members of the list community;
|
||
this is generally a well-known phenomenon of the Net
|
||
- and is yet more reason for regional Cypherpunks
|
||
groups to occasionally meet, to at least make some
|
||
social and conversational connections with folks in
|
||
their region.
|
||
- on the other hand, rudeness is often warranted; people
|
||
who assault me and otherwise plan to deprive me of my
|
||
property of deserving of death, not just insults [Don't
|
||
be worried, there are only a handful of people on this
|
||
list I would be happy to see dead, and on none of them
|
||
would I expend the $5000 it might take to buy a contract.
|
||
Of course, rates could drop.]
|
||
3.4.21. The "rejectionist" stance so many Cypherpunks have
|
||
- that compromise rarely helps when very basic issues are
|
||
involved
|
||
- the experience with the NRA trying compromise, only to find
|
||
ever-more-repressive laws passed
|
||
- the debacle with the EFF and their "EFF Digital Telephony
|
||
Bill" ("We couldn't have put this bill together without
|
||
your help") shows the corruption of power; I'm ashamed to
|
||
have ever been a member of the EFF, and will of course not
|
||
be renewing my membership.
|
||
- I have jokingly suggested we need a "Popular Front for the
|
||
Liberation of Crypto," by analogy with the PFLP.
|
||
3.4.22. "Is the Cypherpunks group an illegal or seditious
|
||
organization?"
|
||
- Well, there are those "Cypherpunk Criminal" t-shirts a lot
|
||
of us have...
|
||
- Depends on what country you're in.
|
||
- Probably in a couple of dozen countries, membership would
|
||
be frowned on
|
||
- the material may be illegal in other countries
|
||
- and many of us advocate things like using strong crypto to
|
||
avoid and evade tzxes, to bypass laws we dislike, etc.
|
||
|
||
3.5. Self-organizing Nature of Cypherpunks
|
||
3.5.1. Contrary to what people sometimes claim, there is no ruling
|
||
clique of Cypherpunks. Anybody is free to do nearly anything,
|
||
just not free to commit others to course of action, or
|
||
control the machine resources the list now runs on, or claim
|
||
to speak for the "Cypherpunks" as a group (and this last
|
||
point is unenforceable except through reptutation and social
|
||
repercussions).
|
||
3.5.2. Another reason to be glad there is no formal Cypherpunks
|
||
structure, ruling body, etc., is that there is then no direct
|
||
target for lawsuits, ITAR vioalation charges, defamation or
|
||
copyright infringement claims, etc.
|
||
|
||
3.6. Mechanics of the List
|
||
3.6.1. Archives of the Cyperpunks List
|
||
- Karl Barrus has a selection of posts at the site
|
||
chaos.bsu.edu, available via
|
||
gopher. Look in the "Cypherpunks gopher site" directory.
|
||
3.6.2. "Why isn't the list sent out in encrypted form?"
|
||
- Too much hassle, no additional security, would only make
|
||
people jump through extra hoops (which might be useful, but
|
||
probably not worth the extra hassle and ill feelings).
|
||
- "We did this about 8 years ago at E&S using DEC VMS NOTES.
|
||
We used a plain vanilla secret key algorithm and a key
|
||
shared by all legitimate members of the group. We could do
|
||
it today -- but why bother? If you have a key that
|
||
widespread, it's effectively certain that a "wrong person"
|
||
(however you define him/her) will have a copy of the key."
|
||
[Carl Ellison, Encrypted BBS?, 1993-08-02]
|
||
3.6.3. "Why isn't the list moderated?"
|
||
- This usually comes up during severe flaming episodes,
|
||
notably when Detweiler is on the list in one of his various
|
||
personnas. Recently, it has not come up, as things have
|
||
been relatively quiet.
|
||
+ Moderation will *not* happen
|
||
- nobody has the time it takes
|
||
- nobody wants the onus
|
||
+ hardly consistent with many of our anarchist leanings, is
|
||
it?
|
||
- (Technically, moderation can be viewed as "my house, my
|
||
rules, and hence OK, but I think you get my point.)
|
||
- "No, please let's not become a 'moderated' newsgroup. This
|
||
would be the end of freedom! This is similar to giving the
|
||
police more powers because crime is up. While it is a
|
||
tactic to fight off the invaders, a better tactic is
|
||
knowledge." [RWGreene@vnet.net, alt.gathering.rainbow, 1994-
|
||
07-06]"
|
||
3.6.4. "Why isn't the list split into smaller lists?"
|
||
- What do you call the list outages?
|
||
+ Seriously, several proposals to split the list into pieces
|
||
have resulted in not much
|
||
- a hardware group...never seen again, that I know of
|
||
- a "moderated cryptography" group, ditto
|
||
- a DC-Net group...ditto
|
||
- several regional groups and meeting planning groups,
|
||
which are apparently moribund
|
||
- a "Dig Lib" group...ditto
|
||
- use Rishab's comment:
|
||
+ Reasons are clear: one large group is more successful in
|
||
traffic than smaller, low-volume groups...out of sight,
|
||
out of mind
|
||
- and topics change anyway, so the need for a
|
||
"steganography" mailing list (argued vehemently for by
|
||
one person, not Romana M., by the way) fades away when
|
||
the debate shifts. And so on.
|
||
3.6.5. Critical Addresses, Numbers, etc.
|
||
+ Cypherpunks archives sites
|
||
- soda
|
||
- mirror sites
|
||
- ftp sites
|
||
- PGP locations
|
||
- Infobot at Wired
|
||
- majordomo@toad.com; "help" as message body
|
||
3.6.6. "How did the Cypherpunk remailers appear so quickly?"
|
||
- remailers were the first big win...a weekend of Perl
|
||
hacking
|
||
|
||
3.7. Publicity
|
||
3.7.1. "What kind of press coverage have the Cypherpunks gotten?"
|
||
- " I concur with those who suggest that the solution to the
|
||
ignorance manifested in many of the articles concerning the
|
||
Net is education. The coverage of the Cypherpunks of late
|
||
(at least in the Times) shows me that reasonable accuracy
|
||
is possible." [Chris Walsh, news.admin.policy, 1994-07-04]
|
||
|
||
3.8. Loose Ends
|
||
3.8.1. On extending the scope of Cypherpunks to other countres
|
||
- a kind of crypto underground, to spread crypto tools, to
|
||
help sow discord, to undermine corrupt governments (to my
|
||
mind, all governments now on the planet are intrinsically
|
||
corrupt and need to be undermined)
|
||
- links to the criminal underworlds of these countries is one
|
||
gutsy thing to consider....fraught with dangers, but
|
||
ultimately destabilizing of governments
|
||
|
||
4. Goals and Ideology -- Privacy, Freedom, New Approaches
|
||
|
||
4.1. copyright
|
||
THE CYPHERNOMICON: Cypherpunks FAQ and More, Version 0.666,
|
||
1994-09-10, Copyright Timothy C. May. All rights reserved.
|
||
See the detailed disclaimer. Use short sections under "fair
|
||
use" provisions, with appropriate credit, but don't put your
|
||
name on my words.
|
||
|
||
4.2. SUMMARY: Goals and Ideology -- Privacy, Freedom, New Approaches
|
||
4.2.1. Main Points
|
||
4.2.2. Connections to Other Sections
|
||
- Crypto Anarchy is the logical outgrowth of strong crypto.
|
||
4.2.3. Where to Find Additional Information
|
||
- Vernor Vinge's "True Names"
|
||
- David Friedman's "Machinery of Freedom"
|
||
4.2.4. Miscellaneous Comments
|
||
- Most of the list members are libertarians, or leaning in
|
||
that direction, so the bias toward this is apparent.
|
||
- (If there's a coherent _non_-libertarian ideology, that's
|
||
also consistent with supporting strong crypto, I'm not sure
|
||
it's been presented.)
|
||
|
||
4.3. Why a Statement of Ideology?
|
||
4.3.1. This is perhaps a controversial area. So why include it? The
|
||
main reason is to provide some grounding for the later
|
||
comments on many issues.
|
||
4.3.2. People should not expect a uniform ideology on this list.
|
||
Some of us are anarcho-capitalist radicals (or "crypto
|
||
anarchists"), others of us are staid Republicans, and still
|
||
others are Wobblies and other assored leftists.
|
||
|
||
4.4. "Welcome to Cypherpunks"
|
||
4.4.1. This is the message each new subscriber to the Cypherpunks
|
||
lists gets, by Eric Hughes:
|
||
4.4.2. "Cypherpunks assume privacy is a good thing and wish there
|
||
were more of it. Cypherpunks acknowledge that those who want
|
||
privacy must create it for themselves and not expect
|
||
governments, corporations, or other large, faceless
|
||
organizations to grant them privacy out of beneficence.
|
||
Cypherpunks know that people have been creating their own
|
||
privacy for centuries with whispers, envelopes, closed doors,
|
||
and couriers. Cypherpunks do not seek to prevent other
|
||
people from speaking about their experiences or their
|
||
opinions.
|
||
|
||
"The most important means to the defense of privacy is
|
||
encryption. To encrypt is to indicate the desire for privacy.
|
||
But to encrypt with weak cryptography is to indicate not too
|
||
much desire for privacy. Cypherpunks hope that all people
|
||
desiring privacy will learn how best to defend it.
|
||
|
||
"Cypherpunks are therefore devoted to cryptography.
|
||
Cypherpunks wish to learn about it, to teach it, to implement
|
||
it, and to make more of it. Cypherpunks know that
|
||
cryptographic protocols make social structures. Cypherpunks
|
||
know how to attack a system and how to defend it.
|
||
Cypherpunks know just how hard it is to make good
|
||
cryptosystems.
|
||
|
||
"Cypherpunks love to practice. They love to play with public
|
||
key cryptography. They love to play with anonymous and
|
||
pseudonymous mail forwarding and delivery. They love to play
|
||
with DC-nets. They love to play with secure communications
|
||
of all kinds.
|
||
|
||
"Cypherpunks write code. They know that someone has to write
|
||
code to defend privacy, and since it's their privacy, they're
|
||
going to write it. Cypherpunks publish their code so that
|
||
their fellow cypherpunks may practice and play with it.
|
||
Cypherpunks realize that security is not built in a day and
|
||
are patient with incremental progress.
|
||
|
||
"Cypherpunks don't care if you don't like the software they
|
||
write. Cypherpunks know that software can't be destroyed.
|
||
Cypherpunks know that a widely dispersed system can't be shut
|
||
down.
|
||
|
||
"Cypherpunks will make the networks safe for privacy." [Eric
|
||
Hughes, 1993-07-21 version]
|
||
|
||
4.5. "Cypherpunks Write Code"
|
||
4.5.1. "Cypherpunks write code" is almost our mantra.
|
||
4.5.2. This has come to be a defining statement. Eric Hughes used it
|
||
to mean that Cypherpunks place more importance in actually
|
||
changing things, in actually getting working code out, than
|
||
in merely talking about how things "ought" to be.
|
||
- Eric Hughes statement needed here:
|
||
- Karl Kleinpaste, author of one of the early anonymous
|
||
posting services (Charcoal) said this about some proposal
|
||
made: "If you've got serious plans for how to implement
|
||
such a thing, please implement it at least skeletally and
|
||
deploy it. Proof by example, watching such a system in
|
||
action, is far better than pontification about it."
|
||
[Karl_Kleinpaste@cs.cmu.edu, news.admin.policy, 1994-06-30]
|
||
4.5.3. "The admonition, "Cypherpunks write code," should be taken
|
||
metaphorically. I think "to write code" means to take
|
||
unilateral effective action as an individual. That may mean
|
||
writing actual code, but it could also mean dumpster diving
|
||
at Mycrotronx and anonymously releasing the recovered
|
||
information. It could also mean creating an offshore digital
|
||
bank. Don't get too literal on us here. What is important
|
||
is that Cypherpunks take personal responsibility for
|
||
empowering themselves against threats to privacy." [Sandy
|
||
Sandfort, 1994-07-08]
|
||
4.5.4. A Cypherpunks outlook: taking the abstractions of academic
|
||
conferences and making them concrete
|
||
- One thing Eric Hughes and I discussed at length (for 3 days
|
||
of nearly nonstop talk, in May, 1992) was the glacial rate
|
||
of progress in converting the cryptographic primitive
|
||
operations of the academic crypto conferences into actual,
|
||
workable code. The basic RSA algorithm was by then barely
|
||
available, more than 15 years after invention. (This was
|
||
before PGP 2.0, and PGP 1.0 was barely available and was
|
||
disappointing, with RSA Data Security's various products in
|
||
limited niches.) All the neat stuff on digital cash, DC-
|
||
Nets, bit commitment, olivioius transfer, digital mixes,
|
||
and so on, was completely absent, in terms of avialable
|
||
code or "crypto ICs" (to borrow Brad Cox's phrase). If it
|
||
took 10-15 years for RSA to really appear in the real
|
||
world, how long would it take some of the exciting stuff to
|
||
get out?
|
||
- We thought it would be a neat idea to find ways to reify
|
||
these things, to get actual running code. As it happened,
|
||
PGP 2.0 appeared the week of our very first meeting, and
|
||
both the Kleinpaste/Julf and Cypherpunks remailers were
|
||
quick, if incomplete, implementations of David Chaum's 1981
|
||
"digital mixes." (Right on schedule, 11 years later.)
|
||
- Sadly, most of the abstractions of cryptology remain
|
||
residents of academic space, with no (available)
|
||
implementations in the real world. (To be sure, I suspect
|
||
many people have cobbled-together versions of many of these
|
||
things, in C code, whatever. But their work is more like
|
||
building sand castles, to be lost when they graduate or
|
||
move on to other projects. This is of course not a problem
|
||
unique to cryptology.)
|
||
- Today, various toolkits and libraries are under
|
||
development. Henry Strickland (Strick) is working on a
|
||
toolkit based on John Ousterhout's "TCL" system (for Unix),
|
||
and of course RSADSI provides RSAREF. Pr0duct Cypher has
|
||
"PGP Tools." Other projects are underway. (My own longterm
|
||
interest here is in building objects which act as the
|
||
cryptography papers would have them act...building block
|
||
objects. For this, I'm looking at Smalltalk of some
|
||
flavor.)
|
||
- It is still the case that most of the modern crypto papers
|
||
discuss theoretical abstractions that are _not even close_
|
||
to being implemented as reusable, robust objects or
|
||
routines. Closing the gap between theoretical papers and
|
||
practical realization is a major Cypherpunk emphasis.
|
||
4.5.5. Prototypes, even if fatally flawed, allow for evolutionary
|
||
learning and improvement. Think of it as engineering in
|
||
action.
|
||
|
||
4.6. Technological empowerment
|
||
4.6.1. (more needed here....)
|
||
4.6.2. As Sandy Sandfort notes, "The real point of Cypherpunks is
|
||
that it's better to use strong crypto than weak crypto or no
|
||
crypto at all. Our use of crypto doesn't have to be totally
|
||
bullet proof to be of value. Let *them* worry about the
|
||
technicalities while we make sure they have to work harder
|
||
and pay more for our encrypted info than they would if it
|
||
were in plaintext." [S.S. 1994-07-01]
|
||
|
||
4.7. Free Speech Issues
|
||
4.7.1. Speech
|
||
- "Public speech is not a series of public speeches, but
|
||
rather one's own
|
||
words spoken openly and without shame....I desire a society
|
||
where all may speak freely about whatever topic they will.
|
||
I desire that all people might be able to choose to whom
|
||
they wish to speak and to whom they do not wish to speak.
|
||
I desire a society where all people may have an assurance
|
||
that their words are directed only at those to whom they
|
||
wish. Therefore I oppose all efforts by governments to
|
||
eavesdrop and to become unwanted listeners." [Eric Hughes,
|
||
1994-02-22]
|
||
- "The government has no right to restrict my use of
|
||
cryptography in any way. They may not forbid me to use
|
||
whatever ciphers I may like, nor may they require me to use
|
||
any that I do not like." [Eric Hughes, 1993-06-01]
|
||
4.7.2. "Should there be _any_ limits whatsoever on a person's use of
|
||
cryptography?"
|
||
- No. Using the mathematics of cryptography is merely the
|
||
manipulation of symbols. No crime is involved, ipso facto.
|
||
- Also, as Eric Hughes has pointed out, this is another of
|
||
those questions where the normative "should" or "shouldn't"
|
||
invokes "the policeman inside." A better way to look at is
|
||
to see what steps people can take to make any question of
|
||
"should" this be allowed just moot.
|
||
- The "crimes" are actual physical acts like murder and
|
||
kidnapping. The fact that crypto may be used by plotters
|
||
and planners, thus making detection more difficult, is in
|
||
no way different from the possibility that plotters may
|
||
speak in an unusual language to each other (ciphers), or
|
||
meet in a private home (security), or speak in a soft voice
|
||
when in public (steganography). None of these things should
|
||
be illegal, and *none of them would be enforceable* except
|
||
in the most rigid of police states (and probably not even
|
||
there).
|
||
- "Crypto is thoughtcrime" is the effect of restricting
|
||
cryptography use.
|
||
4.7.3. Democracy and censorship
|
||
- Does a community have the right to decide what newsgroups
|
||
or magazines it allows in its community? Does a nation have
|
||
the right to do the same? (Tennessee, Iraq, Iran, France.
|
||
Utah?)
|
||
- This is what bypasses with crypto are all about: taking
|
||
these majoritarian morality decisions out of the hands of
|
||
the bluenoses. Direct action to secure freedoms.
|
||
|
||
4.8. Privacy Issues
|
||
4.8.1. "Is there an agenda here beyond just ensuring privacy?"
|
||
- Definitely! I think I can safely say that for nearly all
|
||
political persuasions on the Cypherpunks list. Left, right,
|
||
libertarian, or anarchist, there's much more to to strong
|
||
crypto than simple privacy. Privacy qua privacy is fairly
|
||
uninteresting. If all one wants is privacy, one can simply
|
||
keep to one's self, stay off high-visibility lists like
|
||
this, and generally stay out of trouble.
|
||
- Many of us see strong crypto as the key enabling technology
|
||
for a new economic and social system, a system which will
|
||
develop as cyberspace becomes more important. A system
|
||
which dispenses with national boundaries, which is based on
|
||
voluntary (even if anonymous) free trade. At issue is the
|
||
end of governments as we know them today. (Look at
|
||
interactions on the Net--on this list, for example--and
|
||
you'll see many so-called nationalities, voluntary
|
||
interaction, and the almost complete absence of any "laws."
|
||
Aside from their being almost no rules per se for the
|
||
Cypherpunks list, there are essentially no national laws
|
||
that are invokable in any way. This is a fast-growing
|
||
trend.)
|
||
+ Motivations for Cypherpunks
|
||
- Privacy. If maintaining privacy is the main goal, there's
|
||
not much more to say. Keep a low profile, protect data,
|
||
avoid giving out personal information, limit the number
|
||
of bank loans and credit applications, pay cash often,
|
||
etc.
|
||
- Privacy in activism.
|
||
+ New Structures. Using cryptographic constructs to build
|
||
new political, economic, and even social structures.
|
||
- Political: Voting, polling, information access,
|
||
whistleblowing
|
||
- Economic: Free markets, information markets, increased
|
||
liquidity, black markets
|
||
- Social: Cyberspatial communities, True Names
|
||
- Publically inspectable algorithms always win out over
|
||
private, secret algorithms
|
||
4.8.2. "What is the American attitude toward privacy and
|
||
encryption?"
|
||
+ There are two distinct (and perhaps simultaneously held)
|
||
views that have long been found in the American psyche:
|
||
- "A man's home is his castle." "Mind your own business."
|
||
The frontier and Calvinist sprit of keeping one's
|
||
business to one's self.
|
||
- "What have you got to hide?" The nosiness of busybodies,
|
||
gossiping about what others are doing, and being
|
||
suspicious of those who try too hard to hide what they
|
||
are doing.
|
||
+ The American attitude currently seems to favor privacy over
|
||
police powers, as evidenced by a Time-CNN poll:
|
||
- "In a Time/CNN poll of 1,000 Americans conducted last
|
||
week by Yankelovich Partners, two-thirds said it was more
|
||
important to protect the privacy of phone calls than to
|
||
preserve the ability of police to conduct wiretaps. When
|
||
informed about the Clipper Chip, 80% said they opposed
|
||
it." [Philip Elmer-Dewitt, "Who Should Keep the Keys,"
|
||
_TIME_, 1994-03-04.]
|
||
- The answer given is clearly a function of how the question
|
||
is phrased. Ask folks if they favor "unbreakable
|
||
encryption" or "fortress capabilities" for terrorists,
|
||
pedophiles, and other malefactors, and they'll likely give
|
||
a quite different answer. It is this tack now being taken
|
||
by the Clipper folks. Watch out for this!
|
||
- Me, I have no doubts.
|
||
- As Perry Metzger puts it, "I find the recent disclosures
|
||
concerning U.S. Government testing of the effects of
|
||
radiation on unknowing human subjects to be yet more
|
||
evidence that you simply cannot trust the government with
|
||
your own personal safety. Some people, given positions of
|
||
power, will naturally abuse those positions, often even if
|
||
such abuse could cause severe injury or death. I see little
|
||
reason, therefore, to simply "trust" the U.S. government --
|
||
and given that the U.S. government is about as good as they
|
||
get, its obvious that NO government deserves the blind
|
||
trust of its citizens. "Trust us, we will protect you"
|
||
rings quite hollow in the face of historical evidence.
|
||
Citizens must protect and preserve their own privacy -- the
|
||
government and its centralized cryptographic schemes
|
||
emphatically cannot be trusted." [P.M., 1994-01-01]
|
||
4.8.3. "How is 1994 like 1984?"
|
||
- The television ad for Clipper: "Clipper--why 1994 _will_ be
|
||
like 1984"
|
||
+ As Mike Ingle puts it:
|
||
- 1994: Wiretapping is privacy
|
||
Secrecy is openness
|
||
Obscurity is security
|
||
4.8.4. "We anticipate that computer networks will play a more and
|
||
more important role in many parts of our lives. But this
|
||
increased computerization brings tremendous dangers for
|
||
infringing privacy. Cypherpunks seek to put into place
|
||
structures which will allow people to preserve their privacy
|
||
if they choose. No one will be forced to use pseudonyms or
|
||
post anonymously. But it should be a matter of choice how
|
||
much information a person chooses to reveal about himself
|
||
when he communicates. Right now, the nets don't give you
|
||
that much choice. We are trying to give this power to
|
||
people." [Hal Finney, 1993-02-23]
|
||
4.8.5. "If cypherpunks contribute nothing else we can create a real
|
||
privacy advocacy group, advocating means of real self-
|
||
empowerment, from crypto to nom de guerre credit cards,
|
||
instead of advocating further invasions of our privacy as the
|
||
so-called privacy advocates are now doing!" [Jim Hart, 1994-
|
||
09-08]
|
||
|
||
4.9. Education Issues
|
||
4.9.1. "How can we get more people to use crypto?"
|
||
- telling them about the themes of Cypherpunks
|
||
- surveillance, wiretapping, Digital Telephony, Clipper, NSA,
|
||
FinCEN, etc....these things tend to scare a lot of folks
|
||
- making PGP easier to use, better integration with mailers,
|
||
etc.
|
||
- (To be frank, convincing others to protect themselves is
|
||
not one of my highest priorities. Then why have I written
|
||
this megabyte-plus FAQ? Good question. Getting more users
|
||
is a general win, for obvious reasons.)
|
||
4.9.2. "Who needs to encrypt?"
|
||
+ Corporations
|
||
- competitors...fax transmissions
|
||
+ foreign governments
|
||
- Chobetsu, GCHQ, SDECE, Mossad, KGB
|
||
+ their own government
|
||
- NSA intercepts of plans, investments
|
||
+ Activist Groups
|
||
- Aryan Nation needs to encrypt, as FBI has announced their
|
||
intent to infiltrate and subvert this group
|
||
- RU-486 networks
|
||
- Amnesty International
|
||
+ Terrorists and Drug Dealers
|
||
- clearly are clueless at times (Pablo Escobar using a
|
||
cellphone!)
|
||
- Triads, Russian Mafia, many are becoming crypto-literate
|
||
- (I've been appoached-'nuff said)
|
||
+ Doctors, lawyers, psychiatrists, etc.
|
||
- to preserve records against theft, snooping, casual
|
||
examination, etc.
|
||
- in many cases, a legal obligation has been attached to
|
||
this (notably, medical records)
|
||
- the curious situation that many people are essentially
|
||
_required_ to encrypt (no other way to ensure standards
|
||
are met) and yet various laws exists to limit
|
||
encryption...ITAR, Clipper, EES
|
||
- (Clipper is a partial answer, if unsatisfactory)
|
||
4.9.3. "When should crypto be used?"
|
||
- It's an economic matter. Each person has to decide when to
|
||
use it, and how. Me, I dislike having to download messages
|
||
to my home machine before I can read them. Others use it
|
||
routinely.
|
||
|
||
4.10. Libertarian Issues
|
||
4.10.1. A technological approach to freedom and privacy:
|
||
- "Freedom is, practically, given as much (or more) by the
|
||
tools we can build to protect it, as it is by our ability
|
||
to convince others who violently disagree with us not to
|
||
attack us. On the Internet we have tools like anon
|
||
remailers and PGP that give us a great deal of freedom
|
||
from coercion even in the midst of censors. Thus, these
|
||
tools piss off fans of centralized information control, the
|
||
defenders of the status quo, like nothing else on the
|
||
Internet." [<an50@desert.hacktic.nl> (Nobody), libtech-
|
||
l@netcom.com, 1994-06-08]
|
||
+ Duncan Frissell, as usual, put it cogently:
|
||
- "If I withhold my capital from some country or enterprise
|
||
I am not threatening to kill anyone. When a "Democratic
|
||
State" decides to do something, it does so with armed
|
||
men. If you don't obey, they tend to shoot....[I]f
|
||
technological change enhances the powers of individuals,
|
||
their power is enhanced no matter what the government
|
||
does.
|
||
|
||
"If the collective is weakened and the individual
|
||
strengthened by the fact that I have the power of cheap
|
||
guns, cars, computers, telecoms, and crypto then the
|
||
collective has been weakened and we should ease the
|
||
transition to a society based on voluntary rather than
|
||
coerced interaction.
|
||
|
||
"Unless you can figure out a new, improved way of
|
||
controlling others; you have no choice." [D.F., Decline
|
||
and Fall, 1994-06-19]
|
||
4.10.2. "They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little
|
||
temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety."
|
||
[Benjamin Franklin]
|
||
4.10.3. a typical view of government
|
||
- "As I see it, it's always a home for bullies masquerading
|
||
as a collective defense. Sometimes it actually it actually
|
||
has to perform its advertised defense function. Like naked
|
||
quarks,
|
||
purely defensive governments cannot exist. They are
|
||
bipolar by nature, with some poles (i.e., the bullying
|
||
part) being "more equal than others." [Sandy Sandfort, 1994-
|
||
09-06]
|
||
4.10.4. Sadly, several of our speculative scenarios for various laws
|
||
have come to pass. Even several of my own, such as:
|
||
- "(Yet Another May Prediction Realized)...The text of a
|
||
"digital stalking bill" was just sent to Cyberia-l." [L.
|
||
Todd Masco, 1994-08-31] (This was a joking prediction I
|
||
made that "digital stalking" would soon be a crime; there
|
||
had been news articles about the horrors of such
|
||
cyberspatial stalkings, regardless of there being no real
|
||
physical threats, so this move is not all that surprising.
|
||
Not surprising in an age when free speech gets outlawed as
|
||
"assault speech.")
|
||
4.10.5. "Don't tread on me."
|
||
4.10.6. However, it's easy to get too negative on the situation, to
|
||
assume that a socialist state is right around the corner. Or
|
||
that a new Hitler will come to power. These are unlikely
|
||
developments, and not only because of strong crypto.
|
||
Financial markets are putting constraints on how fascist a
|
||
government can get...the international bond markets, for
|
||
example, will quickly react to signs like this. (This is the
|
||
theory, at least.)
|
||
4.10.7. Locality of reference, cash, TANSTAAFL, privacy
|
||
- closure, local computation, local benefits
|
||
- no accounting system needed
|
||
- markets clear
|
||
- market distortions like rationing, coupons, quotas, all
|
||
require centralized record-keeping
|
||
- anything that ties economic transactions to identity
|
||
(rationing, entitlements, insurance) implies identity-
|
||
tracking, credentials, etc.
|
||
+ Nonlocality also dramatically increases the opportunities
|
||
for fraud, for scams and con jobs
|
||
- because something is being promised for future delivery
|
||
(the essence of many scams) and is not verifiable locally
|
||
- because "trust" is invoked
|
||
- Locality also fixes the "policeman inside" problem: the
|
||
costs of decisions are borne by the decider, not by others.
|
||
|
||
4.11. Crypto Anarchy
|
||
4.11.1. The Crypto Anarchy Principle: Strong crypto permits
|
||
unbreakable encrypion, unforgeable signatures, untraceable
|
||
electronic messages, and unlinkable pseudonomous identities.
|
||
This ensures that some transactions and communications can be
|
||
entered into only voluntarily. External force, law, and
|
||
regulation cannot be applied. This is "anarchy," in the sense
|
||
of no outside rulers and laws. Voluntary arrangements, back-
|
||
stopped by voluntarily-arranged institutions like escrow
|
||
services, will be the only form of rule. This is "crypto
|
||
anarchy."
|
||
4.11.2. crypto allows a return to contracts that governments cannot
|
||
breach
|
||
- based on reputation, repeat business
|
||
- example: ordering illegal material untraceably and
|
||
anonymously,,,governments are powerless to do anything
|
||
- private spaces, with the privacy enforced via cryptographic
|
||
permissions (access credentials)
|
||
- escrows (bonds)
|
||
4.11.3. Technological solutions over legalistic regulations
|
||
+ Marc Ringuette summarized things nicely:
|
||
- "What we're after is some "community standards" for
|
||
cyberspace, and what I'm suggesting is the fairly
|
||
libertarian standard that goes like this:
|
||
|
||
" Prefer technological solutions and self-protection
|
||
solutions
|
||
over rule-making, where they are feasible.
|
||
|
||
"This is based on the notion that the more rules there
|
||
are, the more people will call for the "net police" to
|
||
enforce them. If we can encourage community standards
|
||
which emphasize a prudent level of self-protection, then
|
||
we'll be able to make do with fewer rules and a less
|
||
intrusive level of policing."[Marc Ringuette, 1993-03-14]
|
||
+ Hal Finney has made cogent arguments as to why we should
|
||
not become too complacent about the role of technology vis-
|
||
a-vis politics. He warns us not to grow to confident:
|
||
- "Fundamentally, I believe we will have the kind of
|
||
society that most people want. If we want freedom and
|
||
privacy, we must persuade others that these are worth
|
||
having. There are no shortcuts. Withdrawing into
|
||
technology is like pulling the blankets over your head.
|
||
It feels good for a while, until reality catches up. The
|
||
next Clipper or Digital Telephony proposal will provide a
|
||
rude awakening." [Hal Finney, POLI: Politics vs
|
||
Technology, 1994-01-02]
|
||
- "The idea here is that the ultimate solution to the low
|
||
signal-to-noise ratio on the nets is not a matter of
|
||
forcing people to "stand behind their words". People can
|
||
stand behind all kinds of idiotic ideas. Rather, there
|
||
will need to be developed better systems for filtering news
|
||
and mail, for developing "digital reputations" which can be
|
||
stamped on one's postings to pass through these smart
|
||
filters, and even applying these reputations to pseudonyms.
|
||
In such a system, the fact that someone is posting or
|
||
mailing pseudonymously is not a problem, since nuisance
|
||
posters won't be able to get through." [Hal Finney, 1993-
|
||
02-23]
|
||
4.11.4. Reputations
|
||
4.11.5. I have a moral outlook that many will find unacceptable or
|
||
repugnant. To cut to the chase: I support the killing of
|
||
those who break contracts, who steal in serious enough ways,
|
||
and who otherwise commit what I think of as crimes.
|
||
+ I don't mean this abstractly. Here's an example:
|
||
- Someone is carrying drugs. He knows what he's involved
|
||
in. He knows that theft is punishable by death. And yet
|
||
he steals some of the merchandise.
|
||
- Dealers understand that they cannot tolerate this, that
|
||
an example must be made, else all of their employees will
|
||
steal.
|
||
- Understand that I'm not talking about the state doing the
|
||
killing, nor would I do the killing. I'm just saying such
|
||
things are the natural enforcement mechanism for such
|
||
markets. Realpolitik.
|
||
- (A meta point: the drug laws makes things this way.
|
||
Legalize all drugs and the businesses would be more like
|
||
"ordinary" businesses.)
|
||
- In my highly personal opinion, many people, including most
|
||
Congressrodents, have committed crimes that earn them the
|
||
death penalty; I will not be sorry to see anonymous
|
||
assassination markets used to deal with them.
|
||
4.11.6. Increased espionage will help to destroy nation-state-empires
|
||
like the U.S., which has gotten far too bloated and far too
|
||
dependent on throwing its weight around; nuclear "terrorism"
|
||
may knock out a few cities, but this may be a small price to
|
||
pay to undermine totally the socialist welfare states that
|
||
have launched so many wars this century.
|
||
|
||
4.12. Loose Ends
|
||
4.12.1. "Why take a "no compromise" stance?"
|
||
- Compromise often ends up in the death of a thousand cuts.
|
||
Better to just take a rejectionist stance.
|
||
- The National Rifle Association (NRA) learned this lesson
|
||
the hard way. EFF may eventually learn it; right now they
|
||
appear to be in the "coopted by the power center" mode,
|
||
luxuriating in their inside-the-Beltway access to the Veep,
|
||
their flights on Air Force One, and their general
|
||
schmoozing with the movers and shakers...getting along by
|
||
going along.
|
||
- Let's not compromise on basic issues. Treat censorship as a
|
||
problem to be routed around (as John Gilmore suggests), not
|
||
as something that needs to be compromised on. (This is
|
||
directed at rumblings about how the Net needs to "police
|
||
itself," by the "reasonable" censorship of offensive posts,
|
||
by the "moderation" of newsgroups, etc. What should concern
|
||
us is the accomodation of this view by well-meaning civil
|
||
liberties groups, which are apparently willing to play a
|
||
role in this "self-policing" system. No thanks.)
|
||
- (And since people often misunderstand this point, I'm not
|
||
saying private companies can't set whatever policies they
|
||
wish, that moderated newsgroups can't be formed, etc.
|
||
Private arrangements are just that. The issue is when
|
||
censorship is forced on those who have no other
|
||
obligations. Government usually does this, often aided and
|
||
abetted by corporations and lobbying groups. This is what
|
||
we need to fight. Fight by routing around, via technology.)
|
||
4.12.2. The inherent evils of democracy
|
||
- To be blunt about it, I've come to despise the modern
|
||
version of democracy we have. Every issue is framed in
|
||
terms of popular sentiment, in terms of how the public
|
||
would vote. Mob rule at its worst.
|
||
- Should people be allowed to wear blue jeans? Put it to a
|
||
vote. Can employers have a policy on blue jeans? Pass a
|
||
law. Should health care be provided to all? Put it to a
|
||
vote. And so on, whittling away basic freedoms and rights.
|
||
A travesty. The tyranny of the majority.
|
||
- De Toqueville warned of this when he said that the American
|
||
experiment in democracy would last only until citizens
|
||
discovered they could pick the pockets of their neighbors
|
||
at the ballot box.
|
||
- But maybe we can stop this nonsense. I support strong
|
||
crypto (and its eventual form, crypto anarchy) because it
|
||
undermines this form of democracy. It takes some (and
|
||
perhaps many) transactions out of the realm of popularity
|
||
contests, beyond the reach of will of the herd. (No, I am
|
||
not arguing there will be a complete phase change. As the
|
||
saying goes, "You can't eat cyberspace." But a lot of
|
||
consulting, technical work, programming, etc., can in fact
|
||
be done with crypto anarchic methods, with the money gained
|
||
transferred in a variety of ways into the "real world."
|
||
More on this elsewhere.)
|
||
+ Crypto anarchy effectively allows people to pick and choose
|
||
which laws they support, at least in cyberspatial contexts.
|
||
It empowers people to break the local bonds of their
|
||
majoritarian normative systems and decide for themselves
|
||
which laws are moral and which are bullshit.
|
||
- I happen to have faith that most people will settle on a
|
||
relatively small number of laws that they'll (mostly)
|
||
support, a kind of Schelling point in legal space.
|
||
4.12.3. "Is the Cypherpunks agenda _too extreme_?"
|
||
- Bear in mind that most of the "Cypherpunks agenda," to the
|
||
extent we can identify it, is likely to provoke ordinary
|
||
citizens into _outrage_. Talk of anonymous mail, digital
|
||
money, money laundering, information markets, data havens,
|
||
undermining authority, transnationalism, and all the rest
|
||
(insert your favorite idea) is not exactly mainstream.
|
||
4.12.4. "Crypto Anarchy sounds too wild for me."
|
||
- I accept that many people will find the implications of
|
||
crypto anarchy (which follows in turn from the existence of
|
||
strong cryptography, via the Crypto Anarchy Principle) to
|
||
be more than they can accept.
|
||
- This is OK (not that you need my OK!). The house of
|
||
Cypherpunks has many rooms.
|
||
|
||
5. Cryptology
|
||
|
||
5.1. copyright
|
||
THE CYPHERNOMICON: Cypherpunks FAQ and More, Version 0.666,
|
||
1994-09-10, Copyright Timothy C. May. All rights reserved.
|
||
See the detailed disclaimer. Use short sections under "fair
|
||
use" provisions, with appropriate credit, but don't put your
|
||
name on my words.
|
||
|
||
5.2. SUMMARY: Cryptology
|
||
5.2.1. Main Points
|
||
- gaps still exist here...I treated this as fairly low
|
||
priority, given the wealth of material on cryptography
|
||
5.2.2. Connections to Other Sections
|
||
- detailed crypto knowledge is not needed to understand many
|
||
of the implications, but it helps to know the basics (it
|
||
heads off many of the most wrong-headed interpretations)
|
||
- in particular, everyone should learn enough to at least
|
||
vaguely understand how "blinding" works
|
||
5.2.3. Where to Find Additional Information
|
||
+ a dozen or so major books
|
||
- Schneier, "Applied Cryptography"--is practically
|
||
"required reading"
|
||
- Denning
|
||
- Brassard
|
||
- Simmons
|
||
- Welsh, Dominic
|
||
- Salomaa
|
||
- "CRYPTO" Proceedings
|
||
- Other books I can take or leave
|
||
- many ftp sites, detailed in various places in this doc
|
||
- sci.crypt, alt.privacy.pgp, etc.
|
||
- sci.crypt.research is a new group, and is moderated, so it
|
||
should have some high-quality, technical posts
|
||
- FAQs on sci.crypt, from RSA, etc.
|
||
- Dave Banisar of EPIC (Electronic Privacy Information
|
||
Center) reports: "...we have several hundred files on
|
||
encryption available via ftp/wais/gopher/WWW from cpsr.org
|
||
/cpsr/privacy/crypto." [D.B., sci.crypt, 1994-06-30]
|
||
5.2.4. Miscellaneous Comments
|
||
- details of algorithms would fill several books...and do
|
||
- hence, will not cover crypto in depth here (the main focus
|
||
of this doc is the implications of crypto, the
|
||
Cypherpunkian aspects, the things not covered in crypto
|
||
textbooks)
|
||
- beware of getting lost in the minutiae, in the details of
|
||
specific algorithms...try to keep in the mind the
|
||
_important_ aspects of any system
|
||
|
||
5.3. What this FAQ Section Will Not Cover
|
||
5.3.1. Why a section on crypto when so many other sources exist?
|
||
- A good question. I'll be keeping this section brief, as
|
||
many textbooks can afford to do a much better job here than
|
||
I can.
|
||
- not just for those who read number theory books with one
|
||
hand
|
||
5.3.2. NOTE: This section may remain disorganized, at least as
|
||
compared to some of the later sections. Many excellent
|
||
sources on crypto exist, including readily available FAQs
|
||
(sci.crypt, RSADSI FAQ) and books. Schneier's books is
|
||
especially recommended, and should be on _every_ Cypherpunk's
|
||
bookshelf.
|
||
|
||
5.4. Crypto Basics
|
||
5.4.1. "What is cryptology?"
|
||
- we see crypto all around us...the keys in our pockets, the
|
||
signatures on our driver's licenses and other cards, the
|
||
photo IDs, the credit cards
|
||
+ cryptography or cryptology, the science of secret
|
||
writing...but it's a lot more...consider I.D. cards, locks
|
||
on doors, combinations to safes, private
|
||
information...secrecy is all around us
|
||
- some say this is bad--the tension between "what have you
|
||
got to hide?" and "none of your business"
|
||
- some exotic stuff: digital money, voting systems, advanced
|
||
software protocols
|
||
- of importance to protecting privacy in a world of
|
||
localizers (a la Bob and Cherie), credit cards, tags on
|
||
cars, etc....the dossier society
|
||
+ general comments on cryptography
|
||
- chain is only as strong as its weakest link
|
||
- assume opponnent knows everything except the secret key
|
||
-
|
||
- Crypto is about economics
|
||
+ Codes and Ciphers
|
||
+ Simple Codes
|
||
- Code Books
|
||
+ Simple Ciphers
|
||
+ Substitution Ciphers (A=C, B=D, etc.)
|
||
- Caesar Shift (blocks)
|
||
+ Keyword Ciphers
|
||
+ Vigenre (with Caesar)
|
||
+ Rotor Machines
|
||
- Hagelin
|
||
- Enigma
|
||
- Early Computers (Turing, Colossus)
|
||
+ Modern Ciphers
|
||
+ 20th Century
|
||
+ Private Key
|
||
+ One-Time Pads (long strings of random numbers,
|
||
shared by both parties)
|
||
+ not breakable even in principle, e.g., a one-time
|
||
pad with random characters selected by a truly
|
||
random process (die tosses, radioactive decay,
|
||
certain types of noise, etc.)
|
||
- and ignoring the "breakable by break-ins"
|
||
approach of stealing the one-time pad, etc.
|
||
("Black bag cryptography")
|
||
- Computer Media (Floppies)
|
||
+ CD-ROMs and DATs
|
||
- "CD ROM is a terrible medium for the OTP key
|
||
stream. First, you want exactly two copies of
|
||
the random stream. CD ROM has an economic
|
||
advantage only for large runs. Second, you want
|
||
to destroy the part of the stream already used.
|
||
CD ROM has no erase facilities, outside of
|
||
physical destruction of the entire disk."
|
||
[Bryan G. Olson, sci.crypt, 1994-08-31]
|
||
+ DES--Data Encryption Standard
|
||
- Developed from IBM's Lucifer, supported by NSA
|
||
- a standard since 1970s
|
||
+ But is it "Weak"?
|
||
+ DES-busting hardware and software studied
|
||
+ By 1990, still cracked
|
||
- But NSA/NIST has ordered a change
|
||
+ Key Distribution Problem
|
||
+ Communicating with 100 other people means
|
||
distributing and securing 100 keys
|
||
- and each of those 100 must keep their 100 keys
|
||
secure
|
||
- no possibility of widespread use
|
||
+ Public Key
|
||
+ 1970s: Diffie, Hellman, Merkle
|
||
+ Two Keys: Private Key and Public Key
|
||
+ Anybody can encrypt a message to Receiver with
|
||
Receiver's PUBLIC key, but only the Receiver's
|
||
PRIVATE key can decrypt the message
|
||
+ Directories of public keys can be published
|
||
(solves the key distribution problem)
|
||
+ Approaches
|
||
+ One-Way Functions
|
||
- Knapsack (Merkle, Hellman)
|
||
+ RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman)
|
||
- relies on difficulty of factoring
|
||
large numbers (200 decimal digits)
|
||
- believed to be "NP-hard"
|
||
+ patented and licensed to "carefully
|
||
selected" customers
|
||
- RSA, Fiat-Shamir, and other
|
||
algorithms are not freely usable
|
||
- search for alternatives continues
|
||
5.4.2. "Why does anybody need crypto?"
|
||
+ Why the Need
|
||
- electronic communications...cellular phones, fax
|
||
machines, ordinary phone calls are all easily
|
||
intercepted...by foreign governments, by the NSA, by
|
||
rival drug dealers, by casual amateurs
|
||
+ transactions being traced....credit card receipts,
|
||
personal checks, I.D. cards presented at time of
|
||
purchase...allows cross-referencing, direct mail data
|
||
bases, even government raids on people who buy greenhouse
|
||
supplies!
|
||
- in a sense, encryption and digital money allows a
|
||
return to cash
|
||
- Why do honest people need encryption? Because not
|
||
everyone is honest, and this applies to governments as
|
||
well. Besides, some things are no one else's business.
|
||
- Why does anybody need locks on doors? Why aren't all
|
||
diaries available for public reading?
|
||
+ Whit Diffie, one of the inventors of public key
|
||
cryptography (and a Cypherpunk) points out that human
|
||
interaction has largely been predicated on two important
|
||
aspects:
|
||
- that you are who you say you are
|
||
- expectation of privacy in private communications
|
||
- Privacy exists in various forms in various cultures. But
|
||
even in police states, certain concepts of privacy are
|
||
important.
|
||
- Trust is not enough...one may have opponents who will
|
||
violate trust if it seems justified
|
||
+ The current importance of crypto is even more striking
|
||
+ needed to protect privacy in cyberspace, networks, etc.
|
||
- many more paths, links, interconnects
|
||
- read Vinge's "True Names" for a vision
|
||
+ digital money...in a world of agents, knowbots, high
|
||
connectivity
|
||
- (can't be giving out your VISA number for all these
|
||
things)
|
||
+ developing battle between:
|
||
- privacy advocates...those who want privacy
|
||
- government agencies...FBI, DOJ, DEA, FINCEN, NSA
|
||
+ being fought with:
|
||
- attempts to restrict encryption (S.266, never passed)
|
||
- Digital Telephony Bill, $10K a day fine
|
||
- trial balloons to require key registration
|
||
- future actions
|
||
+ honest people need crypto because there are dishonest
|
||
people
|
||
- and there may be other needs for privacy
|
||
- Phil Zimmerman's point about sending all mail, all letters,
|
||
on postcards--"What have you got to hide?" indeed!
|
||
- the expectation of privacy in out homes and in phone
|
||
conversations
|
||
+ Whit Diffie's main points:
|
||
+ proving who you say you are...signatures, authentications
|
||
- like "seals" of the past
|
||
- protecting privacy
|
||
- locks and keys on property and whatnot
|
||
+ the three elements that are central to our modern view of
|
||
liberty and privacy (a la Diffie)
|
||
- protecting things against theft
|
||
- proving who we say we are
|
||
- expecting privacy in our conversations and writings
|
||
5.4.3. What's the history of cryptology?
|
||
5.4.4. Major Classes of Crypto
|
||
- (these sections will introduce the terms in context, though
|
||
complete definitions will not be given)
|
||
+ Encryption
|
||
- privacy of messages
|
||
- using ciphers and codes to protect the secrecy of
|
||
messages
|
||
- DES is the most common symmetric cipher (same key for
|
||
encryption and decryption)
|
||
- RSA is the most common asymmetric cipher (different keys
|
||
for encryption and decryption)
|
||
+ Signatures and Authentication
|
||
- proving who you are
|
||
- proving you signed a document (and not someone else)
|
||
+ Authentication
|
||
+ Seals
|
||
+ Signatures (written)
|
||
+ Digital Signatures (computer)
|
||
- Example: Numerical codes on lottery tickets
|
||
+ Using Public Key Methods (see below)
|
||
- Digital Credentials (Super Smartcards)
|
||
- Tamper-responding Systems
|
||
+ Credentials
|
||
- ID Cards, Passports, etc.
|
||
+ Biometric Security
|
||
- Fingerprints, Retinal Scans, DNA, etc.
|
||
+ Untraceable Mail
|
||
- untraceable sending and receiving of mail and messages
|
||
- focus: defeating eavesdroppers and traffic analysis
|
||
- DC protocol (dining cryptographers)
|
||
+ Cryptographic Voting
|
||
- focus: ballot box anonymity
|
||
- credentials for voting
|
||
- issues of double voting, security, robustness, efficiency
|
||
+ Digital Cash
|
||
- focus: privacy in transactions, purchases
|
||
- unlinkable credentials
|
||
- blinded notes
|
||
- "digital coins" may not be possible
|
||
+ Crypto Anarchy
|
||
- using the above to evade gov't., to bypass tax
|
||
collection, etc.
|
||
- a technological solution to the problem of too much
|
||
government
|
||
+ Security
|
||
+ Locks
|
||
- Key Locks
|
||
+ Combination Locks
|
||
- Cardkey Locks
|
||
+ Tamper-responding Systems (Seals)
|
||
+ Also known as "tamper-proof" (misleading)
|
||
- Food and Medicine Containers
|
||
- Vaults, Safes (Alarms)
|
||
+ Weapons, Permissive Action Links
|
||
- Nuclear Weapons
|
||
- Arms Control
|
||
- Smartcards
|
||
- Currency, Checks
|
||
+ Cryptographic Checksums on Software
|
||
- But where is it stored? (Can spoof the system by
|
||
replacing the whole package)
|
||
+ Copy Protection
|
||
- Passwords
|
||
- Hardware Keys ("dongles")
|
||
- Call-in at run-time
|
||
+ Access Control
|
||
- Passwords, Passphrases
|
||
- Biometric Security, Handwritten Signatures
|
||
- For: Computer Accounts, ATMs, Smartcards
|
||
5.4.5. Hardware vs. Software
|
||
- NSA says only hardware implementations can really be
|
||
considered secure, and yet most Cypherpunks and ordinary
|
||
crypto users favor the sofware approach
|
||
- Hardware is less easily spoofable (replacement of modules)
|
||
- Software can be changed more rapidly, to make use of newer
|
||
features, faster modules, etc.
|
||
- Different cultures, with ordinary users (many millions)
|
||
knowing they are less likely to have their systems black-
|
||
bag spoofed (midnight engineering) than are the relatively
|
||
fewer and much more sensitive military sites.
|
||
5.4.6. "What are 'tamper-resistant modules' and why are they
|
||
important?"
|
||
- These are the "tamper-proof boxes" of yore: display cases,
|
||
vaults, museum cases
|
||
- that give evidence of having been opened, tampered with,
|
||
etc.
|
||
+ modern versions:
|
||
- display cases
|
||
- smart cards
|
||
+ chips
|
||
- layers of epoxy, abrasive materials, fusible links,
|
||
etc.
|
||
- (goal is to make reverse engineering much more
|
||
expensive)
|
||
- nuclear weapon "permissive action links" (PALs)
|
||
5.4.7. "What are "one way functions"?"
|
||
- functions with no inverses
|
||
- crypto needs functions that are seemingly one-way, but
|
||
which actually have an inverse (though very hard to find,
|
||
for example)
|
||
- one-way function, like "bobbles" (Vinge's "Marooned in
|
||
Realtime")
|
||
5.4.8. When did modern cryptology start?
|
||
+ "What are some of the modern applications of cryptology?"
|
||
+ "Zero Knowledge Interactive Proof Systems" (ZKIPS)
|
||
- since around 1985
|
||
- "minimum disclosure proofs"
|
||
+ proving that you know something without actually
|
||
revealing that something
|
||
+ practical example: password
|
||
+ can prove you have the password without actually
|
||
typing it in to computer
|
||
- hence, eavesdroppers can't learn your password
|
||
- like "20 questions" but more sophisticated
|
||
- abstract example: Hamiltonian circuit of a graph
|
||
+ Digital Money
|
||
+ David Chaum: "RSA numbers ARE money"
|
||
- checks, cashiers checks, etc.
|
||
- can even know if attempt is made to cash same check
|
||
twice
|
||
+ so far, no direct equivalent of paper currency or
|
||
coins
|
||
- but when combined with "reputation-based systems,"
|
||
there may be
|
||
+ Credentials
|
||
+ Proofs of some property that do not reveal more than
|
||
just that property
|
||
- age, license to drive, voting rights, etc.
|
||
- "digital envelopes"
|
||
+ Fiat-Shamir
|
||
- passports
|
||
+ Anonymous Voting
|
||
- protection of privacy with electronic voting
|
||
- politics, corporations, clubs, etc.
|
||
- peer review of electronic journals
|
||
- consumer opinions, polls
|
||
+ Digital Pseudonyms and Untraceable E-Mail
|
||
+ ability to adopt a digital pseudonym that is:
|
||
- unforgeable
|
||
- authenticatable
|
||
- untraceable
|
||
- Vinge's "True Names" and Card's "Ender's Game"
|
||
+ Bulletin Boards, Samizdats, and Free Speech
|
||
+ banned speech, technologies
|
||
- e.g., formula for RU-486 pill
|
||
- bootleg software, legally protected material
|
||
+ floating opinions without fears for professional
|
||
position
|
||
- can even later "prove" the opinions were yours
|
||
+ "The Labyrinth"
|
||
- store-and-forward switching nodes
|
||
+ each with tamper-responding modules that decrypt
|
||
incoming messages
|
||
+ accumulate some number (latency)
|
||
+ retransmit to next address
|
||
- and so on....
|
||
+ relies on hardware and/or reputations
|
||
+ Chaum claims it can be done solely in software
|
||
- "Dining Cryptographers"
|
||
5.4.9. What is public key cryptography?
|
||
5.4.10. Why is public key cryptography so important?
|
||
+ The chief advantage of public keys cryptosystems over
|
||
conventional symmetric key (one key does both encryption
|
||
and decryption) is one _connectivity_ to recipients: one
|
||
can communicate securely with people without exchanging key
|
||
material.
|
||
- by looking up their public key in a directory
|
||
- by setting up a channel using Diffie-Hellman key exchange
|
||
(for example)
|
||
5.4.11. "Does possession of a key mean possession of *identity*?"
|
||
- If I get your key, am I you?
|
||
- Certainly not outside the context of the cryptographic
|
||
transaction. But within the context of a transaction, yes.
|
||
Additional safeguards/speedbumps can be inserted (such as
|
||
biometric credentials, additional passphrases, etc.), but
|
||
these are essentially part of the "key," so the basic
|
||
answer remains "yes." (There are periodically concerns
|
||
raised about this, citing the dangers of having all
|
||
identity tied to a single credential, or number, or key.
|
||
Well, there are ways to handle this, such as by adopting
|
||
protocols that limit one's exposure, that limits the amount
|
||
of money that can be withdrawn, etc. Or people can adopt
|
||
protocols that require additional security, time delays,
|
||
countersigning, etc.)
|
||
+ This may be tested in court soon enough, but the answer for
|
||
many contracts and crypto transactions will be that
|
||
possession of key = possession of identity. Even a court
|
||
test may mean little, for the types of transactions I
|
||
expect to see.
|
||
- That is, in anonymous systems, "who ya gonna sue?"
|
||
- So, guard your key.
|
||
5.4.12. What are digital signatures?
|
||
+ Uses of Digital Signatures
|
||
- Electronic Contracts
|
||
- Voting
|
||
- Checks and other financial instruments (similar to
|
||
contracts)
|
||
- Date-stamped Transactions (augmenting Notary Publics)
|
||
5.4.13. Identity, Passports, Fiat-Shamir
|
||
- Murdoch, is-a-person, national ID cards, surveillance
|
||
society
|
||
+ "Chess Grandmaster Problem" and other Frauds and Spoofs
|
||
- of central importance to proofs of identity (a la Fiat-
|
||
Shamir)
|
||
- "terrorist" and "Mafia spoof" problems
|
||
5.4.14. Where else should I look?
|
||
5.4.15. Crypto, Technical
|
||
+ Ciphers
|
||
- traditional
|
||
- one-time pads, Vernams ciphers, information-theoretically
|
||
secure
|
||
+ "I Have a New Idea for a Cipher---Should I Discuss it
|
||
Here?"
|
||
- Please don't. Ciphers require careful analysis, and
|
||
should be in paper form (that is, presented in a
|
||
detailed paper, with the necessary references to show
|
||
that due diligence was done, the equations, tables,
|
||
etc. The Net is a poor substitute.
|
||
- Also, breaking a randomly presented cipher is by no
|
||
means trivial, even if the cipher is eventually shown
|
||
to be weak. Most people don't have the inclination to
|
||
try to break a cipher unless there's some incentive,
|
||
such as fame or money involved.
|
||
- And new ciphers are notoriously hard to design. Experts
|
||
are the best folks to do this. With all the stuff
|
||
waiting to be done (described here), working on a new
|
||
cipher is probably the least effective thing an amateur
|
||
can do. (If you are not an amateur, and have broken
|
||
other people's ciphers before, then you know who you
|
||
are, and these comments don't apply. But I'll guess
|
||
that fewer than a handful of folks on this list have
|
||
the necessary background to do cipher design.)
|
||
- There are a vast number of ciphers and systems, nearly
|
||
all of no lasting significance. Untested, undocumented,
|
||
unused--and probably unworthy of any real attention.
|
||
Don't add to the noise.
|
||
- What is DES and can it be broken?
|
||
+ ciphers
|
||
- RC4, stream cipher
|
||
+ DolphinEncrypt
|
||
-
|
||
+ "Last time Dolphin Encrypt reared its insecure head
|
||
in this forum,
|
||
- these same issues came up. The cipher that DE uses
|
||
is not public and
|
||
- was not designed by a person of known
|
||
cryptographicc competence. It
|
||
- should therefore be considered extremely weak.
|
||
<Eric Hughes, 4-16-94, Cypherpunks>
|
||
+ RSA
|
||
- What is RSA?
|
||
- Who owns or controls the RSA patents?
|
||
- Can RSA be broken?
|
||
- What alternatives to RSA exist?
|
||
+ One-Way Functions
|
||
- like diodes, one-way streets
|
||
- multiplying two large numbers together is
|
||
easy....factoring the product is often very hard
|
||
- (this is not enough for a usable cipher, as the recipient
|
||
must be able to perform the reverse operation..it turns
|
||
out that "trapdoors" can be found)
|
||
- Digital Signatures
|
||
+ Digital Cash
|
||
- What is digital cash?
|
||
- How does digital cash differ from VISA and similar
|
||
electronic systems?
|
||
- Clearing vs. Doublespending Detection
|
||
- Zero Knowledge
|
||
- Mixes and Remailers
|
||
- Dining Cryptographers
|
||
+ Steganography
|
||
- invisible ink
|
||
- microdots
|
||
- images
|
||
- sound files
|
||
+ Random Number Generators
|
||
+ von Neumann quote about living in a state of sin
|
||
- also paraphrased (I've heard) to include _analog_
|
||
methods, presumably because the nonrepeating (form an
|
||
initial seed/start) nature makes repeating experiments
|
||
impossible
|
||
+ Blum-Blum-Shub
|
||
+ How it Works
|
||
- "The Blum-Blum-Shub PRNG is really very simple.
|
||
There is source floating around on the crypto ftp
|
||
sites, but it is a set of scripts for the Unix bignum
|
||
calculator "bc", plus some shell scripts, so it is
|
||
not very portable.
|
||
|
||
"To create a BBS RNG, choose two random primes p and
|
||
q which are congruent to 3 mod 4. Then the RNG is
|
||
based on the iteration x = x*x mod n. x is
|
||
initialized as a random seed. (x should be a
|
||
quadratic residue, meaning that it is the square of
|
||
some number mod n, but that can be arranged by
|
||
iterating the RNG once before using its output.)"
|
||
[Hal Finney, 1994-05-14]
|
||
- Look for blum-blum-shub-strong-randgen.shar and related
|
||
files in pub/crypt/other at ripem.msu.edu. (This site
|
||
is chock-full of good stuff. Of course, only Americans
|
||
are allowed to use these random number generators, and
|
||
even they face fines of $500,000 and imprisonment for
|
||
up to 5 years for inappopriate use of random numbers.)
|
||
- source code at ripem ftp site
|
||
- "If you don't need high-bandwidth randomness, there are
|
||
several good PRNG, but none of them run fast. See the
|
||
chapter on PRNG's in "Cryptology and Computational
|
||
Number Theory"." [Eric Hughes, 1994-04-14]
|
||
+ "What about hardware random number generators?"
|
||
+ Chips are available
|
||
-
|
||
+ "Hughes Aircraft also offers a true non-deterministic
|
||
chip (16 pin DIP).
|
||
- For more info contact me at kephart@sirena.hac.com"
|
||
<7 April 94, sci.crypt>
|
||
+ "Should RNG hardware be a Cypherpunks project?"
|
||
- Probably not, but go right ahead. Half a dozen folks
|
||
have gotten all fired up about this, proposed a project-
|
||
-then let it drop.
|
||
- can use repeated applications of a cryptographic has
|
||
function to generate pretty damn good PRNs (the RSAREF
|
||
library has hooks for this)
|
||
+ "I need a pretty good random number generator--what
|
||
should I use?"
|
||
- "While Blum-Blum-Shub is probably the cool way to go,
|
||
RSAREF uses repeated iterations of MD5 to generate its
|
||
pseudo-randoms, which can be reasonably secure and use
|
||
code you've probably already got hooks from perl
|
||
for.[BillStewart,1994-04-15]
|
||
+ Libraries
|
||
- Scheme code: ftp://ftp.cs.indiana.edu/pub/scheme-
|
||
repository/scm/rand.scm
|
||
+ P and NP and all that jazz
|
||
- complexity, factoring,
|
||
+ can quantum mechanics help?
|
||
- probably not
|
||
+ Certification Authorities
|
||
- heierarchy vs. distributed web of trust
|
||
- in heierarchy, individual businesses may set themselves
|
||
up as CAs, as CommerceNet is talking about doing
|
||
+ Or, scarily, the governments of the world may insist that
|
||
they be "in the loop"
|
||
- several ways to do this: legal system invocation, tax
|
||
laws, national security....I expect the legal system to
|
||
impinge on CAs and hence be the main way that CAs are
|
||
partnered with the government
|
||
- I mention this to give people some chance to plan
|
||
alternatives, end-runs
|
||
- This is one of the strongest reasons to support the
|
||
decoupling of software from use (that is, to reject the
|
||
particular model RSADSI is now using)
|
||
5.4.16. Randomness
|
||
- A confusing subject to many, but also a glorious subject
|
||
(ripe with algorithms, with deep theory, and readily
|
||
understandable results).
|
||
+ Bill Stewart had a funny comment in sci.crypt which also
|
||
shows how hard it is to know if something's really random
|
||
or not: "I can take a simple generator X[i] = DES( X[i-1],
|
||
K ), which will produce nice random white noise, but you
|
||
won't be able to see that it's non-random unless you rent
|
||
time on NSA's DES-cracker." [B.S. 1994-09-06]
|
||
- In fact, many seemingly random strings are actually
|
||
"cryptoregular": they are regular, or nonrandom, as soon
|
||
as one uses the right key. Obviously, most strings used
|
||
in crypto are cryptoregular in that they _appear_ to be
|
||
random, and pass various randomness measures, but are
|
||
not.
|
||
+ "How can the randomness of a bit string be measured?"
|
||
- It can roughly be estimated by entropy measures, how
|
||
compressible it is (by various compression programs),
|
||
etc.
|
||
- It's important to realize that measures of randomness
|
||
are, in a sense, "in the eye of the beholder"--there just
|
||
is no proof that a string is random...there's always room
|
||
for cleverness, if you will
|
||
+ Chaitin-Kolmogoroff complexity theory makes this clearer.
|
||
To use someone else's words:
|
||
- "Actually, it can't be done. The consistent measure of
|
||
entropy for finite objects like a string or a (finite)
|
||
series of random numbers is the so-called ``program
|
||
length complexity''. This is defined as the length of
|
||
the shortest program for some given universal Turing
|
||
machine
|
||
which computes the string. It's consistent in the
|
||
sense that it has the familiar properties of
|
||
``ordinary'' (Shannon) entropy. Unfortunately, it's
|
||
uncomputable: there's no algorithm which, given an
|
||
arbitrary finite string S, computes the program-length
|
||
complexity of S.
|
||
|
||
Program-length complexity is well-studied in the
|
||
literature. A good introductory paper is ``A Theory of
|
||
Program Size Formally Identical to Information Theory''
|
||
by G. J. Chaitin, _Journal of the ACM_, 22 (1975)
|
||
reprinted in Chaitin's book _Information Randomness &
|
||
Incompleteness_, World Scientific Publishing Co.,
|
||
1990." [John E. Kreznar, 1993-12-02]
|
||
+ "How can I generate reasonably random numbers?"
|
||
- I say "reasonably" becuae of the point above: no number
|
||
or sequence is provably "random." About the best that can
|
||
be said is that a number of string is the reuslt of a
|
||
process we call "random." If done algorithimically, and
|
||
deterministically, we call this process "pseudo-random."
|
||
(And pseudorandom is usually more valuable than "really
|
||
random" because we want to be able to generate the same
|
||
sequence repeatedly, to repeat experiments, etc.)
|
||
5.4.17. Other crypto and hash programs
|
||
+ MDC, a stream cipher
|
||
- Peter Gutman, based on NIST Secure Hash Algorithm
|
||
- uses longer keys than IDEA, DES
|
||
- MD5
|
||
- Blowfish
|
||
- DolphinEncrypt
|
||
5.4.18. RSA strength
|
||
- casual grade, 384 bits, 100 MIPS-years (Paul Leyland, 3-31-
|
||
94)
|
||
- RSA-129, 425 bits, 4000 MIPS-years
|
||
- 512 bits...20,000 MIPS-years
|
||
- 1024 bits...
|
||
5.4.19. Triple DES
|
||
- "It involves three DES cycles, in encrypt-decrypt-encrypt
|
||
order. THe keys used may be either K1/K2/K3 or K1/K2/K1.
|
||
The latter is sometimes caled "double-DES". Combining
|
||
two DES operations like this requires twice as much work to
|
||
break as one DES, and a lot more storage. If you have the
|
||
storage, it just adds one bit to the effective key size. "
|
||
[Colin Plumb, colin@nyx10.cs.du.edu, sci.crypt, 4-13-94]
|
||
5.4.20. Tamper-resistant modules (TRMs) (or tamper-responding)
|
||
+ usually "tamper-indicating", a la seals
|
||
- very tough to stop tampering, but relatively easy to see
|
||
if seal has been breached (and then not restored
|
||
faithfully)
|
||
- possession of the "seal" is controlled...this is the
|
||
historical equivalent to the "private key" in a digital
|
||
signature system, with the technological difficulty of
|
||
forging the seal being the protection
|
||
+ usually for crypto. keys and crypto. processing
|
||
- nuclear test monitoring
|
||
- smart cards
|
||
- ATMs
|
||
+ one or more sensors to detect intrusion
|
||
- vibration (carborundum particles)
|
||
- pressure changes (a la museum display cases)
|
||
- electrical
|
||
- stressed-glass (Corning, Sandia)
|
||
+ test ban treaty verification requires this
|
||
- fiber optic lines sealing a missile...
|
||
- scratch patterns...
|
||
- decals....
|
||
+ Epoxy resins
|
||
- a la Intel in 1970s (8086)
|
||
+ Lawrence Livermore: "Connoisseur Project"
|
||
- gov't agencies using this to protect against reverse
|
||
engineering, acquisition of keys, etc.
|
||
+ can't stop a determined effort, though
|
||
- etches, solvents, plasma ashing, etc.
|
||
- but can cause cost to be very high (esp. if resin
|
||
formula is varied frequently, so that "recipe" can't be
|
||
logged)
|
||
+ can use clear epoxy with "sparkles" in the epoxy and
|
||
careful 2-position photography used to record pattern
|
||
- perhaps with a transparent lid?
|
||
+ fiber optic seal (bundle of fibers, cut)
|
||
- bundle of fibers is looped around device, then sealed and
|
||
cut so that about half the fibers are cut; the pattern of
|
||
lit and
|
||
unlit fibers is a signature, and is extremely difficult
|
||
to reproduce
|
||
- nanotechnology may be used (someday)
|
||
5.4.21. "What are smart cards?"
|
||
- Useful for computer security, bank transfers (like ATM
|
||
cards), etc.
|
||
- may have local intelligence (this is the usual sense)
|
||
- microprocessors, observor protocol (Chaum)
|
||
+ Smart cards and electronic funds transfer
|
||
- Tamper-resistant modules
|
||
+ Security of manufacturing
|
||
- some variant of "cut-and-choose" inspection of
|
||
premises
|
||
+ Uses of smart cards
|
||
- conventional credit card uses
|
||
- bill payment
|
||
- postage
|
||
- bridge and road tolls
|
||
- payments for items received electronically (not
|
||
necessarily anonymously)
|
||
|
||
5.5. Cryptology-Technical, Mathematical
|
||
5.5.1. Historical Cryptography
|
||
+ Enigma machines
|
||
- cracked by English at Bletchley Park
|
||
- a secret until mid-1970s
|
||
+ U.K. sold hundreds of seized E. machines to embassies,
|
||
governments, even corporations, in late 1940s, early
|
||
1950s
|
||
- could then crack what was being said by allies
|
||
+ Hagelin, Boris (?)
|
||
- U.S. paid him to install trapdoors, says Kahn
|
||
+ his company, Crypto A.G., was probably an NSA front
|
||
company
|
||
- Sweden, then U.S., then Sweden, then Zug
|
||
- rotor systems cracked
|
||
5.5.2. Public-key Systems--HISTORY
|
||
+ Inman has admitted that NSA had a P-K concept in 1966
|
||
- fits with Dominik's point about sealed cryptosystem boxes
|
||
with no way to load new keys
|
||
- and consistent with NSA having essentially sole access to
|
||
nation's top mathematicians (until Diffies and Hellmans
|
||
foreswore government funding, as a result of the anti-
|
||
Pentagon feelings of the 70s)
|
||
- Merkle's "puzzle" ideas, circa mid-70s
|
||
- Diffie and Hellman
|
||
- Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman
|
||
5.5.3. RSA and Alternatives to RSA
|
||
+ RSA and other P-K patents are strangling development and
|
||
dissemination of crypto systems
|
||
- perhaps out of marketing stupidity, perhaps with the help
|
||
of the government (which has an interest in keeping a
|
||
monopoly on secure encryption)
|
||
+ One-way functions and "deposit-only envelopes"
|
||
- one-way functions
|
||
- deposit-only envelopes: allow additions to envelopes and
|
||
only addressee can open
|
||
- hash functions are easy to implement one-way functions
|
||
(with no need for an inverse)
|
||
5.5.4. Digital Signatures
|
||
+ Uses of Digital Signatures
|
||
- Electronic Contracts
|
||
- Voting
|
||
- Checks and other financial instruments (similar to
|
||
contracts)
|
||
- Date-stamped Transactions (augmenting Notary Publics)
|
||
- Undeniable digital signatures
|
||
+ Unforgeable signatures, even with unlimited computational
|
||
power, can be achieved if the population is limited (a
|
||
finite set of agents)
|
||
- using an untraceable sending protocol, such as "the
|
||
Dining Cryptographers Problem" of Chaum
|
||
5.5.5. Randomness and incompressibility
|
||
+ best definition we have is due to Chaitin and Kolmogoroff:
|
||
a string or any structure is "random" if it has no shorter
|
||
description of itself than itself.
|
||
- (Now even specific instances of "randomly generated
|
||
strings" sometimes will be compressible--but not very
|
||
often. Cf. the works of Chaitin and others for more on
|
||
these sorts of points.)
|
||
5.5.6. Steganography: Methods for Hiding the Mere Existence of
|
||
Encrypted Data
|
||
+ in contrast to the oft-cited point (made by crypto purists)
|
||
that one must assume the opponent has full access to the
|
||
cryptotext, some fragments of decrypted plaintext, and to
|
||
the algorithm itself, i.e., assume the worst
|
||
- a condition I think is practically absurd and unrealistic
|
||
- assumes infinite intercept power (same assumption of
|
||
infinite computer power would make all systems besides
|
||
one-time pads breakable)
|
||
- in reality, hiding the existence and form of an encrypted
|
||
message is important
|
||
+ this will be all the more so as legal challenges to
|
||
crypto are mounted...the proposed ban on encrypted
|
||
telecom (with $10K per day fine), various governmental
|
||
regulations, etc.
|
||
- RICO and other broad brush ploys may make people very
|
||
careful about revealing that they are even using
|
||
encryption (regardless of how secure the keys are)
|
||
+ steganography, the science of hiding the existence of
|
||
encrypted information
|
||
- secret inks
|
||
- microdots
|
||
- thwarting traffic analysis
|
||
- LSB method
|
||
+ Packing data into audio tapes (LSB of DAT)
|
||
+ LSB of DAT: a 2GB audio DAT will allow more than 100
|
||
megabytes in the LSBs
|
||
- less if algorithms are used to shape the spectrum to
|
||
make it look even more like noise
|
||
- but can also use the higher bits, too (since a real-
|
||
world recording will have noise reaching up to perhaps
|
||
the 3rd or 4th bit)
|
||
+ will manufacturers investigate "dithering" circuits?
|
||
(a la fat zero?)
|
||
- but the race will still be on
|
||
+ Digital video will offer even more storage space (larger
|
||
tapes)
|
||
- DVI, etc.
|
||
- HDTV by late 1990s
|
||
+ Messages can be put into GIFF, TIFF image files (or even
|
||
noisy faxes)
|
||
- using the LSB method, with a 1024 x 1024 grey scale image
|
||
holding 64KB in the LSB plane alone
|
||
- with error correction, noise shaping, etc., still at
|
||
least 50KB
|
||
- scenario: already being used to transmit message through
|
||
international fax and image transmissions
|
||
+ The Old "Two Plaintexts" Ploy
|
||
- one decoding produces "Having a nice time. Wish you were
|
||
here."
|
||
- other decoding, of the same raw bits, produces "The last
|
||
submarine left this morning."
|
||
- any legal order to produce the key generates the first
|
||
message
|
||
+ authorities can never prove-save for torture or an
|
||
informant-that another message exists
|
||
- unless there are somehow signs that the encrypted
|
||
message is somehow "inefficiently encrypted, suggesting
|
||
the use of a dual plaintext pair method" (or somesuch
|
||
spookspeak)
|
||
- again, certain purist argue that such issues (which are
|
||
related to the old "How do you know when to stop?"
|
||
question) are misleading, that one must assume the
|
||
opponent has nearly complete access to everything except
|
||
the actual key, that any scheme to combine multiple
|
||
systems is no better than what is gotten as a result of
|
||
the combination itself
|
||
- and just the overall bandwidth of data...
|
||
+ Several programs exist:
|
||
- Stego
|
||
- etc. (described elsewhere)
|
||
5.5.7. The Essential Impossibility of Breaking Modern Ciphers and
|
||
Codes
|
||
- this is an important change from the past (and from various
|
||
thriller novels that have big computers cracking codes)
|
||
- granted, "unbreakable" is a misleading term
|
||
+ recall the comment that NSA has not really broken any
|
||
Soviet systems in many years
|
||
- except for the cases, a la the Walker case, where
|
||
plaintext versions are gotten, i.e., where human screwups
|
||
occurred
|
||
- the image in so many novels of massive computers breaking
|
||
codes is absurd: modern ciphers will not be broken (but the
|
||
primitive ciphers used by so many Third World nations and
|
||
their embassies will continue to be child's play, even for
|
||
high school science fair projects...could be a good idea
|
||
for a small scene, about a BCC student who has his project
|
||
pulled)
|
||
+ But could novel computational methods crack these public
|
||
key ciphers?
|
||
+ some speculative candidates
|
||
+ holographic computers, where large numbers are
|
||
factored-or at least the possibilities are somehown
|
||
narrowed-by using arrays that (somehow) represent the
|
||
numbers to be factored
|
||
- perhaps with diffraction, channeling, etc.
|
||
- neural networks and evolutionary systems (genetic
|
||
algorithms)
|
||
- the idea is that somehow the massive computations can be
|
||
converted into something that is inherently parallel
|
||
(like a crystal)
|
||
+ hyperspeculatively: finding the oracle for these problems
|
||
using nonconventional methods such as ESP and lucid
|
||
dreaming
|
||
- some groups feel this is worthwhile
|
||
5.5.8. Anonymous Transfers
|
||
- Chaum's digital mixes
|
||
- "Dining Cryptographers"
|
||
+ can do it with exchanged diskettes, at a simple level
|
||
- wherein each person can add new material
|
||
+ Alice to Bob to Carol....Alice and Carol can conspire to
|
||
determine what Bob had added, but a sufficient "mixing"
|
||
of bits and pieces is possible such that only if
|
||
everybody conspires can one of the participants be caught
|
||
- perhaps the card-shuffling results?
|
||
+ may become common inside compute systems...
|
||
- by this vague idea I mean that various new OS protocols
|
||
may call for various new mechanisms for exchanging
|
||
information
|
||
5.5.9. Miscellaneous Abstract Ideas
|
||
- can first order logic predicates be proven in zero
|
||
knowledge?
|
||
- Riemannn hypothesis
|
||
+ P = NP?
|
||
- would the universe change?
|
||
- Smale has shown that if the squares have real numbers in
|
||
them, as opposed to natural numbers (integers), then P =
|
||
NP; perhaps this isn't surprising, as a real implies sort
|
||
of a recursive descent, with each square having unlimited
|
||
computer power
|
||
+ oracles
|
||
- speculatively, a character asks if Tarot cards, etc.,
|
||
could be used (in addition to the normal idea that such
|
||
devices help psychologically)
|
||
- "a cascade of changes coming in from hundreds of
|
||
decimal places out"
|
||
+ Quantum cryptography
|
||
- bits can be exchanged-albeit at fairly low
|
||
efficiencies-over a channel
|
||
- with detection of taps, via the change of polarizations
|
||
+ Stephen Wiesner wrote a 1970 paper, half a decade before
|
||
the P-K work, which outlined this-not published until
|
||
much later
|
||
- speculate that the NSA knew about this and quashed the
|
||
publication
|
||
+ But could novel computational methods crack these public
|
||
key ciphers?
|
||
+ some speculative candidates
|
||
+ holographic computers, where large numbers are
|
||
factored-or at least the possibilities are somehown
|
||
narrowed-by using arrays that (somehow) represent the
|
||
numbers to be factored
|
||
- perhaps with diffraction, channeling, etc.
|
||
- neural networks and evolutionary systems (genetic
|
||
algorithms)
|
||
- the idea is that somehow the massive computations can be
|
||
converted into something that is inherently parallel
|
||
(like a crystal)
|
||
+ hyperspeculatively: finding the oracle for these problems
|
||
using nonconventional methods such as ESP and lucid
|
||
dreaming
|
||
- some groups feel this is worthwhile
|
||
- links to knot theory
|
||
- "cut and choose" protocols (= zero knowledge)
|
||
+ can a "digital coin" be made?
|
||
- this is formally similar to the idea of an active agent
|
||
that is unforgeable, in the sense that the agent or coin
|
||
is "standalone"
|
||
+ bits can always be duplicated (unless tied to hardware,
|
||
as with TRMs), so must look elsewhere
|
||
+ could tie the bits to a specific location, so that
|
||
duplication would be obvious or useless
|
||
- the idea is vaguely that an agent could be placed in
|
||
some location...duplications would be both detectable
|
||
and irrelevant (same bits, same behavior,
|
||
unmodifiable because of digital signature)
|
||
+ coding theory and cryptography at the "Discrete
|
||
Mathematics"
|
||
- http://www.win.tue.nl/win/math/dw/index.html
|
||
5.5.10. Tamper-resistant modules (TRMs) (or tamper-responding)
|
||
+ usually "tamper-indicating", a la seals
|
||
- very tough to stop tampering, but relatively easy to see
|
||
if seal has been breached (and then not restored
|
||
faithfully)
|
||
- possession of the "seal" is controlled...this is the
|
||
historical equivalent to the "private key" in a digital
|
||
signature system, with the technological difficulty of
|
||
forging the seal being the protection
|
||
+ usually for crypto. keys and crypto. processing
|
||
- nuclear test monitoring
|
||
- smart cards
|
||
- ATMs
|
||
+ one or more sensors to detect intrusion
|
||
- vibration (carborundum particles)
|
||
- pressure changes (a la museum display cases)
|
||
- electrical
|
||
- stressed-glass (Corning, Sandia)
|
||
+ test ban treaty verification requires this
|
||
- fiber optic lines sealing a missile...
|
||
- scratch patterns...
|
||
- decals....
|
||
+ Epoxy resins
|
||
- a la Intel in 1970s (8086)
|
||
+ Lawrence Livermore: "Connoisseur Project"
|
||
- gov't agencies using this to protect against reverse
|
||
engineering, acquisition of keys, etc.
|
||
+ can't stop a determined effort, though
|
||
- etches, solvents, plasma ashing, etc.
|
||
- but can cause cost to be very high (esp. if resin
|
||
formula is varied frequently, so that "recipe" can't be
|
||
logged)
|
||
+ can use clear epoxy with "sparkles" in the epoxy and
|
||
careful 2-position photography used to record pattern
|
||
- perhaps with a transparent lid?
|
||
+ fiber optic seal (bundle of fibers, cut)
|
||
- bundle of fibers is looped around device, then sealed and
|
||
cut so that about half the fibers are cut; the pattern of
|
||
lit and
|
||
unlit fibers is a signature, and is extremely difficult
|
||
to reproduce
|
||
- nanotechnology may be used (someday)
|
||
|
||
5.6. Crypto Programs and Products
|
||
5.6.1. PGP, of course
|
||
- it's own section, needless to say
|
||
5.6.2. "What about hardware chips for encryption?"
|
||
- Speed can be gotten, for sure, but at the expense of
|
||
limiting the market dramatically. Good for military uses,
|
||
not so good for civilian uses (especially as most civilians
|
||
don't have a need for high speeds, all other things being
|
||
equal).
|
||
5.6.3. Carl Ellison's "tran" and mixing various ciphers in chains
|
||
- "tran.shar is available at ftp.std.com:/pub/cme
|
||
- des | tran | des | tran | des
|
||
- to make the job of the attacker much harder, and to make
|
||
differential cryptanalyis harder
|
||
- "it's in response to Eli's paper that I advocated prngxor,
|
||
as in:
|
||
des | prngxor | tran | des | tran | des
|
||
with the DES instances in ECB mode (in acknowledgement of
|
||
Eli's attack). The prngxor destroys any patterns from the
|
||
input, which was the purpose of CBC, without using the
|
||
feedback path which Eli exploited."[ Carl Ellison, 1994-07-
|
||
15]
|
||
5.6.4. The Blum-Blum-Shub RNG
|
||
- about the strongest algorithmic RNG we know of, albeit slow
|
||
(if they can predict the next bit of BBS, they can break
|
||
RSA, so....
|
||
- ripem.msu.edu:/pub/crypt/other/blum-blum-shub-strong-
|
||
randgen.shar
|
||
5.6.5. the Blowfish cipher
|
||
+ BLOWFISH.ZIP, written by Bruce Schneier,1994. subject of an
|
||
article in Dr. Dobb's Journal:
|
||
- ftp.dsi.unimi.it:/pub/security/crypt/code/schneier-
|
||
blowfish.c.gz
|
||
|
||
5.7. Related Ideas
|
||
5.7.1. "What is "blinding"?"
|
||
+ This is a basic primitive operation of most digital cash
|
||
systems. Any good textbook on crypto should explain it, and
|
||
cover the math needed to unerstand it in detail. Several
|
||
people have explained it (many times) on the list; here's a
|
||
short explanation by Karl Barrus:
|
||
- "Conceptually, when you blind a message, nobody else can
|
||
read it. A property about blinding is that under the
|
||
right circumstances if another party digitally signs a
|
||
blinded message, the unblinded message will contain a
|
||
valid digital signature.
|
||
|
||
"So if Alice blinds the message "I owe Alice $1000" so
|
||
that it reads (say) "a;dfafq)(*&" or whatever, and Bob
|
||
agrees to sign this message, later Alice can unblind the
|
||
message Bob signed to retrieve the original. And Bob's
|
||
digital signature will appear on the original, although
|
||
he didn't sign the original directly.
|
||
|
||
"Mathematically, blinding a message means multiplying it
|
||
by a number (think of the message as being a number).
|
||
Unblinding is simply dividing the original blinding
|
||
factor out." [Karl Barrus, 1993-08-24]
|
||
+ And another explanation by Hal Finney, which came up in the
|
||
context of how to delink pharmacy prescriptions from
|
||
personal identity (fears of medial dossiers(:
|
||
- "Chaum's "blinded credential" system is intended to solve
|
||
exactly this kind of problem, but it requires an
|
||
extensive infrastructure. There has to be an agency
|
||
where you physically identify yourself. It doesn't have
|
||
to know anything about you other than some physical ID
|
||
like fingerprints. You and it cooperate to create
|
||
pseudonyms of various classes, for example, a "go to the
|
||
doctor" pseudonym, and a "go to the pharmacy" pseudonym.
|
||
These pseudonyms have a certain mathematical relationship
|
||
which allows you to re-blind credentials written to one
|
||
pseudonym to apply to any other. But the agency uses
|
||
your physical ID to make sure you only get one pseudonym
|
||
of each kind....So, when the doctor gives you a
|
||
prescription, that is a credential applied to your "go to
|
||
the doctor" pseudonym. (You can of course also reveal
|
||
your real name to the doctor if you want.) Then you show
|
||
it at the pharmacy using your "go to the pharmacy"
|
||
pseudonym. The credential can only be shown on this one
|
||
pseudonym at the pharamacy, but it is unlinkable to the
|
||
one you got at the doctor's. " [Hal Finney, 1994-09-07]
|
||
5.7.2. "Crypto protocols are often confusing. Is there a coherent
|
||
theory of these things?"
|
||
- Yes, crypto protocols are often expressed as scenarios, as
|
||
word problems, as "Alice and Bob and Eve" sorts of
|
||
complicated interaction protocols. Not exactly game theory,
|
||
not exactly logic, and not exactly anything else in
|
||
particular...its own area.
|
||
- Expert systems, proof-of-correctness calculi, etc.
|
||
- spoofing, eavesdropping, motivations, reputations, trust
|
||
models
|
||
+ In my opinion, much more work is needed here.
|
||
- Graphs, agents, objects, capabilities, goals, intentions,
|
||
logic
|
||
- evolutionary game theory, cooperation, defection, tit-for-
|
||
tat, ecologies, economies
|
||
- mostly ignored, to date, by crypto community
|
||
5.7.3. The holder of a key *is* the person, basically
|
||
- that's the bottom line
|
||
- those that worry about this are free to adopt stronger,
|
||
more elaborate systems (multi-part, passphrases, biometric
|
||
security, limits on account access, etc.)
|
||
- whoever has a house key is essentially able to gain access
|
||
(not saying this is the legal situation, but the practical
|
||
one)
|
||
5.7.4. Strong crypto is helped by huge increases in processor power,
|
||
networks
|
||
+ Encryption *always wins out* over cryptanalysis...gap grows
|
||
greater with time
|
||
- "the bits win"
|
||
+ Networks can hide more bits...gigabits flowing across
|
||
borders, stego, etc.
|
||
- faster networks mean more "degrees of freedom," more
|
||
avenues to hide bits in, exponentially increasing efforts
|
||
to eavesdrop and track
|
||
- (However, these additional degrees of freedome can mean
|
||
greater chances for slipping up and leaving clues that
|
||
allow correlation. Complexity can be a problem.)
|
||
+ "pulling the plug" hurts too much...shuts down world
|
||
economy to stop illegal bits ("naughty bits"?)
|
||
- one of the main goals is to reach the "point of no
|
||
return," beyond which pulling the plug hurts too much
|
||
- this is not to say they won't still pull the plug, damage
|
||
be damned
|
||
5.7.5. "What is the "Diffie-Hellman" protocol and why is it
|
||
important?"
|
||
+ What it is
|
||
- Diffie-Hellman, first described in 1976, allows key
|
||
exchange over insecure channels.
|
||
+ Steve Bellovin was one of several people to explaine D-H
|
||
to the list (every few months someone does!). I'm
|
||
including his explanation, despite its length, to help
|
||
readers who are not cryptologists get some flavor of the
|
||
type of math involved. The thing to notice is the use of
|
||
*exponentiations* and *modular arithmetic* (the "clock
|
||
arithmetic" of our "new math" childhoods, except with
|
||
really, really big numbers!). The difficulty of inverting
|
||
the exponention (the discrete log problem) is what makes
|
||
this a cryptographically interesting approach.
|
||
- "The basic idea is simple. Pick a large number p
|
||
(probably a prime), and a base b that is a generator of
|
||
the group of integers modulo p. Now, it turns out that
|
||
given a known p, b, and (b^x) mod p, it's extremely
|
||
hard to find out x. That's known as the discrete log
|
||
problem.
|
||
|
||
"Here's how to use it. Let two parties, X and Y, pick
|
||
random numbers x and y, 1 < x,y < p. They each
|
||
calculate
|
||
|
||
(b^x) mod p
|
||
|
||
and
|
||
|
||
(b^y) mod p
|
||
|
||
and transmit them to each other. Now, X knows x and
|
||
(b^y) mod p, so s/he can calculate (b^y)^x mod p =
|
||
(b^(xy)) mod p. Y can do the same calculation. Now
|
||
they both know (b^(xy)) mod p. But eavesdroppers know
|
||
only (b^x) mod p and (b^y) mod p, and can't use those
|
||
quantities to recover the shared secret. Typically, of
|
||
course, X and Y will use that shared secret as a key to
|
||
a conventional cryptosystem.
|
||
|
||
"The biggest problem with the algorithm, as outlined
|
||
above, is that there is no authentication. An attacker
|
||
can sit in the middle and speak that protocol to each
|
||
legitimate party.
|
||
|
||
"One last point -- you can treat x as a secret key, and
|
||
publish
|
||
(b^X) mod p as a public key. Proof is left as an
|
||
exercise for
|
||
the reader." [Steve Bellovin, 1993-07-17]
|
||
- Why it's important
|
||
+ Using it
|
||
+ Matt Ghio has made available Phil Karn's program for
|
||
generating numbers useful for D-H:
|
||
- ftp cs.cmu.edu:
|
||
/afs/andrew.cmu.edu/usr12/mg5n/public/Karn.DH.generator
|
||
+ Variants and Comments
|
||
+ Station to Station protocol
|
||
- "The STS protocol is a regular D-H followed by a
|
||
(delicately designed) exchange of signatures on the key
|
||
exchange parameters. The signatures in the second
|
||
exchange that they can't be separated from the original
|
||
parameters.....STS is a well-thought out protocol, with
|
||
many subtleties already arranged for. For the issue at
|
||
hand, though, which is Ethernet sniffing, it's
|
||
authentication aspects are not required now, even
|
||
though they certainly will be in the near future."
|
||
[Eric Hughes, 1994-02-06]
|
||
5.7.6. groups, multiple encryption, IDEA, DES, difficulties in
|
||
analyzing
|
||
5.7.7. "Why and how is "randomness" tested?"
|
||
- Randomness is a core concept in cryptography. Ciphers often
|
||
fail when things are not as random as designers thought
|
||
they would be.
|
||
- Entropy, randomness, predictablility. Can never actually
|
||
_prove_ a data set is random, though one can be fairly
|
||
confident (cf. Kolmogorov-Chaitin complexity theory).
|
||
- Still, tricks can make a random-looking text block look
|
||
regular....this is what decryption does; such files are
|
||
said to be cryptoregular.
|
||
+ As to how much testing is needed, this depends on the use,
|
||
and on the degree of confidence needed. It may take
|
||
millions of test samples, or even more, to establish
|
||
randomness in set of data. For example:
|
||
- "The standard tests for 'randomness' utilized in govt
|
||
systems requires 1X10^6 samples. Most of the tests are
|
||
standard probability stuff and some are classified. "
|
||
[Wray Kephart, sci.crypt, 1994-08-07]
|
||
- never assume something is really random just becuase it
|
||
_looks_ random! (Dynamic Markov compressors can find
|
||
nonrandomness quickly.)
|
||
5.7.8. "Is it possible to tell if a file is encrypted?"
|
||
- Not in general. Undecideability and all that. (Can't tell
|
||
in general if a virus exists in code, Adleman showed, and
|
||
can't tell in general if a file is encrypted, compressed,
|
||
etc. Goes to issues of what we mean by encrypted or
|
||
compressed.)
|
||
+ Sometimes we can have some pretty clear signals:
|
||
- headers are attached
|
||
- other characteristic signs
|
||
- entropy per character
|
||
+ But files encrypted with strong methods typically look
|
||
random; in fact, randomness is closely related to
|
||
encyption.
|
||
+ regularity: all symbols represented equally, in all bases
|
||
(that is, in doubles, triples, and all n-tuples)
|
||
- "cryptoregular" is the term: file looks random
|
||
(regular) until proper key is applied, then the
|
||
randomness vaDCharles Bennett, "Physics of Computation
|
||
Workshop," 1993]
|
||
- "entropy" near the maximum (e.g., near 6 or 7 bits per
|
||
character, whereas ordinary English has roughly 1.5-2
|
||
bits per character of entropy)
|
||
5.7.9. "Why not use CD-ROMs for one-time pads?"
|
||
- The key distribution problem, and general headaches. Theft
|
||
or compromise of the keying material is of course the
|
||
greatest threat.
|
||
- And one-time pads, being symmetric ciphers, give up the
|
||
incredible advantages of public key methods.
|
||
- "CD ROM is a terrible medium for the OTP key stream.
|
||
First, you want exactly two copies of the random stream.
|
||
CD ROM has an economic advantage only for large runs.
|
||
Second, you want to destroy the part of the stream already
|
||
used. CD ROM has no erase facilities, outside of physical
|
||
destruction of the entire disk." [Bryan G. Olson,
|
||
sci.crypt, 1994-08-31]
|
||
- If you have to have a one-time pad, a DAT makes more sense;
|
||
cheap, can erase the bits already used, doesn't require
|
||
pressing of a CD, etc. (One company claims to be selling CD-
|
||
ROMs as one-time pads to customers...the security problems
|
||
here should be obvious to all.)
|
||
|
||
5.8. The Nature of Cryptology
|
||
5.8.1. "What are the truly basic, core, primitive ideas of
|
||
cryptology, crypto protocols, crypto anarchy, digital cash,
|
||
and the things we deal with here?"
|
||
- I don't just mean things like the mechanics of encryption,
|
||
but more basic conceptual ideas.
|
||
5.8.2. Crypto is about the creation and linking of private spaces...
|
||
5.8.3. The "Core" Ideas of Cryptology and What we Deal With
|
||
- Physics has mass, energy, force, momentum, angular
|
||
momentum, gravitation, friction, the Uncertainty Principle,
|
||
Complementarity, Least Action, and a hundred other such
|
||
concepts and prinicples, some more basic than others. Ditto
|
||
for any other field.
|
||
+ It seems to many of us that crypto is part of a larger
|
||
study of core ideas involving: identity, proof, complexity,
|
||
randomness, reputations, cut-and-choose protocols, zero
|
||
knowledge, etc. In other words, the buzzwords.
|
||
- But which of these are "core" concepts, from which others
|
||
are derived?
|
||
- Why, for example, do the "cut-and-choose" protocols work
|
||
so well, so fairly? (That they do has been evident for a
|
||
long time, and they literally are instances of Solomonic
|
||
wisdom. Game theory has explanations in terms of payoff
|
||
matrices, Nash equilibria, etc. It seems likely to me
|
||
that the concepts of crypto will be recast in terms of a
|
||
smaller set of basic ideas taken from these disparate
|
||
fields of economics, game theory, formal systems, and
|
||
ecology. Just my hunch.)
|
||
+ statements, assertions, belief, proof
|
||
- "I am Tim"
|
||
+ possession of a key to a lock is usually treated as proof
|
||
of...
|
||
- not always, but that's the default assumption, that
|
||
someone who unlocks a door is one of the proper
|
||
people..access privileges, etc.
|
||
5.8.4. We don't seem to know the "deep theory" about why certain
|
||
protocols "work." For example, why is "cut-and-choose," where
|
||
Alice cuts and Bob chooses (as in fairly dividing a pie),
|
||
such a fair system? Game theory has a lot to do with it.
|
||
Payoff matrices, etc.
|
||
- But many protocols have not been fully studied. We know
|
||
they work, but I think we don't know fully why they work.
|
||
(Maybe I'm wrong here, but I've seen few papers looking at
|
||
these issues in detail.)
|
||
- Economics is certainly crucial, and tends to get overlooked
|
||
in analysis of crypto protocols....the various "Crypto
|
||
Conference Proceedings" papers typically ignore economic
|
||
factors (except in the area of measuring the strength of a
|
||
system in terms of computational cost to break).
|
||
- "All crypto is economics."
|
||
- We learn what works, and what doesn't. My hunch is that
|
||
complex crypto systems will have emergent behaviors that
|
||
are discovered only after deployment, or good simulation
|
||
(hence my interest in "protocol ecologies").
|
||
5.8.5. "Is it possible to create ciphers that are unbreakable in any
|
||
amount of time with any amount of computer power?"
|
||
+ Information-theoretically secure vs. computationally-secure
|
||
+ not breakable even in principle, e.g., a one-time pad
|
||
with random characters selected by a truly random process
|
||
(die tosses, radioactive decay, certain types of noise,
|
||
etc.)
|
||
- and ignoring the "breakable by break-ins" approach of
|
||
stealing the one-time pad, etc. ("Black bag
|
||
cryptography")
|
||
- not breakable in "reasonable" amounts of time with
|
||
computers
|
||
- Of course, a one-time pad (Vernam cipher) is theoretically
|
||
unbreakable without the key. It is "information-
|
||
theoretically secure."
|
||
- RSA and similar public key algorithms are said to be only
|
||
"computationally-secure," to some level of security
|
||
dependent on modulus lenght, computer resources and time
|
||
available, etc. Thus, given enough time and enough computer
|
||
power, these ciphers are breakable.
|
||
- However, they may be practically impossible to break, given
|
||
the amount of energy in the universe.Not to split universes
|
||
here, but it is interesting to consider that some ciphers
|
||
may not be breakable in _our_ universe, in any amount of
|
||
time. Our universe presumably has some finite number of
|
||
particles (currently estimated to be 10^73 particles). This
|
||
leads to the "even if every particle were a Cray Y-MP it
|
||
would take..." sorts of thought experiments.
|
||
|
||
But I am considering _energy_ here. Ignoring reversible
|
||
computation for the moment, computations dissipate energy
|
||
(some disagree with this point). There is some uppper limit
|
||
on how many basic computations could ever be done with the
|
||
amount of free energy in the universe. (A rough calculation
|
||
could be done by calculating the energy output of stars,
|
||
stuff falling into black holes, etc., and then assuming
|
||
about kT per logical operation. This should be accurate to
|
||
within a few orders of magnitude.) I haven't done this
|
||
calculation, and won't today, but the result would likely
|
||
be something along the lines of X joules of energy that
|
||
could be harnessed for computation, resulting in Y basic
|
||
primitive computational steps.
|
||
|
||
I can then find a modulus of 3000 digits or 5000 digits, or
|
||
whatever,that takes more than this number of steps to
|
||
factor.
|
||
|
||
Caveats:
|
||
|
||
1. Maybe there are really shortcuts to factoring. Certainly
|
||
improvements in factoring methods will continue. (But of
|
||
course these improvements are not things that convert
|
||
factoring into a less than exponential-in-length
|
||
problem...that is, factoring appears to remain "hard.")
|
||
|
||
2. Maybe reversible computations (a la Landauer, Bennett,
|
||
et. al.) actually work. Maybe this means a "factoring
|
||
machine" can be built which takes a fixed, or very slowly
|
||
growing, amount of energy.
|
||
|
||
3. Maybe the quantum-mechanical idea of Shore is possible.
|
||
(I doubt it, for various reasons.)
|
||
|
||
I continue to find it useful to think of very large numbers
|
||
as creating "force fields" or "bobbles" (a la Vinge) around
|
||
data. A 5000-decimal-digit modulus is as close to being
|
||
unbreakable as anything we'll see in this universe.
|
||
|
||
5.9. Practical Crypto
|
||
5.9.1. again, this stuff is covered in many of the FAQs on PGP and
|
||
on security that are floating around...
|
||
5.9.2. "How long should crypto be valid for?"
|
||
+ That is, how long should a file remain uncrackable, or a
|
||
digital signature remain unforgeable?
|
||
- probabalistic, of course, with varying confidence levels
|
||
- depends on breakthroughs, in math and in computer power
|
||
+ Some messages may only need to be valid for a few days or
|
||
weeks. Others, for decades. Certain contracts may need to
|
||
be unforgeable for many decades. And given advances in
|
||
computer power, what appears to be a strong key today may
|
||
fail utterly by 2020 or 2040. (I'm of course not
|
||
suggesting that a 300- or 500-digit RSA modulus will be
|
||
practical by then.)
|
||
+ many people only need security for a matter of months or
|
||
so, while others may need it (or think they need it) for
|
||
decades or even for generations
|
||
- they may fear retaliation against their heirs, for
|
||
example, if certain communications were ever made
|
||
public
|
||
- "If you are signing the contract digitally, for instance,
|
||
you would want to be sure that no one could forge your
|
||
signature to change the terms after the fact -- a few
|
||
months isn't enough for such purposes, only something that
|
||
will last for fifteen or twenty years is okay." [Perry
|
||
Metzger, 1994-07-06]
|
||
5.9.3. "What about commercial encryption programs for protecting
|
||
files?"
|
||
- ViaCrypt, PGP 2.7
|
||
- Various commercial programs have existed for years (I got
|
||
"Sentinel" back in 1987-8...long since discontinued). Check
|
||
reviews in the leading magazines.
|
||
+ Kent Marsh, FolderBolt for Macs and Windows
|
||
- "The best Mac security program....is CryptoMactic by Kent
|
||
Marsh Ltd. It uses triple-DES in CBC mode, hashes an
|
||
arbitrary-length password into a key, and has a whole lot
|
||
of Mac-interface features. (The Windows equivalent is
|
||
FolderBolt for Windows, by the way.)" [Bruce Schneier,
|
||
sci.crypt, 1994-07-19]
|
||
5.9.4. "What are some practical steps to take to improve security?"
|
||
- Do you, like most of us, leave backup diskettes laying
|
||
around?
|
||
- Do you use multiple-pass erasures of disks? If not, the
|
||
bits may be recovered.
|
||
- (Either of these can compromise all encrypted material you
|
||
have, all with nothing more than a search warrant of your
|
||
premises.)
|
||
5.9.5. Picking (and remembering) passwords
|
||
- Many of the issues here also apply to choosing remailers,
|
||
etc. Things are often trickier than they seem. The
|
||
"structure" of these spaces is tricky. For example, it may
|
||
seem really sneaky (and "high entropy" to permute some
|
||
words in a popular song and use that as a pass
|
||
phrase....but this is obviously worth only a few bits of
|
||
extra entropy. Specifically, the attacker will like take
|
||
the thousand or so most popular songs, thousand or so most
|
||
popular names, slogans, speeches, etc., and then run many
|
||
permutations on each of them.
|
||
- bits of entropy
|
||
- lots of flaws, weaknesses, hidden factors
|
||
- avoid simple words, etc.
|
||
- hard to get 100 or more bits of real entropy
|
||
- As Eli Brandt puts it, "Obscurity is no substitute for
|
||
strong random numbers." [E.B., 1994-07-03]
|
||
- Cryptanalysis is a matter of deduction, of forming and
|
||
refining hypotheses. For example, the site
|
||
"bitbucket@ee.und.ac.za" is advertised on the Net as a
|
||
place to send "NSA food" to...mail sent to it gets
|
||
discarded. So , a great place to send cover traffic to, no?
|
||
No, as the NSA will mark this site for what it is and its
|
||
usefulness is blown. (Unless its usefulness is actually
|
||
something else, in which case the recursive descent has
|
||
begun.)
|
||
- Bohdan Tashchuk suggests [1994-07-04] using telephone-like
|
||
numbers, mixed in with words, to better fit with human
|
||
memorization habits; he notes that 30 or more bits of
|
||
entropy are routinely memorized this way.
|
||
5.9.6. "How can I remember long passwords or passphrases?"
|
||
- Lots of security articles have tips on picking hard-to-
|
||
guess (high entropy) passwords and passphrases.
|
||
+ Just do it.
|
||
- People can learn to memorize long sequences. I'm not good
|
||
at this, but others apparently are. Still, it seems
|
||
dangerous, in terms of forgetting. (And writing down a
|
||
passphrase may be vastly more risky than a shorter but
|
||
more easily memorized passphrase is. I think theft
|
||
of keys and keystroke capturing on compromised machines
|
||
are much
|
||
more important practical weaknesses.)
|
||
+ The first letters of long phrases that have meaning only to
|
||
the owner.
|
||
- e.g., "When I was ten I ate the whole thing."--->
|
||
"wiwtiatwt" (Purists will quibble that prepositional
|
||
phrases like "when i was" have lower entropy. True, but
|
||
better than "Joshua.")
|
||
+ Visual systems
|
||
- Another approach to getting enough entropy in
|
||
passwords/phrases is a "visual key" where one mouses from
|
||
position to position in a visual environment. That is,
|
||
one is presented with a scene containg some number of
|
||
nodes, perhaps representing familiar objects from one's
|
||
own home, and a path is chosen. The advantage is that
|
||
most people can remember fairly complicated
|
||
(read: high entropy) "stories." Each object triggers a
|
||
memory of the next object to visit. (Example: door to
|
||
kitchen to blender to refrigerator to ..... ) This is the
|
||
visual memory system said to be favored by Greek epic
|
||
poets. This also gets around the keyboard-monitoring
|
||
trick (but not necessarily the CRT-reading trick, of
|
||
course).
|
||
|
||
It might be an interesting hack to offer this as a front
|
||
end for PGP. Even a simple grid of characters which could
|
||
be moused on could be an assist in using long
|
||
passphrases.
|
||
|
||
5.10. DES
|
||
5.10.1. on the design of DES
|
||
- Biham and Shamir showed how "differential cryptanalyis"
|
||
could make the attack easier than brute-force search of the
|
||
2^56 keyspace. Wiener did a thought experiment design of a
|
||
"DES buster" machine (who ya gonna call?) that could break
|
||
a DES key in a matter of days. (Similar to the Diffie and
|
||
Hellman analysis of the mid-70s, updated to current
|
||
technology.)
|
||
+ The IBM designers knew about differential cryptanalyis, it
|
||
is now clear, and took steps to optimize DES. After Shamir
|
||
and Biham published, Don Coppersmith acknowledged this.
|
||
He's written a review paper:
|
||
- Coppersmith, D., "The Data Encryption Standard (DES) and
|
||
its strength against attacks." IBM Journal of Research
|
||
and Development. 38(3): 243-250. (May 1994)
|
||
|
||
5.11. Breaking Ciphers
|
||
5.11.1. This is not a main Cypherpunks concern, for a variety of
|
||
reasons (lots of work, special expertise, big machines, not a
|
||
core area, ciphers always win in the long run). Breaking
|
||
ciphers is something to consider, hence this brief section.
|
||
5.11.2. "What are the possible consequences of weaknesses in crypto
|
||
systems?"
|
||
- maybe reading messages
|
||
- maybe forging messages
|
||
- maybe faking timestamped documents
|
||
- maybe draining a bank account in seconds
|
||
- maybe winning in a crypto gambling system
|
||
- maybe matters of life and death
|
||
5.11.3. "What are the weakest places in ciphers, practically
|
||
speaking?"
|
||
- Key management, without a doubt. People leave their keys
|
||
lying around , write down their passphrases. etc.
|
||
5.11.4. Birthday attacks
|
||
5.11.5. For example, at Crypto '94 it was reported in a rump session
|
||
(by Michael Wiener with Paul van Oorschot) that a machine to
|
||
break the MD5 ciphers could be built for about $10 M (in 1994
|
||
dollars, of course) and could break MD5 in about 20 days.
|
||
(This follows the 1993 paper on a similar machine to break
|
||
DES.)
|
||
- Hal Finney did some calculations and reported to us:
|
||
- "I mentioned a few days ago that one of the "rump session"
|
||
papers at the crypto conference claimed that a machine
|
||
could be built which would find MD5 collisions for $10M in
|
||
about 20 days.....The net result is that we have taken
|
||
virtually no more time (the 2^64 creations of MD5 will
|
||
dominate) and virtually no space (compared to 2^64 stored
|
||
values) and we get the effect of a birthday attack. This
|
||
is another cautionary data point about the risks of relying
|
||
on space costs for security rather than time costs." [Hal
|
||
Finney, 1994-09-09]
|
||
5.11.6. pkzip reported broken
|
||
- "I finally found time to take a closer look at the
|
||
encryption algorithm by Roger Schlafly that is used in
|
||
PKZIP and have developed a practical known plaintext attack
|
||
that can find the entire 96-bit internal state." [Paul Carl
|
||
Kocher, comp.risks, 1994-09-04]
|
||
5.11.7. Gaming attacks, where loopholes in a system are exploited
|
||
- contests that are defeated by automated attacks
|
||
- the entire legal system can be viewed this way, with
|
||
competing teams of lawyers looking for legal attacks (and
|
||
the more complex the legal code, the more attacks can be
|
||
mounted)
|
||
- ecologies, where weaknesses are exploited ruthlessly,
|
||
forcing most species into extinction
|
||
- economies, ditto, except must faster
|
||
- the hazards for crypto schemes are clear
|
||
+ And there are important links to the issue of overly formal
|
||
systems, or systems in which ordinary "discretion" and
|
||
"choice" is overridden by rules from outside
|
||
- as with rules telling employers in great detail when and
|
||
how they can discharge employees (cf. the discussion of
|
||
"reasonable rules made mandatory," elsewhere)
|
||
- such rules get exploited by employees, who follow the
|
||
"letter of the law" but are performing in a way
|
||
unacceptable to the employer
|
||
- related to "locality of reference" points, in that
|
||
problem should be resolved locally, not with intervention
|
||
from afar.
|
||
- things will never be perfect, from the perspetive of all
|
||
parties, but meddling from outside makes things into a
|
||
game, the whole point of this section
|
||
+ Implications for digital money: overly complex legal
|
||
systems, without the local advantages of true cash (settled
|
||
locally)
|
||
+ may need to inject some supra-legal enforcement
|
||
mechanisms into the system, to make it converge
|
||
- offshore credit databases, beyond reach of U.S. and
|
||
other laws
|
||
+ physical violence (one reason people don't "play games"
|
||
with Mafia, Triads, etc., is that they know the
|
||
implications)
|
||
- it's not unethical, as I see it, for contracts in
|
||
which the parties understand that a possible or even
|
||
likely consequence of their failure to perform is
|
||
death
|
||
5.11.8. Diffie-Hellman key exchange vulnerabilities
|
||
- "man-in-the-midle" attack
|
||
+ phone systems use voice readback of LCD indicated number
|
||
- as computer power increases, even _this_ may be
|
||
insufficient
|
||
5.11.9. Reverse engineering of ciphers
|
||
- A5 code used in GSM phones was reverse engineered from a
|
||
hardware description
|
||
- Graham Toal reports (1994-07-12) that GCHQ blocked a public
|
||
lectures on this
|
||
|
||
5.12. Loose Ends
|
||
5.12.1. "Chess Grandmaster Problem" and other Frauds and Spoofs
|
||
- of central importance to proofs of identity (a la Fiat-
|
||
Shamir)
|
||
- "terrorist" and "Mafia spoof" problems
|
||
|
||
6. The Need For Strong Crypto
|
||
|
||
6.1. copyright
|
||
THE CYPHERNOMICON: Cypherpunks FAQ and More, Version 0.666,
|
||
1994-09-10, Copyright Timothy C. May. All rights reserved.
|
||
See the detailed disclaimer. Use short sections under "fair
|
||
use" provisions, with appropriate credit, but don't put your
|
||
name on my words.
|
||
|
||
6.2. SUMMARY: The Need For Strong Crypto
|
||
6.2.1. Main Points
|
||
- Strong crypto reclaims the power to decide for one's self,
|
||
to deny the "Censor" the power to choose what one reads,
|
||
watches, or listens to.
|
||
6.2.2. Connections to Other Sections
|
||
6.2.3. Where to Find Additional Information
|
||
6.2.4. Miscellaneous Comments
|
||
- this section is short, but is less focussed than other
|
||
sections; it is essentially a "transition" chapter.
|
||
|
||
6.3. General Uses of and Reasons for Crypto
|
||
6.3.1. (see also the extensive listing of "Reasons for Anonymity,"
|
||
which makes many points about the need and uses for strong
|
||
crypto)
|
||
6.3.2. "Where is public key crypto really needed?"
|
||
- "It is the case that there is relatively little need for
|
||
asymmetric key cryptography in small closed populations.
|
||
For example, the banks get along quite well without. The
|
||
advantage of public key is that it permits private
|
||
communication in a large and open population and with a
|
||
minimum of prearrangement." [WHMurray, sci.crypt, 1994-08-
|
||
25]
|
||
- That is, symmetric key systems (such as conventional
|
||
ciphers, one time pads, etc.) work reasonably well by
|
||
prearrangement between parties. And of course one time pads
|
||
have the additional advantage of being information-
|
||
theoretically secure. But asymmetric or public key methods
|
||
are incredibly useful when: the parties have not met
|
||
before, when key material has not been exchanged, and when
|
||
concerns exist about storing the key material. The so-
|
||
called "key management problem" when N people want to
|
||
communicate pairwise with each other is well-founded.
|
||
- And of course public key crypto makes possible all the
|
||
other useful stuff like digital money, DC-Nets, zero
|
||
knowledge proofs, secret sharing, etc.
|
||
6.3.3. "What are the main reasons to use cryptography?"
|
||
- people encrypt for the same reason they close and lock
|
||
their doors
|
||
+ Privacy in its most basic forms
|
||
- text -- records, diaries, letters, e-mail
|
||
- sound -- phone conversations
|
||
- other --video
|
||
+ phones, intercepts, cellular, wireless, car phones,
|
||
scanners
|
||
+ making listening illegal is useless (and wrong-headed)
|
||
- and authorites are exempt from such laws
|
||
- people need to protect, end to end
|
||
+ "How should I protect my personal files, and my phone
|
||
calls?"
|
||
- Personally, I don't worry too much. But many people do.
|
||
Encryption tools are widely available.
|
||
- Cellular telephones are notoriously insecure, as are
|
||
cordless phones (even less secure). There are laws
|
||
about monitoring, small comfort as that may be. (And
|
||
I'm largely opposed to such laws, for libertarian
|
||
reasons and because it creates a false sense of
|
||
security.)
|
||
- Laptops are probably less vulnerable to Van Eck types
|
||
of RF monitoring than are CRTs. The trend to lower
|
||
power, LCDs, etc., all works toward decreasing
|
||
vulnerability. (However, computer power for extracting
|
||
weak signals out of noise is increasing faster than RF
|
||
are decreasing....tradeoffs are unclear.)
|
||
+ encrypting messages because mail delivery is so flaky
|
||
- that is, mail is misdelivered,via hosts incorrectly
|
||
processing the addresses
|
||
- encryption obviously prevents misunderstandings (though
|
||
it does little to get the mail delivered correctly)
|
||
+ Encryption to Protect Information
|
||
- the standard reason
|
||
+ encryption of e-mail is increasing
|
||
- the various court cases about employers reading
|
||
ostensibly private e-mail will sharpen this debate (and
|
||
raise the issue of employers forbidding encryption;
|
||
resonances with the mostly-settled issue of reasonable
|
||
use of company phones for private calls-more efficient
|
||
to let some personal calls be made than to lose the
|
||
time of employees going to public phones)
|
||
+ encryption of faxes will increase, too, especially as
|
||
technology advances and as the dangers of interception
|
||
become more apparent
|
||
- also, tighter links between sender and receive, as
|
||
opposed to the current "dial the number and hope it's
|
||
the right one" approach, will encourage the additional
|
||
use of encryption
|
||
- "electronic vaulting" of large amounts of information,
|
||
sent over T1 and T3 data networks, e.g., backup material
|
||
for banks and large corporations
|
||
+ the miles and miles of network wiring within a
|
||
corporation-LANs, WANs, Novell, Ethernet, TCP-IP, Banyan,
|
||
and so on-cannot all be checked for taps...who would even
|
||
have the records to know if some particular wire is going
|
||
where it should? (so many undocumented hookups, lost
|
||
records, ad hoc connections, etc.)
|
||
- the solution is to have point-to-point encryption, even
|
||
withing corporations (for important items, at least)
|
||
- wireless LANs
|
||
+ corporations are becoming increasingly concerned about
|
||
interception of important information-or even seemingly
|
||
minor information-and about hackers and other intruders
|
||
- calls for network security enhancement
|
||
- they are hiring "tiger teams" to beef up security
|
||
+ cellular phones
|
||
- interceptions are common (and this is becoming
|
||
publicized)
|
||
- modifications to commercial scanners are describe in
|
||
newsletters
|
||
- something like Lotus Notes may be a main substrate for
|
||
the effective introduction of crypto methods (ditto for
|
||
hypertext)
|
||
- encryption provides "solidity" to cyberspace, in the
|
||
sense of creating walls, doors, permanent structures
|
||
- there may even be legal requirements for better security
|
||
over documents, patient files, employee records, etc.
|
||
+ Encryption of Video Signals and Encryption to Control
|
||
Piracy
|
||
- this is of course a whole technology and industry
|
||
- Videocypher II has been cracked by many video hackers
|
||
- a whole cottage industry in cracking such cyphers
|
||
- note that outlawing encryption would open up many
|
||
industries to destruction by piracy, which is yet
|
||
another reason a wholesale ban on encryption is doomed
|
||
to failure
|
||
- Protecting home videos--several cases of home burglaries
|
||
where private x-rated tapes of stars were taken, then
|
||
sold (Leslile Visser, CBS Sports)
|
||
- these general reasons will make encryption more common,
|
||
more socially and legally acceptable, and will hence make
|
||
eventual attempts to limit the use of crypto anarchy
|
||
methods moot
|
||
+ Digital Signatures and Authentication
|
||
+ for electronic forms of contracts and digital
|
||
timestamping
|
||
- not yet tested in the courts, though this should come
|
||
soon (perhaps by 1996)
|
||
+ could be very useful for proving that transactions
|
||
happened at a certain time (Tom Clancy has a situation
|
||
in "Debt of Honor" in which all Wall Street central
|
||
records of stock trades are wiped out in a software
|
||
scheme: only the records of traders are useful, and
|
||
they are worried about these being fudged to turn
|
||
profits...timestamping would help immensely)
|
||
- though certain spoofs, a la the brilliant penny scam,
|
||
are still possible (register multiple trades, only
|
||
reveal the profitable ones)
|
||
- negotiations
|
||
- AMIX, Xanadu, etc.
|
||
+ is the real protection against viruses (since all other
|
||
scanning methods will increasingly fail)
|
||
- software authors and distributors "sign" their
|
||
work...no virus writer can possibly forge the digital
|
||
signature
|
||
+ Proofs of identity, passwords, and operating system use
|
||
- ZKIPS especially in networks, where the chances of seeing
|
||
a password being transmitted are much greater (an obvious
|
||
point that is not much discussed)
|
||
+ operating systems and databases will need more secure
|
||
procedures for access, for agents and the like to pay for
|
||
services, etc.
|
||
- unforgeable tokens
|
||
+ Cyberspace will need better protection
|
||
- to ensure spoofing and counterfeiting is reduced
|
||
(recall Habitat's problems with people figuring out the
|
||
loopholes)
|
||
+ if OH is also working on "world- building" at Los
|
||
Alamos, he may be using evolutionary systems and
|
||
abstract math to help build better and more "coherent"
|
||
worlds
|
||
- agents, demons, structures, persistent objects
|
||
- encryption to protect these structures
|
||
+ the abstract math part of cyberspace: abstract
|
||
measure spaces, topologies, distance metrics
|
||
- may figure in to the balance between user
|
||
malleabilty and rigidity of the space
|
||
- Chaitin's AIT...he has obtained measures for these
|
||
+ Digital Contracts
|
||
- e-mail too easily forged, faked (and lost, misplaced)
|
||
+ Anonymity
|
||
- remailing
|
||
- law avoidance
|
||
- samizdats,
|
||
- Smart cards, ATMs, etc.
|
||
- Digital Money
|
||
- Voting
|
||
+ Information Markets
|
||
- data havens, espionage
|
||
+ Privacy of Purchases
|
||
- for general principles, to prevent a surveillance society
|
||
+ specialized mailing lists
|
||
- vendors pay to get names (Crest labels)
|
||
- Smalltalk job offers
|
||
- in electronic age, will be much easier to "troll" for
|
||
specialized names
|
||
- people will want to "selectively disclose" their
|
||
interests (actually, some will, some won't)
|
||
6.3.4. "What may limit the use of crypto?"
|
||
+ "It's too hard to use"
|
||
- multiple protocols (just consider how hard it is to
|
||
actually send encrypted messages between people today)
|
||
- the need to remember a password or passphrase
|
||
+ "It's too much trouble"
|
||
- the argument being that people will not bother to use
|
||
passwords
|
||
- partly because they don't think anything will happen to
|
||
them
|
||
+ "What have you got to hide?"
|
||
- e.g.,, imagine some comments I'd have gotten at Intel had
|
||
I encrypted everything
|
||
- and governments tend to view encryption as ipso facto
|
||
proof that illegalities are being committed: drugs, money
|
||
laundering, tax evasion
|
||
- recall the "forfeiture" controversy
|
||
+ Government is taking various steps to limit the use of
|
||
encryption and secure communication
|
||
- some attempts have failed (S.266), some have been
|
||
shelved, and almost none have yet been tested in the
|
||
courts
|
||
- see the other sections...
|
||
+ Courts Are Falling Behind, Are Overcrowded, and Can't Deal
|
||
Adequately with New Issues-Such as Encryption and Cryonics
|
||
- which raises the issue of the "Science Court" again
|
||
- and migration to private adjudication (regulatory
|
||
arbitrage)
|
||
- BTW, anonymous systems are essentially the ultimate merit
|
||
system (in the obvious sense) and so fly in the face of the
|
||
"hiring by the numbers" de facto quota systems now
|
||
creeeping in to so many areas of life....there may be rules
|
||
requiring all business dealings to keep track of the sex,
|
||
race, and "ability group" (I'm kidding, I hope) of their
|
||
employees and their consultants
|
||
6.3.5. "What are some likely future uses of crypto?"
|
||
- Video conferencing: without crypto, or with government
|
||
access, corporate meetings become public...as if a
|
||
government agent was sitting in a meeting, taking notes.
|
||
(There may be some who think this is a good idea, a check
|
||
on corporate shenanigans. I don't. Much too high a price to
|
||
pay for marginal or illusory improvements.)
|
||
- presenting unpopular views
|
||
+ getting and giving medical treatments
|
||
- with or without licenses from the medical union (AMA)
|
||
- unapproved treatments
|
||
- bootleg medical treatments
|
||
- information markets
|
||
+ sanctuary movements, underground railroads
|
||
- for battered wives
|
||
- and for fathers taking back their children
|
||
- (I'm not taking sides)
|
||
- smuggling
|
||
- tax evasion
|
||
- data havens
|
||
- bookies, betting, numbers games
|
||
- remailers, anonymity
|
||
- religious networks (digital confessionals)
|
||
- digital cash, for privacy and for tax evasion
|
||
- digital hits
|
||
- newsgroup participation -- archiving of Netnews is
|
||
commonplace, and increases in storage density make it
|
||
likely that in future years one will be able to purchase
|
||
disks with "Usenet, 1985-1995" and so forth (or access,
|
||
search, etc. online sites)
|
||
6.3.6. "Are there illegal uses of crypto?"
|
||
- Currently, there are no blanket laws in the U.S. about
|
||
encryption.
|
||
+ There are specific situations in which encryption cannot be
|
||
freely used (or the use is spelled out)
|
||
- over the amateur radio airwave...keys must be provided
|
||
+ Carl Elllison has noted many times that cryptography has
|
||
been in use for many centuries; the notion that it is a
|
||
"military" technology that civilians have some how gotten
|
||
ahold of is just plain false.
|
||
- and even public key crypto was developed in a university
|
||
(Stanford, then MIT)
|
||
|
||
6.4. Protection of Corporate and Financial Privacy
|
||
6.4.1. corporations are becoming increasingly concerned about
|
||
interception of important information-or even seemingly minor
|
||
information-and about hackers and other intruders
|
||
- calls for network security enhancement
|
||
- they are hiring "tiger teams" to beef up security
|
||
+ cellular phones
|
||
- interceptions are common (and this is becoming
|
||
publicized)
|
||
- modifications to commercial scanners are describe in
|
||
newsletters
|
||
- something like Lotus Notes may be a main substrate for the
|
||
effective introduction of crypto methods (ditto for
|
||
hypertext)
|
||
6.4.2. Corporate Espionage (or "Business Research")
|
||
+ Xeroxing of documents
|
||
- recall the way Murrray Woods inspected files of Fred
|
||
Buch, suspecting he had removed the staples and Xeroxed
|
||
the documents for Zilog (circa late 1977)
|
||
- a precedent: shapes of staples
|
||
+ colors of the paper and ink...blues, for example
|
||
- but these low-tech schemes are easy to circumvent
|
||
+ Will corporations crack down on use of modems?
|
||
+ after all, the specs of a chip or product could be mailed
|
||
out of the company using the companies own networks!
|
||
- applies to outgoing letters as well (and I've never
|
||
heard of any company inspecting to this detail, though
|
||
it may happen at defense contractors)
|
||
+ and messages can still be hidden (covert channels)
|
||
- albeit at much lower bandwidths and with more effort
|
||
required (it'll stop the casual leakage of information)
|
||
- the LSB method (though this still involves a digital
|
||
storage means, e.g., a diskette, which might be
|
||
restricted)
|
||
- various other schemes: buried in word processing format
|
||
(at low bandwidth)
|
||
- subtleties such as covert channels are not even
|
||
considered by corporations-too many leakage paths!
|
||
+ it seems likely that government workers with security
|
||
clearances will face restrictions on their access to AMIX-
|
||
like systems, or even to "private" use of conventional
|
||
databases
|
||
- at least when they use UseNet, the argument will go,
|
||
they can be overseen to some extent
|
||
+ Offsite storage and access of stolen material
|
||
+ instead of storing stolen blueprints and schematics on
|
||
company premises, they may be stored at a remote location
|
||
- possiby unknown to the company, via cryptoanarchy
|
||
techniques
|
||
+ "Business research" is the euphemism for corporate
|
||
espionage
|
||
- often hiring ex-DIA and CIA agents
|
||
+ American companies may step up their economic espionage
|
||
once it is revealed just how extensive the spying by
|
||
European and Japanese companies has been
|
||
- Chobetsu reports to MITI
|
||
- Mossad aids Israeli companies, e.g., Elscint. Elbit
|
||
+ Bidzos calls this "a digital Pearl Harbor" (attacks on
|
||
network security)
|
||
- would be ironic if weaknesses put into encryption gear
|
||
came back to haunt us
|
||
+ corporations will want an arms length relationship with
|
||
corporate spies, to protect themselves against lawsuits,
|
||
criminal charges, etc.
|
||
- third party research agencies will be used
|
||
6.4.3. Encryption to Protect Information
|
||
- the standard reason
|
||
+ encryption of e-mail is increasing
|
||
- the various court cases about employers reading
|
||
ostensibly private e-mail will sharpen this debate (and
|
||
raise the issue of employers forbidding encryption;
|
||
resonances with the mostly-settled issue of reasonable
|
||
use of company phones for private calls-more efficient to
|
||
let some personal calls be made than to lose the time of
|
||
employees going to public phones)
|
||
+ encryption of faxes will increase, too, especially as
|
||
technology advances and as the dangers of interception
|
||
become more apparent
|
||
- also, tighter links between sender and receive, as
|
||
opposed to the current "dial the number and hope it's the
|
||
right one" approach, will encourage the additional use of
|
||
encryption
|
||
- "electronic vaulting" of large amounts of information, sent
|
||
over T1 and T3 data networks, e.g., backup material for
|
||
banks and large corporations
|
||
+ the miles and miles of network wiring within a
|
||
corporation-LANs, WANs, Novell, Ethernet, TCP-IP, Banyan,
|
||
and so on-cannot all be checked for taps...who would even
|
||
have the records to know if some particular wire is going
|
||
where it should? (so many undocumented hookups, lost
|
||
records, ad hoc connections, etc.)
|
||
- the solution is to have point-to-point encryption, even
|
||
withing corporations (for important items, at least)
|
||
- wireless LANs
|
||
- encryption provides "solidity" to cyberspace, in the sense
|
||
of creating walls, doors, permanent structures
|
||
- there may even be legal requirements for better security
|
||
over documents, patient files, employee records, etc.
|
||
6.4.4. U.S. willing to seize assets as they pass through U.S.
|
||
(Haiti, Iraq)
|
||
6.4.5. Privacy of research
|
||
- attacks on tobacco companies, demanding their private
|
||
research documents be turned over to the FDA (because
|
||
tobacco is 'fair game" for all such attacks, ...)
|
||
6.4.6. Using crypto-mediated business to bypass "deep pockets"
|
||
liability suits, abuse of regulations, of the court system,
|
||
etc.
|
||
+ Abuses of Lawsuits: the trend of massive
|
||
judgments...several million for a woman burned when she
|
||
spilled hot coffee at a MacDonald's ($160K for damages, the
|
||
rest for "punitive damages")
|
||
- billions of dollars for various jury decisions
|
||
- "deep pockets" lawsuits are a new form of populism, of de
|
||
Tocqueville's pocket-picking
|
||
+ For example, a shareware author might collect digital cash
|
||
without being traceable by those who feel wronged
|
||
- Is this "right"? Well , what does the contract say? If
|
||
the customer bought or used the product knowing that the
|
||
author/seller was untraceable, and that no additional
|
||
warranties or guarantees were given, what fraud was
|
||
committed?
|
||
+ crypto can, with some costs, take interactions out of the
|
||
reach of courts
|
||
- replacing the courts with PPL-style private-produced
|
||
justice
|
||
6.4.7. on anonymous communication and corporations
|
||
- Most corporations will avoid anonymous communications,
|
||
fearing the repercussions, the illegality (vis-a-vis
|
||
antitrust law), and the "unwholesomeness" of it
|
||
+ Some may use it to access competitor intelligence, offshore
|
||
data havens, etc.
|
||
- Even here, probably through "arm's length" relationships
|
||
with outside consultants, analogous to the cutouts used
|
||
by the CIA and whatnot to insulate themselves from
|
||
charges
|
||
- Boldest of all will be the "crypto-zaibatsu" that use
|
||
strong crypto of the crypto anarchy flavor to arrange
|
||
collusive deals, to remove competitors via force, and to
|
||
generally pursue the "darker side of the force," to coin a
|
||
phrase.
|
||
|
||
6.5. Digital Signatures
|
||
6.5.1. for electronic forms of contracts
|
||
- not yet tested in the courts, though this should come soon
|
||
(perhaps by 1996)
|
||
6.5.2. negotiations
|
||
6.5.3. AMIX, Xanadu, etc.
|
||
6.5.4. is the real protection against viruses (since all other
|
||
scanning methods will increasingly fail)
|
||
- software authors and distributors "sign" their work...no
|
||
virus writer can possibly forge the digital signature
|
||
|
||
6.6. Political Uses of Crypto
|
||
6.6.1. Dissidents, Amnesty International
|
||
- Most governments want to know what their subjects are
|
||
saying...
|
||
- Strong crypto (including steganography to hide the
|
||
existence of the communications) is needed
|
||
- Myanmar (Burma) dissidents are known to be using PGP
|
||
6.6.2. reports that rebels in Chiapas (Mexico, Zapatistas) are on
|
||
the Net, presumably using PGP
|
||
- (if NSA can really crack PGP, this is probably a prime
|
||
target for sharing with the Mexican government)
|
||
6.6.3. Free speech has declined in America--crypto provides an
|
||
antidote
|
||
- people are sued for expressing opinions, books are banned
|
||
("Loompanics Press" facing investigations, because some
|
||
children ordered some books)
|
||
+ SLAPP suits (Strategic Lawsuiits Against Public
|
||
Participation), designed to scare off differing opinions by
|
||
threatening legal ruination in the courts
|
||
- some judges have found for the defendants and ordered the
|
||
SLAPPers to pay damages themselves, but this is still a
|
||
speech-chilling trend
|
||
- crypto untraceability is good immunity to this trend, and
|
||
is thus *real* free speech
|
||
|
||
6.7. Beyond Good and Evil, or, Why Crypto is Needed
|
||
6.7.1. "Why is cryptography good? Why is anonymity good?"
|
||
- These moral questions pop up on the List once in a while,
|
||
often asked by someone preparing to write a paper for a
|
||
class on ethics or whatnot. Most of us on the list probably
|
||
think the answers are clearly "yes," but many in the public
|
||
may not think so. The old dichotomy between "None of your
|
||
damned business" and "What have you got to hide?"
|
||
- "Is it good that people can write diaried unread by
|
||
others?" "Is it good that people can talk to each other
|
||
without law enforcement knowing what they're saying?" "Is
|
||
it good that people can lock their doors and hide from
|
||
outsiders?" These are all essentially equivalent to the
|
||
questions above.
|
||
- Anonymity may not be either good or not good, but the
|
||
_outlawing_ of anonymity would require a police state to
|
||
enforce, would impinge on basic ideas about private
|
||
transactions, and would foreclose many options that some
|
||
degree of anonymity makes possible.
|
||
- "People should not be anonymous" is a normative statement
|
||
that is impractical to enforce.
|
||
6.7.2. Speaking of the isolation from physical threats and pressures
|
||
that cyberspace provides, Eric Hughes writes: "One of the
|
||
whole points of anonymity and pseudonymity is to create
|
||
immunity from these threats, which are all based upon the
|
||
human body and its physical surroundings. What is the point
|
||
of a system of anonymity which can be pierced when something
|
||
"bad" happens? These systems do not reject the regime of
|
||
violence; rather, they merely mitigate it slightly further
|
||
and make their morality a bit more explicit.....I desire
|
||
systems which do not require violence for their existence and
|
||
stability. I desire anonymity as an ally to break the hold
|
||
of morality over culture." [Eric Hughes, 1994-08-31]
|
||
6.7.3. Crypto anarchy means prosperity for those who can grab it,
|
||
those competent enough to have something of value to offer
|
||
for sale; the clueless 95% will suffer, but that is only
|
||
just. With crypto anarchy we can painlessly, without
|
||
initiation of aggression, dispose of the nonproductive, the
|
||
halt and the lame. (Charity is always possible, but I suspect
|
||
even the liberal do-gooders will throw up their hands at the
|
||
prospect of a nation of mostly unskilled and essentially
|
||
illiterate and innumerate workers being unable to get
|
||
meaninful, well-paying jobs.)
|
||
6.7.4. Crypto gets more important as communication increases and as
|
||
computing gets distributed
|
||
+ with bits and pieces of one's environment scattered around
|
||
- have to worry about security
|
||
- others have to also protect their own products, and yet
|
||
still provide/sell access
|
||
- private spaces needed in disparate
|
||
locations...multinationals, teleconferencing, video
|
||
|
||
6.8. Crypo Needed for Operating Systems and Networks
|
||
6.8.1. Restrictions on cryptography--difficult as they may be to
|
||
enforce--may also impose severe hardships on secure operating
|
||
system design, Norm Hardy has made this point several times.
|
||
- Agents and objects inside computer systems will likely need
|
||
security, credentials, robustness, and even digital money
|
||
for transactions.
|
||
6.8.2. Proofs of identity, passwords, and operating system use
|
||
- ZKIPS especially in networks, where the chances of seeing a
|
||
password being transmitted are much greater (an obvious
|
||
point that is not much discussed)
|
||
+ operating systems and databases will need more secure
|
||
procedures for access, for agents and the like to pay for
|
||
services, etc.
|
||
- unforgeable tokens
|
||
6.8.3. An often unmentioned reason why encyption is needed is for
|
||
the creation of private, or virtual, networks
|
||
- so that channels are independent of the "common carrier"
|
||
+ to make this clear: prospects are dangerously high for a
|
||
consolidation under government control of networks
|
||
- in parallel with roads
|
||
+ and like roads, may insist on equivalent of licenses
|
||
- is-a-person
|
||
- bans on encryption
|
||
- The Nightmare Scenario: "We own the networks, we won't
|
||
let anyone install new networks without our approval, and
|
||
we will make the laws about what gets carried, what
|
||
encryption can be used, and how taxes will be collected."
|
||
- Fortunately, I doubt this is enforceable...too many ways
|
||
to create virtual networks...satellites like Iridium,
|
||
fiber optics, ways to hide crypto or bury it in other
|
||
traffic
|
||
+ cyberspace walls...
|
||
+ more than just crypto: physical security is needed (and
|
||
for much the same reason no "digital coin" exists)
|
||
- processes running on controlled-accesss machines (as
|
||
with remailers)
|
||
- access by crypto
|
||
+ a web of mutually suspicious machines may be sufficient
|
||
- robust cyberspaces built with DC-Net ("dining
|
||
cryptographers") methods?
|
||
|
||
6.9. Ominous Trends
|
||
6.9.1. Ever-increasing numbers of laws, complexities of tax codes,
|
||
etc.
|
||
- individuals no longer can navigate
|
||
6.9.2. National ID cards
|
||
- work permits, immigration concerns, welfare fraud, stopping
|
||
terrorists, collecting taxes
|
||
- USPS and other proposals
|
||
6.9.3. Key Escrow
|
||
6.9.4. Extension of U.S. law around the world
|
||
- Now that the U.S. has vanquished the U.S.S.R., a free field
|
||
ahead of it for spreading the New World Order, led of
|
||
course by the U.S.A. and its politicians.
|
||
- treaties, international agreements
|
||
- economic hegemony
|
||
- U.N. mandates, forces, "blue helmets"
|
||
6.9.5. AA BBS case means cyberspace is not what we though it was
|
||
|
||
6.10. Loose Ends
|
||
6.10.1. "Why don't most people pay more attention to security
|
||
issues?"
|
||
- Fact is, most people never think about real security.
|
||
- Safe manufacturers have said that improvements in safes
|
||
(the metal kind) were driven by insurance rates. A direct
|
||
incentive to spend more
|
||
money to improve security (cost of better safe < cost of
|
||
higher insurance rate).
|
||
- Right now there is almost no economic incentive for people
|
||
to worry
|
||
about PIN security, about protecting their files, etc.
|
||
(Banks eat the
|
||
costs and pass them on...any bank which tried to save a few
|
||
bucks in
|
||
losses by requiring 10-digit PINs--which people would
|
||
*write down*
|
||
anyway!--would lose customers. Holograms and pictures on
|
||
bank cards
|
||
are happening because the costs have dropped enough.)
|
||
- Crypto is economics. People will begin to really care when
|
||
it costs them.
|
||
|
||
6.10.2. What motivates an attackers is not the intrinsic value of the
|
||
data but his perception of the value of the data.
|
||
6.10.3. Crypto allows more refinement of permissions...access to
|
||
groups, lists
|
||
- beyond such crude methods as banning domain names or "edu"
|
||
sorts of accounts
|
||
6.10.4. these general reasons will make encryption more common, more
|
||
socially and legally acceptable, and will hence make eventual
|
||
attempts to limit the use of crypto anarchy methods moot
|
||
6.10.5. protecting reading habits..
|
||
- (Imagine using your MicroSoftCashCard for library
|
||
checkouts...)
|
||
6.10.6. Downsides
|
||
- loss of trust
|
||
- markets in unsavory things
|
||
- espionage
|
||
+ expect to see new kinds of con jobs
|
||
- confidence games
|
||
- "Make Digital Money Fast"
|
||
6.10.7. Encryption of Video Signals and Encryption to Control Piracy
|
||
- this is of course a whole technology and industry
|
||
- Videocypher II has been cracked by many video hackers
|
||
- a whole cottage industry in cracking such cyphers
|
||
- note that outlawing encryption would open up many
|
||
industries to destruction by piracy, which is yet another
|
||
reason a wholesale ban on encryption is doomed to failure
|
||
|
||
7. PGP -- Pretty Good Privacy
|
||
|
||
7.1. copyright
|
||
THE CYPHERNOMICON: Cypherpunks FAQ and More, Version 0.666,
|
||
1994-09-10, Copyright Timothy C. May. All rights reserved.
|
||
See the detailed disclaimer. Use short sections under "fair
|
||
use" provisions, with appropriate credit, but don't put your
|
||
name on my words.
|
||
|
||
7.2. SUMMARY: PGP -- Pretty Good Privacy
|
||
7.2.1. Main Points
|
||
- PGP is the most important crypto tool there is, having
|
||
single-handedly spread public key methods around the world
|
||
- many other tools are being built on top of it
|
||
7.2.2. Connections to Other Sections
|
||
- ironically, almost no understanding of how PGP works in
|
||
detail is needed; there are plenty of experts who
|
||
specialize in that
|
||
7.2.3. Where to Find Additional Information
|
||
- newsgroups carry up to date comments; just read them for a
|
||
few weeks and many things will float by
|
||
- various FAQs on PGP
|
||
+ even an entire book, by Simpson Garfinkel:
|
||
- PGP: Pretty Good Privacy
|
||
by Simson Garfinkel
|
||
1st Edition November 1994 (est.)
|
||
250 pages (est),ISBN: 1-56592-098-8, $17.95 (est)
|
||
7.2.4. Miscellaneous Comments
|
||
- a vast number of ftp sites, URLs, etc., and these change
|
||
- this document can't possibly stay current on these--see the
|
||
pointers in the newsgroups for the most current sites
|
||
|
||
7.3. Introduction
|
||
7.3.1. Why does PGP rate its own section?
|
||
- Like Clipper, PGP is too big a set of issues not to have
|
||
its own section
|
||
7.3.2. "What's the fascination in Cypherpunks with PGP?"
|
||
- Ironically, our first meeting, in September 1992, coincided
|
||
within a few days of the release of PGP 2.0. Arthur Abraham
|
||
provided diskettes of 2.0, complete with laser-printed
|
||
labels. Version 2.0 was the first truly useful version of
|
||
PGP (so I hear....I never tried Version 1.0, which had
|
||
limited distribution). So PGP and Cypherpunks shared a
|
||
history--and Phil Zimmermann has been to some physical
|
||
meetings.
|
||
- A practical, usable, understandable tool. Fairly easy to
|
||
use. In contrast, many other developments are more abstract
|
||
and do not lend themselves to use by hobbyists and
|
||
amateurs. This alone ensures PGP an honored place (and
|
||
might be an object lesson for developers of other tools).
|
||
7.3.3. The points here focus on PGP, but may apply as well to
|
||
similar crypto programs, such as commercial RSA packages
|
||
(integrated into mailers, commercial programs, etc.).
|
||
|
||
7.4. What is PGP?
|
||
7.4.1. "What is PGP?"
|
||
7.4.2. "Why was PGP developed?"
|
||
7.4.3. Who developed PGP?
|
||
|
||
7.5. Importance of PGP
|
||
7.5.1. PGP 2.0 arrived at an important time
|
||
- in September 1992, the very same week the Cypherpunks had
|
||
their first meeting, in Oakland, CA. (Arthur Abraham
|
||
printed up professional-looking diskette labels for the PGO
|
||
2.0 diskettes distributed. A general feeling that we were
|
||
forming at the "right time.")
|
||
- just 6 months before the Clipper announcement caused a
|
||
firestorm of interest in public key cryptography
|
||
7.5.2. PGP has been the catalyst for major shifts in opinion
|
||
- has educated tens of thousands of users in the nature of
|
||
strong crypto
|
||
- has led to other tools, including encrypted remailers,
|
||
experiments in digital money, etc.
|
||
7.5.3. "If this stuff is so important, how come not everyone is
|
||
digitally signing their messages?"
|
||
- (Me, for example. I never sign my messages, and this FAQ is
|
||
not signed. Maybe I will, later.)
|
||
- convenience, ease of use, "all crypto is economics"
|
||
- insecurity of host Unix machines (illusory)
|
||
- better integration with mailers needed
|
||
7.5.4. Ripem appears to be dead; traffic in alt.security.ripem is
|
||
almost zero. PGP has obviously won the hearts and minds of
|
||
the user community; and now that it's "legal"...
|
||
|
||
7.6. PGP Versions
|
||
7.6.1. PGP Versions and Implementations
|
||
- 2.6ui is the version compatible with 2.3
|
||
+ What is the difference between versions 2.6 and 2.6ui?
|
||
- "PGP 2.6 is distributed from MIT and is legally available
|
||
to US and Canadian residents. It uses the RSAREF library.
|
||
It has code that will prevent interoperation with earlier
|
||
versions of PGP.
|
||
"PGP 2.6ui is a modified version of PGP 2.3a which
|
||
functions almost identically to MIT PGP 2.6, without the
|
||
"cripple code" of MIT PGP 2.6. It is legally available
|
||
outside the US and Canada only." [Rat
|
||
<ratinox@ccs.neu.edu>, alt.security.pgp, 1994-07-03]
|
||
+ DOS
|
||
- Versions
|
||
+ Pretty Good Shell
|
||
- "When your Microsoft Mail supports an external Editor,
|
||
you might want to try PGS (Pretty Good Shell),
|
||
available as PGS099B.ZIP at several ftp sites. It
|
||
enables you to run PGP from a shell, with a easy way to
|
||
edit/encrypt files." [HHM LIMPENS, 1994-07-01]
|
||
- Windows
|
||
+ Sun
|
||
- "I guess that you should be able to use PGPsendmail,
|
||
available at ftp.atnf.csiro.au:/pub/people/rgooch'
|
||
[eric@terra.hacktic.nl (Eric Veldhuyzen), PGP support for
|
||
Sun's Mailtool?, alt.security.pgp, 1994-06-29]
|
||
+ Mark Grant <mark@unicorn.com> has been working on a tool
|
||
to replace Sun's mailtool. "Privtool ("Privacy Tool") is
|
||
intended to be a PGP-aware replacement for the standard
|
||
Sun Workstation mailtool program, with a similar user
|
||
interface and automagick support for PGP-signing and PGP-
|
||
encryption." [MG, 1994-07-03]
|
||
- "At the moment, the Beta release is available from
|
||
ftp.c2.org in /pub/privtool as privtool-0.80.tar.Z, and
|
||
I've attached the README.1ST file so that you can check
|
||
out the features and bugs before you download it. ....
|
||
Currently the program requires the Xview toolkit to
|
||
build, and has only been compiled on SunOS 4.1 and
|
||
Solaris 2.1."
|
||
+ MacPGP
|
||
- 2.6ui: reports of problems, bombs (remove Preferencs set
|
||
by previous versions from System folder)
|
||
- "MacPGP 2.6ui is fully compatible with MIT's MacPGP 2.6,
|
||
but offers several advantages, a chief one being that
|
||
MacPGP 2.6ui is controllable via AppleScript. This is a
|
||
very powerful feature, and pre-written AppleScripts are
|
||
already available. A set of AppleScripts called the
|
||
Interim Macintosh PGP Interface (IMPI) support
|
||
encryption, decryption, and signing of files via drag-n-
|
||
drop, finder selection, the clipboard, all accessible
|
||
from a system-wide menu. Eudora AppleScripts also exist
|
||
to interface MacPGP with the mail program Eudora.
|
||
|
||
"MacPGP 2.6ui v1.2 is available via anonymous ftp from:
|
||
|
||
FTP SITE DIRECTORY
|
||
CONTENTS
|
||
-------- ---------
|
||
--------
|
||
ftp.darmstadt.gmd.de pub/crypto/macintosh/MacPGP
|
||
MacPGP 2.6ui, source
|
||
|
||
AppleScripts for 2.6ui are available for U.S. and
|
||
Canadian citizens ONLY
|
||
via anonymous ftp from:
|
||
|
||
FTP SITE DIRECTORY
|
||
CONTENTS
|
||
-------- ---------
|
||
--------
|
||
ftp.csn.net mpj
|
||
IMPI & Eudora scripts
|
||
|
||
MacPGP 2.6ui, source
|
||
[phinely@uhunix.uhcc.Hawaii.Edu (Peter Hinely),
|
||
alt.security.pgp, 1994-06-28]
|
||
- Amiga
|
||
+ VMS
|
||
- 2.6ui is said to compile and run under VMS.
|
||
+ German version
|
||
- MaaPGP0,1T1,1
|
||
- dtp8//dtp,dapmqtadt,gmd,de/ilaomilg/MaaP
|
||
- Ahpiqtoph_Pagalies@hh2.maus.
|
||
- (source: andreas.elbert@gmd.de (A.Elbert). by way of
|
||
qwerty@netcom.com (-=Xenon=-), 3-31-94
|
||
7.6.2. What versions of PGP exist?
|
||
- PGP 2.7 is ViaCrypt's commercial version of PGP 2.6
|
||
7.6.3. PGP 2.6 issues
|
||
- There has been much confusion, in the press and in
|
||
discussion groups, about the issues surrounding 2.5, 2.6,
|
||
2.6ui, and various versions of these. Motivations,
|
||
conspiracies, etc., have all been discussed. I'm not
|
||
involved as others on our list are, so I'm often confused
|
||
too.
|
||
+ Here are some comments by Phil Zimmermann, in response to a
|
||
misleading press report:
|
||
- "PGP 2.6 will always be able to read messages,
|
||
signatures, and keys from olderversions, even after
|
||
September 1st. The older versions will not be able to
|
||
read messages, signatures and keys produced by PGP 2.6
|
||
after September 1st. This is an entirely different
|
||
situation. There is every reason for people to switch to
|
||
PGP 2.6, because it will be able to handle both data
|
||
formats, while the older versions will not. Until
|
||
September, the new PGP will continue to produce the old
|
||
format that can be read by older versions, but will start
|
||
producing the new format after that date. This delay
|
||
allows time for everyone to obtain the new version of
|
||
PGP, so that they will not be affected by the change.
|
||
Key servers will still be able to carry the keys made in
|
||
the old format, because PGP 2.6 will still read them with
|
||
no problems. " [Phil Zimmermann, 1994-07-07, also posted
|
||
to Usenet groups] [all dates here refer to 1994]
|
||
- "I developed PGP 2.6 to be released by MIT, and I think
|
||
this new
|
||
arrangement is a breakthrough in the legal status of PGP,
|
||
of benefit to
|
||
all PGP users. I urge all PGP users to switch to PGP
|
||
2.6, and abandon
|
||
earlier versions. The widespread replacement of the old
|
||
versions with
|
||
this new version of PGP fits in with future plans for the
|
||
creation of a
|
||
PGP standard." [Phil Zimmermann, 1994-07-07, also posted
|
||
to Usenet groups]
|
||
7.6.4. PGP version 2.6.1
|
||
- "MIT will be releasing Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) version
|
||
2.6.1 real soon now. By tomorrow, I think. The MSDOS
|
||
release filename will be pgp261.zip, and the source code
|
||
will be in pgp261s.zip. The MIT FTP site is net-
|
||
dist@mit.edu, in the pub/PGP directory." [corrected by
|
||
Derek Atkins to be: net-dist.mit.edu, not net-
|
||
dist@mit.edu.]
|
||
|
||
"This new version has a lot of bug fixes over version 2.6.
|
||
I hope this is the final release of this family of PGP
|
||
source code. We've been working on an entirely new version
|
||
of PGP, rewritten from scratch, which is much cleaner and
|
||
faster, and better suited for the future enhancements we
|
||
have planned. All PGP development efforts will be
|
||
redirected toward this new code base, after this 2.6.1
|
||
release." [Phil Zimmermann, Cypherpunks list, 1994-09-02]
|
||
|
||
7.7. Where to Get PGP?
|
||
7.7.1. "Where can I get PGP on CompuServe?"
|
||
- Note: I can't keep track of the major ftp sites for the
|
||
various crypto packages, let alone info on services like
|
||
this. But, here it is;
|
||
- "Current as of 5-Jul-1994:"
|
||
GO EURFORUM / Utilities PGP26UI.ZIP PGP 2.6ui
|
||
GO PWOFORUM / New uploads PGP26.ZIP PGP 2.6
|
||
PWOFORUM also has the source code and documentation, plus
|
||
a number of shell utilities for PGP. Version 2.3a is also
|
||
still around." [cannon@panix.com, Kevin Martin, PGP on
|
||
Compuserve??, alt.security.pgp, 1994-07-08]
|
||
7.7.2. Off line PGP
|
||
+ ftp.informatik.uni-
|
||
hamburg.de:/pub/virus/crypt/pgp/tools/pgp-elm.zip
|
||
- another place: Crosspoint: ftp.uni-
|
||
kl.de:/pub3/pc/dos/terminal/xpoint XP302*.EXE
|
||
+ "I highly recommend Offline AutoPGP v2.10. It works
|
||
seamlessly with virtually any offline mail reader that
|
||
supports .QWK packets. Shareware registration is $10.00
|
||
US. The author is Staale Schumacher, a student at the
|
||
University of Oslo, is reachable at staale@ifi.uio.no .
|
||
The program should be pretty widely available on US bbs's
|
||
by now. I use the program constantly for bbs mail. It's
|
||
really quite a slick piece of work. If you have any
|
||
trouble finding it, drop me a note."
|
||
[bhowatt@eis.calstate.edu Brent H. Howatt, PGP in an
|
||
offline reader?, alt.security.pgp, 1994-07-05]
|
||
- oak.oakland.edu in /pub/msdos/offline, version 2.11
|
||
- ftp.informatik.uni-
|
||
hamburg.de:/pub/virus/crypt/pgp/tools/apgp211.zip
|
||
7.7.3. "Should I worry about obtaining and compiling the PGP
|
||
sources?"
|
||
- Well, unless you're an expert on the internals of PGP, why
|
||
bother? And a subtle bug in the random number generator
|
||
eluded even Colin Plumb for a while.
|
||
- The value of the source being available is that others can,
|
||
if they wish, make the confirmation that the executable
|
||
correspond to the source. That this _can_ be done is enough
|
||
for me. (Strategy: Hold on to the code for a while, wait
|
||
for reports of flaws or holes, then use with confidence.)
|
||
- Signatures can be checked. Maybe timestamped versions,
|
||
someday.
|
||
- Frankly, the odds are much higher that one's messages or
|
||
pseudonymous identity will be exposed in others ways than
|
||
that PGP has been compromised. Slip-ups in sending messages
|
||
sometimes reveal identities, as do inadvertent comments and
|
||
stylistic cues.
|
||
|
||
7.8. How to Use PGP
|
||
7.8.1. How does PGP work?
|
||
7.8.2. "How should I store the secret part of my key? Can I memorize
|
||
it?"
|
||
- Modern ciphers use keys that are far beyond memorization
|
||
(or even typing in!). The key is usually stored on one's
|
||
home machine, or a machine that is reasonably secure, or on
|
||
diskette. The passphrase should always be memorized or
|
||
written down (ugh) in one's wallet or other such place.
|
||
Secure "dongles" worn around the neck, or a ring or watch,
|
||
may eventually be used. Smartcards and PDAs are a more
|
||
likely intermediate solution (many PCs now have PCMCIA card
|
||
slots).
|
||
7.8.3. "How do I sign messages?"
|
||
- cf. the PGP docs
|
||
+ however, this has come up on the List, and:
|
||
-
|
||
+ pgp -sta +clearsig=on message.txt
|
||
-
|
||
- That's from pgpdoc2.txt. Hope it helps. You might
|
||
wish to set up your mail
|
||
- user agent to invoke this command upon exiting your
|
||
default message editor,
|
||
- with "message.txt" set to whatever your editor calls
|
||
the temporary message
|
||
- file. <Russell Whitaker,
|
||
whitaker@sgi.com, 4-15-94, Cypherpunks>
|
||
7.8.4. Why isn't PGP easier to use?
|
||
- Compared to other possible crypto applications (like
|
||
digital money or voting systems), it is actually _very_
|
||
easy to use
|
||
- semantic gap...learning
|
||
7.8.5. How should I learn PGP?
|
||
7.8.6. "What's the status of PGP integration with other programs?"
|
||
+ Editors
|
||
+ emacs
|
||
+ emacs supports pgp, probably in various flavors (I've
|
||
seen several reports of different packages)..the built-
|
||
in language certainly helps
|
||
- Rick Busdiecker <rfb@lehman.com> has an emacs front
|
||
end to PGP available
|
||
- Jin S. Choi <jsc@monolith.MIT.EDU> once described a
|
||
package he wrote in elisp which supported GNU emacs:
|
||
"mailcrypt"
|
||
- there are probably many more
|
||
+ Mailers
|
||
- That is, are there any mailers that have a good link to
|
||
PGP? Hooks into existing mailers are needed
|
||
+ emacs
|
||
+ emacs supports pgp, probably in various flavors (I've
|
||
seen several reports of different packages)..the built-
|
||
in language certainly helps
|
||
- Rick Busdiecker <rfb@lehman.com> has an emacs front
|
||
end to PGP available
|
||
- Jin S. Choi <jsc@monolith.MIT.EDU> once described a
|
||
package he wrote in elisp which supported GNU emacs:
|
||
"mailcrypt"
|
||
- there are probably many more
|
||
- elm
|
||
- Eudora
|
||
+ PGP sendmail, etc.
|
||
- "Get the PGPsendmail Suite, announced here a few days
|
||
ago. It's available for anonymous ftp from:
|
||
ftp.atnf.csiro.au: pub/people/rgooch (Australia)
|
||
ftp.dhp.com: pub/crypto/pgp/PGPsendmail(U.S.A.)
|
||
ftp.ox.ac.uk: src/security (U.K.)... It works by
|
||
wrapping around the regular sendmail programme, so
|
||
you get automatic encryption for all mailers, not just
|
||
Rmail. " [Richard Gooch, alt.security.pgp, 1994-07-10]
|
||
+ MIME
|
||
- MIME and PGP <Derek Atkins, 4-6-94>
|
||
- [the following material taken from an announcement
|
||
forwarded to the Cypherpunks list by
|
||
remijn@athena.research.ptt.nl, 1994-07-05]
|
||
- "MIME [RFC-1341, RFC-1521] defines a format and
|
||
general framework for the representation of a wide
|
||
variety of data types in Internet mail. This document
|
||
defines one particular type of MIME data, the
|
||
application/pgp type, for "pretty good" privacy,
|
||
authentication, and encryption in Internet mail. The
|
||
application/pgp MIME type is intended to facilitate the
|
||
wider interoperation of private mail across a wide
|
||
variety of hardware and software platforms.
|
||
+ Newsreaders
|
||
- useful for automatic signing/verification, and e-mail
|
||
from withing newsreader
|
||
- yarn
|
||
- tin
|
||
- The "yarn" newsreader reportedly has PGP built in.
|
||
7.8.7. "How often should I change my key or keys?"
|
||
- Hal Finney points out that many people seem to think PGP
|
||
keys are quasi-permanent. In fact, never changing one's key
|
||
is an invitation to disaster, as keys may be compromised in
|
||
various ways (keystroke capture programs, diskettes left
|
||
lying around, even rf monitoring) and may conceivably be
|
||
cracked.
|
||
- "
|
||
+ "What is a good interval for key changes? I would suggest
|
||
every year or so
|
||
- makes sense, especially if infrastructure can be
|
||
developed to make it easier
|
||
- to propagate key changes. Keys should be overlapped in
|
||
time, so that you make
|
||
- a new key and start using it, while continuing to support
|
||
the old key for a
|
||
- time. <Hal Finney, hfinney@shell.portal.com, 4-15-94,
|
||
cypherpunks>
|
||
- Hal also recommends that remailer sites change their keys
|
||
even more frequently, perhaps monthly.
|
||
|
||
7.9. Keys, Key Signings, and Key Servers
|
||
7.9.1. Web of trust vs. heierarchical key management
|
||
- A key innovations of Phil Zimmermann was the use of a "web
|
||
of trust" model for distributed trust in keys.
|
||
- locality, users bear costs
|
||
- by contrast, government estimates $1-2 B a year to run key
|
||
certification agencies for a large fraction of the
|
||
population
|
||
- "PGP is about choice and constructing a web of trust that
|
||
suits your needs. PGP supports a completely decentralized,
|
||
personalized web of trust and also the most highly
|
||
structured bureaucratic centralized scheme you could
|
||
imagine. One problem with relying solely on a personalized
|
||
web of trust is that it limitsyour universe of
|
||
correspondents. We can't expect Phil Zimmermann and a few
|
||
well-known others to sign everyone's key, and I would not
|
||
want to limit my private correspondence to just those
|
||
people I know and trust plus those people whose keys have
|
||
been signed by someone I know and trust." [William
|
||
Stallings, SLED key verification, alt.security.pgp, 1994-09-
|
||
01]
|
||
7.9.2. Practical approaches to signing the keys of others
|
||
+ sign keys of folks you know and wish to communicate with
|
||
- face-to-face encounters ("Here is my key.")
|
||
+ trust--to varying extents--the keys signed by others you
|
||
know
|
||
- web-of-trust
|
||
- trust--to a lesser extent--the keys of people in key
|
||
registries
|
||
7.9.3. Key Servers
|
||
+ There are several major sites which appear to be stable
|
||
+ MIT PGP Public Key Server
|
||
- via www.eff.org
|
||
+ Vesselin Bontchev at University of Hamburg operates a
|
||
very stable one:
|
||
- Ftp: ftp.informatik.uni-hamburg.de
|
||
IP: 134.100.4.42
|
||
Dir: /pub/virus/crypt/pgp/
|
||
File: pubkring.pgp
|
||
E-Mail: pgp-public-keys@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de
|
||
- pgpkeys.io.com
|
||
+ http://martigny.ai.mit.edu/~bal/pks-commands.html
|
||
- This is a PGP keyserver in Zurich. <Russell Whitaker, 7
|
||
April 1994>
|
||
-
|
||
7.9.4. Use of PGP key fingerprints
|
||
- "One of the better uses for key fingerprints is for
|
||
inclusion in signature files and other places that a key
|
||
itself is too bulky. By widespread dissemination of the
|
||
fingerprint, the chances of a bogus key being undetected
|
||
are decreased, since there are more channels for the
|
||
fingerprint to get to recipients, and more channels for the
|
||
owner of a key to see any bogus fingerprints out on the
|
||
net. [Bill Stewart, 1994-08-31]
|
||
7.9.5. "How should address changes be handled? Do old keys have to
|
||
be revoked?"
|
||
- Future versions of PGP may handle better
|
||
- One way is to issue .... "User-id revocation certificates
|
||
are a *good* idea and the PGP key format allows for them -
|
||
maybe one day PGP will do something about it." [Paul Allen,
|
||
alt.security.pgp, 1994-07-01]
|
||
- Persistent e-mail addresses is one approach. Some people
|
||
are using organization like the ACM to provide this (e.g.,
|
||
Phil Zimmermann is prz@acm.org). Others are using remapping
|
||
services. For example, "I signed up with the SLED (Stable
|
||
Large E-mail Database), which is a cross-referencing
|
||
database for linking old, obsolete E-mail addresses with
|
||
current ones over the course of time.... Anyone using this
|
||
key will always be able to find me on the SLED by
|
||
conducting a search with "blbrooks..." as the keyword. Thus
|
||
my key and associated sigs always remain good.... If you
|
||
are interested in the SLED, its address is
|
||
sled@drebes.com." [Robert Brooks, alt.security.pgp, 1994-07-
|
||
01]
|
||
7.9.6. "How can I ensure that my keys have not been tampered with?"
|
||
+ Keep your private key secure
|
||
+ if on an unsecured machine, take steps to protect it
|
||
- offlline storage (Perry Metzger loads his key(s) every
|
||
morning, and removes it when he leaves the machine)
|
||
+ memorize your PGP passphrase and don't write it down, at
|
||
least not anywhere near where the private key is
|
||
available
|
||
- sealed envelopes with a lawyer, safe deposit boxes,
|
||
etc., are possibilities
|
||
- given the near-impossibility of recovering one's files
|
||
if the passphrase is lost permanently, I recommend
|
||
storing it _someplace_, despite the slight loss in
|
||
security (this is a topic of debate...I personally feel
|
||
a lot more comfortable knowing my memory is backed up
|
||
somewhere)
|
||
- Colin Plumb has noted that if someone has accesss to your
|
||
personal keyring, they also probably have access to your
|
||
PGP program and could make modifications to it *directly*.
|
||
- Derek Atkins answered a similar question on sci.crypt:
|
||
"Sure. You can use PGP to verify your keyring, and using
|
||
the web-of-trust, you can then have it verify your
|
||
signatures all the keys that you signed, and recurse
|
||
through your circle-of-friends. To verify that your own
|
||
key was not munged, you can sign something with your secret
|
||
key and then try to verify it. This will ensure that your
|
||
public key wasn't munged." [Derek Atkins, sci.crypt, 1994-
|
||
07-06]
|
||
7.9.7. "Why are key revocations needed?"
|
||
- Key revocation is the "ebb-of-trust"
|
||
- "There are a number of real reasons. Maybe you got coerced
|
||
into signing the key, or you think that maybe the key was
|
||
signed incorrectly, or maybe that person no longer uses
|
||
that email address, because they lost the account, or that
|
||
maybe you don't believe that the binding of key to userID
|
||
is valid for any number of reasons." [Derek Atkins, 4-28-
|
||
94]
|
||
7.9.8. "Is-a-person" registries
|
||
+ There have been proposals that governments could and should
|
||
create registries of "legal persons." This is known in the
|
||
crypto community as "is-a-person" credentialling, and
|
||
various papers (notably Fiat-Shamir) have dealt with issues
|
||
- of spoofing by malicious governments
|
||
- of the dangers of person-tracking
|
||
+ We need to be very careful here!
|
||
- this could limit the spread of 'ad hoc crypto' (by which
|
||
I mean the use of locally-generated keys for reasons
|
||
other than personal use...digital cash, pseudonyms etc.)
|
||
- any system which "issues" permission slips to allow keys
|
||
to be generated is dangerous!
|
||
+ Could be an area that governments want to get into.
|
||
- a la Fiat-Shamir "passport" issues (Murdoch, Libyan
|
||
example)
|
||
- I favor free markets--no limitations on which registries I
|
||
can use
|
||
7.9.9. Keyservers (this list is constantly changing, but most share
|
||
keys, so all one needs is one). Send "help" message. For
|
||
current information, follow alt.security.pgp.
|
||
- about 6000 keys on the main keyservers, as of 1994-08.
|
||
- pgp-public-keys@martigny.ai.mit.edu
|
||
- pgp-public-keys@dsi.unimi.it
|
||
- pgp-public-keys@kub.nl
|
||
- pgp-public-keys@sw.oz.au
|
||
- pgp-public-keys@kiae.su
|
||
- pgp-public-keys@fbihh.informatick.uni-hamburg.de
|
||
- and wasabi.io.com offers public keys by finger (I couldn't
|
||
get it to work)
|
||
7.9.10. "What are key fingerprints and why are they used?"
|
||
- "Distributing the key fingerprint allows J. Random Human to
|
||
correlate a key supplied via one method with that supplied
|
||
via another. For example, now that I have the fingerprint
|
||
for the Betsi key, I can verify whether any other alleged
|
||
Betsi key I see is real or not.....It's a lot easier to
|
||
read off & cross-check 32-character fingerprints than the
|
||
entire key block, especially as signatures are added and
|
||
the key block grows in size." [Paul Robichaux, 1994-08-29]
|
||
7.9.11. Betsi
|
||
- Bellcore
|
||
- key signing
|
||
7.9.12. on attacks on keyservers...
|
||
+ flooding attacks on the keyservers have started; this may
|
||
be an attempt to have the keyservers shut down by using
|
||
obscene, racist, sexist phrases as key names (Cypherpunks
|
||
would not support shutting down a site for something so
|
||
trivial as abusive, offensive language, but many others
|
||
would.)
|
||
- "It appears that some childish jerk has had a great time
|
||
generating bogus PGP keys and uploading them to the
|
||
public keyservers. Here are some of the keys I found on a
|
||
keyserver:...[keys elided]..." [staalesc@ifi.uio.no,
|
||
alt.security.pgp, 1994-09-05]
|
||
|
||
7.10. PGP Front Ends, Shells, and Tools
|
||
7.10.1. Many can be found at this ftp site:
|
||
+ ftp.informatik.uni-hamburg.de:/pub/virus/crypt/pgp/shells/
|
||
- for various shells and front-ends for PGP
|
||
7.10.2. William Stallings had this to say in a Usenet post:
|
||
- "PGPShell: runs directly on the DOS version, doesn't need
|
||
Windows. Nice, simple interface. freeware
|
||
|
||
"PGP Winfront: freeware windows front end. Uses a "control
|
||
panel" style, with many options displayed in a compact
|
||
fashion.
|
||
|
||
"WinPGP: shareware ($45). Uses a drop-down menu style,
|
||
common to many Windows applications." [William Stallings,
|
||
Looking for PGP front end, alt.security, 1994-08-31]
|
||
7.10.3. Rick Busdiecker <rfb@lehman.com> has an emacs front end to
|
||
PGP available
|
||
7.10.4. Pr0duct Cypher's tools:
|
||
+ ftp.informatik.uni-
|
||
hamburg.de:/pub/virus/crypt/pgp/tools/PGPTools.tar.gz
|
||
- Pr0duct Cypher's tools, and other tools in general
|
||
|
||
7.11. Other Crypto Programs And Tools
|
||
7.11.1. Other Ciphers and Tools
|
||
- RIPEM
|
||
- PEM
|
||
- MD5
|
||
+ SFS (Secure FileSystem) 1.0
|
||
- "SFS (Secure FileSystem) is a set of programs which
|
||
create and manage a number of encrypted disk volumes, and
|
||
runs under both DOS and Windows. Each volume appears as
|
||
a normal DOS drive, but all data stored on it is encryped
|
||
at the individual-sector level....SFS 1.1 is a
|
||
maintenance release which fixes a few minor problems in
|
||
1.0, and adds a number of features suggested by users.
|
||
More details on changes are given in in the README file."
|
||
[Peter Gutmann, sci.crypt, 1994-08-25]
|
||
- not the same thing as CFS!
|
||
- 512-bit key using a MDC/SHS hash. (Fast)
|
||
- only works on a386 or better (says V. Bontchev)
|
||
- source code not available?
|
||
- implemented as a device driver (rather than a TSR, like
|
||
SecureDrive)
|
||
- "is vulnerable to a special form of attack, which was
|
||
mentioned once here in sci.crypt and is described in
|
||
detaills in the SFS documentation. Take a loot at the
|
||
section "Encryption Considerations"." [Vesselin Bontchev,
|
||
sci.crypt, 1994-07-01]
|
||
- Comparing SFS to SecureDrive: "Both packages are
|
||
approximately equal in terms of user interface, but SFS
|
||
seems to be quite a bit faster. And comments from
|
||
various people (previous message thread) seems to
|
||
indicate that it is more "secure" as well." [Bill Couture
|
||
<coutu001@gold.tc.umn.edu> , sci.crypt, 1994-0703]
|
||
+ SecureDrive
|
||
- encrypts a disk (always be very careful!)
|
||
- SecureDrive 1.3D, 128-bit IDEA cypher is based on an MD5
|
||
hash of the passphrase
|
||
- implemented as a TSR (rather than a device driver, like
|
||
CFS)
|
||
- source code available
|
||
+ Some problems reported (your mileage may vary)
|
||
- "I have been having quite a bit of difficulty with my
|
||
encrypted drive mangling files. After getting secure
|
||
drive 1.3d installed on my hard drive, I find that
|
||
various files are being corrupted and many times after
|
||
accessing the drive a bunch of crosslinked files are
|
||
present." [Vaccinia@uncvx1.oit.unc.edu, 1994-07-01]
|
||
- Others report being happy with, under both DOS and
|
||
Windows
|
||
- no OS/2 or Mac versions reported; some say an OS/2 device
|
||
driver will have to be used (such as Stacker for OS/2
|
||
uses)
|
||
+ SecureDevice
|
||
- "If you can't find it elsewhere, I have it at
|
||
ftp://ftp.ee.und.ac.za/pub/crypto/secdev13.arj, but
|
||
that's at the end of a saturated 64kbps link." [Alan
|
||
Barrett, 1994-07-01]
|
||
7.11.2. MDC and SHS (same as SHA?)
|
||
- "The MDC cyphers are believed to be as strong as it is
|
||
difficult to invert the cryptographic hash function they
|
||
are using. SHS was designed by the NSA and is believed to
|
||
be secure. There might be other ways to attack the MDC
|
||
cyphers, but nobody who is allowed to speak knows such
|
||
methods." [Vesselin Bontchev, sci.crypt, 1994-07-01]
|
||
+ Secure Hash Standard's algorithm is public, and hence can
|
||
be analyzed and tested for weaknesses (in strong contrast
|
||
with Skipjack).
|
||
- may replace MD5 in future versions of PGP (a rumor)
|
||
- Speed of MDC: "It's a speed tradeoff. MDC is a few times
|
||
faster than IDEA, so SFS is a few times faster than
|
||
SecureDrive. But MDC is less proven." [Colin Plumb,
|
||
sci.crypt, 1994-07-04]
|
||
+ Rumors of problems with SHA
|
||
- "The other big news is a security problem with the Secure
|
||
Hash Algorithm (SHA), discussed in the Apr 94 DDJ. The
|
||
cryptographers at NSA have found a problem with the
|
||
algorithm. They won't tell anyone what it is, or even
|
||
how serious it is, but they promise a fix soon. Everyone
|
||
is waiting with baited breath." [Bruce Schneier, reprot
|
||
on Eurocrypt '94, 1994-07-01]
|
||
7.11.3. Stego programs
|
||
+ DOS
|
||
- S-Tools (or Stools?). DOS? Encrypts in .gif and .wav
|
||
(SoundBlaster format) files. Can set to not indicate
|
||
encrypted files are inside.
|
||
- Windows
|
||
+ Macintosh
|
||
- Stego
|
||
+ sound programs
|
||
- marielsn@Hawaii.Edu (Nathan Mariels) has written a
|
||
program which "takes a file and encrypts it with IDEA
|
||
using a MD5 hash of the password typed in by the user.
|
||
It then stores the file in the lowest bit (or bits,
|
||
user selectable) of a sound file."
|
||
7.11.4. "What about "Pretty Good Voice Privacy" or "Voice PGP" and
|
||
Other Speech Programs?"
|
||
+ Several groups, including one led by Phil Zimmermann, are
|
||
said to be working on something like this. Most are using
|
||
commercially- and widely-available sound input boards, a la
|
||
"SoundBlaster" boards.
|
||
- proprietary hardware or DSPs is often a lose, as people
|
||
won't be able to easily acquire the hardware; a software-
|
||
only solution (possibly relying on built-in hardware, or
|
||
readily-available add-in boards, like SoundBlasters) is
|
||
preferable.
|
||
+ Many important reasons to do such a project:
|
||
- proliferate more crypto tools and systems
|
||
- get it out ahead of "Digital Telephony II" and Clipper-
|
||
type systems; make the tools so ubiquitous that outlawing
|
||
them is too difficult
|
||
- people understand voice communcations in a more natural
|
||
way than e-,mail, so people who don't use PGP may
|
||
nevertheless use a voice encryption system
|
||
+ Eric Blossom has his own effort, and has demonstrated
|
||
hardware at Cypherpunks meetings:
|
||
- "At this moment our primary efforts are on developing a
|
||
family of extensible protocols for both encryption and
|
||
voice across point to point links. We indend to use
|
||
existing standards where ever possible.
|
||
|
||
"We are currently planning on building on top of the RFCs
|
||
for PPP (see RFCs 1549, 1548, and 1334). The basic idea
|
||
is to add a new Link Control Protocol (or possibly a
|
||
Network Control Protocol) that will negotiate base and
|
||
modulus and perform DH key exchange. Some forms of
|
||
Authentication are already supported by RFCs. We're
|
||
looking at others." [Eric Blossom, 1994-04-14]
|
||
+ Building on top of multimedia capabilities of Macintoshes
|
||
and Windows may be an easier approach
|
||
- nearly all Macs and Windows machines will be
|
||
multimedia/audiovisual-capable soon
|
||
- "I realize that it is quite possible to design a secure
|
||
phone
|
||
with a Vocoder, a modem and some cpu power to do the
|
||
encryption, but I think that an easier solution may be on
|
||
the horizon. ....I believe that Microsoft and many others
|
||
are exploring hooking phones to PCs so people can do
|
||
things like ship pictures of their weekend fun to
|
||
friends. When PC's can easily access phone
|
||
communications, then developing encrypted conversations
|
||
should be as easy as programming for Windows :-)."
|
||
[Peter Wayner, 1993--07-08]
|
||
7.11.5. Random Number Generators
|
||
- A huge area...
|
||
+ Chaotic systems, pendula
|
||
- may be unexpected periodicities (phase space maps show
|
||
basins of attraction, even though behavior is seemingly
|
||
random)
|
||
7.11.6. "What's the situation on the dispute between NIST and RSADSI
|
||
over the DSS?"
|
||
- NIST claims it doesn't infringe patents
|
||
- RSADSI bought the Schnorr patent and claims DSS infringes
|
||
it
|
||
- NIST makes no guarantees, nor does it indemnify users
|
||
[Reginald Braithwaite-Lee, talk.politics.crypto, 1994-07-
|
||
04]
|
||
7.11.7. "Are there any programs like telnet or "talk" that use pgp?"
|
||
- "Don't know about Telnet, but I'd like to see "talk"
|
||
secured like that... It exists. (PGP-ized ytalk, that is.)
|
||
Have a look at ftp.informatik.uni-
|
||
hamburg.de:/pub/virus/crypto/pgp/tools/pgptalk.2.0.tar.gz"
|
||
[Vesselin Bontchev, alt.security.pgp, 1994-07-4]
|
||
7.11.8. Digital Timestamping
|
||
+ There are two flavors:
|
||
- toy or play versions
|
||
- real or comercial version(s)
|
||
+ For a play version, send a message to
|
||
"timestamp@lorax.mv.com" and it will be timestamped and
|
||
returned. Clearly this is not proof of much, has not been
|
||
tested in court, and relies solely on the reputation of the
|
||
timestamper. (A fatal flaw: is trivial to reset system
|
||
clocks on computes and thereby alter dates.)
|
||
- "hearsay" equivalent: time stamps by servers that are
|
||
*not* using the "widely witnessed event" approach of
|
||
Haber and Stornetta
|
||
- The version of Haber and Stornetta is of course much more
|
||
impressive, as it relies on something more powerful than
|
||
mere trust that they have set the system clocks on their
|
||
computers correctly!
|
||
|
||
7.12. Legal Issues with PGP
|
||
7.12.1. "What is RSA Data Security Inc.'s position on PGP?"
|
||
I. They were strongly opposed to early versions
|
||
II. objections
|
||
- infringes on PKP patents (claimed infringements, not
|
||
tested in court, though)
|
||
- breaks the tight control previously seen
|
||
- brings unwanted attention to public key approaches (I
|
||
think PGP also helped RSA and RSADSI)
|
||
- bad blood between Zimmermann and Bidzos
|
||
III. objections
|
||
- infringes on PKP patents (claimed infringements, not
|
||
tested in court, though)
|
||
- breaks the tight control previously seen
|
||
- brings unwanted attention to public key approaches (I
|
||
think PGP also helped RSA and RSADSI)
|
||
- bad blood between Zimmermann and Bidzos
|
||
IV. Talk of lawsuits, actions, etc.
|
||
V. The 2.6 MIT accomodation may have lessened the tension;
|
||
purely speculative
|
||
7.12.2. "Is PGP legal or illegal"?
|
||
7.12.3. "Is there still a conflict between RSADSI and PRZ?"
|
||
- Apparently not. The MIT 2.6 negotiations seem to have
|
||
buried all such rancor. At least officially. I hear there's
|
||
still animosity, but it's no longer at the surface. (And
|
||
RSADSI is now facing lawsuits and patent suits.)
|
||
|
||
7.13. Problems with PGP, Flaws, Etc.
|
||
7.13.1. Speculations on possible attacks on PGP
|
||
+ There are periodically reports of problems, most just
|
||
rumors. These are swatted-down by more knowledgeable
|
||
people, for the most part. True flaws may exist, of course,
|
||
as in any piece of software.
|
||
- Colin Plumb acknowledged a flaw in the random number
|
||
generation process in PGP 2.6, to be fixed in later
|
||
versions.
|
||
+ spreading fear, uncertainty and doubt
|
||
- rumors about security of PGP versions
|
||
- selective prosecution of PGP users
|
||
- death threats (a la against Bidzos)
|
||
- sowing confusion in the user community
|
||
- fragmenting it (perhaps via multiple, noninteroperable
|
||
versions...such as we're beginning to see now?)
|
||
7.13.2. What does the NSA know about flaws in PGP?
|
||
- They're not saying. Ironically, this violates the part of
|
||
their charter that deals with making commercial security
|
||
stronger. Now that PGP is kosher, they should help to make
|
||
it stronger, and certainly should not keep mum about
|
||
weaknesses they know about. But for them to help strengthen
|
||
PGP is not really too likely.
|
||
7.13.3. The PGP timebomb
|
||
- (As I've said elsewhere, it all gets very confusing. Many
|
||
versions, many sites, many viewpoints, many tools, many
|
||
shells, many other things. Fortunately, most of it is
|
||
flotsam.)
|
||
- I take no point of view--for various reasons--on avoiding
|
||
the "timebomb" by using 2.6ui. Here's someone else's
|
||
comment: "I would like to take this time to encourage you
|
||
to upgrade to 2.6ui which will overcome mit's timebomb and
|
||
not exclude PGP 2.3a from decrypting messages.....DON'T USE
|
||
MIT's 2.6, use PGP 2.6ui available from soda.berkeley.edu
|
||
: /pub/cypherpunks/pgp" [Matrix at Cypherpunks, BLACK
|
||
THURSAY!, alt.security.pgp, 1994-09-01]
|
||
+ can also be defeated with the "legal kludge":
|
||
- ftp.informatik.uni-hamburg.de :
|
||
/pub/virus/crypt/pgp/legal_kludge.txt
|
||
7.13.4. Spoofing
|
||
- "Suitable timing constraints, and in particular real-time
|
||
constraints, can be used to hinder, and perhaps defeat,
|
||
spoofing attacks. But with a store-and-forward e-mail
|
||
system (such as PGP is designed to work with) these
|
||
constraints cannot, in general, be set." [Ken Pizzini ,
|
||
sci.crypt, 1994-07-05]
|
||
7.13.5. "How do we know that PGP doesn't have a back door or some
|
||
other major flaw? After all, not all of us are programmers or
|
||
cryptologists."
|
||
- Yes, but many of us are. Many folks have analyzed the
|
||
source code in PGP, have compiled the code themselves (a
|
||
fairly common way to get the executable), and have examined
|
||
the random number generators, the selection of primes, and
|
||
all of the other math.
|
||
+ It would take only a single sharp-eyed person to blow the
|
||
whistle on a conspiracy to insert flaws or backdoors. This
|
||
has not been done. (Though Colin Plumb ackknowledged a
|
||
slight weakness in the RNG of 2.6...being fixed.)
|
||
- "While having source code available doesn't guarantee
|
||
that the program is secure, it helps a lot. Even though
|
||
many users are not programmers or cryptographers, others
|
||
are, and many of these will examine the code carefully
|
||
and publicly yell about weaknesses that they notice or
|
||
think they notice. For example, apparently there was a
|
||
big discussion here about the xorbytes() bug in PGP 2.6.
|
||
Contrast this with a commercial program, where such a bug
|
||
might go undetected for years." [Paul Rubin,
|
||
alt.security.pgp, 1994-09-06]
|
||
7.13.6. "Can I run PGP on a machine I don't control, e.g., the campus
|
||
computer system?"
|
||
- Sure, but the sysops and others may then have access to
|
||
your key and passphrase. Only machines the user directly
|
||
controls, and that are adequately firewalled from other
|
||
machines, offer reasonable amounts of security. Arguing
|
||
about whether 1024-bit keylengths are "enough" is rather
|
||
moot if the PGP program is being run on a corportate
|
||
computer, or a university network. The illusion of security
|
||
may be present, but no real security. Too many people are
|
||
kidding themselves that their messages are secure. That
|
||
their electronic identities cannot be spoofed.
|
||
- I'm not interested in the various elm and emacs PGP
|
||
packages (several such shells and wrappers exist). Any
|
||
sysop can not only obtain your secret key, stored on
|
||
hissystem, but he can also capture your passphrase as you
|
||
feed it to the PGP program (assuming you do...many people
|
||
automate this part as well). Since this sysop or one of his
|
||
cronies can then compromise your mail, sign messages and
|
||
contracts as "you," I consider this totally unacceptable.
|
||
Others apparently don't.
|
||
- What can be done? Many of us only run PGP on home machines,
|
||
or on machines we directly control. Some folks who use PGP
|
||
on such machines at least take steps to better secure
|
||
things....Perry Metzger, for example, once described the
|
||
multi-stage process he went through each day to reload his
|
||
key material in a way he felt was quasi-safe.
|
||
- Until the "Internet-in-a-box" or TIA-type products are more
|
||
widespread, many people will be connecting home or office
|
||
machines to other systems they don't control. (To put this
|
||
in sharper focus: do you want your electronic money being
|
||
run out of an account that your sysop and his friends can
|
||
monitor? Not hardly. "Electronic purses," which may be
|
||
smart cards, Newton-like PDAs, or dongle-like rings or
|
||
pendants, are clearly needed. Another entire discussion.)
|
||
|
||
7.14. The Future of PGP
|
||
7.14.1. "Does PGP help or hurt public key methods in general and RSA
|
||
Data Security Inc. in particular?"
|
||
- The outcome is not final, but on balance I think the
|
||
position of RSADSI is helped by the publicity PGP has
|
||
generated. Users of PGP will "graduate" to fully-licensed
|
||
versions, in many cases. Corporations will then use
|
||
RSADSI's products.
|
||
+ Interestingly, PGP could do the "radical" things that
|
||
RSADSI was not prepared to do. (Uses familiar to
|
||
Cypherpunks.)
|
||
- bypassing export restrictions is an example of this
|
||
- incorporation into experimental digital cash systems
|
||
- Parasitism often increases the rate of evolution. Certainly
|
||
PGP has helped to light a fire under RSADSI.
|
||
7.14.2. Stealth PGP
|
||
- Xenon, Nik, S-Tools,
|
||
7.14.3. "Should we work on a more advanced version, a *Really Good
|
||
Privacy*?"
|
||
- easier said than done...strong committment of time
|
||
- not clear what is needed...
|
||
7.14.4. "Can changes and improvements be made to PGP?"
|
||
- I consider it one of the supreme ironies of our age that
|
||
Phil Zimmermann has denounced Tom Rollins for making
|
||
various changes to a version of PGP he makes available.
|
||
+ Issues:
|
||
- Phil's reputation, and that of PGP
|
||
- intellectual property
|
||
- GNU Public license
|
||
- the mere name of PGP
|
||
- Consider that RSA said much the same thing, that PGP
|
||
would degrade the reputation of public key (esp. as Phil
|
||
was an "amateur," the same exact phrasing PRZ uses to
|
||
criticize Tom Rollins!)
|
||
- I'm not taking a stand here....I don't know the details.
|
||
Just some irony.
|
||
|
||
7.15. Loose Ends
|
||
7.15.1. Security measures on login, passwords, etc.
|
||
- Avoid entering passwords over the Net (such as in rlogins
|
||
or telnets). If someone or some agent asks for your
|
||
password, be paranoid.
|
||
- Can use encrypted telnet, or something like Kerberos, to
|
||
avoid sending passwords in the clear between machines. Lots
|
||
of approaches, almost none of them commonly used (at least
|
||
I never see them).
|
||
|
||
8. Anonymity, Digital Mixes, and Remailers
|
||
|
||
8.1. copyright
|
||
THE CYPHERNOMICON: Cypherpunks FAQ and More, Version 0.666,
|
||
1994-09-10, Copyright Timothy C. May. All rights reserved.
|
||
See the detailed disclaimer. Use short sections under "fair
|
||
use" provisions, with appropriate credit, but don't put your
|
||
name on my words.
|
||
|
||
8.2. SUMMARY: Anonymity, Digital Mixes, and Remailers
|
||
8.2.1. Main Points
|
||
- Remailers are essential for anonymous and pseudonymous
|
||
systems, because they defeat traffic analysis
|
||
- Cypherpunks remailers have been one of the major successes,
|
||
appearing at about the time of the Kleinpaste/Julf
|
||
remailer(s), but now expanding to many sites
|
||
- To see a list of sites: finger remailer-
|
||
list@kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu
|
||
( or http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html)
|
||
- Anonymity in general is a core idea
|
||
8.2.2. Connections to Other Sections
|
||
- Remailers make the other technologies possible
|
||
8.2.3. Where to Find Additional Information
|
||
- Very little has been written (formally, in books and
|
||
journals) about remailers
|
||
- David Chaum's papers are a start
|
||
8.2.4. Miscellaneous Comments
|
||
- This remains one of the most jumbled and confusing
|
||
sections, in my opinion. It needs a lot more reworking and
|
||
reorganizing.
|
||
+ Partly this is because of several factors
|
||
- a huge number of people have worked on remailers,
|
||
contributing ideas, problems, code, and whatnot
|
||
- there are many versions, many sites, and the sites change
|
||
from day to day
|
||
- lots of ideas for new features
|
||
- in a state of flux
|
||
- This is an area where actual experimentation with remailers
|
||
is both very easy and very instructive...the "theory" of
|
||
remailers is straighforward (compared to, say, digital
|
||
cash) and the learning experience is better than theory
|
||
anyway.
|
||
- There are a truly vast number of features, ideas,
|
||
proposals, discussion points, and other such stuff. No FAQ
|
||
could begin to cover the ground covered in the literally
|
||
thousands of posts on remailers.
|
||
|
||
8.3. Anonymity and Digital Pseudonyms
|
||
8.3.1. Why is anonymity so important?
|
||
- It allows escape from past, an often-essential element of
|
||
straighening out (an important function of the Western
|
||
frontier, the French Foreign Legion, etc., and something we
|
||
are losing as the dossiers travel with us wherever we go)
|
||
- It allows new and diverse types of opinions, as noted below
|
||
- More basically, anonymity is important because identity is
|
||
not as important as has been made out in our dossier
|
||
society. To wit, if Alice wishes to remain anonymous or
|
||
pseudonymous to Bob, Bob cannot "demand" that she provide
|
||
here "real" name. It's a matter of negotiation between
|
||
them. (Identity is not free...it is a credential like any
|
||
other and cannot be demanded, only negotiated.)
|
||
- Voting, reading habits, personal behavior...all are
|
||
examples where privacy (= anonymity, effectively) are
|
||
critical. The next section gives a long list of reasons for
|
||
anonymity.
|
||
8.3.2. What's the difference between anonymity and pseudonymity?
|
||
+ Not much, at one level...we often use the term "digital
|
||
pseudonym" in a strong sense, in which the actual identity
|
||
cannot be deduced easily
|
||
- this is "anonymity" in a certain sense
|
||
- But at another level, a pseudonym carries reputations,
|
||
credentials, etc., and is _not_ "anonymous"
|
||
- people use pseudonyms sometimes for whimsical reasons
|
||
(e.g., "From spaceman.spiff@calvin.hobbes.org Sep 6, 94
|
||
06:10:30"), sometimes to keep different mailing lists
|
||
separate (different personnas for different groups), etc.
|
||
8.3.3. Downsides of anonymity
|
||
- libel and other similar dangers to reputations
|
||
+ hit-and-runs actions (mostly on the Net)
|
||
+ on the other hand, such rantings can be ignored (KILL
|
||
file)
|
||
- positive reputations
|
||
- accountability based on physical threats and tracking is
|
||
lost
|
||
+ Practical issue. On the Cypherpunks list, I often take
|
||
"anonymous" messages less seriously.
|
||
- They're often more bizarre and inflammatory than ordinary
|
||
posts, perhaps for good reason, and they're certainly
|
||
harder to take seriously and respond to. This is to be
|
||
expected. (I should note that some pseudonyms, such as
|
||
Black Unicorn and Pr0duct Cypher, have established
|
||
reputable digital personnas and are well worth replying
|
||
to.)
|
||
- repudiation of debts and obligations
|
||
+ infantile flames and run-amok postings
|
||
- racism, sexism, etc.
|
||
- like "Rumormonger" at Apple?
|
||
- but these are reasons for pseudonym to be used, where the
|
||
reputation of a pseudonym is important
|
||
+ Crimes...murders, bribery, etc.
|
||
- These are dealt with in more detail in the section on
|
||
crypto anarchy, as this is a major concern (anonymous
|
||
markets for such services)
|
||
8.3.4. "How will privacy and anonymity be attacked?"
|
||
- the downsides just listed are often cited as a reason we
|
||
can't have "anonymity"
|
||
- like so many other "computer hacker" items, as a tool for
|
||
the "Four Horsemen": drug-dealers, money-launderers,
|
||
terrorists, and pedophiles.
|
||
- as a haven for illegal practices, e.g., espionage, weapons
|
||
trading, illegal markets, etc.
|
||
+ tax evasion ("We can't tax it if we can't see it.")
|
||
- same system that makes the IRS a "silent partner" in
|
||
business transactions and that gives the IRS access to--
|
||
and requires--business records
|
||
+ "discrimination"
|
||
- that it enables discrimination (this _used_ to be OK)
|
||
- exclusionary communities, old boy networks
|
||
8.3.5. "How will random accusations and wild rumors be controlled in
|
||
anonymous forums?"
|
||
- First off, random accusations and hearsay statements are
|
||
the norm in modern life; gossip, tabloids, rumors, etc. We
|
||
don't worry obsessively about what to do to stop all such
|
||
hearsay and even false comments. (A disturbing trend has
|
||
been the tendency to sue, or threaten suits. And
|
||
increasingly the attitude is that one can express
|
||
_opinions_, but not make statements "unless they can be
|
||
proved." That's not what free speech is all about!)
|
||
- Second, reputations matter. We base our trust in statements
|
||
on a variety of things, including: past history, what
|
||
others say about veracity, external facts in our
|
||
possession, and motives.
|
||
8.3.6. "What are the legal views on anonymity?"
|
||
+ Reports that Supreme Court struck down a Southern law
|
||
requiring pamphlet distributors to identify themselves. 9I
|
||
don't have a cite on this.)
|
||
- However, Greg Broiles provided this quote, from _Talley
|
||
v. State of California_, 362 U.S. 60, 64-65, 80 S.Ct.
|
||
536, 538-539 (1960) : "Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets,
|
||
brochures and even books have played an important role in
|
||
the progress of mankind. Persecuted groups and sects from
|
||
time to time throughout history have been able to
|
||
criticize oppressive practices and laws either
|
||
anonymously or not at all."
|
||
|
||
Greg adds: "It later says "Even the Federalist Papers,
|
||
written in favor of the adoption of our Constitution,
|
||
were published under fictitious names. It is plain that
|
||
anonymity has sometimes been assumed for the most
|
||
constructive purposes." [Greg Broiles, 1994-04-12]
|
||
|
||
+ And certainly many writers, journalists, and others use
|
||
pseudonyms, and have faced no legal action.
|
||
- Provided they don't use it to evade taxes, evade legal
|
||
judgments, commit fraud, etc.
|
||
- I have heard (no cites) that "going masked for the purpose
|
||
of going masked" is illegal in many jurisdictions. Hard to
|
||
believe, as many other disguises are just as effective and
|
||
are presumably not outlawed (wigs, mustaches, makeup,
|
||
etc.). I assume the law has to do with people wearning ski
|
||
masks and such in "inappropriate" places. Bad law, if real.
|
||
8.3.7. Some Other Uses for Anonymous Systems:
|
||
+ Groupware and Anonymous Brainstorming and Voting
|
||
- systems based on Lotus Notes and designed to encourage
|
||
wild ideas, comments from the shy or overly polite, etc.
|
||
- these systems could initially start in meeting and then
|
||
be extended to remote sites, and eventually to nationwide
|
||
and international forums
|
||
- the NSA may have a heart attack over these trends...
|
||
+ "Democracy Wall" for encrypted messages
|
||
- possibly using time-delayed keys (where even the public
|
||
key, for reading the plaintext, is not distributed for
|
||
some time)
|
||
- under the cover of an electronic newspaper, with all of
|
||
the constitutional protections that entails: letters to
|
||
the editor can be anonymous, ads need not be screened for
|
||
validity, advertising claims are not the responsibility
|
||
of the paper, etc.
|
||
+ Anonymous reviews and hypertext (for new types of journals)
|
||
+ the advantages
|
||
- honesty
|
||
- increased "temperature" of discourse
|
||
+ disadvantages
|
||
- increased flames
|
||
- intentional misinformation
|
||
+ Store-and-forward nodes
|
||
- used to facillitate the anonymous voting and anonymous
|
||
inquiry (or reading) systems
|
||
- Chaum's "mix"
|
||
+ telephone forwarding systems, using digital money to pay
|
||
for the service
|
||
- and TRMs?
|
||
+ Fiber optics
|
||
+ hard to trace as millions of miles are laid, including
|
||
virtually untraceable lines inside private buildings
|
||
- suppose government suspects encrypted packets are going
|
||
in to the buildings of Apple...absent any direct
|
||
knowledge of crimes being aided and abetted, can the
|
||
government demand a mapping of messages from input to
|
||
output?
|
||
- That is, will the government demand full disclosure of
|
||
all routings?
|
||
- high bandwidth means many degrees of freedom for such
|
||
systems to be deployed
|
||
+ Within systems, i.e., user logs on to a secure system and
|
||
is given access to his own processor
|
||
- in a 288-processor system like the NCR/ATT 3600 (or even
|
||
larger)
|
||
- under his cryptonym he can access certain files, generate
|
||
others, and deposit message untraceably in other mail
|
||
locations that other agents or users can later retrieve
|
||
and forward....
|
||
- in a sense, he can use this access to launch his own
|
||
agent processes (anonymity is essential for many agent-
|
||
based systems, as is digital money)
|
||
+ Economic incentives for others to carry mail to other
|
||
sites...
|
||
- further diffusion and hiding of the true functions
|
||
+ Binary systems (two or more pieces needed to complete the
|
||
message)
|
||
- possibly using viruses and worms to handle the
|
||
complexities of distributing these messages
|
||
- agents may handle the transfers, with isolation between
|
||
the agents, so routing cannot be traced (think of scene
|
||
in "Double-Crossed" where bales of marijuana are passed
|
||
from plane to boat to chopper to trucks to cars)
|
||
- this protects against conspiracies
|
||
+ Satellites
|
||
+ physical security, in that the satellites would have to
|
||
be shot down to halt the broadcasting
|
||
+ scenario: WARC (or whomever) grants broadcast rights in
|
||
1996 to some country or consortium, which then accepts
|
||
any and all paying customers
|
||
- cold cash
|
||
- the BCCI of satellite operators
|
||
+ VSATs, L-Band, Satellites, Low-Earth Orbit
|
||
- Very Small Aperture Terminals
|
||
- L-Band...what frequency?
|
||
+ LEO, as with Motorola's Iridium, offers several
|
||
advantages
|
||
- lower-power receivers and smaller antennas
|
||
- low cost to launch, due to small size and lower need
|
||
for 10-year reliability
|
||
- avoidance of the "orbital slot" licensing morass
|
||
(though I presume some licensing is still involved)
|
||
- can combine with impulse or nonsinusoidal transmissions
|
||
8.3.8. "True Names"
|
||
8.3.9. Many ways to get pseudonyms:
|
||
- Telnet to "port 25" or use SLIP connections to alter domain
|
||
name; not very secure
|
||
- Remailers
|
||
8.3.10. "How is Pseudonymity Compromised?"
|
||
- slip-ups in style, headers, sig blocks, etc.
|
||
- inadvertent revealing, via the remailers
|
||
- traffic analysis of remailers (not very likely, at least
|
||
not for non-NSA adversaries)
|
||
- correlations, violations of the "indistinguishability
|
||
principle"
|
||
8.3.11. Miscellaneous Issues
|
||
- Even digital pseudonyms can get confusing...someone
|
||
recently mistook "Tommy the Tourist" for being such an
|
||
actual digital pseudonym (when of course that is just
|
||
attached to all posts going througha particular remailer).
|
||
|
||
8.4. Reasons for Anonymity and Digital Pseudonyms (and Untraceable E-
|
||
Mail)
|
||
8.4.1. (Thre are so many reasons, and this is asked so often, that
|
||
I've collected these various reasons here. More can be added,
|
||
of course.)
|
||
8.4.2. Privacy in general
|
||
8.4.3. Physical Threats
|
||
+ "corporate terrrorism" is not a myth: drug dealers and
|
||
other "marginal" businessmen face this every day
|
||
- extortion, threats, kidnappings
|
||
+ and many businesses of the future may well be less
|
||
"gentlemanly" than the conventional view has it
|
||
- witness the bad blood between Intel and AMD, and then
|
||
imagine it getting ten times worse
|
||
- and national rivalries, even in ostensibly legal
|
||
businesses (think of arms dealers), may cause more use of
|
||
violence
|
||
+ Mafia and other organized crime groups may try to extort
|
||
payments or concessions from market participants, causing
|
||
them to seek the relative protection of anonymous systems
|
||
- with reputations
|
||
+ Note that calls for the threatened to turn to the police
|
||
for protection has several problems
|
||
- the activities may be illegal or marginally illegal
|
||
(this is the reason the Mafia can often get involved
|
||
and why it may even sometimes have a positive effect,
|
||
acting as the cop for illegal activities)
|
||
- the police are often too busy to get involved, what
|
||
with so much physical crime clogging the courts
|
||
- extortion and kidnappings can be done using these very
|
||
techniques of cryptoanarchy, thus causing a kind of arms
|
||
race
|
||
+ battered and abused women and families may need the
|
||
equivalent of a "witness protection program"
|
||
+ because of the ease of tracing credit card purchases,
|
||
with the right bribes and/or court orders (or even
|
||
hacking), battered wives may seek credit cards under
|
||
pseudonyms
|
||
- and some card companies may oblige, as a kind of
|
||
politically correct social gesture
|
||
+ or groups like NOW and Women Against Rape may even
|
||
offer their own cards
|
||
- perhaps backed up by some kind of escrow fund
|
||
- could be debit cards
|
||
+ people who participate in cyberspace businesses may fear
|
||
retaliation or extortion in the real world
|
||
- threats by their governments (for all of the usual
|
||
reasons, plus kickbacks, threats to close them down,
|
||
etcl)
|
||
- ripoffs by those who covet their success...
|
||
8.4.4. Voting
|
||
- We take it for granted in Western societies that voting
|
||
should be "anonymous"--untraceable, unlinkable
|
||
- we don't ask people "What have you got to hide?" or tell
|
||
them "If you're doing something anonymously, it must be
|
||
illegal."
|
||
- Same lesson ought to apply to a lot of things for which the
|
||
government is increasingly demanding proof of identity for
|
||
+ Anonymous Voting in Clubs, Organizations, Churches, etc.
|
||
+ a major avenue for spreading CA methods: "electronic
|
||
blackballing," weighted voting (as with number of shares)
|
||
+ e.g., a corporation issues "voting tokens," which can
|
||
be used to vote anonymously
|
||
- or even sold to others (like selling shares, except
|
||
selling only the voting right for a specific election
|
||
is cheaper, and many people don't much care about
|
||
elections)
|
||
+ a way to protect against deep pockets lawsuits in, say,
|
||
race discrimination cases
|
||
- wherein a director is sued for some action the
|
||
company takes-anonymity will give him some legal
|
||
protection, some "plausible deniability"
|
||
+ is possible to set up systems (cf. Salomaa) in which
|
||
some "supervotes" have blackball power, but the use of
|
||
these vetos is indistinguishable from a standard
|
||
majority rules vote
|
||
- i.e., nobody, except the blackballer(s), will know
|
||
whether the blackball was used!
|
||
+ will the government seek to limit this kind of
|
||
protocol?
|
||
- claiming discrimination potential or abuse of
|
||
voting rights?
|
||
+ will Justice Department (or SEC) seek to overturn
|
||
anonymous voting?
|
||
- as part of the potential move to a "full disclosure"
|
||
society?
|
||
- related to antidiscrimination laws, accountability,
|
||
etc.
|
||
+ Anonymous Voting in Reputation-Based Systems (Journals,
|
||
Markets)
|
||
+ customers can vote on products, on quality of service,
|
||
on the various deals they've been involved in
|
||
- not clear how the voting rights would get distributed
|
||
- the idea is to avoid lawsuits, sanctions by vendors,
|
||
etc. (as with the Bose suit)
|
||
+ Journals
|
||
- a canonical example, and one which I must include, as
|
||
it combines anonymous refereeing (already standard,
|
||
in primitive forms), hypertext (links to reviews),
|
||
and basic freedom of speech issues
|
||
- this will likely be an early area of use
|
||
- this whole area of consumer reviews may be a way to get
|
||
CA bandwidth up and running (lots of PK-encrypted
|
||
traffic sloshing around the various nets)
|
||
8.4.5. Maintenance of free speech
|
||
- protection of speech
|
||
+ avoiding retaliation for controversial speech
|
||
- this speech may be controversial, insulting, horrific,
|
||
politically incorrect, racist, sexist, speciesist, and
|
||
other horrible...but remailers and anonymity make it all
|
||
impossible to stop
|
||
- whistleblowing
|
||
+ political speech
|
||
- KKK, Aryan Resistance League, Black National Front,
|
||
whatever
|
||
- cf. the "debate" between "Locke" and "Demosthenes" in
|
||
Orson Scott Card's novel, "Ender's Game."
|
||
- (Many of these reasons are also why 'data havens' will
|
||
eventually be set up...indeed, they already exist...homolka
|
||
trial, etc.)
|
||
8.4.6. Adopt different personnas, pseudonyms
|
||
8.4.7. Choice of reading material, viewing habits, etc.
|
||
- to prevent dossiers on this being formed, anonymous
|
||
purchases are needed (cash works for small items, not for
|
||
video rentals, etc.)
|
||
+ video rentals
|
||
- (Note: There are "laws" making such releases illegal,
|
||
but...)
|
||
- cable t.v. viewing habits
|
||
+ mail-order purchases
|
||
- yes, they need your address to ship to, but there may be
|
||
cutouts that delink (e.g., FedEx might feature such a
|
||
service, someday
|
||
8.4.8. Anonymity in Requesting Information, Services, Goods
|
||
+ a la the controversy over Caller ID and 900 numbers: people
|
||
don't want their telephone numbers (and hence identities)
|
||
fed into huge consumer-preference data banks
|
||
- of the things they buy, the videos they rent, the books
|
||
they read. etc. (various laws protect some of these
|
||
areas, like library books, video rentals)
|
||
- subscription lists are already a booming resale
|
||
market...this will get faster and more finely "tuned"
|
||
with electronic subscriptions: hence the desire to
|
||
subscribe anonymously
|
||
+ some examples of "sensitive" services that anonymity may be
|
||
desired in (especially related to computers, modems, BBSes)
|
||
+ reading unusual or sensitive groups: alt.sex.bondage,
|
||
etc.
|
||
- or posting to these groups!
|
||
- recent controversy over NAMBLA may make such
|
||
protections more desirable to some (and parallel calls
|
||
for restrictions!)
|
||
- posting to such groups, especially given that records are
|
||
perpetual and that government agencies read and file
|
||
postings (an utterly trivial thing to do)
|
||
- requesting help on personal issues (equivalent to the
|
||
"Name Witheld" seen so often)
|
||
+ discussing controversial political issues (and who knows
|
||
what will be controversial 20 years later when the poster
|
||
is seeking a political office, for example?)
|
||
- given that some groups have already (1991) posted the
|
||
past postings of people they are trying to smear!
|
||
+ Note: the difference between posting to a BBS group or
|
||
chat line and writing a letter to an editor is
|
||
significant
|
||
- partly technological: it is vastly easier to compile
|
||
records of postings than it is to cut clippings of
|
||
letters to editors (though this will change rapidly as
|
||
scanners make this easy)
|
||
- partly sociological: people who write letters know the
|
||
letters will be with the back issues in perpetuity,
|
||
that bound issues will preserve their words for many
|
||
decades to come (and could conceivably come back to
|
||
haunt them), but people who post to BBSes probably
|
||
think their words are temporary
|
||
+ and there are some other factors
|
||
- no editing
|
||
- no time delays (and no chance to call an editor and
|
||
retract a letter written in haste or anger)
|
||
+ and letters can, and often are, written with the
|
||
"Name Witheld" signature-this is currently next to
|
||
impossible to do on networks
|
||
- though some "forwarding" services have informally
|
||
sprung up
|
||
+ Businesses may wish to protect themselves from lawsuits
|
||
over comments by their employees
|
||
+ the usual "The opinions expressed here are not those of
|
||
my employer" may not be enough to protect an employer
|
||
from lawsuits
|
||
- imagine racist or sexist comments leading to lawsuits
|
||
(or at least being brought up as evidence of the type
|
||
of "attitude" fostered by the company, e.g., "I've
|
||
worked for Intel for 12 years and can tell you that
|
||
blacks make very poor engineers.")
|
||
+ employees may make comments that damage the reputations
|
||
of their companies
|
||
- Note: this differs from the current situation, where
|
||
free speech takes priority over company concerns,
|
||
because the postings to a BBS are carried widely, may
|
||
be searched electronically (e.g., AMD lawyers search
|
||
the UseNet postings of 1988-91 for any postings by
|
||
Intel employees besmirching the quality or whatever of
|
||
AMD chips),
|
||
- and so employees of corporations may protect themselves,
|
||
and their employers, by adopting pseudonyms
|
||
+ Businesses may seek information without wanting to alert
|
||
their competitors
|
||
- this is currently done with agents, "executive search
|
||
firms," and lawyers
|
||
- but how will it evolve to handle electronic searches?
|
||
+ there are some analogies with filings of "Freedom of
|
||
Information Act" requests, and of patents, etc.
|
||
+ these "fishing expeditions" will increase with time, as
|
||
it becomes profitable for companies to search though
|
||
mountains of electronically-filed materials
|
||
- environmental impact studies, health and safety
|
||
disclosures, etc.
|
||
- could be something that some companies specialize in
|
||
+ Anonymous Consultation Services, Anonymous Stringers or
|
||
Reporters
|
||
+ imagine an information broker, perhaps on an AMIX-like
|
||
service, with a network of stringers
|
||
+ think of the arms deal newsletter writer in Hallahan's
|
||
The Trade, with his network of stringers feeding him
|
||
tips and inside information
|
||
- instead of meeting in secretive locations, a very
|
||
expensive proposition (in time and travel), a secure
|
||
network can be used
|
||
- with reputations, digital pseudonyms, etc.
|
||
+ they may not wish their actual identities known
|
||
- threats from employers, former employers, government
|
||
agencies
|
||
+ harassment via the various criminal practices that will
|
||
become more common (e.g., the ease with which
|
||
assailants and even assassins can be contracted for)
|
||
- part of the overall move toward anonymity
|
||
- fears of lawsuits, licensing requirements, etc.
|
||
+ Candidates for Such Anonymous Consultation Services
|
||
+ An arms deals newsletter
|
||
- an excellent reputation for accuracy and timely
|
||
information
|
||
+ sort of like an electronic form of Jane's
|
||
- with scandals and government concern
|
||
- but nobody knows where it comes from
|
||
+ a site that distributes it to subscribers gets it
|
||
with another larger batch of forwarded material
|
||
- NSA, FBI, Fincen, etc. try to track it down
|
||
+ "Technology Insider" reports on all kinds of new
|
||
technologies
|
||
- patterned after Hoffler's Microelectronics News, the
|
||
Valley's leading tip sheet for two decades
|
||
- the editor pays for tips, with payments made in two
|
||
parts: immediate, and time-dependent, so that the
|
||
accuracy of a tip, and its ultimate importance (in
|
||
the judgment of the editor) can be proportionately
|
||
rewarded
|
||
+ PK systems, with contributors able to encrypt and
|
||
then publicly post (using their own means of
|
||
diffusion)
|
||
- with their messages containing further material,
|
||
such as authentications, where to send the
|
||
payments, etc.
|
||
+ Lundberg's Oil Industry Survey (or similar)
|
||
- i.e., a fairly conventional newsletter with publicly
|
||
known authors
|
||
- in this case, the author is known, but the identities
|
||
of contributors is well-protected
|
||
+ A Conspiracy Newsletter
|
||
- reporting on all of the latest theories of
|
||
misbehavior (as in the "Conspiracies" section of this
|
||
outline)
|
||
+ a wrinkle: a vast hypertext web, with contributors
|
||
able to add links and nodes
|
||
+ naturally, their real name-if they don't care about
|
||
real-world repercussions-or one of their digital
|
||
pseudonyms (may as well use cryptonyms) is attached
|
||
+ various algorithms for reputations
|
||
- sum total of everything ever written, somehow
|
||
measured by other comments made, by "voting,"
|
||
etc.
|
||
- a kind of moving average, allowing for the fact
|
||
that learning will occur, just as a researcher
|
||
probably gets better with time, and that as
|
||
reputation-based systems become better
|
||
understood, people come to appreciate the
|
||
importance of writing carefully
|
||
+ and one of the most controversial of all: Yardley's
|
||
Intelligence Daily
|
||
- though it may come out more than daily!
|
||
+ an ex-agent set this up in the mid-90s, soliciting
|
||
contributions via an anonymous packet-switching sysem
|
||
- refined over the next couple of years
|
||
- combination of methods
|
||
- government has been trying hard to identify the
|
||
editor, "Yardley"
|
||
- he offers a payback based on value of the
|
||
information, and even has a "Requests" section, and a
|
||
Classifed Ad section
|
||
- a hypertext web, similar to the Conspiracy Newsletter
|
||
above
|
||
+ Will Government Try to Discredit the Newsletter With
|
||
False Information?
|
||
- of course, the standard ploy in reputation-based
|
||
systems
|
||
+ but Yardley has developed several kinds of filters
|
||
for this
|
||
- digital pseudonyms which gradually build up
|
||
reputations
|
||
- cross-checking of his own sort
|
||
- he even uses language filters to analyze the text
|
||
+ and so what?
|
||
- the world is filled with disinformation, rumors,
|
||
lies, half-truths, and somehow things go on....
|
||
+ Other AMIX-like Anonymous Services
|
||
+ Drug Prices and Tips
|
||
- tips on the quality of various drugs (e.g.,
|
||
"Several reliable sources have told us that the
|
||
latest Maui Wowie is very intense, numbers
|
||
below...")
|
||
+ synthesis of drugs (possibly a separate
|
||
subscription)
|
||
- designer drugs
|
||
- home labs
|
||
- avoiding detection
|
||
+ The Hackers Daily
|
||
- tips on hacking and cracking
|
||
- anonymous systems themselves (more tips)
|
||
- Product evaluations (anonymity needed to allow honest
|
||
comments with more protection against lawsuits)
|
||
+ Newspapers Are Becoming Cocerned with the Trend Toward
|
||
Paying for News Tips
|
||
- by the independent consultation services
|
||
- but what can they do?
|
||
+ lawsuits are tried, to prevent anonymous tips when
|
||
payments are involved
|
||
- their lawyers cite the tax evasion and national
|
||
security aspects
|
||
+ Private Data Bases
|
||
+ any organization offering access to data bases must be
|
||
concerned that somebody-a disgruntled customer, a
|
||
whistleblower, the government, whoever-will call for an
|
||
opening of the files
|
||
- under various "Data Privacy" laws
|
||
- or just in general (tort law, lawsuits, "discovery")
|
||
+ thus, steps will be taken to isolate the actual data from
|
||
actual users, perhaps via cutouts
|
||
+ e.g., a data service sells access, but subcontracts out
|
||
the searches to other services via paths that are
|
||
untraceable
|
||
+ this probably can't be outlawed in general-though any
|
||
specific transaction might later be declared illegal,
|
||
etc., at which time the link is cut and a new one is
|
||
established-as this would outlaw all subcontracting
|
||
arrangements!
|
||
- i.e., if Joe's Data Service charges $1000 for a
|
||
search on widgets and then uses another possibly
|
||
transitory (meaning a cutout) data service, the
|
||
most a lawsuit can do is to force Joe to stop using
|
||
this untraceble service
|
||
- levels of indirection (and firewalls that stop the
|
||
propagation of investigations)
|
||
+ Medical Polls (a la AIDS surveys, sexual practices surveys,
|
||
etc.)
|
||
+ recall the method in which a participant tosses a coin to
|
||
answer a question...the analyst can still recover the
|
||
important ensemble information, but the "phase" is lost
|
||
- i.e., an individual answering "Yes" to the question
|
||
"Have you ever had xyz sex?" may have really answered
|
||
"No" but had his answer flipped by a coin toss
|
||
+ researchers may even adopt sophisticated methods in which
|
||
explicit diaries are kept, but which are then transmitted
|
||
under an anonymous mailing system to the researchers
|
||
- obvious dangers of authentication, validity, etc.
|
||
+ Medical testing: many reasons for people to seek anonymity
|
||
- AIDS testing is the preeminent example
|
||
- but also testing for conditions that might affect
|
||
insurablity or employment (e.g., people may go to
|
||
medical havens in Mexico or wherever for tests that might
|
||
lead to uninsurability should insurance companies learn
|
||
of the "precondition")
|
||
+ except in AIDS and STDs, it is probably both illegal and
|
||
against medical ethics to offer anonymous consultations
|
||
- perhaps people will travel to other countries
|
||
8.4.9. Anonymity in Belonging to Certain Clubs, Churches, or
|
||
Organizations
|
||
+ people fear retaliation or embarassment should their
|
||
membership be discovered, now or later
|
||
- e.g., a church member who belongs to controversial groups
|
||
or clubs
|
||
- mainly, or wholly, those in which physical contact or other
|
||
personal contact is not needed (a limited set)
|
||
- similar to the cell-based systems described elsewhere
|
||
+ Candidates for anonymous clubs or organizations
|
||
- Earth First!, Act Up, Animal Liberation Front, etc.
|
||
- NAMBLA and similar controversial groups
|
||
- all of these kinds of groups have very vocal, very visible
|
||
members, visible even to the point of seeking out
|
||
television coverage
|
||
- but there are probably many more who would join these
|
||
groups if there identities could be shielded from public
|
||
group, for the sake of their careers, their families, etc.
|
||
+ ironically, the corporate crackdown on outside activities
|
||
considered hostile to the corporation (or exposing them to
|
||
secondary lawsuits, claims, etc.) may cause greater use of
|
||
anonymous systems
|
||
- cell-based membership in groups
|
||
- the growth of anonymous membership in groups (using
|
||
pseudonyms) has a benefit in increasing membership by
|
||
people otherwise afraid to join, for example, a radical
|
||
environmental group
|
||
8.4.10. Anonymity in Giving Advice or Pointers to Information
|
||
- suppose someone says who is selling some illegal or
|
||
contraband product...is this also illegal?
|
||
- hypertext systems will make this inevitable
|
||
8.4.11. Reviews, Criticisms, Feedback
|
||
- "I am teaching sections for a class this term, and tomorrow
|
||
I am going to: 1) tell my students how to use a remailer,
|
||
and 2) solicit anonymous feedback on my teaching.
|
||
|
||
"I figure it will make them less apprehensive about making
|
||
honest suggestions and comments (assuming any of them
|
||
bother, of course)." [Patrick J. LoPresti
|
||
patl@lcs.mit.edu, alt.privacy.anon-server, 1994-09-08]
|
||
8.4.12. Protection against lawsuits, "deep pockets" laws
|
||
+ by not allowing the wealth of an entity to be associated
|
||
with actions
|
||
- this also works by hiding assets, but the IRS frowns on
|
||
that, so unlinking the posting or mailing name with
|
||
actual entity is usually easier
|
||
+ "deep pockets"
|
||
- it will be in the interest of some to hide their
|
||
identities so as to head off these kinds of lawsuits
|
||
(filed for whatever reasons, rightly or wrongly)
|
||
- postings and comments may expose the authors to lawsuits
|
||
for libel, misrepresentation, unfair competition, and so
|
||
on (so much for free speech in these beknighted states)
|
||
+ employers may also be exposed to the same suits,
|
||
regardless of where their employees posted from
|
||
- on the tenuous grounds that an employee was acting on
|
||
his employer's behalf, e.g., in defending an Intel
|
||
product on Usenet
|
||
- this, BTW, is another reason for people to seek ways to
|
||
hide some of their assets-to prevent confiscation in deep
|
||
pockets lawsuits (or family illnesses, in which various
|
||
agencies try to seize assets of anybody they can)
|
||
- and the same computers that allow these transactions will
|
||
also allow more rapid determination of who has the
|
||
deepest pockets!
|
||
+ by insulating the entity from repercussions of "sexist" or
|
||
"racist" comments that might provoke lawsuits, etc.
|
||
- (Don't laugh--many companies are getting worried that
|
||
what their employees write on Usenet may trigger lawsuits
|
||
against the companies.)
|
||
+ many transactions may be deemed illegal in some
|
||
jursidictions
|
||
+ even in some that the service or goods provider has no
|
||
control over
|
||
- example: gun makers being held liable for firearms
|
||
deaths in the District of Columbia (though this was
|
||
recently cancelled)
|
||
- the maze of laws may cause some to seek anonymity to
|
||
protect themselves against this maze
|
||
+ Scenario: Anonymous organ donor banks
|
||
+ e.g., a way to "market" rare blood types, or whatever,
|
||
without exposing one's self to forced donation or other
|
||
sanctions
|
||
- "forced donation" involves the lawsuits filed by the
|
||
potential recipient
|
||
- at the time of offer, at least...what happens when the
|
||
deal is consummated is another domain
|
||
- and a way to avoid the growing number of government
|
||
stings
|
||
8.4.13. Journalism and Writing
|
||
+ writers have had a long tradtion of adopting pseudonyms,
|
||
for a variety of reasons
|
||
- because they couldn't get published under their True
|
||
Names, because they didn't _want_ their true names
|
||
published, for the fun of it, etc.
|
||
- George Elliot, Lewis Carroll, Saki, Mark Twain, etc.
|
||
- reporters
|
||
+ radio disc jockeys
|
||
- a Cypherpunk who works for a technology company uses the
|
||
"on air personna" of "Arthur Dent" ("Hitchhiker's Guide")
|
||
for his part-time radio broadcasting job...a common
|
||
situation, he tells me
|
||
+ whistleblowers
|
||
- this was an early use
|
||
+ politically sensitive persons
|
||
- "
|
||
+ I subsequently got myself an account on anon.penet.fi as
|
||
the "Lt.
|
||
- Starbuck" entity, and all later FAQ updates were from
|
||
that account.
|
||
- For reasons that seemed important at the time, I took
|
||
it upon myself to
|
||
- become the moderator/editor of the FAQ."
|
||
- <an54835@anon.penet.fi, 4-3-94, alt.fan.karla-homolka>
|
||
+ Example: Remailers were used to skirt the publishing ban on
|
||
the Karla Homolka case
|
||
- various pseudonymous authors issued regular updates
|
||
- much consternation in Canada!
|
||
+ avoidance of prosecution or damage claims for writing,
|
||
editing, distributing, or selling "damaging" materials is
|
||
yet another reason for anonymous systems to emerge: those
|
||
involved in the process will seek to immunize themselves
|
||
from the various tort claims that are clogging the courts
|
||
- producers, distributors, directors, writers, and even
|
||
actors of x-rated or otherwise "unacceptable" material
|
||
may have to have the protection of anonymous systems
|
||
- imagine fiber optics and the proliferation of videos and
|
||
talk shows....bluenoses and prosecutors will use "forum
|
||
shopping" to block access, to prosecute the producers,
|
||
etc.
|
||
8.4.14. Academic, Scientific, or Professional
|
||
- protect other reputations (professional, authorial,
|
||
personal, etc.)
|
||
- wider range of actions and behaviors (authors can take
|
||
chances)
|
||
- floating ideas out under pseudonyms
|
||
- later linking of these pseudonyms to one's own identity, if
|
||
needed (a case of credential transfer)
|
||
- floating unusual points of view
|
||
- Peter Wayner writes: "I would think that many people who
|
||
hang out on technical newsgroups would be very familiar
|
||
with the anonymous review procedures practiced by academic
|
||
journals. There is some value when a reviewer can speak
|
||
their mind about a paper without worry of revenge. Of
|
||
course everyone assures me that the system is never really
|
||
anonymous because there are alwys only three or four people
|
||
qualified to review each paper. :-) ....Perhaps we should
|
||
go out of our way to make anonymous, technical comments
|
||
about papers and ideas in the newsgroups to fascilitate the
|
||
development of an anonymous commenting culture in
|
||
cypberspace." [Peter Wayner, 1993-02-09]
|
||
8.4.15. Medical Testing and Treatment
|
||
- anonymous medical tests, a la AIDS testing
|
||
8.4.16. Abuse, Recovery
|
||
+ personal problem discussions
|
||
- incest, rape, emotional, Dear Abby, etc.
|
||
8.4.17. Bypassing of export laws
|
||
- Anonymous remailers have been useful for bypassing the
|
||
ITARs...this is how PGP 2.6 spread rapidly, and (we hope!)
|
||
untraceably from MIT and U.S. sites to offshore locations.
|
||
8.4.18. Sex groups, discussions of controversial topics
|
||
- the various alt.sex groups
|
||
- People may feel embarrassed, may fear repercussions from
|
||
their employers, may not wish their family and friends to
|
||
see their posts, or may simply be aware that Usenet is
|
||
archived in many, many places, and is even available on CD-
|
||
ROM and will be trivially searchable in the coming decades
|
||
+ the 100% traceability of public postings to UseNet and
|
||
other bulletin boards is very stifling to free expression
|
||
and becomes one of the main justifications for the use of
|
||
anonymous (or pseudononymous) boards and nets
|
||
- there may be calls for laws against such compilation, as
|
||
with the British data laws, but basically there is little
|
||
that can be done when postings go to tens of thousands of
|
||
machines and are archived in perpetuity by many of these
|
||
nodes and by thousands of readers
|
||
- readers who may incorporate the material into their own
|
||
postings, etc. (hence the absurdity of the British law)
|
||
8.4.19. Avoiding political espionage
|
||
+ TLAs in many countries monitor nearly all international
|
||
communications (and a lot of domestic communications, too)
|
||
- companies and individuals may wish to avoid reprisals,
|
||
sanctions, etc.
|
||
- PGP is reported to be in use by several dissident groups,
|
||
and several Cypherpunks are involved in assisting them.
|
||
- "...one legitimate application is to allow international
|
||
political groups or companies to exchange authenticated
|
||
messages without being subjected to the risk of
|
||
espionage/compromise by a three letter US agency, foreign
|
||
intelligence agency, or third party." [Sean M. Dougherty,
|
||
alt.privacy.anon-server, 1994-09-07]
|
||
8.4.20. Controversial political discussion, or membership in
|
||
political groups, mailing lists, etc.
|
||
+ Recall House UnAmerican Activities Committee
|
||
- and it's modern variant: "Are you now, or have you ever
|
||
been, a Cypherpunk?"
|
||
8.4.21. Preventing Stalking and Harassment
|
||
- avoid physical tracing (harassment, "wannafucks," stalkers,
|
||
etc.)
|
||
- women and others are often sent "wannafuck?" messages from
|
||
the males that outnumber them 20-to-1 in many newsgroups--
|
||
pseudonyms help.
|
||
- given the ease with which net I.D.s can be converted to
|
||
physical location information, many women may be worried.
|
||
+ males can be concerned as well, given the death threats
|
||
issued by, for example, S. Boxx/Detweiler.
|
||
- as it happens, S. Boxx threatened me, and I make my home
|
||
phone number and location readily known...but then I'm
|
||
armed and ready.
|
||
8.4.22. pressure relief valve: knowing one can flee or head for the
|
||
frontier and not be burdened with a past
|
||
- perhaps high rate of recidivism is correlated with this
|
||
inability to escape...once a con, marked for life
|
||
(certainly denied access to high-paying jobs)
|
||
8.4.23. preclude lawsuits, subpoenas, entanglement in the legal
|
||
machinery
|
||
8.4.24. Business Reasons
|
||
+ Corporations can order supplies, information, without
|
||
tipping their hand
|
||
- the Disney purchase of land, via anonymous cutouts (to
|
||
avoid driving the price way up)
|
||
- secret ingredients (apocryphally, Coca Cola)
|
||
- avoiding the "deep pockets" syndrome mentioned above
|
||
- to beat zoning and licensing requirements (e.g., a certain
|
||
type of business may not be "permitted" in a home office,
|
||
so the homeowner will have to use cutouts to hide from
|
||
enforcers)
|
||
- protection from (and to) employers
|
||
+ employees of corporations may have to do more than just
|
||
claim their view are not those of their employer
|
||
- e.g., a racist post could expose IBM to sanctions,
|
||
charges
|
||
+ thus, many employees may have to further insulate their
|
||
identities
|
||
- blanc@microsoft.com is now
|
||
blanc@pylon.com...coincidence?
|
||
+ moonlighting employees (the original concern over Black Net
|
||
and AMIX)
|
||
- employers may have all kinds of concerns, hence the need
|
||
for employees to hide their identities
|
||
- note that this interects with the licensing and zoning
|
||
aspects
|
||
- publishers, service-prividers
|
||
+ Needed for Certain Kinds of Reputation-Based Systems
|
||
+ a respected scientist may wish to float a speculative
|
||
idea
|
||
- and be able to later prove it was in fact his idea
|
||
8.4.25. Protection against retaliation
|
||
- whistleblowing
|
||
+ organizing boycotts
|
||
- (in an era of laws regulating free speech, and "SLAPP"
|
||
lawsuits)
|
||
+ the visa folks (Cantwell and Siegel) threatening those who
|
||
comment with suits
|
||
- the law firm that posted to 5,000 groups....also raises
|
||
the issue again of why the Net should be subsidized
|
||
- participating in public forums
|
||
+ as one person threatened with a lawsuit over his Usenet
|
||
comments put it:
|
||
- "And now they are threatening me. Merely because I openly
|
||
expressed my views on their extremely irresponsible
|
||
behaviour. Anyways, I have already cancelled the article
|
||
from my site and I publicly appologize for posting it in
|
||
the first place. I am scared :) I take all my words back.
|
||
Will use the anonymous service next time :)"
|
||
8.4.26. Preventing Tracking, Surveillance, Dossier Society
|
||
+ avoiding dossiers in general
|
||
- too many dossiers being kept; anonymity allows people to
|
||
at least hold back the tide a bit
|
||
+ headhunting, job searching, where revealing one's identity
|
||
is not always a good idea
|
||
- some headhunters are working for one's current employer!
|
||
- dossiers
|
||
8.4.27. Some Examples from the Cypherpunks List
|
||
+ S, Boxx, aka Sue D. Nym, Pablo Escobar, The Executioner,
|
||
and an12070
|
||
- but Lawrence Detweiler by any other name
|
||
+ he let slip his pseudonym-true name links in several ways
|
||
- stylistic cues
|
||
- mention of things only the "other" was likely to have
|
||
heard
|
||
+ sysops acknowledged certain linkings
|
||
- *not* Julf, though Julf presumably knew the identity
|
||
of "an12070"
|
||
+ Pr0duct Cypher
|
||
- Jason Burrell points out: "Take Pr0duct Cypher, for
|
||
example. Many believe that what (s)he's doing(*) is a
|
||
Good Thing, and I've seen him/her using the Cypherpunk
|
||
remailers to conceal his/her identity....* If you don't
|
||
know, (s)he's the person who wrote PGPTOOLS, and a hack
|
||
for PGP 2.3a to decrypt messages written with 2.6. I
|
||
assume (s)he's doing it anonymously due to ITAR
|
||
regulations." [J.B., 1994-09-05]
|
||
+ Black Unicorn
|
||
- Is the pseudonym of a Washington, D.C. lawyer (I think),
|
||
who has business ties to conservative bankers and
|
||
businessmen in Europe, especially Liechtenstein and
|
||
Switzerland. His involvement with the Cypherpunks group
|
||
caused him to adopt this pseudonym.
|
||
- Ironically, he got into a battle with S. Boxx/Detweiler
|
||
and threated legal action. This cause a rather
|
||
instructive debate to occur.
|
||
|
||
8.5. Untraceable E-Mail
|
||
8.5.1. The Basic Idea of Remailers
|
||
- Messages are encrypted, envelopes within envelopes, thus
|
||
making tracing based on external appearance impossible. If
|
||
the remailer nodes keep the mapping between inputs and
|
||
outputs secret, the "trail" is lost.
|
||
8.5.2. Why is untraceable mail so important?
|
||
+ Bear in mind that "untraceable mail" is the default
|
||
situation for ordinary mail, where one seals an envelope,
|
||
applies a stamp, and drops it anonymously in a letterbox.
|
||
No records are kept, no return address is required (or
|
||
confirmed), etc.
|
||
- regional postmark shows general area, but not source
|
||
mailbox
|
||
+ Many of us believe that the current system of anonymous
|
||
mail would not be "allowed" if introduced today for the
|
||
first time
|
||
- Postal Service would demand personalized stamps,
|
||
verifiable return addresses, etc. (not foolproof, or
|
||
secure, but...)
|
||
+ Reasons:
|
||
- to prevent dossiers of who is contacting whom from being
|
||
compiled
|
||
- to make contacts a personal matter
|
||
- many actual uses: maintaining pseudonyms, anonymous
|
||
contracts, protecting business dealings, etc.
|
||
8.5.3. How do Cypherpunks remailers work?
|
||
8.5.4. How, in simple terms, can I send anonymous mail?
|
||
8.5.5. Chaum's Digital Mixes
|
||
- How do digital mixes work?
|
||
8.5.6. "Are today's remailers secure against traffic analysis?"
|
||
- Mostly not. Many key digital mix features are missing, and
|
||
the gaps can be exploited.
|
||
+ Depends on features used:
|
||
- Reordering (e.g., 10 messages in, 10 messages out)
|
||
- Quantization to fixed sizes (else different sizes give
|
||
clues)
|
||
- Encryption at all stages (up to the customer, of course)
|
||
- But probably not, given that current remailers often lack
|
||
necessary features to deter traffic analysis. Padding is
|
||
iffy, batching is often not done at all (people cherish
|
||
speed, and often downcheck remailers that are "too slow")
|
||
- Best to view today's remailers as experiments, as
|
||
prototypes.
|
||
|
||
8.6. Remailers and Digital Mixes (A Large Section!)
|
||
8.6.1. What are remailers?
|
||
8.6.2. Cypherpunks remailers compared to Julf's
|
||
+ Apparently long delays are mounting at the penet remailer.
|
||
Complaints about week-long delays, answered by:
|
||
- "Well, nobody is stopping you from using the excellent
|
||
series of cypherpunk remailers, starting with one at
|
||
remail@vox.hacktic.nl. These remailers beat the hell out
|
||
of anon.penet.fi. Either same day or at worst next day
|
||
service, PGP encryption allowed, chaining, and gateways
|
||
to USENET." [Mark Terka, The normal delay for
|
||
anon.penet.fi?, alt.privacy.anon-server, 1994-08-19]
|
||
+ "How large is the load on Julf's remailer?"
|
||
- "I spoke to Julf recently and what he really needs is
|
||
$750/month and one off $5000 to upgrade his feed/machine.
|
||
I em looking at the possibility of sponsorship (but don't
|
||
let that stop other people trying).....Julf has buuilt up
|
||
a loyal, trusting following of over 100,000 people and
|
||
6000 messages/day. Upgrading him seems a good
|
||
idea.....Yes, there are other remailers. Let's use them
|
||
if we can and lessen the load on Julf." [Steve Harris,
|
||
alt.privacy.anon-server, 1994-08-22]
|
||
- (Now if the deman on Julf's remailer is this high, seems
|
||
like a great chance to deploy some sort of fee-based
|
||
system, to pay for further expansion. No doubt many of
|
||
the users would drop off, but such is the nature of
|
||
business.)
|
||
8.6.3. "How do remailers work?"
|
||
- (The MFAQ also has some answers.)
|
||
- Simply, they work by taking an incoming text block and
|
||
looking for instructions on where to send the remaining
|
||
text block, and what to do with it (decryption, delays,
|
||
postage, etc.)
|
||
+ Some remailers can process the Unix mail program(s) outputs
|
||
directly, operating on the mail headers
|
||
- names of programs...
|
||
+ I think the "::" format Eric Hughes came up with in his
|
||
first few days of looking at this turned out to be a real
|
||
win (perhaps comparable to John McCarthy's decision to use
|
||
parenthesized s-expressions in Lisp?).
|
||
- it allows arbitary chaining, and all mail messages that
|
||
have text in standard ASCII--which is all mailers, I
|
||
believe--can then use the Cypherpunks remailers
|
||
8.6.4. "What are some uses of remailers?"
|
||
- Thi is mostly answered in other sections, outlining the
|
||
uses of anonymity and digital pseudonyms: remailers are of
|
||
course the enabling technology for anonymity.
|
||
+ using remailers to foil traffic analysis
|
||
- An interesting comment from someone not part of our
|
||
group, in a discussion of proposal to disconnect U.K.
|
||
computers from Usenet (because of British laws about
|
||
libel, about pornography, and such): "PGP hides the
|
||
target. The remailers discard the source info. THe more
|
||
paranoid remailers introduce a random delay on resending
|
||
to foil traffic analysis. You'd be suprised what can be
|
||
done :-).....If you use a chain then the first remailer
|
||
knows who you are but the destination is encrypted. The
|
||
last remailer knows the destination but cannot know the
|
||
source. Intermediate ones know neither." [Malcolm
|
||
McMahon, JANET (UK) to ban USENET?, comp.org.eff.talk,
|
||
1994-08-30]
|
||
- So, word is spreading. Note the emphasis on Cyphepunks-
|
||
type remailers, as opposed to Julf-style anonymous
|
||
services.
|
||
+ options for distributing anonymous messages
|
||
+ via remailers
|
||
- the conventional approach
|
||
- upsides: recipient need not do anything special
|
||
- downsides: that's it--recipient may not welcome the
|
||
message
|
||
+ to a newsgroup
|
||
- a kind of message pool
|
||
- upsides: worldwide dist
|
||
- to an ftp site, or Web-reachable site
|
||
- a mailing list
|
||
8.6.5. "Why are remailers needed?"
|
||
+ Hal Finney summarized the reasons nicely in an answer back
|
||
in early 1993.
|
||
- "There are several different advantages provided by
|
||
anonymous remailers. One of the simplest and least
|
||
controversial would be to defeat traffic analysis on
|
||
ordinary email.....Two people who wish to communicate
|
||
privately can use PGP or some other encryption system to
|
||
hide the content of their messages. But the fact that
|
||
they are communicating with each other is still visible
|
||
to many people: sysops at their sites and possibly at
|
||
intervening sites, as well as various net snoopers. It
|
||
would be natural for them to desire an additional amount
|
||
of privacy which would disguise who they were
|
||
communicating with as well as what they were saying.
|
||
|
||
"Anonymous remailers make this possible. By forwarding
|
||
mail between themselves through remailers, while still
|
||
identifying themselves in the (encrypted) message
|
||
contents, they have even more communications privacy than
|
||
with simple encryption.
|
||
|
||
"(The Cypherpunk vision includes a world in which
|
||
literally hundreds or thousands of such remailers
|
||
operate. Mail could be bounced through dozens of these
|
||
services, mixing in with tens of thousands of other
|
||
messages, re-encrypted at each step of the way. This
|
||
should make traffic analysis virtually impossible. By
|
||
sending periodic dummy messages which just get swallowed
|
||
up at some step, people can even disguise _when_ they are
|
||
communicating.)" [Hal Finney, 1993-02-23]
|
||
|
||
"The more controversial vision associated with anonymous
|
||
remailers is expressed in such science fiction stories as
|
||
"True Names", by Vernor
|
||
Vinge, or "Ender's Game", by Orson Scott Card. These
|
||
depict worlds in which computer networks are in
|
||
widespread use, but in which many people choose to
|
||
participate through pseudonyms. In this way they can
|
||
make unpopular arguments or participate in frowned-upon
|
||
transactions without their activities being linked to
|
||
their true identities. It also allows people to develop
|
||
reputations based on the quality of their ideas, rather
|
||
than their job, wealth, age, or status." [Hal Finney,
|
||
1993-02-23]
|
||
- "Other advantages of this approach include its extension to
|
||
electronic on-line transactions. Already today many
|
||
records are kept of our financial dealings - each time we
|
||
purchase an item over the phone using a credit card, this
|
||
is recorded by the credit card company. In time, even more
|
||
of this kind of information may be collected and possibly
|
||
sold. One Cypherpunk vision includes the ability to engage
|
||
in transactions anonymously, using "digital cash", which
|
||
would not be traceable to the participants. Particularly
|
||
for buying "soft" products, like music, video, and software
|
||
(which all may be deliverable over the net eventually), it
|
||
should be possible to engage in such transactions
|
||
anonymously. So this is another area where anonymous mail
|
||
is important." [Hal Finney, 1993-02-23]
|
||
8.6.6. "How do I actually use a remailer?"
|
||
+ (Note: Remailer instructions are posted _frequently_. There
|
||
is no way I can keep up to date with them here. Consult the
|
||
various mailing lists and finger sites, or use the Web
|
||
docs, to find the most current instructions, keys, uptimes,
|
||
etc._
|
||
+ Raph Levien's finger site is very impressive:
|
||
+ Raph Levien has an impressive utility which pings the
|
||
remailers and reports uptime:
|
||
- finger remailer-list@kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu
|
||
- or use the Web at
|
||
http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html
|
||
- Raph Levien also has a remailer chaining script at
|
||
ftp://kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu/pub/raph/premail-
|
||
0.20.tar.gz
|
||
+ Keys for remailers
|
||
- remailer-list@chaos.bsu.edu (Matthew Ghio maintains)
|
||
+ "Why do remailers only operate on headers and not the body
|
||
of a message? Why aren't signatures stripped off by
|
||
remailers?"
|
||
- "The reason to build mailers that faithfully pass on the
|
||
entire body of
|
||
the message, without any kind of alteration, is that it
|
||
permits you to
|
||
send ANY body through that mailer and rely on its
|
||
faithful arrival at the
|
||
destination." [John Gilmore, 93-01-01]
|
||
- The "::" special form is an exception
|
||
- Signature blocks at the end of message bodies
|
||
specifically should _not_ be stripped, even though this
|
||
can cause security breaches if they are accidentally left
|
||
in when not intended. Attempting to strip sigs, which
|
||
come in many flavors, would be a nightmare and could
|
||
strip other stuff, too. Besides, some people may want a
|
||
sig attached, even to an encrypted message.
|
||
- As usual, anyone is of course free to have a remailer
|
||
which munges message bodies as it sees fit, but I expect
|
||
such remailers will lose customers.
|
||
- Another possibility is another special form, such as
|
||
"::End", that could be used to delimit the block to be
|
||
remailed. But it'll be hard getting such a "frill"
|
||
accepted.
|
||
+ "How do remailers handle subject lines?"
|
||
- In various ways. Some ignore it, some preserve it, some
|
||
even can accept instructions to create a new subject line
|
||
(perhaps in the last remailer).
|
||
- There are reasons not to have a subject line propagated
|
||
through a chain of remailers: it tags the message and
|
||
hence makes traffic analysis trivial. But there are also
|
||
reasons to have a subject line--makes it easier on the
|
||
recipient--and so these schemes to add a subject line
|
||
exist.
|
||
+ "Can nicknames or aliases be used with the Cypherpunks
|
||
remailers?"
|
||
- Certainly digitally signed IDs are used (Pr0duct Cypher,
|
||
for example), but not nicknames preserved in fields in
|
||
the remailing and mail-to-Usenet gateways.
|
||
- This could perhaps be added to the remailers, as an extra
|
||
field. (I've heard the mail fields are more tolerant of
|
||
added stuff than the Netnews fields are, making mail-to-
|
||
News gateways lose the extra fields.)
|
||
+ Some remailer sites support them
|
||
- "If you want an alias assigned at vox.hacktic.nl, one -
|
||
only- needs to send some empty mail to
|
||
<ping@vox.hacktic.nl> and the adress the mail was send
|
||
from will be inculded in the data-base.....Since
|
||
vox.hacktic.nl is on a UUCP node the reply can take
|
||
some time, usually something like 8 to 12 hours."[Alex
|
||
de Joode, <usura@vox.hacktic.nl>, 1994-08-29]
|
||
+ "What do remailers do with the various portions of
|
||
messages? Do they send stuff included after an encrypted
|
||
block? Should they? What about headers?"
|
||
+ There are clearly lots of approaches that may be taken:
|
||
- Send everything as is, leaving it up to the sender to
|
||
ensure that nothing incriminating is left
|
||
- Make certain choices
|
||
- I favor sending everything, unless specifically told not
|
||
to, as this makes fewer assumptions about the intended
|
||
form of the message and thus allows more flexibility in
|
||
designing new functions.
|
||
+ For example, this is what Matthew Ghio had to to say
|
||
about his remailer:
|
||
- "Everything after the encrypted message gets passed
|
||
along in the clear. If you don't want this, you can
|
||
remove it using the cutmarks feature with my remailer.
|
||
(Also, remail@extropia.wimsey.com doesn't append the
|
||
text after the encrypted message.) The reason for this
|
||
is that it allows anonymous replies. I can create a
|
||
pgp message for a remailer which will be delivered to
|
||
myself. I send you the PGP message, you append some
|
||
text to it, and send it to the remailer. The remailer
|
||
decrypts it and remails it to me, and I get your
|
||
message. [M.G., alt.privacy.anon-server, 1994-07-03]
|
||
8.6.7. Remailer Sites
|
||
- There is no central administrator of sites, of course, so a
|
||
variety of tools are the best ways to develop one's own
|
||
list of sites. (Many of us, I suspect, simply settle on a
|
||
dozen or so of our favorites. This will change as hundreds
|
||
of remailers appear; of course, various scripting programs
|
||
will be used to generate the trajectories, handled the
|
||
nested encryption, etc.)
|
||
- The newsgroups alt.privacy.anon-server, alt.security.pgp,
|
||
etc. often report on the latest sites, tools, etc.
|
||
+ Software for Remailers
|
||
+ Software to run a remailer site can be found at:
|
||
- soda.csua.berkeley.edu in /pub/cypherpunks/remailer/
|
||
- chaos.bsu.edu in /pub/cypherpunks/remailer/
|
||
+ Instructions for Using Remailers and Keyservers
|
||
+ on how to use keyservers
|
||
- "If you have access to the World Wide Web, see this
|
||
URL: http://draco.centerline.com:8080/~franl/pgp/pgp-
|
||
keyservers.html" [Fran Litterio, alt.security.pgp, 1994-
|
||
09-02]
|
||
+ Identifying Remailer Sites
|
||
+ finger remailer-list@chaos.bsu.edu
|
||
- returns a list of active remailers
|
||
- for more complete information, keys, and instructions,
|
||
finger remailer.help.all@chaos.bsu.edu
|
||
- gopher://chaos.bsu.edu/
|
||
+ Raph Levien has an impressive utility which pings the
|
||
remailers and reports uptime:
|
||
- finger remailer-list@kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu
|
||
- or use the Web at
|
||
http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html
|
||
- Raph Levien also has a remailer chaining script at
|
||
ftp://kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu/pub/raph/premail-0.20.tar.gz
|
||
+ Remailer pinging
|
||
- "I have written and installed a remailer pinging script
|
||
which
|
||
collects detailed information about remailer features and
|
||
reliability.
|
||
|
||
To use it, just finger remailer-
|
||
list@kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu
|
||
|
||
There is also a Web version of the same information, at:
|
||
http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html"
|
||
[Raph Levien, 1994-08-29]
|
||
+ Sites which are down??
|
||
- tamsun.tamu.edu and tamaix.tamu.edu
|
||
8.6.8. "How do I set up a remailer at my site?"
|
||
- This is not something for the casual user, but is certainly
|
||
possible.
|
||
- "Would someone be able to help me install the remailer
|
||
scripts from the archives? I have no Unix experience and
|
||
have *no* idea where to begin. I don't even know if root
|
||
access is needed for these. Any help would be
|
||
appreciated." [Robert Luscombe, 93-04-28]
|
||
- Sameer Parekh, Matthew Ghio, Raph Levien have all written
|
||
instructions....
|
||
8.6.9. "How are most Cypherpunks remailers written, and with what
|
||
tools?"
|
||
- as scripts which manipulate the mail files, replacing
|
||
headers, etc.
|
||
- Perl, C, TCL
|
||
- "The cypherpunks remailers have been written in Perl, which
|
||
facilitates experimenting and testing of new interfaces.
|
||
The idea might be to migrate them to C eventually for
|
||
efficiency, but during this experimental phase we may want
|
||
to try out new ideas, and it's easier to modify a Perl
|
||
script than a C program." [Hal Finney, 93-01-09]
|
||
- "I do appreciate the cypherpunks stuff, but perl is still
|
||
not a very
|
||
widely used standard tool, and not everyone of us want to
|
||
learn the
|
||
ins and outs of yet another language... So I do applaud
|
||
the C
|
||
version..." [Johan Helsingius, "Julf," 93-01-09]
|
||
8.6.10. Dealing with Remailer Abuse
|
||
+ The Hot Potato
|
||
- a remailer who is being used very heavily, or suspects
|
||
abuse, may choose to distribute his load to other
|
||
remailers. Generally, he can instead of remailing to the
|
||
next site, add sites of his own choosing. Thus, he can
|
||
both reduce the spotlight on him and also increase cover
|
||
traffic by scattering some percentage of his traffic to
|
||
other sites (it never reduces his traffic, just lessens
|
||
the focus on him).
|
||
+ Flooding attacks
|
||
- denial of service attacks
|
||
- like blowing whistles at sports events, to confuse the
|
||
action
|
||
- DC-Nets, disruption (disruptionf of DC-Nets by flooding
|
||
is a very similar problem to disruption of remailers by
|
||
mail bombs)
|
||
+ "How can remailers deal with abuse?"
|
||
- Several remailer operators have shut down their
|
||
remailers, either because they got tired of dealing with
|
||
the problems, or because others ordered them to.
|
||
- Source level blocking
|
||
- Paid messages: at least this makes the abusers _pay_ and
|
||
stops certain kinds of spamming/bombing attacks.
|
||
- Disrupters are dealt with in anonymous ways in Chaum's DC-
|
||
Net schemes; there may be a way to use this here.
|
||
+ Karl Kleinpaste was a pioneer (circa 1991-2) of remailers.
|
||
He has become disenchanted:
|
||
- "There are 3 sites out there which have my software:
|
||
anon.penet.fi, tygra, and uiuc.edu. I have philosophical
|
||
disagreement with the "universal reach" policy of
|
||
anon.penet.fi (whose code is now a long-detached strain
|
||
from the original software I gave Julf -- indeed, by now
|
||
it may be a complete rewrite, I simply don't know);
|
||
....Very bluntly, having tried to run anon servers twice,
|
||
and having had both go down due to actual legal
|
||
difficulties, I don't trust people with them any more."
|
||
[Karl_Kleinpaste@cs.cmu.edu, alt.privacy.anon-server,
|
||
1994-08-29]
|
||
- see discussions in alt.privacy.anon-server for more on
|
||
his legal problems with remailers, and why he shut his
|
||
down
|
||
8.6.11. Generations of Remailers
|
||
+ First Generation Remailer Characteristics--Now (since 1992)
|
||
- Perl scripts, simple processing of headers, crypto
|
||
+ Second Generation Remailer Characteristics--Maybe 1994
|
||
- digital postage of some form (perhaps simple coupons or
|
||
"stamps")
|
||
- more flexible handling of exceptions
|
||
- mail objects can tell remailer what settings to use
|
||
(delays, latency, etc.(
|
||
+ Third Generation Remailer Characteristics--1995-7?
|
||
- protocol negotiation
|
||
+ Chaum-like "mix" characteristics
|
||
- tamper-resistant modules (remailer software runs in a
|
||
sealed environment, not visible to operator)
|
||
+ Fourth Generation Remailer Characteristics--1996-9?
|
||
- Who knows?
|
||
- Agent-based (Telescript?)
|
||
- DC-Net-based
|
||
8.6.12. Remailer identity escrow
|
||
+ could have some uses...
|
||
- what incentives would anyone have?
|
||
- recipients could source-block any remailer that did not
|
||
have some means of coping with serious abuse...a perfect
|
||
free market solution
|
||
- could also be mandated
|
||
8.6.13. Remailer Features
|
||
+ There are dozens of proposed variations, tricks, and
|
||
methods which may or may not add to overall remailer
|
||
security (entropy, confusion). These are often discussed on
|
||
the list, one at a time. Some of them are:
|
||
+ Using one's self as a remailer node. Route traffic back
|
||
through one's own system.
|
||
- even if all other systems are compromised...
|
||
- Random delays, over and above what is needed to meet
|
||
reordering requirements
|
||
- MIRVing, sending a packet out in multiple pieces
|
||
- Encryption is of course a primary feature.
|
||
+ Digital postage.
|
||
- Not so much a feature as an incentive/inducement to get
|
||
more remailers and support them better.
|
||
+ "What are features of a remailer network?"
|
||
- A vast number of features have been considered; some are
|
||
derivative of other, more basic features (e.g., "random
|
||
delays" is not a basic feature, but is one proposed way
|
||
of achieving "reordering," which is what is really
|
||
needed. And "reordering" is just the way to achieve
|
||
"decorrelation" of incoming and outgoing messages).
|
||
+ The "Ideal Mix" is worth considering, just as the "ideal
|
||
op amp" is studied by engineers, regardless of whether
|
||
one can ever be built.
|
||
- a black box that decorrelates incoming and outgoing
|
||
packets to some level of diffusion
|
||
- tamper-proof, in that outside world cannot see the
|
||
internal process of decorrelation (Chaum envisioned
|
||
tamper-resistant or tamper-responding circuits doing
|
||
the decorrelation)
|
||
+ Features of Real-World Mixes:
|
||
+ Decorrelation of incoming and outgoing messages. This
|
||
is the most basic feature of any mix or remailer:
|
||
obscuring the relationship between any message entering
|
||
the mix and any message leaving the mix. How this is
|
||
achieve is what most of the features here are all
|
||
about.
|
||
- "Diffusion" is achieved by batching or delaying
|
||
(danger: low-volume traffic defeats simple, fixed
|
||
delays)
|
||
- For example, in some time period, 20 messages enter a
|
||
node. Then 20 or so (could be less, could be
|
||
more...there is no reason not to add messages, or
|
||
throw away some) messages leave.
|
||
+ Encryption should be supported, else the decorrelation
|
||
is easily defeated by simple inspection of packets.
|
||
- public key encryption, clearly, is preferred (else
|
||
the keys are available outside)
|
||
- forward encryption, using D-H approaches, is a useful
|
||
idea to explore, with keys discarded after
|
||
transmission....thus making subpoenas problematic
|
||
(this has been used with secure phones, for example).
|
||
+ Quanitzed packet sizes. Obviously the size of a packet
|
||
(e.g., 3137 bytes) is a strong cue as to message
|
||
identity. Quantizing to a fixed size destroys this cue.
|
||
+ But since some messages may be small, and some large,
|
||
a practical compromise is perhaps to quantize to one
|
||
of several standards:
|
||
- small messages, e.g., 5K
|
||
- medium messages, e.g., 20K
|
||
- large messages....handled somehow (perhaps split
|
||
up, etc.)
|
||
- More analysis is needed.
|
||
+ Reputation and Service
|
||
- How long in business?
|
||
- Logging policy? Are messages logged?
|
||
- the expectation of operating as stated
|
||
+ The Basic Goals of Remailer Use
|
||
+ decorrelation of ingoing and outgoing messages
|
||
- indistinguishability
|
||
+ "remailed messages have no hair" (apologies to the
|
||
black hole fans out there)
|
||
- no distinguishing charateristics that can be used to
|
||
make correlations
|
||
- no "memory" of previous appearance
|
||
+ this means message size padding to quantized sizes,
|
||
typically
|
||
- how many distinct sizes depends on a lot fo things,
|
||
like traffic, the sizes of other messages, etc.
|
||
+ Encryption, of course
|
||
- PGP
|
||
- otherwise, messages are trivially distinguishable
|
||
+ Quantization or Padding: Messages
|
||
- padded to standard sizes, or dithered in size to obscure
|
||
oringinal size. For example, 2K for typical short
|
||
messages, 5K for typical Usenet articles, and 20K for
|
||
long articles. (Messages much longer are hard to hide in
|
||
a sea of much shorter messages, but other possibilities
|
||
exist: delaying the long messages until N other long
|
||
messages have been accumulated, splitting the messages
|
||
into smaller chunks, etc.)
|
||
+ "What are the quanta for remailers? That is, what are the
|
||
preferred packet sizes for remailed messages?"
|
||
- In the short term, now, the remailed packet sizes are
|
||
pretty much what they started out to be, e.g, 3-6KB or
|
||
so. Some remailers can pad to quantized levels, e.g.,
|
||
to 5K or 10K or more. The levels have not been settled
|
||
on.
|
||
- In the long term, I suspect much smaller packets will
|
||
be selected. Perhaps at the granularity of ATM packets.
|
||
"ATM Remailers" are likely to be coming. (This changes
|
||
the nature of traffic analyis a bit, as the _number_ of
|
||
remailed packets increases.
|
||
- A dissenting argument: ATM networks don't give sender
|
||
the control over packets...
|
||
- Whatever, I think packets will get smaller, not larger.
|
||
Interesting issues.
|
||
- "Based on Hal's numbers, I would suggest a reasonable
|
||
quantization for message sizes be a short set of
|
||
geometrically increasing values, namely, 1K, 4K, 16K,
|
||
64K. In retrospect, this seems like the obvious
|
||
quantization, and not arithmetic progressions." [Eric
|
||
Hughes, 1994-08-29]
|
||
- (Eudora chokes at 32K, and so splits messages at about
|
||
25K, to leave room for comments without further
|
||
splitting. Such practical considerations may be important
|
||
to consider.)
|
||
+ Return Mail
|
||
- A complicated issue. May have no simple solution.
|
||
+ Approaches:
|
||
- Post encrypted message to a pool. Sender (who provided
|
||
the key to use) is able to retrieve anonymously by the
|
||
nature of pools and/or public posting.
|
||
+ Return envelopes, using some kind of procedure to
|
||
ensure anonymity. Since software is by nature never
|
||
secure (can always be taken apart), the issues are
|
||
complicated. The security may be gotten by arranging
|
||
with the remailers in the return path to do certain
|
||
things to certain messages.
|
||
- sender sends instructions to remailers on how to
|
||
treat messages of certain types
|
||
- the recipient who is replying cannot deduce the
|
||
identity, because he has no access to the
|
||
instructions the remailers have.
|
||
- Think of this as Alice sending to Bob sending to
|
||
Charles....sending to Zeke. Zeke sends a reply back
|
||
to Yancy, who has instructions to send this back to
|
||
Xavier, and so on back up the chain. Only if Bob,
|
||
Charles, ..., Yancy collude, can the mapping in the
|
||
reverse direction be deduced.
|
||
- Are these schemes complicated? Yes. But so are lot of
|
||
other protocols, such as getting fonts from a screen
|
||
to a laser printer
|
||
+ Reordering of Messages is Crucial
|
||
+ latency or fanout in remailers
|
||
+ much more important than "delay"
|
||
- do some calculations!
|
||
+ the canard about "latency" or delay keeps coming up
|
||
- a "delay" of X is neither necessary nor sufficient
|
||
to achieve reordering (think about it)
|
||
- essential for removing time correlation information,
|
||
for removing a "distinguishing mark" ("ideal remailed
|
||
messages have no hair")
|
||
+ The importance of pay as you go, digital postage
|
||
+ standard market issues
|
||
- markets are how scarece resources are allocated
|
||
- reduces spamming, overloading, bombing
|
||
- congestion pricing
|
||
- incentives for improvement
|
||
+ feedback mechanisms
|
||
- in the same way the restaurants see impacts quickly
|
||
- applies to other crypto uses besides remailers
|
||
+ Miscellaneous
|
||
- by having one's own nodes, further ensures security
|
||
(true, the conspiring of all other nodes can cause
|
||
traceability, but such a conspiracy is costly and would
|
||
be revealed)
|
||
+ the "public posting" idea is very attractive: at no point
|
||
does the last node know who the next node will be...all
|
||
he knows is a public key for that node
|
||
+ so how does the next node in line get the message,
|
||
short of reading all messages?
|
||
- first, security is not much compromised by sorting
|
||
the public postings by some kind of order set by the
|
||
header (e.g., "Fred" is shorthand for some long P-K,
|
||
and hence the recipient knows to look in the
|
||
Fs...obviously he reads more than just the Fs)
|
||
+ outgoing messages can be "broadcast" (sent to many nodes,
|
||
either by a literal broadcast or public posting, or by
|
||
randomly picking many nodes)
|
||
- this "blackboard" system means no point to point
|
||
communication is needed
|
||
+ Timed-release strategies
|
||
+ encrypt and then release the key later
|
||
- "innocuously" (how?)
|
||
- through a remailing service
|
||
- DC-Net
|
||
- via an escrow service or a lawyer (but can the lawyer
|
||
get into hot water for releasing the key to
|
||
controversial data?)
|
||
- with a series of such releases, the key can be
|
||
"diffused"
|
||
- some companies may specialize in timed-release, such
|
||
as by offering a P-K with the private key to be
|
||
released some time later
|
||
- in an ecology of cryptoid entities, this will increase
|
||
the degrees of freedom
|
||
+ this reduces the legal liability of
|
||
retransmitters...they can accurately claim that they
|
||
were only passing data, that there was no way they
|
||
could know the content of the packets
|
||
- of course they can already claim this, due to the
|
||
encrypted nature
|
||
+ One-Shot Remailers
|
||
- "You can get an anonymous address from
|
||
mg5n+getid@andrew.cmu.edu. Each time you request an
|
||
anon address, you get a different one. You can get as
|
||
many as you like. The addresses don't expire, however,
|
||
so maybe it's not the ideal 'one-shot' system, but it
|
||
allows replies without connecting you to your 'real
|
||
name/address' or to any of your other posts/nyms." [
|
||
Matthew Ghio, 1994-04-07]
|
||
8.6.14. Things Needed in Remailers
|
||
+ return receipts
|
||
- Rick Busdiecker notes that "The idea of a Return-Receipt-
|
||
To: field has been around for a while, but the semantics
|
||
have never been pinned down. Some mailer daemons
|
||
generate replies meaning that the bits were delivered."
|
||
[R.B., 1994-08-08]
|
||
+ special handling instructions
|
||
- agents, daemons
|
||
- negotiated procedures
|
||
+ digital postage
|
||
- of paramount importance!
|
||
- solves many problems, and incentivizes remailers
|
||
+ padding
|
||
+ padding to fixed sizes
|
||
- padding to fixed powers of 2 would increase the average
|
||
message size by about a third
|
||
- lots of remailers
|
||
- multiple jursidictions
|
||
- robustness and consistency
|
||
+ running in secure hardware
|
||
- no logs
|
||
- no monitoring by operator
|
||
- wipe of all temp files
|
||
- instantiated quickly, fluidly
|
||
- better randomization of remailers
|
||
8.6.15. Miscellaneous Aspects of Remailers
|
||
+ "How many remailer nodes are actually needed?"
|
||
- We strive to get as many as possible, to distribute the
|
||
process to many jurisdictions and with many opeators.
|
||
- Curiously, as much theoretical diffusivity can occur with
|
||
a single remailer (taking in a hundred messages and
|
||
sending out a hundred, for example) as with many
|
||
remailers. Our intuition is, I think, that many remailers
|
||
offer better diffusivity and better hiding. Why this is
|
||
so (if it is) needs more careful thinking than I've seen
|
||
done so far.
|
||
- At a meta-level, we think multiple remailers lessens the
|
||
chance of them being compromised (this, however, is not
|
||
directly related to the diffusivity of a remailer network-
|
||
-important, but not directly related).
|
||
- (By the way, a kind of sneaky idea is to try to always
|
||
declare one's self to be a remailer. If messages were
|
||
somehow traced back to one's own machine, one could
|
||
claim: 'Yes, I'm a remailer." In principle, one could be
|
||
the only remailer in the universe and still have high
|
||
enough diffusion and confusion. In practice, being the
|
||
only remailer would be pretty dangerous.)
|
||
+ Diffusion and confusion in remailer networks
|
||
+ Consider a single node, with a message entering, and
|
||
two messages leaving; this is essentially the smallest
|
||
"remailer op"
|
||
- From a proof point of view, either outgoing message
|
||
could be the one
|
||
- and yet neither one can be proved to be
|
||
- Now imagine those two messages being sent through 10
|
||
remailers...no additional confusion is added...why?
|
||
- So, with 10 messages gong into a chain of 10 remailers,
|
||
if 10 leave...
|
||
- The practical effect of N remailers is to ensure that
|
||
compromise of some fraction of them doesn't destroy
|
||
overall security
|
||
+ "What do remailers do with misaddressed mail?"
|
||
- Depends on the site. Some operators send notes back
|
||
(which itself causes concern), some just discard
|
||
defective mail. This is a fluid area. At least one
|
||
remailer (wimsey) can post error messages to a message
|
||
pool--this idea can be generalized to provide "delivery
|
||
receipts" and other feedback.
|
||
- Ideal mixes, a la Chaum, would presumably discard
|
||
improperly-formed mail, although agents might exist to
|
||
prescreen mail (not mandatory agents, of course, but
|
||
voluntarily-selected agents)
|
||
- As in so many areas, legislation is not needed, just
|
||
announcement of policies, choice by customers, and the
|
||
reputation of the remailer.
|
||
- A good reason to have robust generation of mail on one's
|
||
own machine, so as to minimize such problems.
|
||
+ "Can the NSA monitor remailers? Have they?"
|
||
+ Certainly they _can_ in various ways, either by directly
|
||
monitoring Net traffic or indirectly. Whether they _do_
|
||
is unknown.
|
||
- There have been several rumors or forgeries claiming
|
||
that NSA is routinely linking anonymous IDs to real IDs
|
||
at the penet remailer.
|
||
+ Cypherpunks remailers are, if used properly, more
|
||
secure in key ways:
|
||
- many of them
|
||
- not used for persistent, assigned IDs
|
||
- support for encryption: incoming and outgoing
|
||
messages look completely unlike
|
||
- batching, padding, etc. supported
|
||
- And properly run remailers will obscure/diffuse the
|
||
connection between incoming and outgoing messages--the
|
||
main point of a remailer!
|
||
+ The use of message pools to report remailer errors
|
||
- A good example of how message pools can be used to
|
||
anonymously report things.
|
||
- "The wimsey remailer has an ingenious method of returning
|
||
error messages anonymously. Specify a subject in the
|
||
message sent to wimsey that will be meaningful to you,
|
||
but won't identify you (like a set of random letters).
|
||
This subject does not appear in the remailed message.
|
||
Then subscribe to the mailing list
|
||
|
||
errors-request@extropia.wimsey.com
|
||
|
||
by sending a message with Subject: subscribe. You will
|
||
receive a msg
|
||
for ALL errors detected in incoming messages and ALL
|
||
bounced messages." [anonymous, 93-08-23]
|
||
- This is of course like reading a classified ad with some
|
||
cryptic message meaningful to you alone. And more
|
||
importantly, untraceable to you.
|
||
+ there may be role for different types of remailers
|
||
- those that support encryption, those that don't
|
||
+ as many in non-U.S. countries as possible
|
||
- especially for the *last* hop, to avoid subpoena issues
|
||
- first-class remailers which remail to *any* address
|
||
+ remailers which only remail to *other remailers*
|
||
- useful for the timid, for those with limited support,
|
||
etc.
|
||
-
|
||
+ "Should mail faking be used as part of the remailer
|
||
strategy?"
|
||
- "1. If you fake mail by talking SMTP directly, the IP
|
||
address or domain name of the site making the outgoing
|
||
connection will appear in a Received field in the header
|
||
somewhere."
|
||
|
||
"2. Fake mail by devious means is generally frowned upon.
|
||
There's no need to take a back-door approach here--it's
|
||
bad politically, as in Internet politics." [Eric Hughes,
|
||
94-01-31]
|
||
- And if mail can really be consistently and robustly
|
||
faked, there would be less need for remailers, right?
|
||
(Actually, still a need, as traffic analysis would likely
|
||
break any "Port 25" faking scheme.)
|
||
- Furthermore, such a strategy would not likely to be
|
||
robust over time, as it relies on exploiting transitory
|
||
flaws and vendor specifics. A bad idea all around.
|
||
+ Difficulties in getting anonymous remailer networks widely
|
||
deployed
|
||
- "The tricky part is finding a way to preserve anonymity
|
||
where the majority of sites on the Internet continue to
|
||
log traffic carefully, refuse to install new software
|
||
(especially anon-positive software), and are
|
||
administrated by people with simplistic and outdated
|
||
ideas about identity and punishment. " [Greg Broiles,
|
||
1994-08-08]
|
||
+ Remailer challenge: insulating the last leg on a chain from
|
||
prosecution
|
||
+ Strategy 1: Get them declared to be common carriers, like
|
||
the phone company or a mail delivery service
|
||
+ e.g., we don't prosecute an actual package
|
||
deliveryperson, or even the company they work for, for
|
||
delivery of an illegal package
|
||
- contents assumed to be unknown to the carrier
|
||
- (I've heard claims that only carriers who make other
|
||
agreements to cooperate with law enforcement can be
|
||
treated as common carriers.)
|
||
+ Strategy 2: Message pools
|
||
+ ftp sites
|
||
- with plans for users to "subscribe to" all new
|
||
messages (thus, monitoring agencies cannot know
|
||
which, if any, messages are being sought)
|
||
- this gets around the complaint about too much volume
|
||
on the Usenet (text messages are a tiny fraction of
|
||
other traffic, especially images, so the complaint is
|
||
only one of potentiality)
|
||
+ Strategy 3: Offshore remailers as last leg
|
||
- probably set by sender, who presumably knows the
|
||
destination
|
||
- A large number of "secondary remailers" who agree to
|
||
remail a limited number...
|
||
+ "Are we just playing around with remailers and such?"
|
||
- It pains me to say this, but, yes, we are just basically
|
||
playing around here!
|
||
- Remailer traffic is so low, padding is so haphazard, that
|
||
making correlations between inputs and outputs is not
|
||
cryptographically hard to do. (It might _seem_ hard, with
|
||
paper and pencil sorts of calculations, but it'll be
|
||
child's play for the Crays at the Fort.)
|
||
- Even if this is not so for any particular message,
|
||
maintaining a persistent ID--such as Pr0duct Cypher does,
|
||
with digital sigs--without eventually providing enough
|
||
clues will be almost impossible. At this time.
|
||
- Things will get better. Better and more detailed
|
||
"cryptanalysis of remailer chains" is sorely needed.
|
||
Until then, we are indeed just playing. (Play can be
|
||
useful, though.)
|
||
+ The "don't give em any hints" principle (for remailers)
|
||
- avoid giving any information
|
||
- dont't say which nodes are sources and which are sinks;
|
||
let attackers assume everyone is a remailer, a source
|
||
- don't say how long a password is
|
||
- don't say how many rounds are in a tit-for-tat tournament
|
||
|
||
8.7. Anonymous Posting to Usenet
|
||
8.7.1. Julf's penet system has historically been the main way to
|
||
post anonymously to Usenet (used by no less a luminary than
|
||
L. Detweiler, in his "an12070/S. Boxx" personna). This has
|
||
particulary been the case with postings to "support" groups,
|
||
or emotional distress groups. For example,
|
||
alt.sexual.abuse.recovery.
|
||
8.7.2. Cryptographically secure remailes are now being used
|
||
increasingly (and scaling laws and multiple jurisdictions
|
||
suggest even more will be used in the future).
|
||
8.7.3. finger remailer.help.all@chaos.bsu.edu gives these results
|
||
[as of 1994-09-07--get a current result before using!]
|
||
- "Anonymous postings to usenet can be made by sending
|
||
anonymous mail to one of the following mail-to-usenet
|
||
gateways:
|
||
|
||
group.name@demon.co.uk
|
||
group.name@news.demon.co.uk
|
||
group.name@bull.com
|
||
group.name@cass.ma02.bull.com
|
||
group.name@undergrad.math.uwaterloo.ca
|
||
group.name@charm.magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu
|
||
group.name@comlab.ox.ac.uk
|
||
group.name@nic.funet.fi
|
||
group.name@cs.dal.ca
|
||
group.name@ug.cs.dal.ca
|
||
group.name@paris.ics.uci.edu (removes headers)
|
||
group.name.usenet@decwrl.dec.com (Preserves all headers)"
|
||
|
||
8.8. Anonymous Message Pools, Newsgroups, etc.
|
||
8.8.1. "Why do some people use message pools?"
|
||
- Provides untracable communication
|
||
- messages
|
||
- secrets
|
||
- transactions
|
||
+ Pr0duct Cypher is a good example of someone who
|
||
communicates primarily via anonymous pools (for messages to
|
||
him). Someone recently asked about this, with this comment:
|
||
- "Pr0duct Cypher chooses to not link his or her "real
|
||
life" identity with the 'nym used to sign the software he
|
||
or she wrote (PGP Tools, Magic Money, ?). This is quite
|
||
an understandable sentiment, given that bad apples in the
|
||
NSA are willing to go far beyond legal hassling, and make
|
||
death threats against folks with high public visibility
|
||
(see the threads about an NSA agent threatening to run
|
||
Jim Bidzos of RSA over in his parking lot)." [Richard
|
||
Johnson, alt.security.pgp, 1994-07-02]
|
||
8.8.2. alt.anonymous.messages is one such pool group
|
||
- though it's mainly used for test messages, discussions of
|
||
anonymity (though there are better groups), etc.
|
||
8.8.3. "Could there be truly anonymous newsgroups?"
|
||
- One idea: newgroup a moderated group in which only messages
|
||
sans headers and other identifiers would be accepted. The
|
||
"moderator"--which could be a program--would only post
|
||
messages after this was ensured. (Might be an interesting
|
||
experiment.)
|
||
+ alt.anonymous.messages was newgrouped by Rick Busdiecker,
|
||
1994-08.
|
||
- Early uses were, predictably, by people who stumbled
|
||
across the group and imputed to it whatever they wished.
|
||
|
||
8.9. Legal Issues with Remailers
|
||
8.9.1. What's the legal status of remailers?
|
||
- There are no laws against it at this time.
|
||
- No laws saying people have to put return addresses on
|
||
messages, on phone calls (pay phones are still legal), etc.
|
||
- And the laws pertaining to not having to produce identity
|
||
(the "flier" case, where leaflet distributors did not have
|
||
to produce ID) would seem to apply to this form of
|
||
communication.
|
||
+ However, remailers may come under fire:
|
||
+ Sysops, MIT case
|
||
- potentially serious for remailers if the case is
|
||
decided such that the sysop's creation of group that
|
||
was conducive to criminal pirating was itself a
|
||
crime...that could make all involved in remailers
|
||
culpable
|
||
8.9.2. "Can remailer logs be subpoenaed?"
|
||
- Count on it happening, perhaps very soon. The FBI has been
|
||
subpoenaing e-mail archives for a Netcom customer (Lewis De
|
||
Payne), probably because they think the e-mail will lead
|
||
them to the location of uber-hacker Kevin Mitnick. Had the
|
||
parties used remailers, I'm fairly sure we'd be seeing
|
||
similar subpoenas for the remailer logs.
|
||
- There's no exemption for remailers that I know of!
|
||
+ The solutions are obvious, though:
|
||
- use many remailers, to make subpoenaing back through the
|
||
chain very laborious, very expensive, and likely to fail
|
||
(if even one party won't cooperate, or is outside the
|
||
court's jurisdiction, etc.)
|
||
- offshore, multi-jurisdictional remailers (seleted by the
|
||
user)
|
||
- no remailer logs kept...destroy them (no law currently
|
||
says anybody has to keep e-mail records! This may
|
||
change....)
|
||
- "forward secrecy," a la Diffie-Hellman forward secrecy
|
||
8.9.3. How will remailers be harassed, attacked, and challenged?
|
||
8.9.4. "Can pressure be put on remailer operators to reveal traffic
|
||
logs and thereby allow tracing of messages?"
|
||
+ For human-operated systems which have logs, sure. This is
|
||
why we want several things in remailers:
|
||
* no logs of messages
|
||
* many remailers
|
||
* multiple legal jurisdictions, e.g., offshore remailers
|
||
(the more the better)
|
||
* hardware implementations which execute instructions
|
||
flawlessly (Chaum's digital mix)
|
||
8.9.5. Calls for limits on anonymity
|
||
+ Kids and the net will cause many to call for limits on
|
||
nets, on anonymity, etc.
|
||
- "But there's a dark side to this exciting phenomenon, one
|
||
that's too rarely understood by computer novices.
|
||
Because they
|
||
offer instant access to others, and considerable
|
||
anonymity to
|
||
participants, the services make it possible for people -
|
||
especially computer-literate kids - to find themselves in
|
||
unpleasant, sexually explicit social situations.... And
|
||
I've gradually
|
||
come to adopt the view, which will be controversial among
|
||
many online
|
||
users, that the use of nicknames and other forms of
|
||
anonymity
|
||
must be eliminated or severly curbed to force people
|
||
online into
|
||
at least as much accountability for their words and
|
||
actions as
|
||
exists in real social encounters." [Walter S. Mossberg,
|
||
Wall Street Journal, 6/30/94, provided by Brad Dolan]
|
||
- Eli Brandt came up with a good response to this: "The
|
||
sound-bite response to this: do you want your child's
|
||
name, home address, and phone number available to all
|
||
those lurking pedophiles worldwide? Responsible parents
|
||
encourage their children to use remailers."
|
||
- Supreme Court said that identity of handbill distributors
|
||
need not be disclosed, and pseudonyms in general has a long
|
||
and noble tradition
|
||
- BBS operators have First Amendment protections (e.g..
|
||
registration requirements would be tossed out, exactly as
|
||
if registration of newspapers were to be attempted)
|
||
8.9.6. Remailers and Choice of Jurisdictions
|
||
- The intended target of a remailed message, and the subject
|
||
material, may well influence the set of remailers used,
|
||
especially for the very important "last remailer' (Note: it
|
||
should never be necessary to tell remailers if they are
|
||
first, last, or others, but the last remailer may in fact
|
||
be able to tell he's the last...if the message is in
|
||
plaintext to the recipient, with no additional remailer
|
||
commands embedded, for example.)
|
||
- A message involving child pornography might have a remailer
|
||
site located in a state like Denmark, where child porn laws
|
||
are less restrictive. And a message critical of Islam might
|
||
not be best sent through a final remailer in Teheran. Eric
|
||
Hughes has dubbed this "regulatory arbitrage," and to
|
||
various extents it is already common practice.
|
||
- Of course, the sender picks the remailer chain, so these
|
||
common sense notions may not be followed. Nothing is
|
||
perfect, and customs will evolve. I can imagine schemes
|
||
developing for choosing customers--a remailer might not
|
||
accept as a customer certain abusers, based on digital
|
||
pseudonyms < hairy).
|
||
8.9.7. Possible legal steps to limit the use of remailers and
|
||
anonymous systems
|
||
- hold the remailer liable for content, i.e., no common
|
||
carrier status
|
||
- insert provisions into the various "anti-hacking" laws to
|
||
criminalize anonymous posts
|
||
8.9.8. Crypto and remailers can be used to protect groups from "deep
|
||
pockets" lawsuits
|
||
- products (esp. software) can be sold "as is," or with
|
||
contracts backed up by escrow services (code kept in an
|
||
escrow repository, or money kept there to back up
|
||
committments)
|
||
+ jurisdictions, legal and tax, cannot do "reach backs" which
|
||
expose the groups to more than they agreed to
|
||
- as is so often the case with corporations in the real
|
||
world, which are taxed and fined for various purposes
|
||
(asbestos, etc.)
|
||
- (For those who panic at the thought of this, the remedy for
|
||
the cautious will be to arrange contracts with the right
|
||
entities...probably paying more for less product.)
|
||
8.9.9. Could anonymous remailers be used to entrap people, or to
|
||
gather information for investigations?
|
||
- First, there are so few current remailers that this is
|
||
unlikely. Julf seems a non-narc type, and he is located in
|
||
Finland. The Cypherpunks remailers are mostly run by folks
|
||
like us, for now.
|
||
- However, such stings and set-ups have been used in the past
|
||
by narcs and "red squads." Expect the worse from Mr.
|
||
Policeman. Now that evil hackers are identified as hazards,
|
||
expect moves in this direction. "Cryps" are obviously
|
||
"crack" dealers.
|
||
- But use of encryption, which CP remailers support (Julf's
|
||
does not), makes this essentially moot.
|
||
|
||
8.10. Cryptanalysis of Remailer Networks
|
||
8.10.1. The Need for More Detailed Analysis of Mixes and Remailers
|
||
+ "Have remailer systems been adequately cryptanalyzed?"
|
||
- Not in my opinion, no. Few calculations have been done,
|
||
just mostly some estimates about how much "confusion" has
|
||
been created by the remailer nodes.
|
||
- But thinking that a lot of complication and messiness
|
||
makes a strong crypto system is a basic mistake...sort of
|
||
like thinking an Enigma rotor machine makes a good cipher
|
||
system, by today's standards, just because millions of
|
||
combinations of pathways through the rotor system are
|
||
possible. Not so.
|
||
+ Deducing Patterns in Traffic and Deducing Nyms
|
||
- The main lesson of mathematical cryptology has been that
|
||
seemingly random things can actually be shown to have
|
||
structure. This is what cryptanalysis is all about.
|
||
- The same situation applies to "seemingly random" message
|
||
traffic, in digital mixes, telephone networks, etc.
|
||
"Cryptanalysis of remailers" is of course possible,
|
||
depending on the underlying model. (Actually, it's always
|
||
possible, it just may not yield anything, as with
|
||
cryptanalysis of ciphers.)
|
||
+ on the time correlation in remailer cryptanalysis
|
||
- imagine Alice and Bob communicating through
|
||
remailers...an observer, unable to follow specific
|
||
messages through the remailers, could still notice
|
||
pairwise correlations between messages sent and
|
||
received by these two
|
||
+ like time correlations between events, even if the
|
||
intervening path or events are jumbled
|
||
- e.g., if within a few hours of every submarine's
|
||
departure from Holy Loch a call is placed to Moscow,
|
||
one may make draw certain conclusions about who is a
|
||
Russian spy, regardless of not knowing the
|
||
intermediate paths
|
||
- or, closer to home, correlating withdrawals from one
|
||
bank to deposits in another, even if the intervening
|
||
transfers are jumbled
|
||
+ just because it seems "random" does not mean it is
|
||
- Scott Collins speculates that a "dynamic Markov
|
||
compressor" could discern or uncover the non-
|
||
randomness in remailer uses
|
||
- Cryptanalysis of remailers has been woefully lacking. A
|
||
huge fraction of posts about remailer improvements make
|
||
hand-waving arguments about the need for more traffic,
|
||
longer delays, etc. (I'm not pointing fingers, as I make
|
||
the same informal, qualitative comments, too. What is
|
||
needed is a rigorous analysis of remailer security.)
|
||
- We really don't have any good estimates of overall security
|
||
as a function of number of messages circulating, the
|
||
latency ( number of stored messages before resending), the
|
||
number of remailer hops, etc. This is not cryptographically
|
||
"exciting" work, but it's still needed. There has not been
|
||
much focus in the academic community on digital mixes or
|
||
remailers, probably because David Chaum's 1981 paper on
|
||
"Untraceable E-Mail" covered most of the theoretically
|
||
interesting material. That, and the lack of commercial
|
||
products or wide usage.
|
||
+ Time correlations may reveal patterns that individual
|
||
messages lack. That is, repeated communicatin between Alice
|
||
and Bob, even if done through remailers and even if time
|
||
delays/dwell times are built-in, may reveal nonrandom
|
||
correlations in sent/received messages.
|
||
- Scott Collins speculates that a dynamic Markov compressor
|
||
applied to the traffic would have reveal such
|
||
correlations. (The application of such tests to digital
|
||
cash and other such systems would be useful to look at.)
|
||
- Another often overlooked weakness is that many people
|
||
send test messages to themselves, a point noted by Phil
|
||
Karn: "Another way that people often let themselves be
|
||
caught is that they inevitably send a test message to
|
||
themselves right before the forged message in question.
|
||
This shows up clearly in the sending system's sendmail
|
||
logs. It's a point to consider with remailer chains too,
|
||
if you don't trust the last machine on the chain." [P.K.,
|
||
1994-09-06]
|
||
+ What's needed:
|
||
- aggreement on some terminology (this doesn't require
|
||
consensus, just a clearly written paper to de facto
|
||
establish the terminology)
|
||
- a formula relating degree of untraceability to the major
|
||
factors that go into remailers: packet size and
|
||
quantization, latency (# of messages), remailer policies,
|
||
timing, etc.
|
||
- Also, analysis of how deliberate probes or attacks might
|
||
be mounted to deduce remailer patterns (e.g., Fred always
|
||
remails to Josh and Suzy and rarely to Zeke).
|
||
- I think this combinatorial analysis would be a nice little
|
||
monograph for someone to write.
|
||
8.10.2. A much-needed thing. Hal Finney has posted some calculations
|
||
(circa 1994-08-08), but more work is sorely needed.
|
||
8.10.3. In particular, we should be skeptical of hand-waving analyses
|
||
of the "it sure looks complicated to follow the traffic"
|
||
sort. People think that by adding "messy" tricks, such as
|
||
MIRVing messages, that security is increased. Maybe it is,
|
||
maybe it isn't. But it needs formal analysis before claims
|
||
can be confidantly believed.
|
||
8.10.4. Remailers and entropy
|
||
- What's the measure of "mixing" that goes on in a mix, or
|
||
remailer?
|
||
- Hand=waving about entropy and reordering may not be too
|
||
useful.
|
||
+ Going back to Shannon's concept of entropy as measuring the
|
||
degree of uncertainty...
|
||
+ trying to "guess" or "predict' where a message leaving
|
||
one node will exit the system
|
||
- not having clear entrance and exit points adds to the
|
||
difficulty, somewhat analogously to having a password
|
||
of unknown length (an attacker can't just try all 10-
|
||
character passwords, as he has no idea of the length)
|
||
- the advantages of every node being a remailer, of
|
||
having no clearly identified sources and sinks
|
||
+ This predictability may depend on a _series_ of messages
|
||
sent between Alice and Bob...how?
|
||
- it seems there may be links to Persi Diaconis' work on
|
||
"perfect shuffles" (a problem which seemed easy, but
|
||
which eluded solving until recently...should give us
|
||
comfort that our inability to tackle the real meat of
|
||
this issue is not too surprising
|
||
8.10.5. Scott Collins believes that remailer networks can be
|
||
cryptanalyzed roughly the same way as pseudorandom number
|
||
generators are analyzed, e.g., with dynamic Markov
|
||
compressors (DNCs). (I'm more skeptical: if each remailer is
|
||
using an information-theoretically secure RNG to reorder the
|
||
messages, and if all messages are the same size and (of
|
||
course) are encypted with information-theoretically secure
|
||
(OTP) ciphers, then it seems to me that the remailing would
|
||
itself be information-theoretically secure.)
|
||
|
||
8.11. Dining Cryptographers
|
||
8.11.1. This is effectively the "ideal digital mix," updated from
|
||
Chaum's original hardware mix form to a purely software-based
|
||
form.
|
||
8.11.2. David Chaum's 1988 paper in Journal of Crypology (Vol 1, No
|
||
1) outlines a way for completely untraceable communication
|
||
using only software (no tamper-resistant modules needed)
|
||
- participants in a ring (hence "dining cryptographers")
|
||
- Chaum imagines that 3 cryptographers are having dinner and
|
||
are informed by their waiter that their dinner has already
|
||
been paid for, perhaps by the NSA, or perhaps by one of
|
||
themselves...they wish to determine which of these is true,
|
||
without revealing which of them paid!
|
||
- everyone flips a coin (H or T) and shows it to his neighbor
|
||
on the left
|
||
+ everyone reports whether he sees "same" or "different"
|
||
- note that with 2 participants, they both already know
|
||
the other's coin (both are to the left!)
|
||
- however, someone wishing to send a message, such as Chaum's
|
||
example of "I paid for dinner," instead says the opposite
|
||
of what he sees
|
||
+ some analysis of this (analyze it from the point of view of
|
||
one of the cryptographers) shows that the 3 cryptographers
|
||
will know that one of them paid (if this protocol is
|
||
executed faithfully), but that the identity can't be
|
||
"localized"
|
||
- a diagram is needed...
|
||
+ this can be generalized...
|
||
+ longer messages
|
||
- use multiple rounds of the protocol
|
||
+ faster than coin-flipping
|
||
- each participant and his left partner share a list of
|
||
"pre-flipped" coins, such as truly random bits
|
||
(radioactive decay, noise, etc.) stored on a CD-ROM or
|
||
whatever
|
||
- they can thus "flip coins" as fast as they can read the
|
||
disk
|
||
+ simultaneous messages (collision)
|
||
- use back-off and retry protocols (like Ethernet uses)
|
||
+ collusion of participants
|
||
- an interesting issue...remember that participants are
|
||
not restricted to the simple ring topology
|
||
- various subgraphs can be formed
|
||
- a participant who fears collusion can pick a subgraph
|
||
that includes those he doubts will collude (a tricky
|
||
issue)
|
||
+ anonymity of receiver
|
||
- can use P-K to encrypt message to some P-K and then
|
||
"broadcast" it and force every participant to try to
|
||
decrypt it (only the anonymous recipient will actually
|
||
succeed)
|
||
- Chaum's complete 1988 "Journal of Cryptology" article is
|
||
available at the Cypherpunks archive site,
|
||
ftp.soda.csua.edu, in /pub/cypherpunks
|
||
8.11.3. What "DC-Net" Means
|
||
- a system (graph, subgraphs, etc.) of communicating
|
||
participants, who need not be known to each other, can
|
||
communicate information such that neither the sender nor
|
||
the recipient is known
|
||
+ unconditional sender untraceability
|
||
- the anonymity of the broadcaster can be information-
|
||
theoretically secure, i.e., truly impossible to break and
|
||
requiring no assumptions about public key systems, the
|
||
difficulty of factoring, etc.
|
||
+ receiver untraceability depends on public-key protocols, so
|
||
traceability is computationally-dependent
|
||
- but this is believed to be secure, of course
|
||
+ bandwidth can be increased by several means
|
||
- shared keys
|
||
- block transmission by accumulating messages
|
||
- hiearchies of messages, subgraphs, etc.
|
||
|
||
8.12. Future Remailers
|
||
8.12.1. "What are the needed features for the Next Generation
|
||
Remailer?"
|
||
+ Some goals
|
||
- generally, closer to the goals outlined in Chaum's 1981
|
||
paper on "Untraceable E-Mail"
|
||
- Anonymity
|
||
- Digital Postage, pay as you go, ,market pricing
|
||
- Traffic Analysis foiled
|
||
+ Bulletproof Sites:
|
||
- Having offshore (out of the U.S.) sites is nice, but
|
||
having sites resistant to pressures from universities and
|
||
corporate site administrators is of even greater
|
||
practical consequence. The commercial providers, like
|
||
Netcom, Portal, and Panix, cannot be counted on to stand
|
||
and fight should pressures mount (this is just my guess,
|
||
not an aspersion against their backbones, whether organic
|
||
or Internet).
|
||
- Locating remailers in many non-U.S. countries is a Good
|
||
Idea. As with money-laundering, lots of countries means
|
||
lots of jurisdictions, and the near impossibility of
|
||
control by one country.
|
||
+ Digital Postage, or Pay-as-you-Go Services:
|
||
- Some fee for the service. Just like phone service, modem
|
||
time, real postage, etc. (But unlike highway driving,
|
||
whose usage is largely subsidized.)
|
||
- This will reduce spamming, will incentivize remailer
|
||
services to better maintain their systems, and will
|
||
- Rates would be set by market process, in the usual way.
|
||
"What the traffic will bear." Discounts, favored
|
||
customers, rebates, coupons, etc. Those that don't wish
|
||
to charge, don't have to (they'll have to deal with the
|
||
problems).
|
||
+ Generations
|
||
- 1st Gen--Today's Remailer:
|
||
- 2nd Gen--Near Future (c. 1995)
|
||
- 3rd Gen-
|
||
- 4th Gen--
|
||
8.12.2. Remailing as a side effect of mail filtering
|
||
- Dean Tribble has proposed...
|
||
- "It sounds like the plan is to provide a convenient mail
|
||
filtering tool which provides remailer capability as a SIDE
|
||
EFFECT! What a great way to spread remailers!" [Hal Finney,
|
||
93-01-03]
|
||
8.12.3. "Are there any remailers which provide you with an anonymous
|
||
account to which other people may send messages, which are
|
||
then forwarded to you in a PGP-encrypted form?" [Mikolaj
|
||
Habryn, 94-04]
|
||
- "Yes, but it's not running for real yet. Give me a few
|
||
months until I get the computer + netlink for it. (It's
|
||
running for testing though, so if you want to test it, mail
|
||
me, but it's not running for real, so don't *use* it.)"
|
||
[Sameer Parekh, 94-04-03]
|
||
8.12.4. "Remailer Alliances"
|
||
+ "Remailer's Guild"
|
||
- to make there be a cost to flakiness (expulsion) and a
|
||
benefit to robustness, quality, reliability, etc.
|
||
(increased business)
|
||
- pings, tests, cooperative remailing
|
||
- spreading the traffic to reduce effectiveness of attacks
|
||
- which execute protocols
|
||
- e.g., to share the traffic at the last hop, to reduce
|
||
attacks on any single remailer
|
||
|
||
8.13. Loose Ends
|
||
8.13.1. Digital espionage
|
||
+ spy networks can be run safely, untraceably, undetectably
|
||
- anonymous contacts, pseudonyms
|
||
- digital dead drops, all done electronically...no chance
|
||
of being picked up, revealed as an "illegal" (a spy with
|
||
no diplomatic cover to save him) and shot
|
||
+ so many degrees of freedom in communications that
|
||
controlling all of them is essentially impossible
|
||
- Teledesic/Iridium/etc. satellites will increase this
|
||
capability further
|
||
+ unless crypto is blocked--and relatively quickly and
|
||
ruthlessly--the situation described here is unstoppable
|
||
- what some call "espionage" others would just call free
|
||
communication
|
||
- (Some important lessons for keeping corporate or business
|
||
secrets...basically, you can't.)
|
||
8.13.2. Remailers needs some "fuzziness," probably
|
||
+ for example, if a remailer has a strict policy of
|
||
accumulating N messages, then reordering and remailing
|
||
them, an attacker can send N - 1 messages in and know which
|
||
of the N messages leaving is the message they want to
|
||
follow; some uncertainly helps here
|
||
- the mathematics of how this small amount of uncertainty,
|
||
or scatter, could help is something that needs a detailed
|
||
analysis
|
||
- it may be that leaving some uncertainty, as with the
|
||
keylength issue, can help
|
||
8.13.3. Trying to confuse the eavesdroppers, by adding keywords they
|
||
will probably pick up on
|
||
+ the "remailer@csua.berkeley.edu" remailer now adds actual
|
||
paragraphs, such as this recent example:
|
||
- "I fixed the SKS. It came with a scope and a Russian
|
||
night scope. It's killer. My friend knows about a
|
||
really good gunsmith who has a machineshop and knows how
|
||
to convert stuff to automatic."
|
||
|
||
- How effective this ploy is is debatable
|
||
8.13.4. Restrictions on anonymous systems
|
||
- Anonymous AIDS testing. Kits for self-testing have been
|
||
under FDA review for 5 years, but counseling advocates have
|
||
delayed release on the grounds that some people will react
|
||
badly and perhaps kill themselves upon getting a positive
|
||
test result...they want the existing system to prevail. (I
|
||
mention this to show that anonymous systems are somtimes
|
||
opposed for ideological reasons.)
|
||
|
||
9. Policy: Clipper,Key Escrow, and Digital Telephony
|
||
|
||
9.1. copyright
|
||
THE CYPHERNOMICON: Cypherpunks FAQ and More, Version 0.666,
|
||
1994-09-10, Copyright Timothy C. May. All rights reserved.
|
||
See the detailed disclaimer. Use short sections under "fair
|
||
use" provisions, with appropriate credit, but don't put your
|
||
name on my words.
|
||
|
||
9.2. SUMMARY: Policy: Clipper,Key Escrow, and Digital Telephony
|
||
9.2.1. Main Points
|
||
- Clipper has been a main unifying force, as 80% of all
|
||
Americans, and 95% of all computer types, are opposed.
|
||
- "Big Brother Inside"
|
||
9.2.2. Connections to Other Sections
|
||
- the main connections are _legal_
|
||
- some possible implications for limits on crypto
|
||
9.2.3. Where to Find Additional Information
|
||
- There have been hundreds of articles on Clipper, in nearly
|
||
all popular magazines. Many of these were sent to the
|
||
Cypherpunks list and may be available in the archives. (I
|
||
have at least 80 MB of Cypherpunks list stuff, a lot of it
|
||
newspaper and magazine articles on Clipper!)
|
||
+ more Clipper information can be found at:
|
||
- "A good source is the Wired Online Clipper Archive. Send
|
||
e-mail to info-rama@wired.com. with no subject and the
|
||
words 'get help' and 'get clipper/index' in the body of
|
||
the message." [students@unsw.EDU.AU, alt.privacy.clipper,
|
||
1994-09-01]
|
||
9.2.4. Miscellaneous Comments
|
||
- As with a couple of other sections, I won't try to be as
|
||
complete as some might desire. Just too many thousands of
|
||
pages of stuff to consider.
|
||
|
||
9.3. Introduction
|
||
9.3.1. What is Clipper?
|
||
- government holds the skeleton keys
|
||
- analogies to other systems
|
||
9.3.2. Why do most Cypherpunks oppose Clipper?
|
||
- fear of restrictions on crypto, derailing so many wonderful
|
||
possibilities
|
||
9.3.3. Why does Clipper rate its own section?
|
||
- The announcement of the "Escrowed Encryption Standard,"
|
||
EES, on April 16, 1993, was a galvanizing event for
|
||
Cypherpunks and for a large segment of the U. S.
|
||
population. The EES was announced originally as "Clipper,"
|
||
despite the use of the name Clipper by two major products
|
||
(the Intergraph CPU and a dBase software tool), and the
|
||
government backed off on the name. Too late, though, as the
|
||
name "Clipper" had become indelibly linked to this whole
|
||
proposal.
|
||
9.3.4. "Is stopping Clipper the main goal of Cypherpunks?"
|
||
- It certainly seems so at times, as Clipper has dominated
|
||
the topics since the Clipper announcement in April, 1993.
|
||
+ it has become so, with monkeywrenching efforts in several
|
||
areas
|
||
- lobbying and education against it (though informal, such
|
||
lobbying has been successful...look at NYT article)
|
||
- "Big Brother Inside" and t-shirts
|
||
- technical monkeywrenching (Matt Blaze...hesitate to claim
|
||
any credit, but he has been on our list, attended a
|
||
meeting, etc.)
|
||
- Although it may seem so, Clipper is just one
|
||
aspect...step...initiative.
|
||
- Developing new software tools, writing code, deploying
|
||
remailers and digital cash are long-range projects of great
|
||
importance.
|
||
- The Clipper key escrow proposal came along (4-93) at an
|
||
opportune time for Cypherpunks and became a major focus.
|
||
Emergency meetings, analyses, etc.
|
||
|
||
9.4. Crypto Policy Issues
|
||
9.4.1. Peter Denning on crypto policy:
|
||
+ provided by Pat Farrell, 1994-08-20; Denning comments are
|
||
1992-01-22, presented at Computers, Freedom, and Privacy 2.
|
||
Peter D. uses the metaphor of a "clearing,"as in a forest,
|
||
for the place where people meet to trade, interact, etc.
|
||
What others call markets, agoras, or just "cyberspace."
|
||
- "Information technology in producing a clearing in which
|
||
individuals and corporations are key players besides
|
||
government. Any attempt by government to control the flow
|
||
of information over networks will be ignored or met with
|
||
outright hostility. There is no practical way that
|
||
government can control information except information
|
||
directly involved in the business of governing. It
|
||
should not try." [Peter Denning, PUBLIC POLICY FOR THE
|
||
21ST CENTURY, DRAFT 1/22/92]
|
||
- No word on how this view squares with his wife's control
|
||
freak views.
|
||
9.4.2. Will government and NSA in particular attempt to acquire some
|
||
kind of control over crypto companies?
|
||
+ speculations, apparently unfounded, that RSA Data Security
|
||
is influenced by NSA wishes
|
||
- weaknesses in the DES keys picked?
|
||
- and companies may be dramatically influenced by contracts
|
||
(and the witholding of them)
|
||
9.4.3. NIST and DSS
|
||
9.4.4. Export restrictions, Munitions List, ITAR
|
||
9.4.5. old crypto machines sold to Third World governments, cheaply
|
||
- perhaps they think they can make some changes and outsmart
|
||
the NSA (which probably has rigged it so any changes are
|
||
detectable and can be factored in)
|
||
- and just knowing the type of machine is a huge advantage
|
||
9.4.6. 4/28/97 The first of several P-K and RSA patents expires
|
||
+ U.S. Patent Number: 4200770
|
||
- Title: Cryptographic Apparatus and Method
|
||
- Inventors: Hellman, Diffie, Merkle
|
||
- Assignee: Stanford University
|
||
- Filed: September 6, 1977
|
||
- Granted: April 29, 1980
|
||
- [Expires: April 28, 1997]
|
||
+ remember that any one of these several patents held by
|
||
Public Key Partners (Stanford and M.I.T., with RSA Data
|
||
Security the chief dispenser of licenses) can block an
|
||
effort to bypass the others
|
||
- though this may get fought out in court
|
||
9.4.7. encryption will be needed inside computer systems
|
||
- for operating system protection
|
||
- for autonomous agents (active agents)
|
||
- for electronic money
|
||
|
||
9.5. Motivations for Crypto Laws
|
||
9.5.1. "What are the law enforcement and FBI worries?"
|
||
- "FBI Director Louis Freeh is worried. The bad guys are
|
||
beginning to see the light, and it is digital. ... Freeh
|
||
fears some pretty nasty folks have discovered they can
|
||
commit highway robbery and more, without even leaving home.
|
||
Worse, to Freeh and other top cops, by using some pretty
|
||
basic technologies, savvy criminals can do their crimes
|
||
without worrying about doing time.
|
||
|
||
"Some crooks, spies, drug traffickers, terrorists and
|
||
frauds already use the tools of the information age to
|
||
outfox law enforcement officers. Hackers use PBXs to hide
|
||
their tracks as they rip off phone companies and poke
|
||
around in other people's files. Reprogrammed cellular
|
||
phones give cops fits." [LAN Magazine,"Is it 1984?," by Ted
|
||
Bunker, August 1994]
|
||
- Their fears have some validity...in the same way that the
|
||
rulers in Gutenberg's time could have some concerns about
|
||
the implications of books (breaking of guilds, spread of
|
||
national secrets, pornography, atheism, etc.).
|
||
9.5.2. "What motivated Clipper? What did the Feds hope to gain?"
|
||
- ostensibly to stop terrorists (only the unsophisticated
|
||
ones, if alternatives are allowed)
|
||
- to force a standard on average Americans
|
||
- possibly to limit crypto development
|
||
+ Phil Karn provides an interesting motivation for Clipper:
|
||
"Key escrow exists only because the NSA doesn't want to
|
||
risk blame if some terrorist or drug dealer were to use an
|
||
unescrowed NSA-produced .....The fact that a terrorist or
|
||
drug dealer can easily go elsewhere and obtain other strong
|
||
or stronger algorithms without key escrow is irrelevant.
|
||
The NSA simply doesn't care as long as *they* can't be
|
||
blamed for whatever happens. Classic CYA, nothing
|
||
more.....A similar analysis applies to the export control
|
||
regulations regarding cryptography." [Phil Karn, 1994-08-
|
||
31]
|
||
- Bill Sommerfeld notes: "If this is indeed the case, Matt
|
||
Blaze's results should be particularly devastating to
|
||
them." [B.S., 1994-09-01]
|
||
9.5.3. Steve Witham has an interesting take on why folks like
|
||
Dorothy Denning and Donn Parker support key escrow so
|
||
ardently:
|
||
- "Maybe people like Dot and Don think of government as a
|
||
systems-administration sort of job. So here they are,
|
||
security experts advising the sys admins on things like...
|
||
|
||
setting permissions
|
||
allocating quotas
|
||
registering users and giving them passwords.....
|
||
deciding what utilities are and aren't available
|
||
deciding what software the users need, and installing it
|
||
(grudgingly, based on who's yelling the loudest)
|
||
setting up connections to other machines
|
||
deciding who's allowed to log in from "foreign hosts"
|
||
getting mail set up and running
|
||
buying new hardware from vendors
|
||
specifying the hardware to the vendors
|
||
...
|
||
|
||
"These are the things computer security experts advise on.
|
||
Maybe hammer experts see things as nails.
|
||
|
||
"Only a country is not a host system owned and administered
|
||
by the government, and citizens are not guests or users."
|
||
[Steve Witham, Government by Sysadmin, 1994-03-23]
|
||
|
||
9.5.4. Who would want to use key escrow?
|
||
9.5.5. "Will strong crypto really thwart government plans?"
|
||
- Yes, it will give citizens the basic capabilities that
|
||
foreign governments have had for many years
|
||
+ Despite talk about codebreakes and the expertise of the
|
||
NSA, the plain fact is that no major Soviet ciphers have
|
||
been broken for many years
|
||
+ recall the comment that NSA has not really broken any
|
||
Soviet systems in many years
|
||
- except for the cases, a la the Walker case, where
|
||
plaintext versions are gotten, i.e., where human
|
||
screwups occurred
|
||
- the image in so many novels of massive computers breaking
|
||
codes is absurd: modern ciphers will not be broken (but the
|
||
primitive ciphers used by so many Third World nations and
|
||
their embassies will continue to be child's play, even for
|
||
high school science fair projects...could be a good idea
|
||
for a small scene, about a BCC student who has his project
|
||
pulled)
|
||
9.5.6. "Why does the government want short keys?"
|
||
- Commercial products have often been broken by hackers. The
|
||
NSA actually has a charter to help businesses protect their
|
||
secrets; just not so strongly that the crypto is
|
||
unbreakable by them. (This of course has been part of the
|
||
tension between the two sides of the NSA for the past
|
||
couple of decades.)
|
||
+ So why does the government want crippled key lengths?
|
||
- "The question is: how do you thwart hackers while
|
||
permitting NSA access? The obvious answer is strong
|
||
algorithm(s) and relatively truncated keys." [Grady Ward,
|
||
sci.crypt, 1994-08-15]
|
||
|
||
9.6. Current Crypto Laws
|
||
9.6.1. "Has crypto been restricted in countries other than the
|
||
U.S.?"
|
||
- Many countries have restrictions on civilian/private use of
|
||
crypto. Some even insist that corporations either send all
|
||
transmissions in the clear, or that keys be provided to the
|
||
government. The Phillipines, for example. And certainly
|
||
regimes in the Communists Bloc, or what's left of it, will
|
||
likely have various laws restricting crypto. Possibly
|
||
draconian laws....in many cultures, use of crypto is
|
||
tantamount to espionage.
|
||
|
||
9.7. Crypto Laws Outside the U.S.
|
||
9.7.1. "International Escrow, and Other Nation's Crypto Policies?"
|
||
- The focus throughout this document on U.S. policy should
|
||
not lull non-Americans into complacency. Many nations
|
||
already have more Draconian policies on the private use of
|
||
encryption than the U.S. is even contemplating
|
||
(publically). France outlaws private crypto, though
|
||
enforcement is said to be problematic (but I would not want
|
||
the DGSE to be on my tail, that's for sure). Third World
|
||
countries often have bans on crypto, and mere possession of
|
||
random-looking bits may mean a spying conviction and a trip
|
||
to the gallows.
|
||
+ There are also several reports that European nations are
|
||
preparing to fall in line behind the U.S. on key escrow
|
||
- Norway
|
||
- Netherlands
|
||
- Britain
|
||
+ A conference in D.C. in 6/94, attended by Whit Diffie (and
|
||
reported on to us at the 6/94 CP meeting) had internation
|
||
escrow arrangements as a topic, with the crypto policy
|
||
makers of NIST and NSA describing various options
|
||
- bad news, because it could allow bilateral treaties to
|
||
supercede basic rights
|
||
- could be plan for getting key escrow made mandatory
|
||
+ there are also practical issues
|
||
+ who can decode international communications?
|
||
- do we really want the French reading Intel's
|
||
communications? (recall Matra-Harris)
|
||
- satellites? (like Iridium)
|
||
- what of multi-national messages, such as an encrypted
|
||
message posted to a message pool on the Internet...is
|
||
it to be escrowed with each of 100 nations?
|
||
9.7.2. "Will foreign countries use a U.S.-based key escrow system?"
|
||
- Lots of pressure. Lots of evidence of compliance.
|
||
9.7.3. "Is Europe Considering Key Escrow?"
|
||
- Yes, in spades. Lots of signs of this, with reports coming
|
||
in from residents of Europe and elsewhere. The Europeans
|
||
tend to be a bit more quiet in matters of public policy (at
|
||
least in some areas).
|
||
- "The current issue of `Communications Week International'
|
||
informs us that the European Union's Senior Officials Group
|
||
for Security of Information Systems has been considering
|
||
plans for standardising key escrow in Europe.
|
||
|
||
"Agreement had been held up by arguments over who should
|
||
hold the keys. France and Holland wanted to follow the
|
||
NSA's lead and have national governments assume this role;
|
||
other players wanted user organisations to do this." [
|
||
rja14@cl.cam.ac.uk (Ross Anderson), sci.crypt, Key Escrow
|
||
in Europe too, 1994-06-29]
|
||
9.7.4. "What laws do various countries have on encryption and the
|
||
use of encryption for international traffic?"
|
||
+ "Has France really banned encryption?"
|
||
- There are recurring reports that France does not allow
|
||
unfettered use of encryption.
|
||
- Hard to say. Laws on the books. But no indications that
|
||
the many French users of PGP, say, are being prosecuted.
|
||
- a nation whose leader, Francois Mitterand, was a Nazi
|
||
collaborationist, working with Petain and the Vichy
|
||
government (Klaus Barbie involved)
|
||
+ Some Specific Countries
|
||
- (need more info here)
|
||
+ Germany
|
||
- BND cooperates with U.S.
|
||
- Netherlands
|
||
- Russia
|
||
+ Information
|
||
- "Check out the ftp site at csrc.ncsl.nist.gov for a
|
||
document named something like "laws.wp" (There are
|
||
several of these, in various formats.) This contains a
|
||
survey of the positions of various countries, done for
|
||
NIST by a couple of people at Georgetown or George
|
||
Washington or some such university." [Philip Fites,
|
||
alt.security.pgp, 1994-07-03]
|
||
9.7.5. France planning Big Brother smart card?
|
||
- "PARIS, FRANCE, 1994 MAR 4 (NB) -- The French government
|
||
has confirmed its plans to replace citizen's paper-based ID
|
||
cards with credit card-sized "smart card" ID cards.
|
||
.....
|
||
"The cards contain details of recent transactions, as well
|
||
as act as an "electronic purse" for smaller value
|
||
transactions using a personal identification number (PIN)
|
||
as authorization. "Purse transactions" are usually separate
|
||
from the card credit/debit system, and, when the purse is
|
||
empty, it can be reloaded from the card at a suitable ATM
|
||
or retailer terminal." (Steve Gold/19940304)" [this was
|
||
forwarded to me for posting]
|
||
9.7.6. PTTs, local rules about modem use
|
||
9.7.7. "What are the European laws on "Data Privacy" and why are
|
||
they such a terrible idea?"
|
||
- Various European countries have passed laws about the
|
||
compiling of computerized records on people without their
|
||
explicit permission. This applies to nearly all
|
||
computerized records--mailing lists, dossiers, credit
|
||
records, employee files, etc.--though some exceptions exist
|
||
and, in general, companies can find ways to compile records
|
||
and remain within the law.
|
||
- The rules are open to debate, and the casual individual who
|
||
cannot afford lawyers and advisors, is likely to be
|
||
breaking the laws repeatedly. For example, storing the
|
||
posts of people on the Cypherpunks list in any system
|
||
retrievable by name would violate Britain's Data Privacy
|
||
laws. That almost no such case would ever result in a
|
||
prosecution (for practical reasons) does not mean the laws
|
||
are acceptable.
|
||
- To many, these laws are a "good idea." But the laws miss
|
||
the main point, give a false sense of security (as the real
|
||
dossier-compilers are easily able to obtain exemptions, or
|
||
are government agencies themselves), and interfere in what
|
||
people do with information that properly and legally comes
|
||
there way. (Be on the alert for "civil rights" groups like
|
||
the ACLU and EFF to push for such data privacy laws. The
|
||
irony of Kapor's connection to Lotus and the failed
|
||
"Marketplace" CD-ROM product cannot be ignored.)
|
||
- Creating a law which bans the keeping of certain kinds of
|
||
records is an invitation to having "data inspectors"
|
||
rummaging through one's files. Or some kind of spot checks,
|
||
or even software key escrow.
|
||
- (Strong crypto makes these laws tough to enforce. Either
|
||
the laws go, or the counties with such laws will then have
|
||
to limit strong crypto....not that that will help in the
|
||
long run.)
|
||
- The same points apply to well-meaning proposals to make
|
||
employer monitoring of employees illegal. It sounds like a
|
||
privacy-enhancing idea, but it tramples upon the rights of
|
||
the employer to ensure that work is being done, to
|
||
basically run his business as he sees fit, etc. If I hire a
|
||
programmer and he's using my resources, my network
|
||
connections, to run an illegal operation, he exposes my
|
||
company to damages, and of course he isn't doing the job I
|
||
paid him to do. If the law forbids me to monitor this
|
||
situation, or at least to randomly check, then he can
|
||
exploit this law to his advantage and to my disadvantage.
|
||
(Again, the dangers of rigid laws, nonmarket
|
||
solutions,(lied game theory.)
|
||
9.7.8. on the situation in Australia
|
||
+ Matthew Gream [M.Gream@uts.edu.au] informed us that the
|
||
export situation in Oz is just as best as in the U.S. [1994-
|
||
09-06] (as if we didn't know...much as we all like to dump
|
||
on Amerika for its fascist laws, it's clear that nearly all
|
||
countries are taking their New World Order Marching Orders
|
||
from the U.S., and that many of them have even more
|
||
repressive crypto laws alredy in place...they just don't
|
||
get the discussion the U.S. gets, for apparent reasons)
|
||
- "Well, fuck that for thinking I was living under a less
|
||
restrictive regime -- and I can say goodbye to an
|
||
international market for my software.]
|
||
- (I left his blunt language as is, for impact.)
|
||
9.7.9. "For those interested, NIST have a short document for FTP,
|
||
'Identification & Analysis of Foreign Laws & Regulations
|
||
Pertaining to the Use of Commercial Encryption Products for
|
||
Voice & Data Communications'. Dated Jan 1994." [Owen Lewis,
|
||
Re: France Bans Encryption, alt.security.pgp, 1994-07-07]
|
||
|
||
9.8. Digital Telephony
|
||
9.8.1. "What is Digital Telephony?"
|
||
- The Digital Telephony Bill, first proposed under Bush and
|
||
again by Clinton, is in many ways much worse than Clipper.
|
||
It has gotten less attention, for various reasons.
|
||
- For one thing, it is seen as an extension by some of
|
||
existing wiretap capabilities. And, it is fairly abstract,
|
||
happening behind the doors of telephone company switches.
|
||
- The implications are severe: mandatory wiretap and pen
|
||
register (who is calling whom) capaibilities, civil
|
||
penalties of up to $10,000 a day for insufficient
|
||
compliance, mandatory assistance must be provided, etc.
|
||
- If it is passed, it could dictate future technology. Telcos
|
||
who install it will make sure that upstart technologies
|
||
(e.g., Cypherpunks who find ways to ship voice over
|
||
computer lines) are also forced to "play by the same
|
||
rules." Being required to install government-accessible tap
|
||
points even in small systems would of course effectively
|
||
destroy them.
|
||
- On the other hand, it is getting harder and harder to make
|
||
Digital Telephony workable, even by mandate. As Jim
|
||
Kallstrom of the FBI puts it: ""Today will be the cheapest
|
||
day on which Congress could fix this thing," Kallstrom
|
||
said. "Two years from now, it will be geometrically more
|
||
expensive."" [LAN Magazine,"Is it 1984?," by Ted Bunker,
|
||
August 1994]
|
||
- This gives us a goal to shoot for: sabotage the latest
|
||
attempt to get Digital Telephony passed into law and it may
|
||
make it too intractable to *ever* be passed.
|
||
+ "Today will be the cheapest day on which
|
||
- Congress could fix this thing," Kallstrom said. "Two
|
||
years from now,
|
||
- it will be geometrically more expensive."
|
||
- The message is clear: delay Digital Telephony. Sabotage it
|
||
in the court of public opinion, spread the word, make it
|
||
flop. (Reread your "Art of War" for Sun Tsu's tips on
|
||
fighting your enemy.)
|
||
-
|
||
9.8.2. "What are the dangers of the Digital Telephony Bill?"
|
||
- It makes wiretapping invisible to the tappee.
|
||
+ If passed into law, it makes central office wiretapping
|
||
trivial, automatic.
|
||
- "What should worry people is what isn't in the news (and
|
||
probably never will until it's already embedded in comm
|
||
systems). A true 'Clipper' will allow remote tapping on
|
||
demand. This is very easily done to all-digital
|
||
communications systems. If you understand network routers
|
||
and protocol it's easy to envision how simple it would be
|
||
to 're-route' a copy of a target comm to where ever you
|
||
want it to go..." [domonkos@access.digex.net (andy
|
||
domonkos), comp.org.eff.talk, 1994-06-29]
|
||
9.8.3. "What is the Digital Telephony proposal/bill?
|
||
- proposed a few years ago...said to be inspiration for PGP
|
||
- reintroduced Feb 4, 1994
|
||
- earlier versrion:
|
||
+ "1) DIGITAL TELEPHONY PROPOSAL
|
||
- "To ensure law enforcement's continued ability to conduct
|
||
court-
|
||
- authorized taps, the administration, at the request of
|
||
the
|
||
- Dept. of Justice and the FBI, proposed ditigal telephony
|
||
- legislation. The version submitted to Congress in Sept.
|
||
1992
|
||
- would require providers of electronic communication
|
||
services
|
||
- and private branch exchange (PBX) operators to ensure
|
||
that the
|
||
- government's ability to lawfully intercept communications
|
||
is not
|
||
- curtailed or prevented entirely by the introduction of
|
||
advanced
|
||
- technology."
|
||
|
||
9.9. Clipper, Escrowed Encyption Standard
|
||
9.9.1. The Clipper Proposal
|
||
- A bombshell was dropped on April 16, 1993. A few of us saw
|
||
it coming, as we'd been debating...
|
||
9.9.2. "How long has the government been planning key escrow?"
|
||
- since about 1989
|
||
- ironically, we got about six months advance warning
|
||
- my own "A Trial Balloon to Ban Encryption" alerted the
|
||
world to the thinking of D. Denning....she denies having
|
||
known about key escorw until the day before it was
|
||
announced, which I find implausible (not calling her a
|
||
liar, but...)
|
||
+ Phil Karn had this to say to Professor Dorothy Denning,
|
||
several weeks prior to the Clipper announcement:
|
||
- "The private use of strong cryptography provides, for the
|
||
very first time, a truly effective safeguard against this
|
||
sort of government abuse. And that's why it must continue
|
||
to be free and unregulated.
|
||
- "I should credit you for doing us all a very important
|
||
service by raising this issue. Nothing could have lit a
|
||
bigger fire under those of us who strongly believe in a
|
||
citizens' right to use cryptography than your proposals
|
||
to ban or regulate it. There are many of us out here who
|
||
share this belief *and* have the technical skills to turn
|
||
it into practice. And I promise you that we will fight
|
||
for this belief to the bitter end, if necessary." [Phil
|
||
Karn, 1993-03-23]
|
||
-
|
||
-
|
||
9.9.3. Technically, the "Escrowed Encryption Standard," or EES. But
|
||
early everyone still calls it "Clipper, " even if NSA
|
||
belatedly realized Intergraph's won product has been called
|
||
this for many years, a la the Fairchild processor chip of the
|
||
same name. And the database product of the same name. I
|
||
pointed this out within minutes of hearing about this on
|
||
April 16th, 1993, and posted a comment to this effect on
|
||
sci.crypt. How clueless can they be to not have seen in many
|
||
months of work what many of us saw within seconds?
|
||
9.9.4. Need for Clipper
|
||
9.9.5. Further "justifications" for key escrow
|
||
+ anonymous consultations that require revealing of
|
||
identities
|
||
- suicide crisis intervention
|
||
- confessions of abuse, crimes, etc. (Tarasoff law)
|
||
- corporate records that Feds want to look at
|
||
+ Some legitimate needs for escrowed crypto
|
||
- for corporations, to bypass the passwords of departed,
|
||
fired, deceased employees,
|
||
9.9.6. Why did the government develop Clipper?
|
||
9.9.7. "Who are the designated escrow agents?"
|
||
- Commerce (NIST) and Treasury (Secret Service).
|
||
9.9.8. Whit Diffie
|
||
- Miles Schmid was architect
|
||
+ international key escrow
|
||
- Denning tried to defend it....
|
||
9.9.9. What are related programs?
|
||
9.9.10. "Where do the names "Clipper" and "Skipjack" come from?
|
||
- First, the NSA and NIST screwed up big time by choosing the
|
||
name "Clipper," which has long been the name of the 32-bit
|
||
RISC processor (one of the first) from Fairchild, later
|
||
sold to Intergraph. It is also the name of a database
|
||
compiler. Most of us saw this immediately.
|
||
-
|
||
+ Clippers are boats, so are skipjacks ("A small sailboat
|
||
having a
|
||
- bottom shaped like a flat V and vertical sides" Am
|
||
Heritage. 3rd).
|
||
- Suggests a nautical theme, which fits with the
|
||
Cheseapeake environs of
|
||
- the Agency (and small boats have traditionally been a way
|
||
for the
|
||
+ Agencies to dispose of suspected traitors and spies).
|
||
-
|
||
- However, Capstone is not a boat, nor is Tessera, so the
|
||
trend fails.
|
||
|
||
9.10. Technical Details of Clipper, Skipjack, Tessera, and EES
|
||
9.10.1. Clipper chip fabrication details
|
||
+ ARM6 core being used
|
||
- but also rumors of MIPS core in Tessera
|
||
- MIPS core reportedly being designed into future versions
|
||
- National also built (and may operate) a secure wafer fab
|
||
line for NSA, reportedly located on the grounds of Ft.
|
||
Meade--though I can't confirm the location or just what
|
||
National's current involvement still is. May only be for
|
||
medium-density chips, such as key material (built under
|
||
secure conditions).
|
||
9.10.2. "Why is the Clipper algorithm classified?"
|
||
- to prevent non-escrow versions, which could still use the
|
||
(presumably strong) algorithm and hardware but not be
|
||
escrowed
|
||
- cryptanalysis is always easier if the algorithms are known
|
||
:-}
|
||
- general government secrecy
|
||
- backdoors?
|
||
9.10.3. If Clipper is flawed (the Blaze LEAF Blower), how can it
|
||
still be useful to the NSA?
|
||
- by undermining commercial alternatives through subsidized
|
||
costs (which I don't think will happen, given the terrible
|
||
PR Clipper has gotten)
|
||
- mandated by law or export rules
|
||
- and the Blaze attack is--at present--not easy to use (and
|
||
anyone able to use it is likely to be sophisticated enough
|
||
to use preencryption anyway)
|
||
9.10.4. What about weaknesses of Clipper?
|
||
- In the views of many, a flawed approach. That is, arguing
|
||
about wrinkles plays into the hands of the Feds.
|
||
9.10.5. "What are some of the weaknesses in Clipper?"
|
||
- the basic idea of key escrow is an infringement on liberty
|
||
+ access to the keys
|
||
- "
|
||
+ "There's a big door in the side with a
|
||
- big neon sign saying "Cops and other Authorized People
|
||
Only";
|
||
- the trapdoor is the fact that anybody with a fax
|
||
machine can make
|
||
- themselves and "Authorized Person" badge and walk in.
|
||
<Bill Stewart, bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.com, 4-15-
|
||
94, sci.crypt>
|
||
- possible back doors in the Skipjace algorithm
|
||
+ generation of the escrow keys
|
||
-
|
||
+ "There's another trapdoor, which is that if you can
|
||
predict the escrow
|
||
- keys by stealing the parameters used by the Key
|
||
Generation Bureau to
|
||
- set them, you don't need to get the escrow keys from
|
||
the keymasters,
|
||
- you can gen them yourselves. " <Bill Stewart,
|
||
bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.com, 4-15-94, sci.crypt>
|
||
9.10.6. Mykotronx
|
||
- MYK-78e chip, delays, VTI, fuses
|
||
- National Semiconductor is working with Mykotronx on a
|
||
faster implementation of the
|
||
Clipper/Capstone/Skipjack/whatever system. (May or may not
|
||
be connected directly with the iPower product line. Also,
|
||
the MIPS processor core may be used, instead of the ARM
|
||
core, which is said to be too slow.)
|
||
9.10.7. Attacks on EES
|
||
- sabotaging the escrow data base
|
||
+ stealing it, thus causing a collapse in confidence
|
||
- Perry Metzger's proposal
|
||
- FUD
|
||
9.10.8. Why is the algorithm secret?
|
||
9.10.9. Skipjack is 80 bits, which is 24 bits longer than the 56 bits
|
||
of DES. so
|
||
9.10.10. "What are the implications of the bug in Tessera found by
|
||
Matt Blaze?"
|
||
- Technically, Blaze's work was done on a Tessera card, which
|
||
implements the Skipjace algorithm. The Clipper phone system
|
||
may be slightly different and details may vary; the Blaze
|
||
attack may not even work, at least not practically.
|
||
- " The announcement last month was about a discovery that,
|
||
with a half-hour or so of time on an average PC, a user
|
||
could forge a bogus LEAF (the data used by the government
|
||
to access the back door into Clipper encryption). With such
|
||
a bogus LEAF, the Clipper chip on the other end would
|
||
accept and decrypt the communication, but the back door
|
||
would not work for the government." [ Steve Brinich,
|
||
alt.privacy.clipper, 1994-07-04]
|
||
- "The "final" pre-print version (dated August 20, 1994) of
|
||
my paper, "Protocol Failure in the Escrowed Encryption
|
||
Standard" is now available. You can get it in PostScript
|
||
form via anonymous ftp from research.att.com in the file
|
||
/dist/mab/eesproto.ps . This version replaces the
|
||
preliminary draft (June 3) version that previously occupied
|
||
the same file. Most of the substance is identical,
|
||
although few sections are expanded and a few minor errors
|
||
are now corrected." [Matt Blaze, 1994-09-04]
|
||
|
||
9.11. Products, Versions -- Tessera, Skipjack, etc.
|
||
9.11.1. "What are the various versions and products associated with
|
||
EES?"
|
||
- Clipper, the MYK-78 chip.
|
||
- Skipjack.
|
||
+ Tessera. The PCMCIA card version of the Escrowed Encryption
|
||
Standard.
|
||
- the version Matt Blaze found a way to blow the LEAF
|
||
- National Semiconductor "iPower" card may or may not
|
||
support Tessera (conflicting reports).
|
||
9.11.2. AT&T Surety Communications
|
||
- NSA may have pressured them not to release DES-based
|
||
products
|
||
9.11.3. Tessera cards
|
||
- iPower
|
||
- Specifications for the Tessera card interface can be found
|
||
in several places, including " csrc.ncsl.nist.gov"--see the
|
||
file cryptcal.txt [David Koontz, 1994-08-08].
|
||
|
||
9.12. Current Status of EES, Clipper, etc.
|
||
9.12.1. "Did the Administration really back off on Clipper? I heard
|
||
that Al Gore wrote a letter to Rep. Cantwell, backing off."
|
||
- No, though Clipper has lost steam (corporations weren't
|
||
interested in buying Clipper phones, and AT&T was very late
|
||
in getting "Surety" phones out).
|
||
- The Gore announcement may actually indicate a shift in
|
||
emphasis to "software key escrow" (my best guess).
|
||
- Our own Michael Froomkin, a lawyer, writes: "The letter is
|
||
a nullity. It almost quotes from testimony given a year
|
||
earlier by NIST to Congress. Get a copy of Senator Leahy's
|
||
reaction off the eff www server. He saw it for the empty
|
||
thing it is....Nothing has changed except Cantwell dropped
|
||
her bill for nothing." [A.Michael Froomkin,
|
||
alt.privacy.clipper, 1994-09-05]
|
||
|
||
9.13. National Information Infrastructure, Digital Superhighway
|
||
9.13.1. Hype on the Information Superhighway
|
||
- It's against the law to talk abou the Information
|
||
Superhighway without using at least one of the overworked
|
||
metaphors: road kill, toll boths, passing lanes, shoulders,
|
||
on-ramps, off-ramps, speeding, I-way, Infobahn, etc.
|
||
- Most of what is now floating around the suddenly-trendy
|
||
idea of the Digital Superduperway is little more than hype.
|
||
And mad metaphors. Misplaced zeal, confusing tangential
|
||
developments with real progress. Much like libertarians
|
||
assuming the space program is something they should somehow
|
||
be working on.
|
||
- For example, the much-hyped "Pizza Hut" on the Net (home
|
||
pizza pages, I guess). It is already being dubbed "the
|
||
first case of true Internet commerce." Yeah, like the Coke
|
||
machines on the Net so many years ago were examples of
|
||
Internet commerce. Pure hype. Madison Avenue nonsense. Good
|
||
for our tabloid generation.
|
||
9.13.2. "Why is the National Information Infrastructure a bad idea?"
|
||
- NII = Information Superhighway = Infobahn = Iway = a dozen
|
||
other supposedly clever and punning names
|
||
+ Al Gore's proposal:
|
||
- links hospitals, schools, government
|
||
+ hard to imagine that the free-wheeling anarchy of the
|
||
Internet would persist..more likely implications:
|
||
- "is-a-person" credentials, that is, proof of identity,
|
||
and hence tracking, of all interactions
|
||
- the medical and psychiatric records would be part of
|
||
this (psychiatrists are leery of this, but they may
|
||
have no choice but to comply under the National Health
|
||
Care plans being debated)
|
||
+ There are other bad aspects:
|
||
- government control, government inefficiency, government
|
||
snooping
|
||
- distortion of markets ("universal access')
|
||
- restriction of innovation
|
||
- is not needed...other networks are doing perfectly well,
|
||
and will be placed where they are needed and will be
|
||
locally paid for
|
||
9.13.3. NII, Video Dialtone
|
||
+ "Dialtone"
|
||
- phone companies offer an in-out connection, and charge
|
||
for the connection, making no rulings on content (related
|
||
to the "Common Carrier" status)
|
||
+ for video-cable, I don't believe there is an analogous
|
||
set-up being looked at
|
||
+ cable t.v.
|
||
- Carl Kadie's comments to Sternlight
|
||
9.13.4. The prospects and dangers of Net subsidies
|
||
- "universal access," esp. if same happens in health care
|
||
- those that pay make the rules
|
||
+ but such access will have strings attached
|
||
- limits on crypto
|
||
-
|
||
- universal access also invites more spamming, a la the
|
||
"Freenet" spams, in which folks keep getting validated as
|
||
new users: any universal access system that is not pay-as-
|
||
you-go will be sensitive to this *or* will result in calls
|
||
for universal ID system (is-a-person credentialling)
|
||
9.13.5. NII, Superhighway, I-way
|
||
- crypto policy
|
||
- regulation, licensing
|
||
|
||
9.14. Government Interest in Gaining Control of Cyberspace
|
||
9.14.1. Besides Clipper, Digital Telephony, and the National
|
||
Information Infrastructure, the government is interested in
|
||
other areas, such as e-mail delivery (US Postal Service
|
||
proposal) and maintenance of network systems in general.
|
||
9.14.2. Digital Telephony, ATM networks, and deals being cut
|
||
- Rumblings of deals being cut
|
||
- a new draft is out [John Gilmore, 1994-08-03]
|
||
- Encryption with hardware at full ATM speeds
|
||
- and SONET networks (experimental, Bay Area?)
|
||
9.14.3. The USPS plans for mail, authentication, effects on
|
||
competition, etc.
|
||
+ This could have a devastating effect on e-mail and on
|
||
cyberspace in general, especially if it is tied in to other
|
||
government proposals in an attempt to gain control of
|
||
cyberspace.
|
||
- Digital Telelphony, Clipper, pornography laws and age
|
||
enforcement (the Amateur Action case), etc.
|
||
+ "Does the USPS really have a monopoly on first class mail?"
|
||
- and on "routes"?
|
||
- "The friendly PO has recently been visiting the mail
|
||
rooms of 2) The friendly PO has recently been visiting
|
||
the mail rooms of corporations in the Bay Area, opening
|
||
FedX, etc. packages (not protected by the privacy laws of
|
||
the PO's first class mail), and fining companies ($10,000
|
||
per violation, as I recall), for sending non-time-
|
||
sensitive documents via FedX when they could have been
|
||
sent via first-class mail." [Lew Glendenning, USPS
|
||
digital signature annoucement, sci.crypt, 1994-08-23] (A
|
||
citation or a news story would make this more credible,
|
||
but I've heard of similar spot checks.)
|
||
- The problems with government agencies competing are well-
|
||
known. First, they often have shoddy service..civil service
|
||
jobs, unfireable workers, etc. Second, they often cannot be
|
||
sued for nonperformance. Third, they often have government-
|
||
granted monopolies.
|
||
+ The USPS proposal may be an opening shot in an attempt to
|
||
gain control of electronic mail...it never had control of e-
|
||
mail, but its monopoly on first-class mail may be argued by
|
||
them to extend to cyberspace.
|
||
- Note: FedEx and the other package and overnight letter
|
||
carriers face various restrictions on their service; for
|
||
example, they cannot offer "routes" and the economies
|
||
that would result in.
|
||
- A USPS takeover of the e-mail business would mean an end
|
||
to many Cypherpunks objectives, including remailers,
|
||
digital postage, etc.
|
||
- The challenge will be to get these systems deployed as
|
||
quickly as possible, to make any takeover by the USPS all
|
||
the more difficult.
|
||
|
||
9.15. Software Key Escrow
|
||
9.15.1. (This section needs a lot more)
|
||
9.15.2. things are happening fast....
|
||
9.15.3. TIS, Carl Ellison, Karlsruhe
|
||
9.15.4. objections to key escrow
|
||
- "Holding deposits in real estate transactions is a classic
|
||
example. Built-in wiretaps are *not* escrow, unless the
|
||
government is a party to your contract. As somebody on the
|
||
list once said, just because the Mafia call themselves
|
||
"businessmen" doesn't make them legitimate; calling
|
||
extorted wiretaps "escrow" doesn't make them a service.
|
||
|
||
"The government has no business making me get their
|
||
permission to talk to anybody about anything in any
|
||
language I choose, and they have no business insisting I
|
||
buy "communication protection service" from some of their
|
||
friends to do it, any more than the aforenamed
|
||
"businessmen" have any business insisting I buy "fire
|
||
insurance" from *them*." [Bill Stewart, 1994-07-24]
|
||
9.15.5. Micali's "Fair Escrow"
|
||
- various efforts underway
|
||
- need section here
|
||
- Note: participants at Karlsruhe Conference report that a
|
||
German group may have published on software key escrow
|
||
years before Micali filed his patent (reports that NSA
|
||
officials were "happy")
|
||
|
||
9.16. Politics, Opposition
|
||
9.16.1. "What should Cypherpunks say about Clipper?"
|
||
- A vast amount has been written, on this list and in dozens
|
||
of other forums.
|
||
- Eric Hughes put it nicely a while back:
|
||
- "The hypothetical backdoor in clipper is a charlatan's
|
||
issue by comparison, as is discussion of how to make a key
|
||
escrow system
|
||
'work.' Do not be suckered into talking about an issue
|
||
that is not
|
||
important. If someone want to talk about potential back
|
||
doors, refuse to speculate. The existence of a front door
|
||
(key escrow) make back door issues pale in comparison.
|
||
|
||
"If someone wants to talk about how key escrow works,
|
||
refuse to
|
||
elaborate. Saying that this particular key escrow system
|
||
is bad has a large measure of complicity in saying that
|
||
escrow systems in general are OK. Always argue that this
|
||
particular key escrow system is bad because it is a key
|
||
escrow system, not because it has procedural flaws.
|
||
|
||
"This right issue is that the government has no right to my
|
||
private communications. Every other issue is the wrong
|
||
issue and detracts from this central one. If we defeat one
|
||
particular system without defeating all other possible such
|
||
systems at the same time, we have not won at all; we have
|
||
delayed the time of reckoning." [ Eric Hughes, Work the
|
||
work!, 1993-06-01]
|
||
9.16.2. What do most Americans think about Clipper and privacy?"
|
||
- insights into what we face
|
||
+ "In a Time/CNN poll of 1,000 Americans conducted last week
|
||
by Yankelovich
|
||
- Partners, two-thirds said it was more important to
|
||
protect the privacy of phone
|
||
- calls than to preserve the ability of police to conduct
|
||
wiretaps.
|
||
- When informed about the Clipper Chip, 80% said they
|
||
opposed it."
|
||
- Philip Elmer-Dewitt, "Who Should Keep the Keys", Time,
|
||
Mar. 4, 1994
|
||
9.16.3. Does anyone actually support Clipper?
|
||
+ There are actually legitimate uses for forms of escrow:
|
||
- corporations
|
||
- other partnerships
|
||
9.16.4. "Who is opposed to Clipper?"
|
||
- Association for Computing Machinery (ACM). "The USACM urges
|
||
the Administration at this point to withdraw the Clipper
|
||
Chip proposal and to begin an open and public review of
|
||
encryption policy. The escrowed encryption initiative
|
||
raises vital issues of privacy, law enforcement,
|
||
competitiveness and scientific innovation that must be
|
||
openly discussed." [US ACM, DC Office" <usacm_dc@acm.org>,
|
||
USACM Calls for Clipper Withdrawal, press release, 1994-06-
|
||
30]
|
||
9.16.5. "What's so bad about key escrow?"
|
||
+ If it's truly voluntary, there can be a valid use for this.
|
||
+ Are trapdoors justified in some cases?
|
||
+ Corporations that wish to recover encrypted data
|
||
+ several scenarios
|
||
- employee encrypts important files, then dies or is
|
||
otherwise unavailable
|
||
+ employee leaves company before decrypting all files
|
||
- some may be archived and not needed to be opened
|
||
for many years
|
||
- employee may demand "ransom" (closely related to
|
||
virus extortion cases)
|
||
- files are found but the original encryptor is
|
||
unknown
|
||
+ Likely situation is that encryption algorithms will be
|
||
mandated by corporation, with a "master key" kept
|
||
available
|
||
- like a trapdoor
|
||
- the existence of the master key may not even be
|
||
publicized within the company (to head off concerns
|
||
about security, abuses, etc.)
|
||
+ Government is trying to get trapdoors put in
|
||
- S.266, which failed ultimately (but not before
|
||
creating a ruckus)
|
||
+ If the government requires it...
|
||
- Key escrow means the government can be inside your home
|
||
without you even knowing it
|
||
- and key escrow is not really escrow...what does one get
|
||
back from the "escrow" service?
|
||
9.16.6. Why governments should not have keys
|
||
- can then set people up by faking messages, by planting
|
||
evidence
|
||
- can spy on targets for their own purposes (which history
|
||
tells us can include bribery, corporate espionage, drug-
|
||
running, assassinations, and all manner of illegal and
|
||
sleazy activities)
|
||
- can sabotage contracts, deals, etc.
|
||
- would give them access to internal corporate communications
|
||
- undermines the whole validity of such contracts, and of
|
||
cryptographic standards of identity (shakes confidence)
|
||
- giving the King or the State the power to impersonate
|
||
another is a gross injustice
|
||
- imagine the government of Iran having a backdoor to read
|
||
the secret journals of its subjects!
|
||
- 4th Amendment
|
||
- attorney-client privilege (with trapdoors, no way to know
|
||
that government has not breached confidentiality)
|
||
9.16.7. "How might the Clipper chip be foiled or defeated?"
|
||
- Politically, market-wise, and technical
|
||
- If deployed, that is
|
||
+ Ways to Defeat Clipper
|
||
- preencryption or superencryption
|
||
- LEAF blower
|
||
- plug-compatible, reverse-engineered chip
|
||
- sabotage
|
||
- undermining confidence
|
||
- Sun Tzu
|
||
9.16.8. How can Clipper be defeated, politically?
|
||
9.16.9. How can Clipper be defeated, in the market?
|
||
9.16.10. How can Clipper be defeated, technologically?
|
||
9.16.11. Questions
|
||
+ Clipper issues and questions
|
||
- a vast number of questions, comments, challenges,
|
||
tidbits, details, issues
|
||
- entire newsgroups devoted to this
|
||
+ "What criminal or terrrorist will be smart enough to use
|
||
encryption but dumb enough to use Clipper?"
|
||
- This is one of the Great Unanswered Questions. Clipper's
|
||
supporter's are mum on this one. Suggesting....
|
||
+ "Why not encrypt data before using the Clipper/EES?"
|
||
- "Why can't you just encrypt data before the clipper chip?
|
||
|
||
Two answers:
|
||
|
||
1) the people you want to communicate with won't have
|
||
hardware to
|
||
decrypt your data, statistically speaking. The beauty
|
||
of clipper
|
||
from the NSA point of view is that they are leveraging
|
||
the
|
||
installed base (they hope) of telephones and making it
|
||
impossible
|
||
(again, statistically) for a large fraction of the
|
||
traffic to be
|
||
untappable.
|
||
|
||
2) They won't license bad people like you to make
|
||
equipment like the
|
||
system you describe. I'll wager that the chip
|
||
distribution will be
|
||
done in a way to prevent significant numbers of such
|
||
systems from
|
||
being built, assuring that (1) remains true." [Tom
|
||
Knight, sci.crypt, 6-5-93]
|
||
|
||
-
|
||
+ What are the implications of mandatory key escrow?
|
||
+ "escrow" is misleading...
|
||
- wrong use of the term
|
||
- implies a voluntary, and returnable, situation
|
||
+ "If key escrow is "voluntary," what's the big deal?"
|
||
- Taxes are supposedly "voluntary," too.
|
||
- A wise man prepares for what is _possible_ and even
|
||
_likely_, not just what is announced as part of public
|
||
policy; policies can and do change. There is plenty of
|
||
precedent for a "voluntary" system being made mandatory.
|
||
- The form of the Clipper/EES system suggests eventual
|
||
mandatory status; the form of such a ban is debatable.
|
||
+ "What is 'superencipherment,' and can it be used to defeat
|
||
Clipper?"
|
||
- preencrypting
|
||
- could be viewed as a non-English language
|
||
+ how could Clipper chip know about it (entropy measures?)
|
||
- far-fetched
|
||
- wouldn't solve traffic anal. problem
|
||
- What's the connection between Clipper and export laws?
|
||
+ "Doesn't this make the Clipper database a ripe target?"
|
||
- for subversion, sabotage, espionage, theft
|
||
- presumably backups will be kept, and _these_ will also be
|
||
targets
|
||
+ "Is Clipper just for voice encryption?"
|
||
- Clipper is a data encryption chip, with the digital data
|
||
supplied by an ADC located outside the chip. In
|
||
principle, it could thus be used for data encryption in
|
||
general.
|
||
- In practice, the name Clipper is generally associated
|
||
with telephone use, while "Capstone" is the data standard
|
||
(some differences, too). The "Skipjack" algorithm is used
|
||
in several of these proposed systems (Tessera, also).
|
||
9.16.12. "Why is Clipper worse than what we have now?"
|
||
+ John Gilmore answered this question in a nice essay. I'm
|
||
including the whole thing, including a digression into
|
||
cellular telephones, because it gives some insight--and
|
||
names some names of NSA liars--into how NSA and NIST have
|
||
used their powers to thwart true security.
|
||
- "It's worse because the market keeps moving toward
|
||
providing real encryption.
|
||
|
||
"If Clipper succeeds, it will be by displacing real
|
||
secure encryption. If real secure encryption makes it
|
||
into mass market communications products, Clipper will
|
||
have failed. The whole point is not to get a few
|
||
Clippers used by cops; the point is to make it a
|
||
worldwide standard, rather than having 3-key triple-DES
|
||
with RSA and Diffie-Hellman become the worldwide
|
||
standard.
|
||
|
||
"We'd have decent encryption in digital cellular phones
|
||
*now*, except for the active intervention of Jerry
|
||
Rainville of NSA, who `hosted' a meeting of the standards
|
||
committee inside Ft. Meade, lied to them about export
|
||
control to keep committee documents limited to a small
|
||
group, and got a willing dupe from Motorola, Louis
|
||
Finkelstein, to propose an encryption scheme a child
|
||
could break. The IS-54 standard for digital cellular
|
||
doesn't describe the encryption scheme -- it's described
|
||
in a separate document, which ordinary people can't get,
|
||
even though it's part of the official accredited
|
||
standard. (Guess who accredits standards bodies though -
|
||
- that's right, the once pure NIST.)
|
||
|
||
"The reason it's secret is because it's so obviously
|
||
weak. The system generates a 160-bit "key" and then
|
||
simply XORs it against each block of the compressed
|
||
speech. Take any ten or twenty blocks and recover the
|
||
key by XORing frequent speech patterns (like silence, or
|
||
the letter "A") against pieces of the blocks to produce
|
||
guesses at the key. You try each guess on a few blocks,
|
||
and the likelihood of producing something that decodes
|
||
like speech in all the blocks is small enough that you'll
|
||
know when your guess is the real key.
|
||
|
||
"NSA is continuing to muck around in the Digital Cellular
|
||
standards committee (TR 45.3) this year too. I encourage
|
||
anyone who's interested to join the committee, perhaps as
|
||
an observer. Contact the Telecommunications Industry
|
||
Association in DC and sign up. Like any standards
|
||
committee, it's open to the public and meets in various
|
||
places around the country. I'll lend you a lawyer if
|
||
you're a foreign national, since the committee may still
|
||
believe that they must exclude foreign nationals from
|
||
public discussions of cryptography. Somehow the crypto
|
||
conferences have no trouble with this; I think it's
|
||
called the First Amendment. NSA knows the law here --
|
||
indeed it enforces it via the State Dept -- but lied to
|
||
the committee." [John Gilmore, "Why is clipper worse than
|
||
"no encryption like we have," comp.org.eff.talk, 1994-04-
|
||
27]
|
||
9.16.13. on trusting the government
|
||
- "WHAT AM THE MORAL OF THE STORY, UNCLE REMUS?....When the
|
||
government makes any announcement (ESPECIALLY a denial),
|
||
you should figure out what the government is trying to get
|
||
you to do--and do the opposite. Contrarianism with a
|
||
vengance. Of all the advice I've offered on the
|
||
Cypherpunks Channel, this is absolutely the most certain."
|
||
[Sandy Sandfort, 1994-07-17]
|
||
- if the Founders of the U.S. could see the corrupt,
|
||
socialist state this nation has degenerated to, they'd be
|
||
breaking into missile silos and stealing nukes to use
|
||
against the central power base.
|
||
+ can the government be trusted to run the key escrow system?
|
||
- "I just heard on the news that 1300 IRS employees have
|
||
been disciplined for unauthorized accesses to
|
||
electronically filed income tax returns. ..I'm sure they
|
||
will do much better, though, when the FBI runs the phone
|
||
system, the Post Office controls digital identity and
|
||
Hillary takes care of our health." [Sandy Sandfort, 1994-
|
||
07-19]
|
||
- This is just one of many such examples: Watergate ("I am
|
||
not a crook!"), Iran-Contra, arms deals, cocaine
|
||
shipments by the CIA, Teapot Dome, graft, payoffs,
|
||
bribes, assassinations, Yankee-Cowboy War, Bohemian
|
||
Grove, Casolaro, more killings, invasions, wars. The
|
||
government that is too chicken to ever admit it lost a
|
||
war, and conspicuously avoids diplomatic contact with
|
||
enemies it failed to vanquish (Vietnam, North Korea,
|
||
Cuba, etc.), while quickly becoming sugar daddy to the
|
||
countries it did vanquish...the U.S. appears to be
|
||
lacking in practicality. (Me, I consider it wrong for
|
||
anyone to tell me I can't trade with folks in another
|
||
country, whether it's Haiti, South Africa, Cuba, Korea,
|
||
whatever. Crypto anarchy means we'll have _some_ of the
|
||
ways of bypassing these laws, of making our own moral
|
||
decisions without regard to the prevailing popular
|
||
sentiment of the countries in which we live at the
|
||
moment.)
|
||
|
||
9.17. Legal Issues with Escrowed Encryption and Clipper
|
||
9.17.1. As John Gilmore put it in a guest editorial in the "San
|
||
Francisco Examiner," "...we want the public to see a serious
|
||
debate about why the Constitution should be burned in order
|
||
to save the country." [J.G., 1994-06-26, quoted by S.
|
||
Sandfort]
|
||
9.17.2. "I don't see how Clipper gives the government any powers or
|
||
capabilities it doesn't already have. Comments?"
|
||
9.17.3. Is Clipper really voluntary?
|
||
9.17.4. If Clipper is voluntary, who will use it?
|
||
9.17.5. Restrictions on Civilian Use of Crypto
|
||
9.17.6. "Has crypto been restricted in the U.S.?"
|
||
9.17.7. "What legal steps are being taken?"
|
||
- Zimmermann
|
||
- ITAR
|
||
9.17.8. reports that Department of Justice has a compliance
|
||
enforcement role in the EES [heard by someone from Dorothy
|
||
Denning, 1994-07], probably involving checking the law
|
||
enforcement agencies...
|
||
9.17.9. Status
|
||
+ "Will government agencies use Clipper?"
|
||
- Ah, the embarrassing question. They claim they will, but
|
||
there are also reports that sensitive agencies will not
|
||
use it, that Clipper is too insecure for them (key
|
||
lenght, compromise of escrow data, etc.). There may also
|
||
be different procedures (all agencies are equal, but some
|
||
are more equal than others).
|
||
- Clipper is rated for unclassified use, so this rules out
|
||
many agencies and many uses. An interesting double
|
||
standard.
|
||
+ "Is the Administration backing away from Clipper?"
|
||
+ industry opposition surprised them
|
||
- groups last summer, Citicorp, etc.
|
||
- public opinion
|
||
- editorial remarks
|
||
- so they may be preparing alternative
|
||
- and Gilmore's FOIA, Blaze's attack, the Denning
|
||
nonreview, the secrecy of the algortithm
|
||
+ will not work
|
||
- spies won't use it, child pornographers probably won't
|
||
use it (if alternatives exist, which may be the whole
|
||
point)
|
||
- terrorists won't use it
|
||
- Is Clipper in trouble?
|
||
9.17.10. "Will Clipper be voluntary?"
|
||
- Many supporters of Clipper have cited the voluntary nature
|
||
of Clipper--as expressed in some policy statements--and
|
||
have used this to counter criticism.
|
||
+ However, even if truly voluntary, some issues
|
||
+ improper role for government to try to create a
|
||
commercial standard
|
||
- though the NIST role can be used to counter this point,
|
||
partly
|
||
- government can and does make it tough for competitors
|
||
- export controls (statements by officials on this exist)
|
||
+ Cites for voluntary status:
|
||
- original statement says it will be voluntary
|
||
- (need to get some statements here)
|
||
+ Cites for eventual mandatory status:
|
||
- "Without this initiative, the government will eventually
|
||
become helpless to defend the nation." [Louis Freeh,
|
||
director of the FBI, various sources]
|
||
- Steven Walker of Trusted Information Systems is one of
|
||
many who think so: "Based on his analysis, Walker added,
|
||
"I'm convinced that five years from now they'll say 'This
|
||
isn't working,' so we'll have to change the rules." Then,
|
||
he predicted, Clipper will be made mandatory for all
|
||
encoded communications." [
|
||
+ Parallels to other voluntary programs
|
||
- taxes
|
||
|
||
9.18. Concerns
|
||
9.18.1. Constitutional Issues
|
||
- 4th Amend
|
||
- privacy of attorney-client, etc.
|
||
+ Feds can get access without public hearings, records
|
||
- secret intelligence courts
|
||
-
|
||
+ "It is uncontested (so far as I have read) that under
|
||
certain circum-
|
||
- stances, the Federal intelligence community wil be
|
||
permitted to
|
||
- obtain Clipper keys without any court order on public
|
||
record. Only
|
||
- internal, classified proceedings will protect our
|
||
privacy." <Steve Waldman, steve@vesheu.sar.usf.edu,
|
||
sci.crypt, 4-13-94>
|
||
9.18.2. "What are some dangers of Clipper, if it is widely adopted?"
|
||
+ sender/receiver ID are accessible without going to the key
|
||
escrow
|
||
- this makes traffic analysis, contact lists, easy to
|
||
generate
|
||
+ distortions of markets ("chilling effects") as a plan by
|
||
government
|
||
- make alternatives expensive, hard to export, grounds for
|
||
suspicion
|
||
- use of ITAR to thwart alternatives (would be helped if
|
||
Cantwell bill to liberalize export controls on
|
||
cryptography (HR 3627) passes)
|
||
+ VHDL implementations possible
|
||
- speculates Lew Glendenning, sci.crypt, 4-13-94
|
||
- and recall MIPS connection (be careful here)
|
||
9.18.3. Market Isssues
|
||
9.18.4. "What are the weaknesses in Clipper?"
|
||
+ Carl Ellison analyzed it this way:
|
||
- "It amuses the gallows-humor bone in me to see people
|
||
busily debating the quality of Skipjack as an algorithm
|
||
and the quality of the review of its strength.
|
||
|
||
Someone proposes to dangle you over the Grand Canyon
|
||
using
|
||
|
||
sewing thread
|
||
tied to
|
||
steel chain
|
||
tied to
|
||
knitting yarn
|
||
|
||
and you're debating whether the steel chain has been X-
|
||
rayed properly to see if there are flaws in the metal.
|
||
|
||
"Key generation, chip fabrication, court orders,
|
||
distribution of keys once acquired from escrow agencies
|
||
and safety of keys within escrow agencies are some of the
|
||
real weaknesses. Once those are as strong as my use of
|
||
1024-bit RSA and truly random session keys in keeping
|
||
keys on the two sides of a conversation with no one in
|
||
the middle able to get the key, then we need to look at
|
||
the steel chain in the middle: Skipjack itself." [Carl
|
||
Ellison, 1993-08-02]
|
||
+ Date: Mon, 2 Aug 93 17:29:54 EDT
|
||
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
|
||
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
|
||
Subject: cross-post
|
||
Status: OR
|
||
|
||
Path: transfer.stratus.com!ellisun.sw.stratus.com!cme
|
||
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
|
||
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
|
||
Subject: Skipjack review as a side-track
|
||
Date: 2 Aug 1993 21:25:11 GMT
|
||
Organization: Stratus Computer, Marlboro MA
|
||
Lines: 28
|
||
Message-ID: <23k0nn$8gk@transfer.stratus.com>
|
||
NNTP-Posting-Host: ellisun.sw.stratus.com
|
||
|
||
It amuses the gallows-humor bone in me to see people
|
||
busily debating the
|
||
quality of Skipjack as an algorithm and the quality of
|
||
the review of its
|
||
strength.
|
||
|
||
Someone proposes to dangle you over the Grand Canyon
|
||
using
|
||
|
||
sewing thread
|
||
tied to
|
||
steel chain
|
||
tied to
|
||
knitting yarn
|
||
|
||
and you're debating whether the steel chain has been X-
|
||
rayed properly
|
||
to see if there are flaws in the metal.
|
||
|
||
Key generation, chip fabrication, court orders,
|
||
distribution of keys once
|
||
acquired from escrow agencies and safety of keys within
|
||
escrow agencies are
|
||
some of the real weaknesses. Once those are as strong as
|
||
my use of
|
||
1024-bit RSA and truly random session keys in keeping
|
||
keys on the two sides
|
||
of a conversation with no one in the middle able to get
|
||
the key, then we
|
||
need to look at the steel chain in the middle: Skipjack
|
||
itself.
|
||
|
||
- "Key generation, chip fabrication, court orders,
|
||
distribution of keys once acquired from escrow agencies
|
||
and safety of keys within escrow agencies are some of
|
||
the real weaknesses. Once those are as strong as my
|
||
use of 1024-bit RSA and truly random session keys in
|
||
keeping keys on the two sides of a conversation with no
|
||
one in the middle able to get the key, then we need to
|
||
look at the steel chain in the middle: Skipjack
|
||
itself."
|
||
9.18.5. What it Means for the Future
|
||
9.18.6. Skipjack
|
||
9.18.7. National security exceptions
|
||
- grep Gilmore's FOIA for mention that national security
|
||
people will have direct access and that this will not be
|
||
mentioned to the public
|
||
+ "The "National Security" exception built into the Clipper
|
||
proposal
|
||
- leaves an extraordinarily weak link in the chain of
|
||
procedures designed
|
||
- to protect user privacy. To place awesome powers of
|
||
surveillance
|
||
- technologically within the reach of a few, hoping that so
|
||
weak a chain
|
||
- will bind them, would amount to dangerous folly. It
|
||
flies in the face
|
||
- of history. <Steve Waldman, steve@vesheu.sar.usf.edu, 4-
|
||
14-94, talk.politics.crypto>
|
||
9.18.8. In my view, any focus on the details of Clipper instead of
|
||
the overall concept of key escrow plays into their hands.
|
||
This is not to say that the work of Blaze and others is
|
||
misguided....in fact, it's very fine work. But a general
|
||
focus on the _details_ of Skipjack does nothing to allay my
|
||
concerns about the _principle_ of government-mandated crypto.
|
||
|
||
If it were "house key escrow" and there were missing details
|
||
about the number of teeth allowed on the keys, would be then
|
||
all breathe a sigh of relief if the details of the teeth were
|
||
clarified? Of course not. Me, I will never use a key escrow
|
||
system, even if a blue ribbon panel of hackers and
|
||
Cypherpunks studies the design and declares it to be
|
||
cryptographically sound.
|
||
9.18.9. Concern about Clipper
|
||
- allows past communications to be read
|
||
+ authorities could--maybe--read a lot of stuff, even
|
||
illegally, then use this for other investigations (the old
|
||
"we had an anonymous tip" ploy)
|
||
- "The problem with Clipper is that it provides police
|
||
agencies with dramatically enhanced target acquistion.
|
||
There is nothing to prevent NSA, ATF, FBI (or the Special
|
||
Projects division of the Justice Department) from
|
||
reviewing all internet traffic, as long as they are
|
||
willing to forsake using it in a criminal prosecution."
|
||
[dgard@netcom.com, alt.privacy.clipper, 1994-07-05]
|
||
9.18.10. Some wags have suggested that the new escrow agencies be
|
||
chosen from groups like Amnesty International and the ACLU.
|
||
Most of us are opposed to the "very idea" of key escrow
|
||
(think of being told to escrow family photos, diaries, or
|
||
house keys) and hence even these kinds of skeptical groups
|
||
are unacceptable as escrow agents.
|
||
|
||
9.19. Loose Ends
|
||
9.19.1. "Are trapdoors--or some form of escrowed encryption--
|
||
justified in some cases?"
|
||
+ Sure. There are various reasons why individuals, companies,
|
||
etc. may want to use crypto protocols that allow them to
|
||
decrypt even if they've lost their key, perhaps by going to
|
||
their lawyer and getting the sealed envelope they left with
|
||
him, etc.
|
||
- or using a form of "software key escrow" that allows them
|
||
access
|
||
+ Corporations that wish to recover encrypted data
|
||
+ several scenarios
|
||
- employee encrypts important files, then dies or is
|
||
otherwise unavailable
|
||
+ employee leaves company before decrypting all files
|
||
- some may be archived and not needed to be opened for
|
||
many years
|
||
- employee may demand "ransom" (closely related to virus
|
||
extortion cases)
|
||
- files are found but the original encryptor is unknown
|
||
+ Likely situation is that encryption algorithms will be
|
||
mandated by corporation, with a "master key" kept available
|
||
- like a trapdoor
|
||
- the existence of the master key may not even be
|
||
publicized within the company (to head off concerns about
|
||
security, abuses, etc.)
|
||
- The mandatory use of key escrow, a la a mandatory Clipper
|
||
system, or the system many of us believe is being developed
|
||
for software key escrow (SKE, also called "GAK," for
|
||
"government access to keys, by Carl Ellison) is completely
|
||
different, and is unacceptable. (Clipper is discussed in
|
||
many places here.)
|
||
9.19.2. DSS
|
||
+ Continuing confusion over patents, standards, licensing,
|
||
etc.
|
||
- "FIPS186 is DSS. NIST is of the opinion that DSS does not
|
||
violate PKP's patents. PKP (or at least Jim Bidzos) takes
|
||
the position that it does. But for various reasons, PKP
|
||
won't sue the government. But Bidzos threatens to sue
|
||
private parties who infringe. Stay tuned...." [Steve
|
||
Wildstrom, sci.crypt, 1994-08-19]
|
||
- even Taher ElGamal believes it's a weak standard
|
||
- subliminal channels issues
|
||
9.19.3. The U.S. is often hypocritical about basic rights
|
||
- plans to "disarm" the Haitians, as we did to the Somalians
|
||
(which made those we disarmed even more vulnerable to the
|
||
local warlords)
|
||
- government officials are proposing to "silence" a radio
|
||
station in Ruanda they feel is sending out the wrong
|
||
message! (Heard on "McNeil-Lehrer News Hour," 1994-07-21]
|
||
9.19.4. "is-a-person" and RSA-style credentials
|
||
+ a dangerous idea, that government will insist that keys be
|
||
linked to persons, with only one per person
|
||
- this is a flaw in AOCE system
|
||
- many apps need new keys generated many times
|
||
|
||
10. Legal Issues
|
||
|
||
10.1. copyright
|
||
THE CYPHERNOMICON: Cypherpunks FAQ and More, Version 0.666,
|
||
1994-09-10, Copyright Timothy C. May. All rights reserved.
|
||
See the detailed disclaimer. Use short sections under "fair
|
||
use" provisions, with appropriate credit, but don't put your
|
||
name on my words.
|
||
|
||
10.2. SUMMARY: Legal Issues
|
||
10.2.1. Main Points
|
||
10.2.2. Connections to Other Sections
|
||
- Sad to say, but legal considerations impinge on nearly
|
||
every aspect of crypto
|
||
10.2.3. Where to Find Additional Information
|
||
10.2.4. Miscellaneous Comments
|
||
- "I'm a scientist, Jim, not an attorney." Hence, take my
|
||
legal comments here with a grain of salt, representing only
|
||
hints of the truth as I picked them up from the discussions
|
||
on the various forums and lists.
|
||
|
||
10.3. Basic Legality of Encryption
|
||
10.3.1. "Is this stuff legal or illegal?"
|
||
- Certainly the _talking_ about it is mostly legal, at least
|
||
in the U.S. and at the time of this writing. In other
|
||
countries, you prison term may vary.
|
||
+ The actions resulting from crypto, and crypto anarchy, may
|
||
well be illegal. Such is often the case when technology is
|
||
applied without any particular regard for what the laws say
|
||
is permitted. (Pandora's Box and all that.)
|
||
- Cypherpunks really don't care much about such ephemera as
|
||
the "laws" of some geographic region. Cypherpunks make
|
||
their own laws.
|
||
+ There are two broad ways of getting things done:
|
||
- First, looking at the law and regulations and finding
|
||
ways to exploit them. This is the tack favored by
|
||
lawyers, of whic$are many in this country.
|
||
- Second, "just do it." In areas where the law hasn't
|
||
caught up, this can mean unconstrained technological
|
||
developement. Good examples are the computer and chip
|
||
business, where issues of legality rarely arose (except
|
||
in the usual areas of contract enforcement, etc.). More
|
||
recently the chip business has discovered lawyering, with
|
||
a vengeance.
|
||
- In other areas, where the law is centrally involved,
|
||
"just do it" can mean many technical violations of the
|
||
law. Examples: personal service jobs (maids and
|
||
babysitters), contracting jobs without licenses,
|
||
permissions, etc., and so on. Often these are "illegal
|
||
markets," putatively.
|
||
- And bear in mind that the legal system can be used to
|
||
hassle people, to pressure them to "plead out" to some
|
||
charges, to back off, etc. (In the firearms business, the
|
||
pressures and threats are also used to cause some
|
||
manufacturers, like Ruger, to back off on a radical pro-gun
|
||
stance, so as to be granted favors and milder treatment.
|
||
Pressure on crypto-producing companies are probably very
|
||
similar. Play ball, or we'll run you over in the parking
|
||
lot.)
|
||
10.3.2. "Why is the legal status of crypto so murky?"
|
||
- First, it may be murkier to me than it it to actual lawyers
|
||
like Mike Godwin and Michael Froomkin, both of whom have
|
||
been on our list at times. (Though my impression from
|
||
talking to Godwin is that many or even most of these issues
|
||
have not been addressed in the courts, let alone resolved
|
||
definitively.)
|
||
- Second, crypto issues have not generally reached the
|
||
courts, reflecting the nascent status of most of the things
|
||
talked about it here. Things as "trivial" as digital
|
||
signatures and digital timestamping have yet to be
|
||
challenged in courts, or declared illegal, or anything
|
||
similar that might produce a precedent-setting ruling. (Stu
|
||
Haber agrees that such tests are lacking.)
|
||
- Finally, the issues are deep ones, going to the heart of
|
||
issues of self-incrimination (disclosure of keys,
|
||
contempt), of intellectual property and export laws (want
|
||
to jail someone for talking about prime numbers?), and the
|
||
incredibly byzantine world of money and financial
|
||
instruments.
|
||
- A legal study of crypto--which I hear Professor Froomkin is
|
||
doing--could be very important.
|
||
10.3.3. "Has the basic legality of crypto and laws about crypto been
|
||
tested?"
|
||
- As usual, a U.S. focus here. I know little of the situation
|
||
in non-U.S. countries (and in many of them the law is
|
||
whatever the rulers say it is).
|
||
- And I'm not a lawyer.
|
||
+ Some facts:
|
||
- no direct Constitutional statement about privacy (though
|
||
many feel it is implied)
|
||
- crypto was not a major issue (espionage was, and was
|
||
dealt with harshly, but encrypting things was not a
|
||
problem per se)
|
||
+ only in the recent past has it become important...and it
|
||
will become much more so
|
||
- as criminals encrypt, as terrorists encrypt
|
||
- as tax is avoided via the techniques described here
|
||
- collusion of business ("crypto interlocking
|
||
directorates," price signalling)
|
||
- black markets, information markets
|
||
+ Lawrence Tribe..new amendment
|
||
- scary, as it may place limits.... (but unlikely to
|
||
happen)
|
||
+ Crypto in Court
|
||
- mostly untested
|
||
- can keys be compelled?
|
||
- Expect some important cases in the next several years
|
||
10.3.4. "Can authorities force the disclosure of a key?"
|
||
+ Mike Godwin, legal counsel for the EFF, has been asked this
|
||
queston _many_ times:
|
||
- "Note that a court could cite you for contempt for not
|
||
complying with a subpoena duces tecum (a subpoena
|
||
requiring you to produce objects or documents) if you
|
||
fail to turn over subpoenaed backups....To be honest, I
|
||
don't think *any* security measure is adequate against a
|
||
government that's determined to overreach its authority
|
||
and its citizens' rights, but crypto comes close." [Mike
|
||
Godwin, 1993-06-14]
|
||
+ Torture is out (in many countries, but not all). Truth
|
||
serum, etc., ditto.
|
||
- "Rubber hose cryptography"
|
||
+ Constitutional issues
|
||
- self-incrimination
|
||
+ on the "Yes" side:
|
||
+ is same, some say, as forcing combination to a safe
|
||
containing information or stolen goods
|
||
- but some say-and a court may have ruled on this-that
|
||
the safe can always be cut open and so the issue is
|
||
mostly moot
|
||
- while forcing key disclosure is compelled testimony
|
||
- and one can always claim to have forgotten the key
|
||
- i.e., what happens when a suspect simply clams up?
|
||
- but authorities can routinely demand cooperation in
|
||
investigations, can seize records, etc.
|
||
+ on the "No" side:
|
||
- can't force a suspect to talk, whether about where he hid
|
||
the loot or where his kidnap victim is hidden
|
||
- practically speaking, someone under indictment cannot be
|
||
forced to reveal Swiss bank accounts....this would seem
|
||
to be directly analogous to a cryptographic key
|
||
- thus, the key to open an account would seem to be the
|
||
same thing
|
||
- a memorized key cannot be forced, says someone with EFF
|
||
or CPSR
|
||
+ "Safe" analogy
|
||
+ You have a safe, you won' tell the combination
|
||
- you just refuse
|
||
- you claim to have forgotten it
|
||
- you really don't know it
|
||
- cops can cut the safe open, so compelling a combination
|
||
is not needed
|
||
- "interefering with an investigation"
|
||
- on balance, it seems clear that the disclosure of
|
||
cryptographic keys cannot be forced (though the practical
|
||
penalty for nondisclosure could be severe)
|
||
+ Courts
|
||
+ compelled testimony is certainly common
|
||
- if one is not charged, one cannot take the 5th (may be
|
||
some wrinkles here)
|
||
- contempt
|
||
+ What won't immunize disclosure:
|
||
+ clever jokes about "I am guilty of money laundering"
|
||
- can it be used?
|
||
- does judge declaring immunity apply in this case?
|
||
- Eric Hughes has pointed out that the form of the
|
||
statement is key: "My key is: "I am a murderer."" is
|
||
not a legal admission of anything.
|
||
- (There may be some subtleties where the key does contain
|
||
important evidence--perhaps the location of a buried body-
|
||
-but I think these issues are relatively minor.)
|
||
- but this has not really been tested, so far as I know
|
||
- and many people say that such cooperation can be
|
||
demanded...
|
||
- Contempt, claims of forgetting
|
||
10.3.5. Forgetting passwords, and testimony
|
||
+ This is another area of intense speculation:
|
||
- "I forgot. So sue me."
|
||
- "I forgot. It was just a temporary file I was working on,
|
||
and I just can't remember the password I picked." (A less
|
||
in-your-face approach.)
|
||
+ "I refuse to give my password on the grounds that it may
|
||
tend to incriminate me."
|
||
+ Canonical example: "My password is: 'I sell illegal
|
||
drugs.'"
|
||
- Eric Hughes has pointed out this is not a real
|
||
admission of guilt, just a syntactic form, so it is
|
||
nonsense to claim that it is incriminating. I agree.
|
||
I don't know if any court tests have confirmed this.
|
||
+ Sandy Sandfort theorizes that this example might work, or
|
||
at least lead to an interesting legal dilemma:
|
||
- "As an example, your passphrase could be:
|
||
|
||
I shot a cop in the back and buried his body
|
||
under
|
||
the porch at 123 Main St., anywhere USA. The gun
|
||
is
|
||
wrapped in an oily cloth in my mother's attic.
|
||
|
||
"I decline to answer on the grounds that my passphrase is
|
||
a statement which may tend to incriminate me. I will
|
||
only give my passphrase if I am given immunity from
|
||
prosecution for the actions to which it alludes."
|
||
|
||
"Too cute, I know, but who knows, it might work." [S.S.,
|
||
1994-0727]
|
||
10.3.6. "What about disavowal of keys? Of digital signatures? Of
|
||
contracts?
|
||
- In the short term, the courts are relatively silent, as few
|
||
of these issues have reached the courts. Things like
|
||
signatures and contract breaches would likely be handled as
|
||
they currently are (that is, the judge would look at the
|
||
circumstances, etc.)
|
||
+ Clearly this is a major concern. There are two main avenues
|
||
of dealing with this"
|
||
- The "purist" approach. You *are* your key. Caveat emptor.
|
||
Guard your keys. If your signature is used, you are
|
||
responsible. (People can lessen their exposure by using
|
||
protocols that limit risk, analogous to the way ATM
|
||
systems only allow, say, $200 a day to be withdrawn.)
|
||
- The legal system can be used (maybe) to deal with these
|
||
issues. Maybe. Little of this has been tested in courts.
|
||
Conventional methods of verifying forged signatures will
|
||
not work. Contract law with digital signatures will be a
|
||
new area.
|
||
- The problem of *repudiation* or *disavowal* was recognized
|
||
early on in cryptologic circles. Alice is confronted with a
|
||
digital signature, or whatever. She says; "But I didn't
|
||
sign that" or "Oh, that's my old key--it's obsolete" or "My
|
||
sysadmin must have snooped through my files," or "I guess
|
||
those key escrow guys are at it again."
|
||
- I think that only the purist stance will hold water in the
|
||
long run.(A hint of this: untraceable cash means, for most
|
||
transactions of interest with digital cash, that once the
|
||
crypto stuff has been handled, whether the sig was stolen
|
||
or not is moot, because the money is gone...no court can
|
||
rule that the sig was invalid and then retrieve the cash!)
|
||
10.3.7. "What are some arguments for the freedom to encrypt?"
|
||
- bans are hard to enforce, requiring extensive police
|
||
intrusions
|
||
- private letters, diaries, conversations
|
||
- in U.S., various provisions
|
||
- anonymity is often needed
|
||
10.3.8. Restrictions on anonymity
|
||
- "identity escrow" is what Eric Hughes calls it
|
||
- linits on mail drops, on anonymous accounts, and--perhaps
|
||
ultimately--on cash purchases of any and all goods
|
||
10.3.9. "Are bulletin boards and Internet providers "common carriers"
|
||
or not?"
|
||
- Not clear. BBS operators are clearly held more liable for
|
||
content than the phone company is, for example.
|
||
10.3.10. Too much cleverness is passing for law
|
||
- Many schemes to bypass tax laws, regulations, etc., are, as
|
||
the British like to say, "too cute by half." For example,
|
||
claims that the dollar is defined as 1/35th of an ounce of
|
||
gold and that the modern dollar is only 1/10th of this. Or
|
||
that Ohio failed to properly enter the Union, and hence all
|
||
laws passed afterward are invalid. The same could be said
|
||
of schemes to deploy digital cash be claiming that ordinary
|
||
laws do not apply. Well, those who try such schemes often
|
||
find out otherwise, sometimes in prison. Tread carefully.
|
||
10.3.11. "Is it legal to advocate the overthrow of governments or the
|
||
breaking of laws?"
|
||
- Although many Cypherpunks are not radicals, many others of
|
||
us are, and we often advocate "collapse of governments" and
|
||
other such things as money laundering schemes, tax evasion,
|
||
new methods for espionage, information markets, data
|
||
havens, etc. This rasises obvious concerns about legality.
|
||
- First off, I have to speak mainly of U.S. issues...the laws
|
||
of Russia or Japan or whatever may be completely different.
|
||
Sorry for the U.S.-centric focus of this FAQ, but that's
|
||
the way it is. The Net started here, and still is
|
||
dominantly here, and the laws of the U.S. are being
|
||
propagated around the world as part of the New World Order
|
||
and the collapse of the other superpower.
|
||
- Is it legal to advocate the replacement of a government? In
|
||
the U.S., it's the basic political process (though cynics
|
||
might argue that both parties represent the same governing
|
||
philosophy). Advocating the *violent overthrow* of the U.S.
|
||
government is apparently illegal, though I lack a cite on
|
||
this.
|
||
+ Is it legal to advocate illegal acts in general? Certainly
|
||
much of free speech is precisely this: arguing for drug
|
||
use, for boycotts, etc.
|
||
+ The EFF gopher site has this on "Advocating Lawbreaking,
|
||
Brandenburg v. Ohio. ":
|
||
- "In the 1969 case of Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Supreme
|
||
Court struck down the conviction of a Ku Klux Klan
|
||
member under a criminal syndicalism law and established
|
||
a new standard: Speech may not be suppressed or
|
||
punished unless it is intended to produce 'imminent
|
||
lawless action' and it is 'likely to produce such
|
||
action.' Otherwise, the First Amendment protects even
|
||
speech that advocates violence. The Brandenburg test is
|
||
the law today. "
|
||
|
||
10.4. Can Crypto be Banned?
|
||
10.4.1. "Why won't government simply _ban such encryption methods?"
|
||
+ This has always been the Number One Issue!
|
||
- raised by Stiegler, Drexler, Salin, and several others
|
||
(and in fact raised by some as an objection to my even
|
||
discussing these issues, namely, that action may then be
|
||
taken to head off the world I describe)
|
||
+ Types of Bans on Encryption and Secrecy
|
||
- Ban on Private Use of Encryption
|
||
- Ban on Store-and-Forward Nodes
|
||
- Ban on Tokens and ZKIPS Authentication
|
||
- Requirement for public disclosure of all transactions
|
||
+ Recent news (3-6-92, same day as Michaelangelo and
|
||
Lawnmower Man) that government is proposing a surcharge
|
||
on telcos and long distance services to pay for new
|
||
equipment needed to tap phones!
|
||
- S.266 and related bills
|
||
- this was argued in terms of stopping drug dealers and
|
||
other criminals
|
||
- but how does the government intend to deal with the
|
||
various forms fo end-user encryption or "confusion"
|
||
(the confusion that will come from compression,
|
||
packetizing, simple file encryption, etc.)
|
||
+ Types of Arguments Against Such Bans
|
||
- The "Constitutional Rights" Arguments
|
||
+ The "It's Too Late" Arguments
|
||
- PCs are already widely scattered, running dozens of
|
||
compression and encryption programs...it is far too
|
||
late to insist on "in the clear" broadcasts, whatever
|
||
those may be (is program code distinguishable from
|
||
encrypted messages? No.)
|
||
- encrypted faxes, modem scramblers (albeit with some
|
||
restrictions)
|
||
- wireless LANs, packets, radio, IR, compressed text and
|
||
images, etc....all will defeat any efforts short of
|
||
police state intervention (which may still happen)
|
||
+ The "Feud Within the NSA" Arguments
|
||
- COMSEC vs. PROD
|
||
+ Will affect the privacy rights of corporations
|
||
- and there is much evidence that corporations are in
|
||
fact being spied upon, by foreign governments, by the
|
||
NSA, etc.
|
||
+ They Will Try to Ban Such Encryption Techniques
|
||
+ Stings (perhaps using viruses and logic bombs)
|
||
- or "barium," to trace the code
|
||
+ Legal liability for companies that allow employees to use
|
||
such methods
|
||
- perhaps even in their own time, via the assumption that
|
||
employees who use illegal software methods in their own
|
||
time are perhaps couriers or agents for their
|
||
corporations (a tenuous point)
|
||
10.4.2. The long-range impossibility of banning crypto
|
||
- stego
|
||
- direct broadcast to overhead satellites
|
||
- samizdat
|
||
- compression, algorithms, ....all made plaintext hard to
|
||
find
|
||
10.4.3. Banning crypto is comparable to
|
||
+ banning ski masks because criminals can hide their identity
|
||
- Note: yes, there are laws about "going masked for the
|
||
purpose of being masked," or somesuch
|
||
+ insisting that all speech be in languages understandable by
|
||
eavesdroppers
|
||
- (I don't mean "official languages" for dealing with the
|
||
Feds, or what employers may reasonably insist on)
|
||
- outlawing curtains, or at least requiring that "Clipper
|
||
curtains" be bought (curtains which are transparent at
|
||
wavelengths the governments of the world can use)
|
||
- position escrow, via electronic bracelets like criminals
|
||
wear
|
||
- restrictions on books that possibly help criminals
|
||
- banning body armor (proposed in several communities)
|
||
- banning radar detectors
|
||
- (Note that these bans become more "reasonable" when the
|
||
items like body armor and radar detectos are reached, at
|
||
least to many people. Not to me, of course.)
|
||
10.4.4. So Won't Governments Stop These Systems?
|
||
- Citing national security, protection of private property,
|
||
common decency, etc.
|
||
+ Legal Measures
|
||
- Bans on ownership and operation of "anonymous" systems
|
||
+ Restrictions on cryptographic algorithms
|
||
- RSA patent may be a start
|
||
+ RICO, civil suits, money-laundering laws
|
||
- FINCEN, Financial Crimes Information Center
|
||
- IRS, Justice, NSA, FBI, DIA, CIA
|
||
- attempts to force other countries to comply with U.S.
|
||
banking laws
|
||
10.4.5. Scenario for a ban on encryption
|
||
- "Paranoia is cryptography's occupational hazard." [Eric
|
||
Hughes, 1994-05-14]
|
||
+ There are many scenarios. Here is a graphic one from Sandy
|
||
Sandfort:
|
||
- "Remember the instructions for cooking a live frog. The
|
||
government does not intend to stop until they have
|
||
effectively eliminated your privacy.
|
||
|
||
STEP 1: Clipper becomes the de facto encryption
|
||
standard.
|
||
|
||
STEP 2: When Cypherpunks and other "criminals" eschew
|
||
Clipper in favor of trusted strong crypto, the government
|
||
is "forced" to ban non-escrowed encryption systems.
|
||
(Gotta catch those pedophiles, drug dealers and
|
||
terrorists, after all.)
|
||
|
||
STEP 3: When Cypherpunks and other criminals use
|
||
superencryption with Clipper or spoof LEAFs, the
|
||
government will regretably be forced to engage in random
|
||
message monitoring to detect these illegal techniques.
|
||
|
||
Each of these steps will be taken because we wouldn't
|
||
passively accept such things as unrestricted wiretaps and
|
||
reasonable precautions like
|
||
digital telephony. It will portrayed as our fault.
|
||
Count on it." [Sandy Sandfort, 6-14-94]
|
||
|
||
10.4.6. Can the flow of bits be stopped? Is the genie really out of
|
||
the bottle?
|
||
- Note that Carl Ellison has long argued that the genie was
|
||
never _in_ the bottle, at least not in the U.S. in non-
|
||
wartime situations (use of cryptography, especially in
|
||
communications, in wartime obviously raises eyebrows)
|
||
|
||
10.5. Legal Issues with PGP
|
||
7.12.1. "What is RSA Data Security Inc.'s position on PGP?"
|
||
I. They were strongly opposed to early versions
|
||
II. objections
|
||
- infringes on PKP patents (claimed infringements, not
|
||
tested in court, though)
|
||
- breaks the tight control previously seen
|
||
- brings unwanted attention to public key approaches (I
|
||
think PGP also helped RSA and RSADSI)
|
||
- bad blood between Zimmermann and Bidzos
|
||
III. objections
|
||
- infringes on PKP patents (claimed infringements, not
|
||
tested in court, though)
|
||
- breaks the tight control previously seen
|
||
- brings unwanted attention to public key approaches (I
|
||
think PGP also helped RSA and RSADSI)
|
||
- bad blood between Zimmermann and Bidzos
|
||
IV. Talk of lawsuits, actions, etc.
|
||
V. The 2.6 MIT accomodation may have lessened the tension;
|
||
purely speculative
|
||
7.12.2. "Is PGP legal or illegal"?
|
||
7.12.3. "Is there still a conflict between RSADSI and PRZ?"
|
||
- Apparently not. The MIT 2.6 negotiations seem to have
|
||
buried all such rancor. At least officially. I hear there's
|
||
still animosity, but it's no longer at the surface. (And
|
||
RSADSI is now facing lawsuits and patent suits.)
|
||
|
||
10.6. Legal Issues with Remailers
|
||
8.9.1. What's the legal status of remailers?
|
||
- There are no laws against it at this time.
|
||
- No laws saying people have to put return addresses on
|
||
messages, on phone calls (pay phones are still legal), etc.
|
||
- And the laws pertaining to not having to produce identity
|
||
(the "flier" case, where leaflet distributors did not have
|
||
to produce ID) would seem to apply to this form of
|
||
communication.
|
||
+ However, remailers may come under fire:
|
||
+ Sysops, MIT case
|
||
- potentially serious for remailers if the case is
|
||
decided such that the sysop's creation of group that
|
||
was conducive to criminal pirating was itself a
|
||
crime...that could make all involved in remailers
|
||
culpable
|
||
8.9.2. "Can remailer logs be subpoenaed?"
|
||
- Count on it happening, perhaps very soon. The FBI has been
|
||
subpoenaing e-mail archives for a Netcom customer (Lewis De
|
||
Payne), probably because they think the e-mail will lead
|
||
them to the location of uber-hacker Kevin Mitnick. Had the
|
||
parties used remailers, I'm fairly sure we'd be seeing
|
||
similar subpoenas for the remailer logs.
|
||
- There's no exemption for remailers that I know of!
|
||
+ The solutions are obvious, though:
|
||
- use many remailers, to make subpoenaing back through the
|
||
chain very laborious, very expensive, and likely to fail
|
||
(if even one party won't cooperate, or is outside the
|
||
court's jurisdiction, etc.)
|
||
- offshore, multi-jurisdictional remailers (seleted by the
|
||
user)
|
||
- no remailer logs kept...destroy them (no law currently
|
||
says anybody has to keep e-mail records! This may
|
||
change....)
|
||
- "forward secrecy," a la Diffie-Hellman forward secrecy
|
||
8.9.3. How will remailers be harassed, attacked, and challenged?
|
||
8.9.4. "Can pressure be put on remailer operators to reveal traffic
|
||
logs and thereby allow tracing of messages?"
|
||
+ For human-operated systems which have logs, sure. This is
|
||
why we want several things in remailers:
|
||
* no logs of messages
|
||
* many remailers
|
||
* multiple legal jurisdictions, e.g., offshore remailers
|
||
(the more the better)
|
||
* hardware implementations which execute instructions
|
||
flawlessly (Chaum's digital mix)
|
||
8.9.5. Calls for limits on anonymity
|
||
+ Kids and the net will cause many to call for limits on
|
||
nets, on anonymity, etc.
|
||
- "But there's a dark side to this exciting phenomenon, one
|
||
that's too rarely understood by computer novices.
|
||
Because they
|
||
offer instant access to others, and considerable
|
||
anonymity to
|
||
participants, the services make it possible for people -
|
||
especially computer-literate kids - to find themselves in
|
||
unpleasant, sexually explicit social situations.... And
|
||
I've gradually
|
||
come to adopt the view, which will be controversial among
|
||
many online
|
||
users, that the use of nicknames and other forms of
|
||
anonymity
|
||
must be eliminated or severly curbed to force people
|
||
online into
|
||
at least as much accountability for their words and
|
||
actions as
|
||
exists in real social encounters." [Walter S. Mossberg,
|
||
Wall Street Journal, 6/30/94, provided by Brad Dolan]
|
||
- Eli Brandt came up with a good response to this: "The
|
||
sound-bite response to this: do you want your child's
|
||
name, home address, and phone number available to all
|
||
those lurking pedophiles worldwide? Responsible parents
|
||
encourage their children to use remailers."
|
||
- Supreme Court said that identity of handbill distributors
|
||
need not be disclosed, and pseudonyms in general has a long
|
||
and noble tradition
|
||
- BBS operators have First Amendment protections (e.g..
|
||
registration requirements would be tossed out, exactly as
|
||
if registration of newspapers were to be attempted)
|
||
8.9.6. Remailers and Choice of Jurisdictions
|
||
- The intended target of a remailed message, and the subject
|
||
material, may well influence the set of remailers used,
|
||
especially for the very important "last remailer' (Note: it
|
||
should never be necessary to tell remailers if they are
|
||
first, last, or others, but the last remailer may in fact
|
||
be able to tell he's the last...if the message is in
|
||
plaintext to the recipient, with no additional remailer
|
||
commands embedded, for example.)
|
||
- A message involving child pornography might have a remailer
|
||
site located in a state like Denmark, where child porn laws
|
||
are less restrictive. And a message critical of Islam might
|
||
not be best sent through a final remailer in Teheran. Eric
|
||
Hughes has dubbed this "regulatory arbitrage," and to
|
||
various extents it is already common practice.
|
||
- Of course, the sender picks the remailer chain, so these
|
||
common sense notions may not be followed. Nothing is
|
||
perfect, and customs will evolve. I can imagine schemes
|
||
developing for choosing customers--a remailer might not
|
||
accept as a customer certain abusers, based on digital
|
||
pseudonyms < hairy).
|
||
8.9.7. Possible legal steps to limit the use of remailers and
|
||
anonymous systems
|
||
- hold the remailer liable for content, i.e., no common
|
||
carrier status
|
||
- insert provisions into the various "anti-hacking" laws to
|
||
criminalize anonymous posts
|
||
8.9.8. Crypto and remailers can be used to protect groups from "deep
|
||
pockets" lawsuits
|
||
- products (esp. software) can be sold "as is," or with
|
||
contracts backed up by escrow services (code kept in an
|
||
escrow repository, or money kept there to back up
|
||
committments)
|
||
+ jurisdictions, legal and tax, cannot do "reach backs" which
|
||
expose the groups to more than they agreed to
|
||
- as is so often the case with corporations in the real
|
||
world, which are taxed and fined for various purposes
|
||
(asbestos, etc.)
|
||
- (For those who panic at the thought of this, the remedy for
|
||
the cautious will be to arrange contracts with the right
|
||
entities...probably paying more for less product.)
|
||
8.9.9. Could anonymous remailers be used to entrap people, or to
|
||
gather information for investigations?
|
||
- First, there are so few current remailers that this is
|
||
unlikely. Julf seems a non-narc type, and he is located in
|
||
Finland. The Cypherpunks remailers are mostly run by folks
|
||
like us, for now.
|
||
- However, such stings and set-ups have been used in the past
|
||
by narcs and "red squads." Expect the worse from Mr.
|
||
Policeman. Now that evil hackers are identified as hazards,
|
||
expect moves in this direction. "Cryps" are obviously
|
||
"crack" dealers.
|
||
- But use of encryption, which CP remailers support (Julf's
|
||
does not), makes this essentially moot.
|
||
|
||
10.7. Legal Issues with Escrowed Encryption and Clipper
|
||
9.17.1. As John Gilmore put it in a guest editorial in the "San
|
||
Francisco Examiner," "...we want the public to see a serious
|
||
debate about why the Constitution should be burned in order
|
||
to save the country." [J.G., 1994-06-26, quoted by S.
|
||
Sandfort]
|
||
9.17.2. "I don't see how Clipper gives the government any powers or
|
||
capabilities it doesn't already have. Comments?"
|
||
9.17.3. Is Clipper really voluntary?
|
||
9.17.4. If Clipper is voluntary, who will use it?
|
||
9.17.5. Restrictions on Civilian Use of Crypto
|
||
9.17.6. "Has crypto been restricted in the U.S.?"
|
||
9.17.7. "What legal steps are being taken?"
|
||
- Zimmermann
|
||
- ITAR
|
||
9.17.8. reports that Department of Justice has a compliance
|
||
enforcement role in the EES [heard by someone from Dorothy
|
||
Denning, 1994-07], probably involving checking the law
|
||
enforcement agencies...
|
||
9.17.9. Status
|
||
+ "Will government agencies use Clipper?"
|
||
- Ah, the embarrassing question. They claim they will, but
|
||
there are also reports that sensitive agencies will not
|
||
use it, that Clipper is too insecure for them (key
|
||
lenght, compromise of escrow data, etc.). There may also
|
||
be different procedures (all agencies are equal, but some
|
||
are more equal than others).
|
||
- Clipper is rated for unclassified use, so this rules out
|
||
many agencies and many uses. An interesting double
|
||
standard.
|
||
+ "Is the Administration backing away from Clipper?"
|
||
+ industry opposition surprised them
|
||
- groups last summer, Citicorp, etc.
|
||
- public opinion
|
||
- editorial remarks
|
||
- so they may be preparing alternative
|
||
- and Gilmore's FOIA, Blaze's attack, the Denning
|
||
nonreview, the secrecy of the algortithm
|
||
+ will not work
|
||
- spies won't use it, child pornographers probably won't
|
||
use it (if alternatives exist, which may be the whole
|
||
point)
|
||
- terrorists won't use it
|
||
- Is Clipper in trouble?
|
||
9.17.10. "Will Clipper be voluntary?"
|
||
- Many supporters of Clipper have cited the voluntary nature
|
||
of Clipper--as expressed in some policy statements--and
|
||
have used this to counter criticism.
|
||
+ However, even if truly voluntary, some issues
|
||
+ improper role for government to try to create a
|
||
commercial standard
|
||
- though the NIST role can be used to counter this point,
|
||
partly
|
||
- government can and does make it tough for competitors
|
||
- export controls (statements by officials on this exist)
|
||
+ Cites for voluntary status:
|
||
- original statement says it will be voluntary
|
||
- (need to get some statements here)
|
||
+ Cites for eventual mandatory status:
|
||
- "Without this initiative, the government will eventually
|
||
become helpless to defend the nation." [Louis Freeh,
|
||
director of the FBI, various sources]
|
||
- Steven Walker of Trusted Information Systems is one of
|
||
many who think so: "Based on his analysis, Walker added,
|
||
"I'm convinced that five years from now they'll say 'This
|
||
isn't working,' so we'll have to change the rules." Then,
|
||
he predicted, Clipper will be made mandatory for all
|
||
encoded communications." [
|
||
+ Parallels to other voluntary programs
|
||
- taxes
|
||
|
||
10.8. Legal Issues with Digital Cash
|
||
10.8.1. "What's the legal status of digital cash?"
|
||
- It hasn't been tested, like a lot of crypto protocols. It
|
||
may be many years before these systems are tested.
|
||
10.8.2. "Is there a tie between digital cash and money laundering?"
|
||
- There doesn't have to be, but many of us believe the
|
||
widespread deployment of digital, untraceable cash will
|
||
make possible new approaches
|
||
- Hence the importance of digital cash for crypto anarchy and
|
||
related ideas.
|
||
- (In case it isn't obvious, I consider money-laundering a
|
||
non-crime.)
|
||
10.8.3. "Is it true the government of the U.S. can limit funds
|
||
transfers outside the U.S.?"
|
||
- Many issues here. Certainly some laws exist. Certainly
|
||
people are prosecuted every day for violating currency
|
||
export laws. Many avenues exist.
|
||
- "LEGALITY - There isn't and will never be a law restricting
|
||
the sending of funds outside the United States. How do I
|
||
know? Simple. As a country dependant on international
|
||
trade (billions of dollars a year and counting), the
|
||
American economy would be destroyed." [David Johnson,
|
||
privacy@well.sf.ca.us, "Offshore Banking & Privacy,"
|
||
alt.privacy, 1994-07-05]
|
||
10.8.4. "Are "alternative currencies" allowed in the U.S.? And what's
|
||
the implication for digital cash of various forms?
|
||
- Tokens, coupons, gift certificates are allowed, but face
|
||
various regulations. Casino chips were once treated as
|
||
cash, but are now more regulated (inter-casino conversion
|
||
is no longer allowed).
|
||
- Any attempt to use such coupons as an alternative currency
|
||
face obstacles. The coupons may be allowed, but heavily
|
||
regulated (reporting requirements, etc.).
|
||
- Perry Metzger notes, bearer bonds are now illegal in the
|
||
U.S. (a bearer bond represented cash, in that no name was
|
||
attached to the bond--the "bearer" could sell it for cash
|
||
or redeem it...worked great for transporting large amounts
|
||
of cash in compact form).
|
||
+ Note: Duncan Frissell claims that bearer bonds are _not_
|
||
illegal.
|
||
- "Under the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of
|
||
1982 (TEFRA), any interest payments made on *new* issues
|
||
of domestic bearer bonds are not deductible as an
|
||
ordinary and necessary business expense so none have been
|
||
issued since then. At the same time, the Feds
|
||
administratively stopped issuing treasury securities in
|
||
bearer form. Old issues of government and corporate debt
|
||
in bearer form still exist and will exist and trade for
|
||
30 or more years after 1982. Additionally, US residents
|
||
can legally buy foreign bearer securities." [Duncan
|
||
Frissell, 1994-08-10]
|
||
- Someone else has a slightly different view: "The last US
|
||
Bearer Bond issues mature in 1997. I also believe that to
|
||
collect interest, and to redeem the bond at maturity, you
|
||
must give your name and tax-id number to the paying
|
||
agent. (I can check with the department here that handles
|
||
it if anyone is interested in the pertinent OCC regs that
|
||
apply)" [prig0011@gold.tc.umn.edu, 1994-08-10]
|
||
- I cite this gory detail to give readers some idea about
|
||
how much confusion there is about these subjects. The
|
||
usual advice is to "seek competent counsel," but in fact
|
||
most lawyers have no clear ideas about the optimum
|
||
strategies, and the run-of-the-mill advisor may mislead
|
||
one dangerously. Tread carefully.
|
||
- This has implications for digital cash, of course.
|
||
10.8.5. "Why might digital cash and related techologies take hold
|
||
early in illegal markets? That is, will the Mob be an early
|
||
adopter?"
|
||
- untraceability needed
|
||
- and reputations matter to them
|
||
- they've shown in the past that they will try new
|
||
approaches, a la the money movements of the drug cartels,
|
||
novel methods for security, etc.
|
||
10.8.6. "Electronic cash...will it have to comply with laws, and
|
||
how?"
|
||
- Concerns will be raised about the anonymity aspects, the
|
||
usefulness for evading taxes and reporting requirements,
|
||
etc.
|
||
- a messy issue, sure to be debated and legislated about for
|
||
many years
|
||
+ split the cash into many pieces...is this "structuring"? is
|
||
it legal?
|
||
- some rules indicate the structuring per se is not
|
||
illegal, only tax evasion or currency control evasion
|
||
- what then of systems which _automatically_, as a basic
|
||
feature, split the cash up into multiple pieces and move
|
||
them?
|
||
10.8.7. Currency controls, flight capital regulations, boycotts,
|
||
asset seizures, etc.
|
||
- all are pressures to find alternate ways for capital to
|
||
flow
|
||
- all add to the lack of confidence, which, paradoxically to
|
||
lawmakers, makes capital flight all the more likely
|
||
10.8.8. "Will banking regulators allow digital cash?"
|
||
- Not easily, that's for sure. The maze of regulations,
|
||
restrictions, tax laws, and legal rulings is daunting. Eric
|
||
Hughes spent a lot of time reading up on the laws regarding
|
||
banks, commercial paper, taxes, etc., and concluded much
|
||
the same. I'm not saying it's impossible--indeed, I believe
|
||
it will someday happen, in some form--but the obstacles are
|
||
formidable.
|
||
+ Some issues:
|
||
+ Will such an operation be allowed to be centered or based
|
||
in the U.S.?
|
||
- What states? What laws? Bank vs. Savings and Loan vs.
|
||
Credit Union vs. Securities Broker vs. something else?
|
||
+ Will customers be able to access such entities offshore,
|
||
outside the U.S.?
|
||
- strong crypto makes communication possible, but it may
|
||
be difficult, not part of the business fabric, etc.
|
||
(and hence not so useful--if one has to send PGP-
|
||
encrypted instructions to one's banker, and can't use
|
||
the clearing infrastructure....)
|
||
+ Tax collection, money-laundering laws, disclosure laws,
|
||
"know your customer" laws....all are areas where a
|
||
"digital bank" could be shut down forthwith. Any bank not
|
||
filling out the proper forms (including mandatory
|
||
reporting of transactions of certain amounts and types,
|
||
and the Social Security/Taxpayer Number of customers)
|
||
faces huge fines, penalties, and regulatory sanctions.
|
||
- and the existing players in the banking and securities
|
||
business will not sit idly by while newcomers enter
|
||
their market; they will seek to force newcomers to jump
|
||
through the same hoops they had to (studies indicate
|
||
large corporations actually _like_ red tape, as it
|
||
helps them relative to smaller companies)
|
||
- Concluson: Digital banks will not be "launched" without a
|
||
*lot* of work by lawyers, accountants, tax experts,
|
||
lobbyists, etc. "Lemonade stand digital banks" (TM) will
|
||
not survive for long. Kids, don't try this at home!
|
||
- (Many new industries we are familiar with--software,
|
||
microcomputers--had very little regulation, rightly so. But
|
||
the effect is that many of us are unprepared to understand
|
||
the massive amount of red tape which businesses in other
|
||
areas, notably banking, face.)
|
||
10.8.9. Legal obstacles to digital money. If governments don't want
|
||
anonymous cash, they can make things tough.
|
||
+ As both Perry Metzger and Eric Hughes have said many times,
|
||
regulations can make life very difficult. Compliance with
|
||
laws is a major cost of doing business.
|
||
- ~"The cost of compliance in a typical USA bank is 14% of
|
||
operating costs."~ [Eric Hughes, citing an "American
|
||
Banker" article, 1994-08-30]
|
||
+ The maze of regulations is navigable by larger
|
||
institutions, with staffs of lawyers, accountants, tax
|
||
specialists, etc., but is essentially beyond the
|
||
capabilities of very small institutions, at least in the
|
||
U.S.
|
||
- this may or may not remain the case, as computers
|
||
proliferate. A "bank-in-a-box" program might help. My
|
||
suspicion is that a certain size of staff is needed just
|
||
to handle the face-to-face meetings and hoop-jumping.
|
||
+ "New World Order"
|
||
- U.S. urging other countries to "play ball" on banking
|
||
secrecy, on tax evasion extradition, on immigration, etc.
|
||
- this is closing off the former loopholes and escape
|
||
hatches that allowed people to escape repressive
|
||
taxation...the implications for digital money banks are
|
||
unclear, but worrisome.
|
||
|
||
10.9. Legality of Digital Banks and Digital Cash?
|
||
10.9.1. In terms of banking laws, cash reporting regulations, money
|
||
laundering statutes, and the welter of laws connected with
|
||
financial transactions of all sorts, the Cypherpunks themes
|
||
and ideas are basically _illegal_. Illegal in the sense that
|
||
anyone trying to set up his own bank, or alternative currency
|
||
system, or the like would be shut down quickly. As an
|
||
informal, unnoticed _experiment_, such things are reasonably
|
||
safe...until they get noticed.
|
||
10.9.2. The operative word here is "launch," in my opinion. The
|
||
"launch" of the BankAmericard (now VISA) in the 1960s was not
|
||
done lightly or casually...it required armies of lawyers,
|
||
accountants, and other bureacrats to make the launch both
|
||
legal and successful. The mere 'idea" of a credit card was
|
||
not enough...that was essentially the easiest part of it all.
|
||
(Anyone contemplating the launch of a digital cash system
|
||
would do well to study BankAmericard as an example...and
|
||
several other examples also.)
|
||
10.9.3. The same will be true of any digital cash or similar system
|
||
which intends to operate more or less openly, to interface
|
||
with existing financial institutions, and which is not
|
||
explicity intended to be a Cypherpunkish underground
|
||
activity.
|
||
|
||
10.10. Export of Crypto, ITAR, and Similar Laws
|
||
10.10.1. "What are the laws and regulations about export of crypto,
|
||
and where can I find more information?"
|
||
- "The short answer is that the Department of State, Office
|
||
of Defense Trade Controls (DOS/DTC) and the National
|
||
Security Administration (NSA) won't allow unrestricted
|
||
export (like is being done with WinCrypt) for any
|
||
encryption program that the NSA can't crack with less than
|
||
a certain amount (that they are loathe to reveal) of
|
||
effort. For the long answer, see
|
||
ftp://ftp.csn.net/cryptusa.txt.gz and/or call DOS/DTC at
|
||
703-875-7041." [Michael Paul Johnson, sci.crypt, 1994-07-
|
||
08]
|
||
10.10.2. "Is it illegal to send encrypted stuff out of the U.S.?"
|
||
- This has come up several times, with folks claiming they've
|
||
heard this.
|
||
- In times of war, real war, sending encrypted messages may
|
||
indeed be suspect, perhaps even illegal.
|
||
- But the U.S. currently has no such laws, and many of us
|
||
send lots of encrypted stuff outside the U.S. To remailers,
|
||
to friends, etc.
|
||
- Encrypted files are often tough to distinguish from
|
||
ordinary compressed files (high entropy), so law
|
||
enforcement would have a hard time.
|
||
- However, other countries may have different laws.
|
||
10.10.3. "What's the situation about export of crypto?"
|
||
+ There's been much debate about this, with the case of Phil
|
||
Zimmermann possibly being an important test case, should
|
||
charges be filed.
|
||
- as of 1994-09, the Grand Jury in San Jose has not said
|
||
anything (it's been about 7-9 months since they started
|
||
on this issue)
|
||
- Dan Bernstein has argued that ITAR covers nearly all
|
||
aspects of exporting crypto material, including codes,
|
||
documentation, and even "knowledge." (Controversially, it
|
||
may be in violation of ITAR for knowledgeable crypto people
|
||
to even leave the country with the intention of developing
|
||
crypto tools overseas.)
|
||
- The various distributions of PGP that have occurred via
|
||
anonymous ftp sources don't imply that ITAR is not being
|
||
enforced, or won't be in the future.
|
||
10.10.4. Why and How Crypto is Not the Same as Armaments
|
||
- the gun comparison has advantages and disadvantages
|
||
- "right to keep and bear arms"
|
||
- but then this opens the door wide to restrictions,
|
||
regulations, comparisons of crypto to nuclear weapons, etc.
|
||
-
|
||
+ "Crypto is not capable of killing people directly. Crypto
|
||
consists
|
||
- entirely of information (speech, if you must) that cannot
|
||
be
|
||
- interdicted. Crypto has civilian use.
|
||
- -
|
||
- <Robert Krawitz <rlk@think.com>, 4-11-94, sci.crypt>
|
||
10.10.5. "What's ITAR and what does it cover?"
|
||
+ ITAR, the International Trafficking in Arms Regulations, is
|
||
the defining set of rules for export of munitions--and
|
||
crypto is treated as munitions.
|
||
- regulations for interpreting export laws
|
||
+ NSA may have doubts that ITAR would hold up in court
|
||
- Some might argue that this contravenes the Constitution,
|
||
and hence would fail in court. Again, there have been few
|
||
if any solid tests of ITAR in court, and some indications
|
||
that NSA lawyers are reluctant to see it tested, fearing
|
||
it would not pass muster.
|
||
- doubts about legality (Carl Nicolai saw papers, since
|
||
confirmed in a FOIA)
|
||
- Brooks statement
|
||
- Cantwell Bill
|
||
- not fully tested in court
|
||
+ reports of NSA worries that it wouldn't hold up in court if
|
||
ever challenged
|
||
- Carl Nicolai, later FOIA results, conversations with Phil
|
||
+ Legal Actions Surrounding ITAR
|
||
- The ITAR laws may be used to fight hackers and
|
||
Cypherpunks...the outcome of the Zimmermann indictment
|
||
will be an important sign.
|
||
+ What ITAR covers
|
||
- "ITAR 121.8(f): ``Software includes but is not limited to
|
||
the system functional design, logic flow, algorithms,
|
||
application programs, operating systems and support
|
||
software for design, implementation, test, operation,
|
||
diagnosis and repair.'' [quoted by Dan Bernstein,
|
||
talk.politics.crypto, 1994-07-14]
|
||
- joke by Bidzos about registering as an international arms
|
||
dealer
|
||
+ ITAR and code (can code be published on the Net?)
|
||
- "Why does ITAR matter?"
|
||
- Phil Karn is involved with this, as are several others
|
||
here
|
||
+ Dan Bernstein has some strongly held views, based on his
|
||
long history of fighting the ITAR
|
||
- "Let's assume that the algorithm is capable of
|
||
maintaining secrecy of information, and that it is not
|
||
restricted to decryption, banking, analog scrambling,
|
||
special smart cards, user authentication, data
|
||
authentication, data compression, or virus protection.
|
||
|
||
"The algorithm is then in USML Category XIII(b)(1).
|
||
|
||
"It is thus a defense article. ITAR 120.6. " [Dan
|
||
Bernstein, posting code to sci.crypt,
|
||
talk.politics.crypto, 1994-08-22]
|
||
- "Sending a defense article out of the United States in
|
||
any manner (except as knowledge in your head) is
|
||
export. ITAR 120.17(1).
|
||
|
||
"So posting the algorithm constitutes export. There are
|
||
other forms of export, but I won't go into them here.
|
||
|
||
"The algorithm itself, without any source code, is
|
||
software." [Dan Bernstein, posting code to sci.crypt,
|
||
talk.politics.crypto, 1994-08-22]
|
||
- "The statute is the Arms Export Control Act; the
|
||
regulations are the
|
||
International Traffic in Arms Regulations. For precise
|
||
references, see
|
||
my ``International Traffic in Arms Regulations: A
|
||
Publisher's Guide.''" [Dan Bernstein, posting code to
|
||
sci.crypt, talk.politics.crypto, 1994-08-22]
|
||
+ "Posting code is fine. We do it all the time; we have
|
||
the right to do it; no one seems to be trying to stop us
|
||
from doing it." [Bryan G. Olson, posting code to
|
||
sci.crypt, talk.politics.crypto, 1994-08-20]
|
||
- Bernstein agrees that few busts have occurred, but
|
||
warns: "Thousands of people have distributed crypto in
|
||
violation of ITAR; only two, to my knowledge, have been
|
||
convicted. On the other hand, the guv'mint is rapidly
|
||
catching up with reality, and the Phil Zimmermann case
|
||
may be the start of a serious crackdown." [Dan
|
||
Bernstein, posting code to sci.crypt,
|
||
talk.politics.crypto, 1994-08-22]
|
||
- The common view that academic freedom means one is OK is
|
||
probably not true.
|
||
+ Hal Finney neatly summarized the debate between Bernstein
|
||
and Olsen:
|
||
- "1) No one has ever been prosecuted for posting code on
|
||
sci.crypt. The Zimmermann case, if anything ever comes
|
||
of it, was not about posting code on Usenet, AFAIK.
|
||
|
||
"2) No relevant government official has publically
|
||
expressed an opinion on whether posting code on
|
||
sci.crypt would be legal. The conversations Dan
|
||
Bernstein posted dealt with his requests for permission
|
||
to export his algorithm, not to post code on sci.crypt.
|
||
|
||
"3) We don't know whether anyone will ever be
|
||
prosecuted for posting code on sci.crypt, and we don't
|
||
know what the outcome of any such prosecution would
|
||
be." [Hal Finney, talk.politics.crypto, 1994-008-30]
|
||
10.10.6. "Can ITAR and other export laws be bypassed or skirted by
|
||
doing development offshore and then _importing_ strong crypto
|
||
into the U.S.?"
|
||
- IBM is reportedly doing just this: developing strong crypto
|
||
products for OS/2 at its overseas labs, thus skirting the
|
||
export laws (which have weakened the keys to some of their
|
||
network security products to the 40 bits that are allowed).
|
||
+ Some problems:
|
||
- can't send docs and knowhow to offshore facilities (some
|
||
obvious enforcement problems, but this is how the law
|
||
reads)
|
||
- may not even be able to transfer knowledgeable people to
|
||
offshore facilities, if the chief intent is to then have
|
||
them develop crypto products offshore (some deep
|
||
Constitutional issues, I would think...some shades of how
|
||
the U.S.S.R. justified denying departure visas for
|
||
"needed" workers)
|
||
- As with so many cases invovling crypto, there are no
|
||
defining legal cases that I am aware of.
|
||
|
||
10.11. Regulatory Arbitrage
|
||
10.11.1. Jurisdictions with more favorable laws will see claimants
|
||
going there.
|
||
10.11.2. Similar to "capital flight" and "people voting with their
|
||
feet."
|
||
10.11.3. Is the flip side of "jurisdiction shopping." wherein
|
||
prosecutors shop around for a jurisdiction that will be
|
||
likelier to convict. (As with the Amateur Action BBS case,
|
||
tried in Memphis, Tennessee, not in California.)
|
||
|
||
10.12. Crypto and Pornography
|
||
10.12.1. There's been a lot of media attention given to this,
|
||
especially pedophilia (pedophilia is not the same thing as
|
||
porn, of course, but the two are often discussed in articles
|
||
about the Net). As Rishab Ghosh put it: "I think the
|
||
pedophilic possibilities of the Internet capture the
|
||
imaginations of the media -- their deepest desires, perhaps."
|
||
[R.G., 1994-07-01]
|
||
10.12.2. The fact is, the two are made for each other. The
|
||
untraceability of remailers, the unbreakability of strong
|
||
crypto if the files are intercepted by law enforcement, and
|
||
the ability to pay anonymously, all mean the early users of
|
||
commercial remailers will likely be these folks.
|
||
10.12.3. Avoid embarrassing stings! Keep your job at the elementary
|
||
school! Get re-elected to the church council!
|
||
10.12.4. pedophilia, bestiality, etc. (morphed images)
|
||
10.12.5. Amateur Action BBS operator interested in crypto....a little
|
||
bit too late
|
||
10.12.6. There are new prospects for delivery of messages as part of
|
||
stings or entrapment attacks, where the bits decrypt into
|
||
incriminating evidence when the right key is used. (XOR of
|
||
course)
|
||
10.12.7. Just as the law enforcement folks are claiming, strong crypto
|
||
and remailers will make new kinds of porn networks. The nexus
|
||
or source will not be known, and the customers will not be
|
||
known.
|
||
- (An interesting strategy: claim customers unknown, and
|
||
their local laws. Make the "pickup" the customer's
|
||
responsibility (perhaps via agents).
|
||
|
||
10.13. Usenet, Libel, Local Laws, Jurisdictions, etc.
|
||
10.13.1. (Of peripheral importance to crypto themes, but important for
|
||
issues of coming legislation about the Net, attempts to
|
||
"regain control," etc. And a bit of a jumble of ideas, too.)
|
||
10.13.2. Many countries, many laws. Much of Usenet traffic presumably
|
||
violates various laws in Iran, China, France, Zaire, and the
|
||
U.S., to name f ew places which have laws about what thoughts
|
||
can be expressed.
|
||
10.13.3. Will this ever result in attempts to shut down Usenet, or at
|
||
least the feeds into various countries?
|
||
10.13.4. On the subject of Usenet possibly being shut-down in the U.K.
|
||
(a recent rumor, unsubstantiated), this comment: " What you
|
||
have to grasp is that USENET type networks and the whole
|
||
structure of the law on publshing are fundamentally
|
||
incompatiable. With USENT anyone can untracably distribute
|
||
pornographic, libelous, blasphemous, copyright or even
|
||
officially secret information. Now, which do you think HMG
|
||
and, for that matter, the overwhealming majority of oridnary
|
||
people in this country think is most important. USENET or
|
||
those laws?" [Malcolm McMahon, malcolm@geog.leeds.ac.uk,
|
||
comp.org.eff.talk, 1994--08-26]
|
||
10.13.5. Will it succeed? Not completely, as e-mail, gopher, the Web,
|
||
etc., still offers access. But the effects could reach most
|
||
casual users, and certainly affect the structure as we know
|
||
it today.
|
||
10.13.6. Will crypto help? Not directly--see above.
|
||
|
||
10.14. Emergency Regulations
|
||
10.14.1. Emergency Orders
|
||
- various NSDDs and the like
|
||
- "Seven Days in May" scenario
|
||
10.14.2. Legal, secrecy orders
|
||
- George Davida, U. oif Wisconsin, received letter in 1978
|
||
threatening a $10K per day fine
|
||
- Carl Nicolai, PhasorPhone
|
||
- The NSA has confirmed that parts of the EES are patented,
|
||
in secrecy, and that the patents will be made public and
|
||
then used to stop competitors should the algorithm become
|
||
known.
|
||
10.14.3. Can the FCC-type Requirements for "In the clear" broadcasting
|
||
(or keys supplied to Feds) be a basis for similar legislation
|
||
of private networks and private use of encryption?
|
||
- this would seem to be impractical, given the growth of
|
||
cellular phones, wireless LANs, etc....can't very well
|
||
mandate that corporations broadcast their internal
|
||
communications in the clear!
|
||
- compression, packet-switching, and all kinds of other
|
||
"distortions" of the data...requiring transmissions to be
|
||
readable by government agencies would require providing the
|
||
government with maps (of where the packets are going), with
|
||
specific decompression algorithms, etc....very impractical
|
||
|
||
10.15. Patents and Copyrights
|
||
10.15.1. The web of patents
|
||
- what happens is that everyone doing anything substantive
|
||
spends much of his time and money seeking patents
|
||
- patents are essential bargaining chips in dealing with
|
||
others
|
||
- e.g., DSS, Schnorr, RSADSI, etc.
|
||
- e.g., Stefan Brands is seeking patents
|
||
- Cylink suing...
|
||
10.15.2. Role of RSA, Patents, etc.
|
||
+ Bidzos: "If you make money off RSA, we make money" is the
|
||
simple rule
|
||
- but of course it goes beyond this, as even "free" uses
|
||
may have to pay
|
||
- Overlapping patents being used (apparently) to extent the
|
||
life of the portfolio
|
||
+ 4/28/97 The first of several P-K and RSA patents expires
|
||
+ U.S. Patent Number: 4200770
|
||
- Title: Cryptographic Apparatus and Method
|
||
- Inventors: Hellman, Diffie, Merkle
|
||
- Assignee: Stanford University
|
||
- Filed: September 6, 1977
|
||
- Granted: April 29, 1980
|
||
- [Expires: April 28, 1997]
|
||
+ remember that any one of these several patents held by
|
||
Public Key Partners (Stanford and M.I.T., with RSA Data
|
||
Security the chief dispenser of licenses) can block an
|
||
effort to bypass the others
|
||
- though this may get fought out in court
|
||
+ 8/18/97 The second of several P-K and RSA patents expires
|
||
+ U.S. Patent Number: 4218582
|
||
- Title: Public Key Cryptographic Apparatus and Method
|
||
- Inventors: Hellman, Merkle
|
||
- Assignee: The Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford
|
||
Junior University
|
||
- Filed: October 6, 1977
|
||
- Granted: August 19, 1980
|
||
- [Expires: August 18, 1997]
|
||
- this may be disputed because it describe algortihms in
|
||
broad terms and used the knapsack algorithm as the chief
|
||
example
|
||
+ 9/19/00 The main RSA patent expires
|
||
+ U.S. Patent Number: 4405829
|
||
- Title: Cryptographic Communications System and Method
|
||
- Inventors: Rivest, Shamir, Adleman
|
||
- Assignee: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
|
||
- Filed: December 14, 1977
|
||
- Granted: September 20, 1983
|
||
- [Expires: September 19, 2000]
|
||
10.15.3. Lawsuits against RSA patents
|
||
+ several are brewing
|
||
- Cylink is suing (strange rumors that NSA was involved)
|
||
- Roger Schlafly
|
||
10.15.4. "What about the lawsuit filed by Cylink against RSA Data
|
||
Security Inc.?"
|
||
- Very curious, considering they are both part of Public Key
|
||
Partners, the consortium of Stanford, MIT, Cylink, and RSA
|
||
Data Security Inc. (RSADSI)
|
||
- the suit was filed in the summer of 1994
|
||
+ One odd rumor I heard, from a reputable source, was that
|
||
the NSA had asked PKP to do something (?) and that Cylink
|
||
had agreed, but RSADSI had refused, helping to push the
|
||
suit along
|
||
- any links with the death threats against Bidzos?
|
||
10.15.5. "Can the patent system be used to block government use of
|
||
patents for purposes we don't like?"
|
||
- Comes up especially in the context of S. Micali's patent on
|
||
escrow techniques
|
||
- "Wouldn't matter. The government can't be enjoined from
|
||
using a patent. The federal government, in the final
|
||
analysis, can use any patent they want, without permission,
|
||
and the only recourse of the patent owner is to sue for
|
||
royalties in the Court of Claims." [Bill Larkins,
|
||
talk.politics.crypto, 1994-07-14]
|
||
|
||
10.16. Practical Issues
|
||
10.16.1. "What if I tell the authorities I Forgot My Password?"
|
||
- (or key, or passphrase...you get the idea)
|
||
- This comes up repeatedly, but the answer remains murky
|
||
10.16.2. Civil vs. Criminal
|
||
+ "This is a civil mattep, and the pights of ppivaay one haq
|
||
in cpiminal mattepq
|
||
- tend to vaniqh in aivil litigation. The paptieq to a
|
||
lawquit hate
|
||
- tpemeldouq powepq to dopae the othep qide to peteal
|
||
ildopmatiol peletalt
|
||
- to the aaqe, <@pad Templetol, 4-1-94, aomp,opg,edd,tal
|
||
10.16.3. the law is essentially what the courts say it is
|
||
|
||
10.17. Free Speech is Under Assault
|
||
10.17.1. Censorship comes in many forms. Tort law, threats of grant or
|
||
contract removal, all are limiting speech. (More reasons for
|
||
anonymous speech, of course.)
|
||
10.17.2. Discussions of cryptography could be targets of future
|
||
crackdowns. Sedition laws, conspiracy laws, RICO, etc. How
|
||
long before speaking on these matters earns a warning letter
|
||
from your university or your company? (It's the "big stick"
|
||
of ultimate government action that spurs these university and
|
||
company policies. Apple fears being shut down for having
|
||
"involvement" with a terrorist plot, Emory University fears
|
||
being sued for millions of dollars for "conspiring" to
|
||
degrade wimmin of color, etc.)
|
||
|
||
How long before "rec.guns" is no longer carried at many
|
||
sites, as they fear having their universities or companies
|
||
linked to discussions of "assault weapons" and "cop-killer
|
||
bullets"? Prediction: Many companies and universities, under
|
||
pressure from the Feds, will block groups in which encrypted
|
||
files are posted. After all, if one encrypts, one must have
|
||
something to hide, and that could expose the university to
|
||
legal action from some group that feels aggrieved.
|
||
10.17.3. Free speech is under assault across the country. The tort
|
||
system is being abused to stifle dissenting views (and lest
|
||
you think I am only a capitalist, only a free marketeer, the
|
||
use of "SLAPP suits"--"Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
|
||
Participation"--by corporations or real estate developers to
|
||
threaten those who dare to publicly speak against their
|
||
projects is a travesty, a travesty that the courts have only
|
||
recently begun to correct).
|
||
|
||
We are becoming a nation of sheep, fearing the midnight raid,
|
||
the knock on the door. We fear that if we tell a joke,
|
||
someone will glare at us and threaten to sue us _and_ our
|
||
company! And so companies are adopting "speech codes" and
|
||
other such baggage of the Orwell's totalitarian state.
|
||
Political correctness is extending its tendrils into nearly
|
||
every aspect of life in America.
|
||
|
||
10.18. Systems, Access, and the Law
|
||
10.18.1. Legal issues regarding access to systems
|
||
+ Concerns:
|
||
- access by minors to sexually explicit material
|
||
+ access from regions where access "should not be
|
||
permitted"
|
||
- export of crypto, for example
|
||
- the Memphis access to California BBS
|
||
+ Current approach: taking the promise of the accessor
|
||
- "I will not export this outside the U.S. or Canada."
|
||
- "I am of legal age to access this material."
|
||
+ Possible future approaches:
|
||
+ Callbacks, to ensure accessor is from region stated
|
||
- easy enough to bypass with cut-outs and remailers
|
||
+ "Credentials"
|
||
- a la the US Postal Service's proposed ID card (and
|
||
others)
|
||
+ cryptographically authenticated credentials
|
||
- Chaum's credentials system (certainly better than
|
||
many non-privacy-preserving credentials systems)
|
||
10.18.2. "What is a "common carrier" and how does a service become
|
||
one?"
|
||
- (This topic has significance for crypto and remailers, vis
|
||
a vis whether remailers are to be treated as common
|
||
carriers.)
|
||
- Common carriers are what the phone and package delivery
|
||
services are. They are not held liable for the contents of
|
||
phone calls, for the contents of packages (drugs,
|
||
pornography, etc.), or for illegal acts connected with
|
||
their services. One of the deals is that common carriers
|
||
not examine the insides of packages. Common carriers
|
||
essentially agree to take all traffic that pays the fee and
|
||
not to discriminate based on content. Thus, a phone service
|
||
will not ask what the subject of a call is to be, or listen
|
||
in, to decide whether to make the connection.
|
||
- Some say that to be a common carrier requires a willingness
|
||
to work with law enforcement. That is, Federal Express is
|
||
not responsible for contents of packages, but they have to
|
||
cooperate in reasonable ways with law enforcement to open
|
||
or track suspicious packages. Anybody have a cite for this?
|
||
Is it true?
|
||
- Common carrier status is also cited for bookstores, which
|
||
are not presumed to have read each and every one of the
|
||
books they sell...so if somebody blows their hand off in a
|
||
an experiment, the bookstore is not liable. (The
|
||
author/publisher may be, but that's aänt issue.)
|
||
- How does one become a common carrier? Not clear. One view
|
||
is that a service should "behave like" a common carrier and
|
||
then hope and pray that a court sees it that way.
|
||
+ Are computer services common carriers? A topic of great
|
||
interest.
|
||
- "According to a discussion I had with Dave Lawrence
|
||
(postmaster at UUNET, as well as moderator of
|
||
news.admin.newgroups), UUNET is registered with the FCC
|
||
as an "Enhanced Service Provider," which, according to
|
||
Dave, amounts to similar protection as "Common Carrier."
|
||
("Common Carrier" seems to not be appropriate yet, since
|
||
Congress is so behind the tech curve)." [L. Todd Masco,
|
||
1994-08-11]
|
||
- As for remailer networks being treated as common carriers,
|
||
totally unclear at this time. Certainly the fact that
|
||
packets are fully encrypted and unreadabel goes to part of
|
||
the issue about agreeing not to screen.
|
||
+ More on the common carrier debate:
|
||
- "Ah, the eternal Common Carrier debate. The answer is
|
||
the same as the last few times. "Common Carrier" status
|
||
has little to do with exemption from liability. It has
|
||
most to do with being unable to reject passengers, goods,
|
||
or phone calls......Plenty of non-common carrier entities
|
||
are immune from prosecution for ideas that they
|
||
unkowingly communicate -- bookstores for example (unless
|
||
they are *knowingly* porno bookstores in the wrong
|
||
jurisdiction)....Compuserve was held not liable for an
|
||
(alleged) libel by one of its sysops. Not because of
|
||
common carrier but because they had no knowledge or
|
||
control....Remailers have no knowledge or control hence
|
||
no scienter (guilty knowledge) hence no liability as a
|
||
matter of law---not a jury question BTW." [Duncan
|
||
Frissell, 1994-08-11]
|
||
|
||
10.19. Credentials
|
||
10.19.1. "Are credentials needed? Will digital methods be used?"
|
||
10.19.2. I take a radical view. Ask yourself why credentials are
|
||
_ever_ needed. Maybe for driving a car, and the like, but in
|
||
those cases anonymity is not needed, as the person is in the
|
||
car, etc.
|
||
|
||
Credentials for drinking age? Why? Let the parents enforce
|
||
this, as the argument goes about watching sex and violence on
|
||
t.v. (If one accepts the logic of requiring bars to enforce
|
||
children's behavior, then one is on a slippery slope toward
|
||
requiring television set makers to check smartcards of
|
||
viewers, or of requiring a license to access the Internet,
|
||
etc.)
|
||
|
||
In almost no cases do I see the need to carry "papers" with
|
||
me. Maybe a driver's license, like I said. In other areas,
|
||
why?
|
||
10.19.3. So Cypherpunks probably should not spend too much time
|
||
worrying about how permission slips and "hall passes" will be
|
||
handled. Little need for them.
|
||
10.19.4. "What about credentials for specific job performance, or for
|
||
establishing time-based contracts?"
|
||
- Credentials that prove one has completed certain classes,
|
||
or reached certain skill levels, etc.?
|
||
- In transactions where "future performance" is needed, as in
|
||
a contract to have a house built, or to do some similar
|
||
job, then of course the idea of on-line or immediate
|
||
clearing is bogus...like paying a stranger a sum of money
|
||
on his promise that he'll be back the next day to start
|
||
building you a house.
|
||
|
||
Parties to such long-term, non-locally-cleared cases may
|
||
contract with an escrow agent, as I described above. This
|
||
is like the "privately-produced law" we've discussed so
|
||
many times. The essence: voluntary arrangements.
|
||
|
||
Maybe proofs of identity will be needed, or asked for,
|
||
maybe not. But these are not the essence of the deal.
|
||
|
||
10.20. Escrow Agents
|
||
10.20.1. (the main discussion of this is under Crypto Anarchy)
|
||
10.20.2. Escrow Agents as a way to deal with contract renegging
|
||
- On-line clearing has the possible danger implicit in all
|
||
trades that Alice will hand over the money, Bob will verify
|
||
that it has cleared into hisaccount (in older terms, Bob
|
||
would await word that his Swiss bank account has just been
|
||
credited), and then Bob will fail to complete his end of
|
||
the bargain. If the transaction is truly anonymous, over
|
||
computer lines, then of course Bob just hangs up his modem
|
||
and the connection is broken. This situation is as old as
|
||
time, and has always involved protcols in which trust,
|
||
repeat business, etc., are factors. Or escrow agents.
|
||
- Long before the "key escrow" of Clipper, true escrow was
|
||
planned. Escrow as in escrow agents. Or bonding agents.
|
||
- Alice and Bob want to conduct a transaction. Neither trusts
|
||
the other;
|
||
indeed, they are unknown to each other. In steps "Esther's
|
||
Escrow Service." She is _also utraceable_, but has
|
||
established a digitally-signed presence and a good
|
||
reputation for fairness. Her business is in being an escrow
|
||
agent, like a bonding agency, not in "burning" either
|
||
party. (The math of this is interesting: as long as the
|
||
profits to be gained from any small set of transactions is
|
||
less than her "reputation capital," it is in her interest
|
||
to forego the profits from burning and be honest. It is
|
||
also possible to arrange that Esther cannot profit from
|
||
burning either Alice or Bob or both of them, e.g., by
|
||
suitably encrypting the escrowed stuff.)
|
||
- Alice can put her part of the transaction into escrow with
|
||
Esther, Bob can do the same, and then Esther can release
|
||
the items to the parties when conditions are met, when both
|
||
parties agree, when adjudication of some sort occurs, etc.
|
||
(There a dozen issues here, of course, about how disputes
|
||
are settled, about how parties satisfy themselves that
|
||
Esther has the items she says she has, etc.)
|
||
|
||
10.21. Loose Ends
|
||
10.21.1. Legality of trying to break crypto systems
|
||
+ "What's the legality of breaking cyphers?"
|
||
- Suppose I find some random-looking bits and find a way to
|
||
apparently decrease their entropy, perhaps turning them
|
||
into the HBO or Playboy channel? What crime have I
|
||
committed?
|
||
- "Theft of services" is what they'll get me for. Merely
|
||
listening to broadcasts can now be a crime (cellular,
|
||
police channels, satellite broadcasts). In my view, a
|
||
chilling developemt, for practical reasons (enforcement
|
||
means invasive monitoring) and for basic common sense
|
||
ethics reasons: how can listening to what lands on your
|
||
property be illegal?
|
||
- This also opens the door for laws banning listening to
|
||
certain "outlaw" or "unlicensed" braodcast stations.
|
||
Shades of the Iron Curtain. (I'm not talking about FCC
|
||
licensing, per se.)
|
||
+ "Could it ever be illegal to try to break an encryption
|
||
scheme, even if the actual underlying data is not
|
||
"stolen"?"
|
||
+ Criminalizing *tools* rather than actions
|
||
- The U.S. is moving in the direction of making mere
|
||
possession of certain tools and methods illegal, rather
|
||
than criminalizing actual actions. This has been the
|
||
case--or so I hear, though I can't cite actual laws--
|
||
with "burglar tools." (Some dispute this, pointing to
|
||
the sale of lockpicks, books on locksmithing, etc.
|
||
Still, see what happens if you try to publish a
|
||
detailed book on how to counterfeit currency.)
|
||
- Black's law term for this?
|
||
+ To some extent, it already is. Video encryption is this
|
||
way. So is cellular.
|
||
- attendees returning from a Bahamas conference on pirate
|
||
video methods (guess why it was in the Bahamas) had
|
||
their papers and demo materials seized by Customs
|
||
- Counterfeiting is, I think, in this situation, too.
|
||
Merely exploring certain aspects is verboten. (I don't
|
||
claim that all aspects are, of course.)
|
||
- Interception of broadcast signals may be illegal--
|
||
satellite or cellular phone traffic (and Digital
|
||
Telephony Act may further make such intercepts illegal
|
||
and punishable in draconian ways)
|
||
+ Outlawing of the breaking of encryption, a la the
|
||
broadcast/scanner laws
|
||
- (This came up in a thread with Steve Bellovin)
|
||
+ Aspects
|
||
+ PPL side...hard to convince a PPL agent to "enforce"
|
||
this
|
||
- but market sanctions against those who publically use
|
||
the information are of course possible, just as with
|
||
those who overhear conversations and then gossip
|
||
widely (whereas the act of overhearing is hardly a
|
||
crime)
|
||
- statutory enforcement leads to complacency, to below-
|
||
par security
|
||
+ is an unwelcome expansion of power of state to enforce
|
||
laws against decryption of numbers
|
||
- and may lead to overall restrictions on crypto use
|
||
10.21.2. wais, gopher, WWW, and implications
|
||
- borders more transparent...not clear _where_ searches are
|
||
taking place, files being transferrred, etc. (well, it is
|
||
deterministic, so some agent or program presumably knows,
|
||
but it's likely that humans don't)
|
||
10.21.3. "Why are so many prominent Cypherpunks interested in the
|
||
law?"
|
||
- Beats me. Nothing is more stultfyingly boring to me than
|
||
the cruft and "found items" nature of the law.
|
||
- However,, for a certain breed of hacker, law hacking is the
|
||
ultimate challenge. And it's important for some Cypherpunks
|
||
goals.
|
||
10.21.4. "How will crypto be fought?"
|
||
- The usual suspects: porn, pedophilia, terrorists, tax
|
||
evaders, spies
|
||
+ Claims that "national security" is at stake
|
||
- As someone has said, "National security is the root
|
||
password to the Constitution"
|
||
+ claims of discrimination
|
||
- as but one example, crypto allows offshore bank accounts,
|
||
a la carte insurance, etc...these are all things that
|
||
will shake the social welfare systems of many nations
|
||
10.21.5. Stego may also be useful in providing board operators with
|
||
"plausible deniabillity"--they can claim ignorance of the LSB
|
||
contents (I'm not saying this will stand up in court very
|
||
well, but any port in a storm, especially port 25).
|
||
10.21.6. Can a message be proved to be encrypted, and with what key?
|
||
10.21.7. Legality of digital signatures and timestamps?
|
||
- Stu Haber confirms that this has not been tested, no
|
||
precedents set
|
||
10.21.8. A legal issue about proving encryption exists
|
||
- The XOR point. Any message can be turned into any other
|
||
message, with the proper XOR intermediate message.
|
||
Implications for stego as well as for legal proof
|
||
(difficulty of). As bits leave no fingerprints, the mere
|
||
presence of a particular XOR pad on a defendant's disk is
|
||
no proof that he put it there...the cops could have planted
|
||
the incriminating key, which turns "gi6E2lf7DX01jT$" into
|
||
"Dope is ready." (I see issues of "chain of evidence"
|
||
becoming even more critical, perhaps with use of
|
||
independent "timestamping authorities" to make hashes of
|
||
seized evidence--hashes in the cryptographic sense and not
|
||
hashes in the usual police sense.)
|
||
10.21.9. "What are the dangers of standardization and official
|
||
sanctioning?"
|
||
- The U.S. has had a disturbing tendency to standardize on
|
||
some technology and then punish deviations from the
|
||
standard. Examples: telephones, cable (franchises granted,
|
||
competitors excluded)
|
||
- Franchises, standards...
|
||
+ My concern: Digital money will be blessed...home banking,
|
||
Microsoft, other banks, etc. The Treasury folks will sign
|
||
on, etc.
|
||
- Competitors will have a hard time, as government throws
|
||
roadblocks in front of them, as the U.S. makes
|
||
international deals with other countries, etc.
|
||
10.21.10. Restrictions on voice encryption?
|
||
+ may arise for an ironic reason: people can use Net
|
||
connections to talk worldwide for $1 an hour or less,
|
||
rather than $1 a minute; this may cause telcos to clamor
|
||
for restrictions
|
||
- enforcing these restrictions then becomes problematic,
|
||
unless channel is monitored
|
||
- and if encrypted...
|
||
10.21.11. Fuzziness of laws
|
||
- It may seem surprising that a nation so enmeshed in
|
||
complicated legalese as the U.S., with more lawyers per
|
||
capita than any other large nation and with a legal code
|
||
that consists of hundreds of thousands of pages of
|
||
regulations and interpretations, is actually a nation with
|
||
a legal code that is hard to pin down.
|
||
- Any system with formal, rigid rules can be "gamed against"
|
||
be an adversary. The lawmakers know this, and so the laws
|
||
are kept fuzzy enough to thwart mechanistic gaming; this
|
||
doesn't stop there from being an army of lawyers (in fact,
|
||
it guarantees it). Some would say that the laws are kept
|
||
fuzzy to increase the power of lawmakers and regulators.
|
||
- "Bank regulations in this country are kept deliberately
|
||
somewhat vague. The regulator's word is the deciding
|
||
principle, not a detailed interpretation of statute. The
|
||
lines are fuzzy, and because they are fuzzy, the banks
|
||
don't press on them nearly as hard as when there's clear
|
||
statutory language available to be interpreted in a court.
|
||
|
||
"The uncertainty in the regulatory environment _increases_
|
||
the hold the regulators have over the banks. And the
|
||
regulators are known for being decidedly finicky. Their
|
||
decisions are largely not subject to appeal (except for the
|
||
flagrant stuff, which the regulators are smart enough not
|
||
to do too often), and there's no protection against cross-
|
||
linking issues. If a bank does something untoward in, say,
|
||
mortgage banking, they may find, say, their interstate
|
||
branching possibilities seem suddenly much dimmer.
|
||
|
||
"The Dept. of Treasury doesn't want untraceable
|
||
transactions." [Eric Hughes, Cypherpunks list, 1994-8-03]
|
||
- Attempts to sneak around the laws, especially in the
|
||
context of alternative currencies, Perry Metzger notes:
|
||
"They are simply trying to stop you from playing games. The
|
||
law isn't like geometry -- there aren't axioms and rules
|
||
for deriving one thing from another. The general principle
|
||
is that they want to track all your transactions, and if
|
||
you make it difficult they will either use existing law to
|
||
jail you, or will produce a new law to try to do the same."
|
||
[Perry Metzger, 1994-08-10]
|
||
- This fuzziness and regulatory discretion is closely related
|
||
to those wacky schemes to avoid taxes by claiming , for
|
||
example, that the "dollar" is defined as 1/35th of an ounce
|
||
of gold (and that hence one's earnings in "real dollars"
|
||
are a tiny fraction of the ostensible earnings), that Ohio
|
||
did not legally enter the Union and thus the income tax was
|
||
never properly ratified,, etc. Lots of these theories have
|
||
been tested--and rejected. I mention this because some
|
||
Cypherpunks show signs of thinking "digital cash" offers
|
||
similar opportunities. (And I expect to see similar scams.)
|
||
- (A related example. Can one's accumulation of money be
|
||
taken out of the country? Depending on who you ask, "it
|
||
depends." Taking it out in your suitcase rasises all kind
|
||
of possibilies of seizure (violation of currency export
|
||
laws, money laundering, etc.). Wiring it out may invoke
|
||
FinCEN triggers. The IRS may claim it is "capital flight"
|
||
to avoid taxes--which it may well be. Basically, your own
|
||
money is no longer yours. There may be ways to do this--I
|
||
hope so--but the point remains that the rules are fuzzy,
|
||
and the discretionary powers to seize assets are great.
|
||
Seek competent counsel, and then pray.)
|
||
10.21.12. role of Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)
|
||
- not discussed in crypto circles much, but the "rules of the
|
||
road"
|
||
- in many way, an implementation of anarcho-capitalism, in
|
||
that the UCC is a descendant (modulo some details) of the
|
||
"Law Merchant" that handled relations between sovereign
|
||
powers, trade at sea, etc.
|
||
- things like electronic funds transfere, checks, liablities
|
||
for forged sigs, etc.
|
||
- I expect eventual UCC involvement in digital money schemes
|
||
10.21.13. "What about the rush to legislate, to pass laws about
|
||
cyberspace, the information superduperhighway, etc.?
|
||
+ The U.S. Congress feels it has to "do something" about
|
||
things that many of us feel don't need regulation or "help"
|
||
from Congress.
|
||
- crypto legislation
|
||
- set-top boxes, cable access, National Information
|
||
Infrastructure (Cable Version)
|
||
- information access, parental lock-outs, violence ratings,
|
||
sexually explicit materials, etc.
|
||
- Related to the "do something!" mentality on National Health
|
||
Care, guns, violence, etc.
|
||
- Why not just not do anything?
|
||
+ Scary possibilities being talked about:
|
||
+ giving television sets unique IDs ("V chips") with cable
|
||
access through these chips
|
||
- tying national ID cards to these, e.g., Joe Citizen, of
|
||
Provo, Utah, would be "allowed" to view an NC-17
|
||
violence-rated program
|
||
- This would be disastrous: records, surveillance,
|
||
dossiers, permission, centralization
|
||
- The "how can we fix it?" mindset is very damaging. Many
|
||
things just cannot be "fixed" by central planners....look
|
||
at economies for an example. The same is usually true of
|
||
technologies.
|
||
10.21.14. on use of offshore escrow agents as protection against
|
||
seizures
|
||
- contempt laws come into play, but the idea is to make
|
||
yourself powerless to alter the situation, and hence not
|
||
willfully disobeying the court
|
||
+ Can also tell offshore agents what to do with files, and
|
||
when to release them
|
||
- Eric Hughes proposes: "One solution to this is to give
|
||
the passphrase (or other access information) to someone
|
||
who won't give it back to you if you are under duress,
|
||
investigation, court order, etc. One would desire that
|
||
this entity be in a jurisdiction other than where an
|
||
investigation might happen." [E.H., 1994-07-26]
|
||
- Sandy Sandfort adds: "Prior to seizure/theft, you would
|
||
make an arrangement with an offshore "escrow agent."
|
||
After seizure you would send your computer the
|
||
instruction that says, "encrypt my disk with the escrow
|
||
agents public key." After that, only the escrow agent
|
||
could decrypt your disk. Of course, the escrow agent
|
||
would only do that when conditions you had stipulated
|
||
were in effect." [S. S., 1994-07-27]
|
||
- related to data havens and offshore credit/P.I. havens
|
||
10.21.15. Can the FCC-type Requirements for "In the clear" broadcasting
|
||
(or keys supplied to Feds) be a basis for similar legislation
|
||
of private networks and private use of encryption?
|
||
- this would seem to be impractical, given the growth of
|
||
cellular phones, wireless LANs, etc....can't very well
|
||
mandate that corporations broadcast their internal
|
||
communications in the clear!
|
||
- compression, packet-switching, and all kinds of other
|
||
"distortions" of the data...requiring transmissions to be
|
||
readable by government agencies would require providing the
|
||
government with maps (of where the packets are going), with
|
||
specific decompression algorithms, etc....very impractical
|
||
10.21.16. Things that could trigger a privacy flap or limitations on
|
||
crypto
|
||
- Anonymously publishing adoption records [suggested by Brian
|
||
Williams, 1994-08-22]
|
||
- nuclear weapons secrets (true secrets, not just the
|
||
titillating stuff that any bright physics student can
|
||
cobble together)
|
||
- repugant markets (assassinations, organ selling, etc.)
|
||
10.21.17. Pressures on civilians not to reveal crypto knowledge
|
||
+ Example: mobile phone crypto standards.
|
||
- "This was the official line until a few months ago - that
|
||
A5 was strong and A5X a weakened export
|
||
version....However, once we got hold of A5 we found that
|
||
it was not particularly strong there is an easy 2^40
|
||
attack. The government's line then changed to `you
|
||
mustn't discuss this in public because it would harm
|
||
British export sales'....Perhaps it was all a ploy to get
|
||
Saddam to buy A5 chips off some disreputable arms dealer
|
||
type. [Ross Anderson, "mobil phone in europe <gms-
|
||
standard>, a precedence?," sci.crypt, 1994-08-15]
|
||
- Now this example comes from Britain, where the
|
||
intelligence community has always had more lattitude than
|
||
in the U.S. (an Official Secrets Act, limits on the
|
||
press, no pesky Constitution to get in the way, and even
|
||
more of an old boy's network than we have in the U.S.
|
||
mil-industrial complex).
|
||
- And the threat by NSA officials to have Jim Bidzos, the
|
||
president of RSA Data Security, Inc., killed if he didn't
|
||
play ball. {"The Keys to the Kingdom," San Jose Mercury
|
||
News]
|
||
10.21.18. "identity escrow", Eric Hughes, for restrictions on e-mail
|
||
accounts and electronic PO boxes (has been talked about,
|
||
apparently...no details)
|
||
|
||
11. Surveillance, Privacy, And Intelligence Agencies
|
||
|
||
11.1. copyright
|
||
THE CYPHERNOMICON: Cypherpunks FAQ and More, Version 0.666,
|
||
1994-09-10, Copyright Timothy C. May. All rights reserved.
|
||
See the detailed disclaimer. Use short sections under "fair
|
||
use" provisions, with appropriate credit, but don't put your
|
||
name on my words.
|
||
|
||
11.2. SUMMARY: Surveillance, Privacy, And Intelligence Agencies
|
||
11.2.1. Main Points
|
||
11.2.2. Connections to Other Sections
|
||
11.2.3. Where to Find Additional Information
|
||
- Bamford ("The Puzzle Palace"), Richelson (several books,
|
||
including "U.S. Intelligence Agencies"), Burrows ("Deep
|
||
Black," about the NRO and spy satellites), Covert Action
|
||
Quarterly
|
||
11.2.4. Miscellaneous Comments
|
||
|
||
11.3. Surveillance and Privacy
|
||
11.3.1. We've come a long way from Secretary of State Stimpson's
|
||
famous "Gentlemen do not read other gentlemen's mail"
|
||
statement. It is now widely taken for granted that Americans
|
||
are to be monitored, surveilled, and even wiretapped by the
|
||
various intelligence agencies. The FBI, the National Security
|
||
Agency, the CIA, the National Reconnaissance Office, etc.
|
||
(Yes, these groups have various charters telling them who
|
||
they can spy on, what legalities they have to meet, etc. But
|
||
they still spy. And there's not an uproar--the "What have you
|
||
got to hide?" side of the American privacy dichotomy.)
|
||
11.3.2. Duncan Frissell reminds us of Justice Jackson's 1948
|
||
dissenting opinion in some case:
|
||
- "The government could simplify criminal law enforcement by
|
||
requiring every citizen "to keep a diary that would show
|
||
where he was at all times, with whom he was, and what he
|
||
was up to." [D.F. 1994-09-06, from an article in the WSJ]
|
||
- (It should be noted that tracking devices--collars,
|
||
bracelets, implantable transmitters--exist and are in use
|
||
with prisoners. Some parents are even installing them in
|
||
children, it is rumored. A worry for the future?)
|
||
11.3.3. "What is the "surveillance state"?"
|
||
- the issue with crypto is the _centralization_ of
|
||
eavesdropping...much easier than planting bugs
|
||
+ "Should some freedom be given up for security?"
|
||
+ "Those who are willing to trade freedom for security
|
||
- deserve neither
|
||
+ freedom nor security
|
||
- Ben Franklin
|
||
- the tradeoff is often illusory--police states result when
|
||
the trains are made to run on time
|
||
- "It's a bit ironic that the Administration is crying foul
|
||
so loudly
|
||
over the Soviet/Russian spy in the CIA -- as if this was
|
||
unfair --
|
||
while they're openly proclaiming the right to spy on
|
||
citizens
|
||
and foreigners via Clipper." [Carl Ellison, 1994-02-23]
|
||
+ Cameras are becoming ubiquitous
|
||
+ cheap, integrated, new technologes
|
||
- SDI fisheye lens
|
||
- ATMs
|
||
- traffic, speed traps, street corners
|
||
- store security
|
||
- Barcodes--worst fear of all...and not plausible
|
||
+ Automatic recognition is still lacking
|
||
- getting better, slowly
|
||
- neural nets, etc. (but these require training)
|
||
11.3.4. "Why would the government monitor _my_ communications?"
|
||
- "Because of economics and political stability....You can
|
||
build computers and monitoring devices in secret, deploy
|
||
them in secret, and listen to _everything_. To listen to
|
||
everything with bludgeons and pharmaceuticals would not
|
||
only cost more in labor and equipment, but also engender a
|
||
radicalizing backlash to an actual police state." [Eric
|
||
Hughes, 1994-01-26]
|
||
- Systems like Digital Telephony and Clipper make it much too
|
||
easy for governments to routinely monitor their citizens,
|
||
using automated technology that requires drastically less
|
||
human involvement than previous police states required.
|
||
11.3.5. "How much surveillance is actually being done today?"
|
||
+ FBI and Law Enforcement Surveillance Activities
|
||
- the FBI kept records of meetings (between American
|
||
companies and Nazi interests), and may have used these
|
||
records during and after the war to pressure companies
|
||
+ NSA and Security Agency Surveillance Activities
|
||
- collecting economic intelligence
|
||
- in WW2, Economic Warfare Council (which was renamed Board
|
||
of Economic Warfare) kept tabs on shipments of petroleum
|
||
and other products
|
||
+ MINARET, code word for NSA "watch list" material
|
||
(intercepts)
|
||
- SIGINT OPERATION MINARET
|
||
- originally, watch list material was "TOP SECRET
|
||
HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY UMBRA GAMMA"
|
||
+ NSA targeting is done primarily via a list called
|
||
Intelligence Guidelines for COMINT Priorities (IGCP)
|
||
- committe made up of representatives from several
|
||
intelligence agencies
|
||
- intiated in around 1966
|
||
+ revelations following Pentagon Papers that national
|
||
security elsur had picked up private conversations (part
|
||
of the Papers)
|
||
- timing of PP was late 1963, early 1964...about time UB
|
||
was getting going
|
||
+ F-3, the NSA's main antenna system for intercepting ASCII
|
||
transmissions from un-TEMPESTed terminals and PCs
|
||
- signals can be picked up through walls up to a foot
|
||
thick (or more, considering how such impulses bounce
|
||
around)
|
||
+ Joint FBI/NSA Surveillance Activities
|
||
+ Operation Shamrock was a tie between NSA and FBI
|
||
- since 1945, although there had been earlier intercepts,
|
||
too
|
||
- COINTELPRO, dissidents, radicals
|
||
+ 8/0/45 Operation Shamrock begins
|
||
- a sub rosa effort to continue the monitoring
|
||
arrangements of WW II
|
||
- ITT Communications agreed to turn over all cables
|
||
+ RCA Communications also turned over all cables
|
||
- even had an ex-Signal Corps officer as a VP to
|
||
handle the details
|
||
- direct hookups to RCA lines were made, for careful
|
||
monitoring by the ASA
|
||
- cables to and from corporations, law firms,
|
||
embassies, citizens were all kept
|
||
+ 12/16/47 Meeting between Sosthenes Behn of ITT,
|
||
General Ingles of RCA, and Sec. of Defense James
|
||
Forrestal
|
||
- to discuss Operation Shamrock
|
||
- to arrange exemptions from prosecution
|
||
+ 0/0/63 Operation Shamrock enters a new phase as RCA
|
||
Global switches to computerized operation
|
||
- coincident with Harvest at NSA
|
||
- and perfect for start of UB/Severn operations
|
||
+ 1/6/67 Hoover officially terminates "black bag"
|
||
operations
|
||
- concerned about blowback
|
||
- had previously helped NSA by stealing codes, ciphers,
|
||
decrypted traffic, planting bugs on phone lines, etc.
|
||
- from embassies, corporations
|
||
- unclear as to whether these operations continued
|
||
anyway
|
||
+ Plot Twist: may have been the motivation for NSA and
|
||
UB/Severn to pursue other avenues, such as the use of
|
||
criminals as cutouts
|
||
- and is parallel to "Plumbers Unit" used by White
|
||
House
|
||
+ 10/1/73 AG Elliot Richardson orders FBI and SS to
|
||
stop requesting NSA surveillance material
|
||
- NSA agreed to stop providing this, but didn't tell
|
||
Richardson about Shamrock or Minaret
|
||
- however, events of this year (1973) marked the end of
|
||
Minaret
|
||
+ 3/4/77 Justice Dept. recommends against prosecution
|
||
of any NSA or FBI personnel over Operations Shamrock
|
||
and Minaret
|
||
- decided that NSCID No. 9 (aka No. 6) gave NSA
|
||
sufficient leeway
|
||
- 5/15/75 Operation Shamrock officially terminated
|
||
- and Minaret, of course
|
||
+ Operation Shamrock-Details
|
||
+ 8/0/45 Operation Shamrock begins
|
||
- a sub rosa effort to continue the monitoring
|
||
arrangements of WW II
|
||
- ITT Communications agreed to turn over all cables
|
||
+ RCA Communications also turned over all cables
|
||
- even had an ex-Signal Corps officer as a VP to
|
||
handle the details
|
||
- direct hookups to RCA lines were made, for careful
|
||
monitoring by the ASA
|
||
- cables to and from corporations, law firms,
|
||
embassies, citizens were all kept
|
||
+ 12/16/47 Meeting between Sosthenes Behn of ITT,
|
||
General Ingles of RCA, and Sec. of Defense James
|
||
Forrestal
|
||
- to discuss Operation Shamrock
|
||
- to arrange exemptions from prosecution
|
||
+ 0/0/63 Operation Shamrock enters a new phase as RCA
|
||
Global switches to computerized operation
|
||
- coincident with Harvest at NSA
|
||
- and perfect for start of UB/Severn operations
|
||
+ 8/18/66 (Thursday) New analysis site in New York for
|
||
Operation Shamrock
|
||
+ Louis Tordella meets with CIA Dep. Dir. of Plans and
|
||
arranges to set up a new listening post for analysis
|
||
of the tapes from RCA and ITT (that had been being
|
||
shipped to NSA and then back)
|
||
- Tordella was later involved in setting up the watch
|
||
list in 1970 for the BNDD, (Operation Minaret)
|
||
- LPMEDLEY was code name, of a television tape
|
||
processing shop (reminiscent of "Man from U.N.C.L.E."
|
||
- but NSA had too move away later
|
||
- 5/15/75 Operation Shamrock officially terminated
|
||
+ 10/1/73 AG Elliot Richardson orders FBI and SS to
|
||
stop requesting NSA surveillance material
|
||
- NSA agreed to stop providing this, but didn't tell
|
||
Richardson about Shamrock or Minaret
|
||
- however, events of this year (1973) marked the end of
|
||
Minaret
|
||
- Abzug committee prompted by New York Daily News report,
|
||
7/22/75, that NSA and FBI had been monitoring
|
||
commercial cable traffic (Operation Shamrock)
|
||
+ 6/30/76 175 page report on Justice Dept.
|
||
investigation of Shamrock and Minaret
|
||
- only 2 copies prepared, classified TOP SECRET UMBRA,
|
||
HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
|
||
+ 3/4/77 Justice Dept. recommends against prosecution
|
||
of any NSA or FBI personnel over Operations Shamrock
|
||
and Minaret
|
||
- decided that NSCID No. 9 (aka No. 6) gave NSA
|
||
sufficient leeway
|
||
+ the NSA program, begun in August 1945, to monitor all
|
||
telegrams entering or leaving the U.S.
|
||
- reminiscent of Yardley's arrangements in the 1920s
|
||
(and probably some others)
|
||
- known only to Louis Tordella and agents involved
|
||
- compartmentalization
|
||
+ Plot Links of Operation Shamrock to Operation Ultra
|
||
Black
|
||
- many links, from secrecy, compartmentalization, and
|
||
illegality to the methods used and the subversion of
|
||
government power
|
||
- "Shamrock was blown...Ultra Black burrowed even
|
||
deeper."
|
||
+ NSA, FBI, and surveillance of Cuban sympathizers
|
||
- "watch list" used
|
||
- were there links to Meyer Lansky and Trafficante via
|
||
the JFK-Mafia connection?
|
||
- various Watergate break-in connections (Cubans used)
|
||
- Hoover ended black-bag operations in 1967-8
|
||
+ NSA, FBI, and Dissenters (COINTELPRO-type activities)
|
||
+ 10/20/67 NSA is asked to begin collecting information
|
||
related to civil disturbances, war protesters, etc.
|
||
- Army Intelligence, Secret Service, CIA, FBI, DIA were
|
||
all involved
|
||
- arguably, this continues (given the success of FBI
|
||
and Secret Service in heading off major acts of
|
||
terrorism and attempted assassinations)
|
||
+ Huston Plan and Related Plans (1970-71)
|
||
- 7/19/66 Hoover unofficially terminates black bag
|
||
operations
|
||
+ 1/6/67 Hoover officially terminates black bag
|
||
operations
|
||
- fearing blowback, concerned about his place in
|
||
history
|
||
+ 6/20/69 Tom C. Huston recommends increased
|
||
intelligence activity on dissent
|
||
- memo to NSA, CIA, DIA, FBI
|
||
- this later becomes basis of Huston Plan
|
||
+ 6/5/70 Meeting at White House to prepare for Huston
|
||
Plan; Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc),
|
||
ICI
|
||
- Nixon, Huston, Ehrlichman, Haldeman, Noel Gayler of
|
||
NSA. Richard Helms of CIA, J. Edgar Hoover of FBI,
|
||
Donald V. Bennett of DIA
|
||
- William Sullivan of FBI named to head ICI
|
||
+ NSA enthusiastically supported ICI
|
||
- PROD named Benson Buffham as liaison
|
||
- sought increased surreptitious entries and
|
||
elimination of legal restrictions on domestic
|
||
surveillance (not that they had felt bound by
|
||
legalisms)
|
||
- recipients to be on "Bigot List" and with even more
|
||
security than traditional TOP SECRET, HANDLE VIA
|
||
COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
|
||
-
|
||
+ 7/23/70 Huston Plan circulated
|
||
- 43 pages, entitled Domestic Intelligence Gathering
|
||
Plan: Analysis and Stategy
|
||
- urged increased surreptitious entries (for codes,
|
||
ciphers, plans, membership lists)
|
||
- targeting of embassies
|
||
+ 7/27/70 Huston Plan cancelled
|
||
- pressure by Attorney General John Mitchell
|
||
- and perhaps by Hoover
|
||
- Huston demoted; he resigned a year later
|
||
- but the Plan was not really dead...perhaps Huston's
|
||
mistake was in being young and vocal and making the
|
||
report too visible and not deniable enough
|
||
+ 12/3/70 Intelligence Evaluation Committee (IEC) meets
|
||
(Son-of-Huston Plan)
|
||
- John Dean arranged it in fall of '70
|
||
- Robert C. Mardian, Assistant AG for Internal Security
|
||
headed up the IEC
|
||
- Benson Buffham of NSA/PROD, James Jesus Angleton of
|
||
CIA, George Moore from FBI, Col. John Downie from DOD
|
||
- essentially adopted all of Huston Plan
|
||
+ 1/26/71 NSA issues NSA Contribution to Domestic
|
||
Intelligence (as part of IEC)
|
||
- increased scope of surveillance related to drugs (via
|
||
BNDD and FBI), foreign nationals
|
||
- "no indication of origin" on generated material
|
||
- full compartmentalization, NSA to ensure compliance
|
||
+ 8/4/71 G. Gordon Liddy attends IEC meeting, to get
|
||
them to investigate leaks of Pentagon Papers
|
||
- channel from NSA/PROD to Plumber's Unit in White
|
||
House, bypassing other agencies
|
||
+ 6/7/73 New York Times reveals details of Huston Plan
|
||
- full text published
|
||
- trials of Weatherman jeopardized and ultimately
|
||
derailed it
|
||
+ 10/1/73 AG Elliot Richardson orders FBI and SS to
|
||
stop requesting NSA surveillance material
|
||
- NSA agreed to stop providing this, but didn't tell
|
||
Richardson about Shamrock or Minaret
|
||
- however, events of this year (1973) marked the end of
|
||
Minaret
|
||
+ FINCEN, IRS, and Other Economic Surveillance
|
||
- set up in Arlington as a group to monitor the flows of
|
||
money and information
|
||
+ eventually these groups will see the need to actively
|
||
hack into computer systems used by various groups that
|
||
are under investigation
|
||
- ties to the death of Alan Standorf? (Vint Hill)
|
||
- Casolaro, Riconosciutto
|
||
11.3.6. "Does the government want to monitor economic transactions?"
|
||
- Incontrovertibly, they _want_ to. Whether they have actual
|
||
plans to do so is more debatable. The Clipper and Digital
|
||
Telephony proposals are but two of the indications they
|
||
have great plans laid to ensure their surveillance
|
||
capabilities are maintained and extended.
|
||
- The government will get increasingly panicky as more Net
|
||
commerce develops, as trade moves offshore, and as
|
||
encryption spreads.
|
||
11.3.7. A danger of the surveillance society: You can't hide
|
||
- seldom discussed as a concern
|
||
- no escape valve, no place for those who made mistakes to
|
||
escape to
|
||
- (historically, this is a way for criminals to get back on a
|
||
better track--if a digital identity means their record
|
||
forever follows them, this may...)
|
||
+ A growing problem in America and other "democratic"
|
||
countries is the tendency to make mandatory what were once
|
||
voluntary choices. For example, fingerprinting children to
|
||
help in kidnapping cases may be a reasonable thing to do
|
||
voluntarily, but some school districts are planning to make
|
||
it mandatory.
|
||
- This is all part of the "Let's pass a law" mentality.
|
||
11.3.8. "Should I refuse to give my Social Security Number to those
|
||
who ask for it?"
|
||
- It's a bit off of crypto, but the question does keep coming
|
||
up on the Cypherpunks list.
|
||
- Actually, they don't even need to ask for it
|
||
anymore....it's attached to so many _other_ things that pop
|
||
up when they enter your name that it's a moot point. In
|
||
other words, the same dossiers that allow the credit card
|
||
companies to send you "preapproved credit cards" every few
|
||
days are the same dossiers that MCI, Sprint, AT&T, etc. are
|
||
using to sign you up.
|
||
11.3.9. "What is 'Privacy 101'?"
|
||
- I couldn't think of a better way to introduce the topic of
|
||
how individuals can protect their privacy, avoid
|
||
interference by the government, and (perhaps) avoid taxes.
|
||
- Duncan Frissell and Sandy Sandfort have given out a lot of
|
||
tips on this, some of them just plain common sense, some of
|
||
them more arcane.
|
||
+ They are conducting a seminar, entitled "PRIVACY 101" and
|
||
the archives of this are available by Web at:
|
||
- http://www.iquest.com/~fairgate/privacy/index.html
|
||
11.3.10. Cellular phones are trackable by region...people are getting
|
||
phone calls as they cross into new zones, "welcoming" them
|
||
- but it implies that their position is already being tracked
|
||
11.3.11. Ubiquitous use of SSNs and other personal I.D.
|
||
11.3.12. cameras that can recognize faces are placed in many public
|
||
places, e.g., airports, ports of entry, government buildings
|
||
- and even in some private places, e.g., casinos, stores that
|
||
have had problems with certain customers, banks that face
|
||
robberies, etc.
|
||
11.3.13. speculation (for the paranoids)
|
||
- covert surveillance by noninvasive detection
|
||
methods...positron emission tomography to see what part of
|
||
the brain is active (think of the paranoia possibility!)
|
||
- typically needs special compounds, but...
|
||
11.3.14. Diaries are no longer private
|
||
+ can be opened under several conditions
|
||
- subpoena in trial
|
||
- discovery in various court cases, including divorce,
|
||
custody, libel, etc.
|
||
- business dealings
|
||
- psychiatrists (under Tarasoff ruling) can have records
|
||
opened; whatever one may think of the need for crimes
|
||
confessed to shrinks to be reported, this is certainly a
|
||
new era
|
||
- Packwood diary case establishes the trend: diaries are no
|
||
longer sacrosanct
|
||
- An implication for crypto and Cypherpunks topics is that
|
||
diaries and similar records may be stored in encrypted
|
||
forms, or located in offshore locations. There may be more
|
||
and more use of offshore or encrypted records.
|
||
|
||
11.4. U.S. Intelligence Agencies: NSA, FinCEN, CIA, DIA, NRO, FBI
|
||
11.4.1. The focus here is on U.S. agencies, for various reasons. Most
|
||
Cypherpunks are currently Americans, the NSA has a dominant
|
||
role in surveillance technology, and the U.S. is the focus of
|
||
most current crypto debate. (Britain has the GCHQ, Canada has
|
||
its own SIGINT group, the Dutch have...., France has DGSE and
|
||
so forth, and...)
|
||
11.4.2. Technically, not all are equal. And some may quibble with my
|
||
calling the FBI an "intelligence agency." All have
|
||
surveillance and monitoring functions, albeit of different
|
||
flavors.
|
||
11.4.3. "Is the NSA involved in domestic surveillance?"
|
||
+ Not completely confirmed, but much evidence that the answer
|
||
is "yes":
|
||
* previous domestic surveillance (Operation Shamrock,
|
||
telegraphs, ITT, collusion with FBI, etc.)
|
||
* reciprocal arrangements with GCHQ (U.K.)
|
||
* arrangements on Indian reservations for microwave
|
||
intercepts
|
||
* the general technology allows it (SIGINT, phone lines)
|
||
* the National Security Act of 1947, and later
|
||
clarifications and Executive Orders, makes it likely
|
||
- And the push for Digital Telephony.
|
||
11.4.4. "What will be the effects of widespread crypto use on
|
||
intelligence collection?"
|
||
- Read Bamford for some stuff on how the NSA intercepts
|
||
overseas communications, how they sold deliberately-
|
||
crippled crypto machines to Third World nations, and how
|
||
much they fear the spread of strong, essentially
|
||
unbreakable crypto. "The Puzzle Palace" was published in
|
||
1982...things have only gotten worse in this regard since.
|
||
- Statements from senior intelligence officials reflect this
|
||
concern.
|
||
- Digital dead drops will change the whole espionage game.
|
||
Information markets, data havens, untraceable e-mail...all
|
||
of these things will have a profound effect on national
|
||
security issues.
|
||
- I expect folks like Tom Clancy to be writing novels about
|
||
how U.S. national security interests are being threatened
|
||
by "unbreakable crypto." (I like some Clancy novels, but
|
||
there's no denying he is a right-winger who's openly
|
||
critical of social trends, and that he believes druggies
|
||
should be killed, the government is necessary to ward off
|
||
evil, and ordinary citizens ought not to have tools the
|
||
government can't overcome.)
|
||
11.4.5. "What will the effects of crypto on conventional espionage?"
|
||
- Massive effects; watch out for this to be cited as a reason
|
||
to ban or restrict crypto--however pointless that may be.
|
||
+ Effects:
|
||
- information markets, a la BlackNet
|
||
- digital dead drops -- why use Coke cans near oak trees
|
||
when you can put messages into files and post them
|
||
worldwide, with untraceably? (but, importantly, with a
|
||
digital signature!)
|
||
- transparency of borders
|
||
- arms trade, arms deals
|
||
- virus, weaponry
|
||
11.4.6. NSA budget
|
||
- $27 billion over 6 years, give or take
|
||
- may actually increase, despite end of Cold War
|
||
- new threats, smaller states, spread of nukes, concerns
|
||
about trade, money-laundering, etc.
|
||
- first rule of bureaucracies: they always get bigger
|
||
+ NSA-Cray Computer supercomputer
|
||
+ press release, 1994-08-17, gives some clues about the
|
||
capabilities sought by the surveillance state
|
||
- "The Cray-3/SSS will be a hybrid system capable of
|
||
vector parallel processing, scalable parallel
|
||
processing and a combination of both. The system will
|
||
consist of a dual processor 256 million word Cray-3 and
|
||
a 512,000 processor 128 million byte single instruction
|
||
multiple data (SIMD) array......SIMD arrays of one
|
||
million processors are expected to be possible using
|
||
the current version of the Processor-In-Memory (PIM)
|
||
chips developed by the Supercomputing Research Center
|
||
once the development project is completed. The PIM chip
|
||
contains 64 single-bit processors and 128 kilobyte bits
|
||
of memory. Cray Computer will package PIM chips
|
||
utilizing its advanced multiple chip module packaging
|
||
technology. The chips are manufactured by National
|
||
Semiconductor Corporation."
|
||
- This is probably the supercomputer described in the
|
||
Gunter Ahrendt report
|
||
11.4.7. FINCEN, IRS, and Other Economic Surveillance
|
||
- Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, a consortium or task
|
||
force made up of DEA, DOJ, FBI, CIA, DIA, NSA, IRS, etc.
|
||
- set up in Arlington as a group to monitor the flows of
|
||
money and information
|
||
- eventually these groups will see the need to hack into
|
||
computer systems used by various groups that are under
|
||
investigation
|
||
- Cf. "Wired," either November or December, 1993
|
||
11.4.8. "Why are so many computer service, telecom, and credit agency
|
||
companies located near U.S. intelligence agency sites?"
|
||
+ For example, the cluster of telecom and credit reporting
|
||
agencies (TRW Credit, Transunion, etc.) in and around the
|
||
McLean/Langley area of Northern Virginia (including
|
||
Herndon, Vienna, Tyson's Corner, Chantilly, etc.)
|
||
- same thing for, as I recall, various computer network
|
||
providers, such as UUCP (or whatever), America Online,
|
||
etc.
|
||
- The least conspiratorial view: because all are located near
|
||
Washington, D.C., for various regulatory, lobbying, etc.
|
||
reasons
|
||
+ The most conspiratorial view: to ensure that the
|
||
intelligence agencies have easy access to communications,
|
||
direct landlines, etc.
|
||
- credit reporting agencies need to clear identities that
|
||
are fabricated for the intelligence agencies, WitSec,
|
||
etc. (the three major credit agencies have to be
|
||
complicit in these creations, as the "ghosts" show up
|
||
immediately when past records are cross-correlated)
|
||
- As Paul Ferguson, Cypherpunk and manager at US Sprint,
|
||
puts it: "We're located in Herndon, Virginia, right
|
||
across the street from Dulles Airport and a hop, skip &
|
||
jump down the street from the new NRO office. ,-)"
|
||
[P.F., 1994-08-18]
|
||
11.4.9. Task Force 157, ONI, Kissinger, Castle Bank, Nugan Hand Bank,
|
||
CIA
|
||
11.4.10. NRO building controversy
|
||
- and an agency I hadn't seen listed until August, 1994: "The
|
||
Central Imagery Office"
|
||
11.4.11. SIGINT listening posts
|
||
+ possible monkeywrenching?
|
||
- probably too hard, even for an EMP bomb (non-nuclear,
|
||
that is)
|
||
11.4.12. "What steps is the NSA taking?"
|
||
* besides death threats against Jim Bidzos, that is
|
||
* Clipper a plan to drive competitors out (pricing, export
|
||
laws, harassment)
|
||
* cooperation with other intelligence agencies, other nations
|
||
- New World Order
|
||
* death threats were likely just a case of bullying...but
|
||
could conceivably be part of a campaign of terror--to shut
|
||
up critics or at least cause them to hesitate
|
||
|
||
11.5. Surveillance in Other Countries
|
||
11.5.1. Partly this overlaps on the earlier discussion of crypto laws
|
||
in other countries.
|
||
11.5.2. Major Non-U.S. Surveillance Organizations
|
||
+ BnD -- Bundesnachrichtendienst
|
||
- German security service
|
||
- BND is seeking constitutional amendment, buy may not need
|
||
it, as the mere call for it told everyone what is already
|
||
existing
|
||
- "vacuum cleaner in the ether"
|
||
- Gehlen...Eastern Front Intelligence
|
||
- Pullach, outside Munchen
|
||
- they have always tried to get the approval to do domestic
|
||
spying...a key to power
|
||
+ Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) -- W. German FBI
|
||
- HQ is at Wiesbaden
|
||
- bomb blew up there when being examined, killing an
|
||
officer (related to Pan Am/Lockerbie/PFLP-GC)
|
||
- sign has double black eagles (back to back)
|
||
- BVD -- Binnenlandse Veiligheids Dienst, Dutch Internal
|
||
Security Service
|
||
+ SDECE
|
||
- French intelligence (foreign intelligence), linked to
|
||
Greepeace ship bombing in New Zealand?
|
||
- SDECE had links to the October Surprise, as some French
|
||
agents were in on the negotiations, the arms shipments
|
||
out of Marseilles and Toulon, and in meetings with
|
||
Russbacher and the others
|
||
- DST, Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire,
|
||
counterespionage arm of France (parallel to FBI)
|
||
+ DSGE, Direction GŽnŽrale de la SŽcuritŽ ExtŽriere
|
||
- provides draft deferments for those who deliver stolen
|
||
information
|
||
+ Sweden, Forsvarets Radioanstalt ("Radio Agency of the
|
||
Defense")
|
||
- cracked German communications between occupied Norway and
|
||
occupied Denmark
|
||
- Beurling, with paper and pencil only
|
||
+ Mossad, LAKAM, Israel
|
||
+ HQ in Tel Aviv, near HQ of AMAN, military intelligence
|
||
- doesn't HQ move around a lot?
|
||
- LAKAM (sp?), a supersecret Israeli intelligence
|
||
agency...was shown the PROMIS software in 1983
|
||
+ learned of the Pakistani success in building an atom bomb
|
||
and took action against the Pakistani leadership:
|
||
destruction of the plane carrying the President (Zia?)
|
||
and some U.S. experts
|
||
- Mossad knew of DIA and CIA involvement in BCCI
|
||
financing of Pakistani atom bomb efforts (and links to
|
||
other arms dealers that allowed triggers and the like
|
||
to reach Pakistan)
|
||
- revelations by Vanunu were designed to scare the Arab and
|
||
Muslim world-and to send a signal that the killing of
|
||
President Zia was to be the fate of any Pakistani leader
|
||
who continued the program
|
||
11.5.3. They are very active, though they get less publicity than do
|
||
the American CIA, NSA, FBI, etc.
|
||
|
||
11.6. Surveillance Methods and Technology
|
||
11.6.1. (some of this gets speculative and so may not be to
|
||
everyone's liking)
|
||
11.6.2. "What is TEMPEST and what's the importance of it?"
|
||
- TEMPEST apprarently stands for nothing, and hence is not an
|
||
acronym, just a name. The all caps is the standard
|
||
spelling.
|
||
- RF emission, a set of specs for complying
|
||
- Van Eyck (or Van Eck?) radiation
|
||
+ Mostly CRTs are the concern, but also LCD panels and the
|
||
internal circuitry of the PCs, workstations, or terminals.
|
||
- "Many LCD screens can be read at a distance. The signal
|
||
is not as strong as that from the worst vdus, but it is
|
||
still considerable. I have demonstrated attacks on Zenith
|
||
laptops at 10 metres or so with an ESL 400 monitoring
|
||
receiver and a 4m dipole antenna; with a more modern
|
||
receiver, a directional antenna and a quiet RF
|
||
environment there is no reason why 100 metres should be
|
||
impossible." [Ross Anderson, Tempest Attacks on Notebook
|
||
Computers ???, comp.security.misc, 1994-08-31]
|
||
11.6.3. What are some of the New Technologies for Espionage and
|
||
Surveillance
|
||
+ Bugs
|
||
+ NSA and CIA have developed new levels of miniaturized
|
||
bugs
|
||
- e.g., passive systems that only dribble out intercepted
|
||
material when interrogated (e.g., when no bug sweeps
|
||
are underway)
|
||
- many of these new bugging technologies were used in the
|
||
John Gotti case in New York...the end of the Cold War
|
||
meant that many of these technologies became available
|
||
for use by the non-defense side
|
||
- the use of such bugging technology is a frightening
|
||
development: conversations can be heard inside sealed
|
||
houses from across streets, and all that will be
|
||
required is an obligatory warrant
|
||
+ DRAM storage of compressed speech...6-bit companded,
|
||
frequency-limited, so that 1 sec of speech takes
|
||
50Kbits, or 10K when compressed, for a total of 36 Mbits
|
||
per hour-this will fit on a single chip
|
||
- readout can be done from a "mothership" module (a
|
||
larger bug that sits in some more secure location)
|
||
- or via tight-beam lasers
|
||
+ Bugs are Mobile
|
||
- can crawl up walls, using the MIT-built technology for
|
||
microrobots
|
||
- some can even fly for short distances (a few klicks)
|
||
+ Wiretaps
|
||
- so many approaches here
|
||
- phone switches are almost totally digital (a la ESS IV)
|
||
- again, software hacks to allow wiretaps
|
||
+ Vans equipped to eavesdrop on PCs and networks
|
||
+ TEMPEST systems
|
||
+ technology is somewhat restricted, companies doing this
|
||
work are under limitations not to ship to some
|
||
customers
|
||
- no laws against shielding, of course
|
||
- these vans are justified for the "war on drugs" and
|
||
weapons proliferation controle efforts (N.E.S.T., anti-
|
||
Iraq, etc.)
|
||
+ Long-distance listening
|
||
- parabolic reflectors, noise cancellation (from any off-
|
||
axis sources), high gain amplification, phoneme analysis
|
||
- neural nets that learn the speech patterns and so can
|
||
improve clarity
|
||
+ lip-reading
|
||
- with electronically stabilized CCD imagers, 3000mm lenses
|
||
- neural net-based lip-reading programs, with learning
|
||
systems capable of improving performance
|
||
- for those in sensitive positions, the availability of new
|
||
bugging methods will accelerate the conversion to secure
|
||
systems based on encrypted telecommunications and the
|
||
avoidance of voice-based systems
|
||
11.6.4. Digital Telephony II is a major step toward easier
|
||
surveillance
|
||
11.6.5. Citizen tracking
|
||
+ the governments of the world would obviously like to trace
|
||
the movements, or at least the major movements, of their
|
||
subjects
|
||
- makes black markets a bit more difficult
|
||
- surfaces terrorists, illegal immigrants, etc. (not
|
||
perfectly)
|
||
+ allows tracking of "sex offenders"
|
||
- who often have to register with the local police,
|
||
announce to their neighbors their previous crimes, and
|
||
generally wear a scarlet letter at all times--I'm not
|
||
defending rapists and child molesters, just noting the
|
||
dangerous precedent this is setting
|
||
- because its the nature of bureaucracies to want to know
|
||
where "their" subjects are (dossier society = accounting
|
||
society...records are paramount)
|
||
+ Bill Stewart has pointed out that the national health care
|
||
systems, and the issuance of social security numbers to
|
||
children, represent a way to track the movements of
|
||
children, through hospital visits, schools, etc. Maybe even
|
||
random check points at places where children gather (malls,
|
||
schools, playgrounds, opium dens, etc.)
|
||
- children in such places are presumed to have lesser
|
||
rights, hence...
|
||
- this could all be used to track down kidnapped children,
|
||
non-custodial parents, etc.
|
||
- this could be a wedge in the door: as the children age,
|
||
the system is already in place to continue the tracking
|
||
(about the right timetable, too...start the systme this
|
||
decade and by 2010 or 2020, nearly everybody will be in
|
||
it)
|
||
- (A true paranoid would link these ideas to the child
|
||
photos many schools are requring, many local police
|
||
departments are officially assisting with, etc. A dossier
|
||
society needs mug shots on all the perps.)
|
||
- These are all reasons why governments will continue to push
|
||
for identity systems and will seek to derail efforts at
|
||
providing anonymity
|
||
+ Surveillance and Personnel Identification
|
||
+ cameras that can recognize faces are placed in many
|
||
public places, e.g., airports, ports of entry, government
|
||
buildings
|
||
- and even in some private places, e.g., casinos, stores
|
||
that have had problems with certain customers, banks
|
||
that face robberies, etc.
|
||
+ "suspicious movements detectors"
|
||
+ cameras that track movements, loitering, eye contact
|
||
with other patrons
|
||
+ neural nets used to classify behvaiors
|
||
- legal standing not needed, as these systems are
|
||
used only to trigger further surveillance, not to
|
||
prove guilt in a court of law
|
||
- example: banks have cameras, by 1998, that can
|
||
identify potential bank robbers
|
||
- camera images are sent to a central monitoring
|
||
facility, so the usual ploy of stopping the silent
|
||
alarm won't work
|
||
- airports and train stations (fears of terrorists),
|
||
other public places
|
||
11.6.6. Cellular phones are trackable by region...people are getting
|
||
phone calls as they cross into new zones, "welcoming" them
|
||
- but it implies that their position is already being tracked
|
||
11.6.7. coming surveillance, Van Eck, piracy, vans
|
||
- An interesting sign of things to come is provided in this
|
||
tale from a list member: "In Britain we have 'TV detector
|
||
Vans'. These are to detect licence evaders (you need to pay
|
||
an annual licence for the BBC channels). They are provided
|
||
by the Department of Trade and Industry. They use something
|
||
like a small minibus and use Van Eck principles. They have
|
||
two steerable detectors on the van roof so they can
|
||
triangulate. But TV shops have to notify the Government of
|
||
buyers - so that is the basic way in which licence evaders
|
||
are detected. ... I read of a case on a bulletin board
|
||
where someone did not have a TV but used a PC. He got a
|
||
knock on the door. They said he appeared to have a TV but
|
||
they could not make out what channel he was watching!
|
||
[Martin Spellman, <mspellman@cix.compulink.co.uk>, 1994-
|
||
0703]
|
||
- This kind of surveillance is likely to become more and more
|
||
common, and raises serious questions about what _other_
|
||
information they'll look for. Perhaps the software piracy
|
||
enforcers (Software Publishers Association) will look for
|
||
illegal copies of Microsoft Word or SimCity! (This area
|
||
needs more discussion, obviously.)
|
||
11.6.8. wiretaps
|
||
- supposed to notify targets within 90 days, unless extended
|
||
by a judge
|
||
- Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act cases are exempt from
|
||
this (it is likely that Cypherpunks wiretapped, if they
|
||
have been, for crypto activities fall under this
|
||
case...foreigners, borders being crossed, national security
|
||
implications, etc. are all plausible reasons, under the
|
||
Act)
|
||
|
||
11.7. Surveillance Targets
|
||
11.7.1. Things the Government May Monitor
|
||
- besides the obvious things like diplomatic cable traffic,
|
||
phone calls from and to suspected terrorists and criminals,
|
||
etc.
|
||
+ links between Congressmen and foreign embassies
|
||
- claims in NYT (c. 9-19-91) that CIA had files on
|
||
Congressmen opposing aid to Contras
|
||
+ Grow lamps for marijuana cultivation
|
||
- raids on hydroponic supply houses and seizure of mailing
|
||
lists
|
||
- records of postings to alt.drugs and alt.psychoactive
|
||
- vitamin buyers clubs
|
||
+ Energy consumption
|
||
- to spot use of grow lamps
|
||
+ but also might be refined to spot illegal aliens being
|
||
sheltered or any other household energy consumption
|
||
"inconsistent with reported uses"
|
||
- same for water, sewage, etc.
|
||
+ raw chemicals
|
||
- as with monitors on ammonium nitrate and other bomb
|
||
materials
|
||
- or feedstock for cocaine production (recall various
|
||
seizures of shipments of chemicals to Latin America)
|
||
- checkout of books, a la FBI's "Library Awareness Program"
|
||
of around 1986 or so
|
||
- attendance at key conferences, such as Hackers Conference
|
||
(could have scenes involving this), Computer Security
|
||
Conference
|
||
11.7.2. Economic Intelligence (Spying on Corporations, Foreign and
|
||
Domestic)
|
||
+ "Does the NSA use economic intelligence data obtained in
|
||
intercepts?"
|
||
- Some of us speculate that this is so, that this has been
|
||
going on since the 1960s at least. For example, Bamford
|
||
noted in 1982 that the NSA had foreknowledge of the plans
|
||
by the British to devalue the pound in the late 1970s,
|
||
and knowledge of various corporate plans.
|
||
- The NSA clears codes used by the CIA, so it seem
|
||
impossible for the NSA not to have known about CIA drug
|
||
smuggling activities. The NSA is very circumspect,
|
||
however, and rarely (or never) comments.
|
||
+ there have been calls for the government to somehow help
|
||
American business and overall competitiveness by "levelling
|
||
the playing field" via espionage
|
||
- especially as the perceived threat of the Soviet bloc
|
||
diminishes and as the perceived threat of Japan and
|
||
Germany increases
|
||
- leaders of the NSA and CIA have even talked openly about
|
||
turning to economic surveillance
|
||
+ Problems with this proposal:
|
||
- illegal
|
||
- unethical
|
||
+ who gets the intelligence information? Does NSA just call
|
||
up Apple and say "We've intercepted some message from
|
||
Taiwan that describe their plans for factories. Are you
|
||
interested?"
|
||
- the U.S. situation differs from Japan and MITI (which
|
||
is often portrayed as the model for how this ought to
|
||
work) in that we have many companies with little or no
|
||
history of obeying government recommendations
|
||
+ and foreign countries will likely learn of this espionage
|
||
and take appropriate measures
|
||
- e.g., by increasing encryption
|
||
11.7.3. War on Drugs and Money Laundering is Causing Increase in
|
||
Surveillance and Monitoring
|
||
- monitoring flows of capital, cash transactions, etc.
|
||
- cooperation with Interpol, foreign governments, even the
|
||
Soviets and KGB (or whatever becomes of them)
|
||
- new radar systems are monitoring light aircraft, boats,
|
||
etc.
|
||
|
||
11.8. Legal Issues
|
||
11.8.1. "Can my boss monitor my work?" "Can my bankruptcy in 1980 be
|
||
used to deny me a loan?" etc.
|
||
- Libertarians have a very different set of answers than do
|
||
many others: the answer to all these questions is mostly
|
||
"yes," morally (sorry for the normative view).
|
||
11.8.2. Theme: to protect some rights, invasion of privacy is being
|
||
justified
|
||
- e.g., by forcing employer records to be turned over, or of
|
||
seizing video rental records (on the grounds of catching
|
||
sexual deviants)
|
||
- various laws about employee monitoring
|
||
11.8.3. Government ID cards, ability to fake identities
|
||
- The government uses its powers to forge credentials, with
|
||
the collusion of the major credit agencies (who obviously
|
||
see these fake identities "pop into existence full-blown."
|
||
- WitSec, FINCen, false IDs, ties to credit card companies
|
||
- DEA stings, Heidi in La Jolla, Tava, fake tax returns, fake
|
||
bank applications, fake IDs
|
||
- the "above it all" attitude is typical of this...who guards
|
||
the guardians?
|
||
- WitSec, duplicity
|
||
11.8.4. Legalities of NSA surveillance
|
||
- read Bamford for some circa 1982 poinra
|
||
- UK-USA
|
||
- ECPA
|
||
- national security exemptions
|
||
- lots of confusion; however, the laws have never had any
|
||
real influence, and I cannot imagine the NSA being sued!
|
||
|
||
11.9. Dossiers and Data Bases
|
||
11.9.1. "The dossier never forgets"
|
||
+ any transgressions of any law in any country can be stored
|
||
indefinitely, exposing the transgressor to arrest and
|
||
detention anytime he enters a country with such a record on
|
||
him
|
||
- (This came up with regard to the British having quaint
|
||
ideas about computer security, hacking, and data privacy;
|
||
it is quite possible that an American passing through
|
||
London could be detained for some obscure violation years
|
||
in the past.)
|
||
- this is especially worrisome in a society in which legal
|
||
codes fill entire rooms and in which nearly every day
|
||
produces some violation of some law
|
||
11.9.2. "What about the privacy issues with home shopping, set-top
|
||
boxes, advertisers, and the NII?"
|
||
- Do we want our preferences in toothpaste fed into databases
|
||
so that advertisers can target us? Or that our food
|
||
purchases be correlated and analyzed by the government to
|
||
spot violations of the Dietary Health Act?
|
||
- First, laws which tell people what records they are
|
||
"allowed" to keep are wrong-headed, and lead to police
|
||
state inspections of disk drives, etc. The so-called "Data
|
||
Privacy" laws of several European nations are a nightmare.
|
||
Strong crypto makes them moot.
|
||
- Second, it is mostly up to people to protect what they want
|
||
protected, not to pass laws demanding that others protect
|
||
it for them.
|
||
- In practice, this means either use cash or make
|
||
arrangements with banks and credit card companies that will
|
||
protect privacy. Determining if they have or not is another
|
||
issue, but various ideas suggest themselves (John Gilmore
|
||
says he often joins groups under variants of his name, to
|
||
see who is selling his name to mailing lists.)
|
||
- Absent any laws which forbid them, privacy-preserving
|
||
credit card companies will likely spring up if there's a
|
||
market demand. Digital cash is an example. Other variants
|
||
abound. Cypherpunks should not allow such alternatives to
|
||
be banned, and should of course work on their own such
|
||
systems.
|
||
11.9.3. credit agencies
|
||
- TRW Credit, Transunion, Equifax
|
||
- links to WitSec
|
||
11.9.4. selling of data bases, linking of records...
|
||
- several states have admitted to selling their driver's
|
||
license data bases
|
||
|
||
11.10. Police States and Informants
|
||
11.10.1. Police states need a sense of terror to help magnify the
|
||
power or the state, a kind of "shrechlichkeit," as the Nazis
|
||
used to call it. And lots of informants. Police states need
|
||
willing accomplices to turn in their neighbors, or even their
|
||
parents, just as little Pavel Morozov became a Hero of the
|
||
Soviet People by sending his parents to their deaths in
|
||
Stalin's labor camps for the crime of expressing negative
|
||
opinions about the glorious State.
|
||
- (The canonization of Pavel Morozov was recently repudiated
|
||
by current Russian leaders--maybe even by the late-Soviet
|
||
era leades, like Gorbachev--who pointed out the corrosive
|
||
effects of encouraging families to narc on each
|
||
other...something the U.S. has forgotten...will it be 50
|
||
years before our leaders admit that having children turn in
|
||
Daddy for using "illegal crypto" was not such a good idea?)
|
||
11.10.2. Children are encouraged in federally-mandated D.A.R.E.
|
||
programs to become Junior Narcs, narcing their parents out to
|
||
the cops and counselors who come into their schools.
|
||
11.10.3. The BATF has a toll-free line (800-ATF-GUNS) for snitching on
|
||
neighbors who one thinks are violating the federal gun laws.
|
||
(Reports are this is backfiring, as gun owners call the
|
||
number to report on local liberal politicians and gun-
|
||
grabbers.)
|
||
11.10.4. Some country we live in, eh? (Apologies to non-U.S. readers,
|
||
as always.)
|
||
11.10.5. The implications for use of crypto, for not trusting others,
|
||
etc., are clear
|
||
11.10.6. Dangers of informants
|
||
+ more than half of all IRS prosecutions arise out of tips by
|
||
spouses and ex-spouses...they have the inside dope, the
|
||
motive, and the means
|
||
- a sobering thought even in the age of crypto
|
||
+ the U.S. is increasing a society of narcs and stool
|
||
pigeons, with "CIs" (confidential informants), protected
|
||
witnesses (with phony IDs and lavish lifestyles), and with
|
||
all sorts of vague threats and promises
|
||
- in a system with tens of thousands of laws, nearly all
|
||
behavior breaks at least some laws, often unavoidably,
|
||
and hence a powerful sword hangs over everyone's head
|
||
- corrosion of trust, especially within families (DARE
|
||
program in schools encourages children to narc on their
|
||
parents who are "substance abusers"!)
|
||
|
||
11.11. Privacy Laws
|
||
11.11.1. Will proposed privacy laws have an effect?
|
||
+ I suspect just the opposite: the tangled web of laws-part
|
||
of the totalitarian freezeout-will "marginalize" more
|
||
people and cause them to seek ways to protect their own
|
||
privacy and protect themselves from sanctions over their
|
||
actions
|
||
+ free speech vs. torts, SLAPP suits, sedition charges,
|
||
illegal research, etc.
|
||
- free speech is vanishing under a torrent of laws,
|
||
licensing requirements, and even zoning rules
|
||
+ outlawing of work on drugs, medical procedures, etc.
|
||
- against the law to disseminate information on drug use
|
||
(MDMA case at Stanford), on certain kinds of birth
|
||
control
|
||
- "If encrytion is outlawed, only outlaws will have
|
||
encryption."
|
||
+ privacy laws are already causing encryption ("file
|
||
protection") to be mandatory in many cases, as with medical
|
||
records, transmission of sensitive files, etc.
|
||
- by itself this is not in conflict with the government
|
||
requirement for tappable access, but the practical
|
||
implementation of a two-tier system-secure against
|
||
civilian tappers but readable by national security
|
||
tappers-is a nightmare and is likely impossible to
|
||
achieve
|
||
11.11.2. "Why are things like the "Data Privacy Laws" so bad?"
|
||
- Most European countries have laws that limit the collection
|
||
of computerized records, dossiers, etc., except for
|
||
approved uses (and the governments themselves and their
|
||
agents).
|
||
- Americans have no such laws. I've heard calls for this,
|
||
which I think is too bad.
|
||
- While we may not like the idea of others compiling dossiers
|
||
on us, stopping them is an even worse situation. It gives
|
||
the state the power to enter businesses, homes, and examine
|
||
computers (else it is completely unenforceable). It creates
|
||
ludicrous situations in which, say, someone making up a
|
||
computerized list of their phone contacts is compiling an
|
||
illegal database! It makes e-mail a crime (those records
|
||
that are kept).
|
||
- they are themselves major invasions of privacy
|
||
- are you going to put me in jail because I have data bases
|
||
of e-mail, Usenet posts, etc.?
|
||
- In my opinion, advocates of "privacy" are often confused
|
||
about this issue, and fail to realize that laws about
|
||
privacy often take away the privacy rights of _others_.
|
||
(Rights are rarely in conflict--contract plus self-privacy
|
||
take care of 99% of situations where rights are purported
|
||
to be in conflict.)
|
||
11.11.3. on the various "data privacy laws"
|
||
- many countries have adopted these data privacy laws,
|
||
involving restrictions on the records that can be kept, the
|
||
registration of things like mailing lists, and heavy
|
||
penalties for those found keeping computer files deemed
|
||
impermissable
|
||
- this leads to invasions of privacy....this very Cypherpunks
|
||
list would have to be "approved" by a bureaucrat in many
|
||
countries...the oportunites (and inevitabilities) of abuse
|
||
are obvious
|
||
- "There is a central contradiction running through the
|
||
dabase regulations proposed by many so-called "privacy
|
||
advocates". To be enforceable they require massive
|
||
government snooping into database activities on our
|
||
workstatins and PCs, especially the activities of many
|
||
small at-home businesses (such as mailing list
|
||
entrepreneurs who often work out of the home).
|
||
|
||
"Thus, the upshot of these so-called "privacy" regulations
|
||
is to destroy our last shreds of privacy against
|
||
government, and calm us into blindly letting even more of
|
||
the details of our personal lives into the mainframes of
|
||
the major government agencies and credit reporting
|
||
agenices, who if they aren't explicitly excepted from the
|
||
privacy laws (as is common) can simply evade them by using
|
||
offshore havesn, mutual agreements with foreign
|
||
investigators, police and intelligence agencies." [Jim
|
||
Hart, 1994-09-08]
|
||
11.11.4. "What do Cypherpunks think about this?"
|
||
+ divided minds...while no one likes being monitored, the
|
||
question is how far one can go to stop others from being
|
||
monitored
|
||
- "Data Privacy Laws" as a bad example: tramples on freedom
|
||
to write, to keep one's computer private
|
||
11.11.5. Assertions to data bases need to be checked (credit,
|
||
reputation, who said what, etc.)
|
||
- if I merely assert that Joe Blow no longer is employed, and
|
||
this spreads...
|
||
|
||
11.12. National ID Systems
|
||
11.12.1. "National ID cards are just the driver's licenses on the
|
||
Information Superhighway." [unknown...may have been my
|
||
coining]
|
||
11.12.2. "What's the concern?"
|
||
11.12.3. Insurance and National Health Care will Produce the "National
|
||
ID" that will be Nearly Unescapable
|
||
- hospitals and doctors will have to have the card...cash
|
||
payments will evoke suspicion and may not even be feasible
|
||
11.12.4. National ID Card Arguments
|
||
- "worker's permit" (another proposal, 1994-08, that would
|
||
call for a national card authorizing work permission)
|
||
- immigration, benefit
|
||
- possible tie-in to the system being proposed by the US
|
||
Postal Service: a registry of public keys (will they also
|
||
"issue" the private-public key pair?)
|
||
- software key escrow and related ideas
|
||
- "I doubt that one would only have to "flash" your card and
|
||
be on your way. More correctly, one would have to submit
|
||
to being "scanned" and be on your way. This would also
|
||
serve to be a convienient locator tag if installed in the
|
||
toll systems and miscellaneous "security checkpoints". Why
|
||
would anyone with nothing to hide care if your every move
|
||
could be monitored? Its for your own good, right? Pretty
|
||
soon sliding your ID into slots in everyplace you go will
|
||
be common." [Korac MacArthur, comp.org.eff.talk, 1994-07-
|
||
25]
|
||
11.12.5. "What are some concerns about Universal ID Cards?"
|
||
- "Papierren, bitte! Schnell!
|
||
- that they would allow traceability to the max (as folks
|
||
used to say)... tracking of movements, erosion of privacy
|
||
- that they would be required to be used for banking
|
||
transactions, Net access, etc. (As usual, there may be
|
||
workarounds, hacks, ...)
|
||
- "is-a-person" credentially, where government gets involved
|
||
in the issuance of cryptographic keys (a la the USPS
|
||
proposal), where only "approved uses" are allowed, etc.
|
||
- timestamps, credentials
|
||
11.12.6. Postal Service trial balloon for national ID card
|
||
- "While it is true that they share technology, their intent
|
||
and purpose is very different. Chaum's proposal has as its
|
||
intent and purpose to provide and protect anonymity in
|
||
financial transactions. The intent and purpose of the US
|
||
Postal Service is to identify and authenticate you to the
|
||
government and to guarantee the traceability of all
|
||
financial transactions." [WHMurray, alt.privacy, 1994-07-
|
||
04]
|
||
11.12.7. Scenario for introduction of national ID cards
|
||
- Imagine that vehicle registrations require presentation of
|
||
this card (gotta get those illegals out of their cars, or,
|
||
more benignly, the bureaucracy simply makes the ID cars
|
||
part of their process).
|
||
- Instantly this makes those who refuse to get an ID card
|
||
unable to get valid license tags. (Enforcement is already
|
||
pretty good....I was pulled over a couple of times for
|
||
either forgetting to put my new stickers on, or for driving
|
||
with Oregon expired tags.)
|
||
+ The "National Benefits Card," for example, is then required
|
||
to get license plate tags.and maybe other things, like car
|
||
and home insurance, etc. It would be very difficult to
|
||
fight such a card, as one could not drive, could not pay
|
||
taxes ("Awhh!" I hear you say, but consider the penalties,
|
||
the tie-ins with employers, etc. You can run but you can't
|
||
hide.)
|
||
- the national ID card would presumably be tied in to
|
||
income tax filings, in various ways I won't go into here.
|
||
The Postal Service, aiming to get into this area I guess,
|
||
has floated the idea of electronic filing, ID systems,
|
||
etc.
|
||
11.12.8. Comments on national ID cards
|
||
- That some people will be able to skirt the system, or that
|
||
the system will ultimately be unenforceable, does not
|
||
lessen the concern. Things can get real tough in the
|
||
meantime.
|
||
- I see great dangers here, in tying a national ID card to
|
||
transactions we are essentially unable to avoid in this
|
||
society: driving, insurance (and let's not argue
|
||
insurance...I mean it is unavoidable in the sense of legal
|
||
issues, torts, etc.), border crossings, etc. Now how will
|
||
one file taxes without such a card if one is made mandatory
|
||
for interactions with the government? Saying "taxes are not
|
||
collectable" is not an adequate answer. They may not be
|
||
collectible for street punks and others who inhabit the
|
||
underground economy, but they sure are for most of us.
|
||
|
||
11.13. National Health Care System Issues
|
||
11.13.1. Insurance and National Health Care will Produce the "National
|
||
ID" that will be Nearly Unescapable
|
||
- hospitals and doctors will have to have the card...cash
|
||
payments will evoke suspicion and may not even be feasible
|
||
11.13.2. I'm less worried that a pharmacist will add me to some
|
||
database he keeps than that my doctor will be instructed to
|
||
compile a dossier to government standards and then zip it off
|
||
over the Infobahn to the authorities.
|
||
11.13.3. Dangers and issues of National Health Care Plan
|
||
- tracking, national ID card
|
||
- "If you think the BATF is bad, wait until the BHCRCE goes
|
||
into action. "What is the BHCRCE?" you ask. Why, it the
|
||
Burea of Health Care Reform Compliance Enforcement - the
|
||
BATF, FBI, FDA, CIA and IRS all rolled into one." [Dave
|
||
Feustel, talk.politics.guns, 1994-08-19]
|
||
- Bill Stewart has pointed out the dangers of children having
|
||
social security numbers, of tracking systems in schools and
|
||
hospitals, etc.
|
||
|
||
11.14. Credentials
|
||
11.14.1. This is one of the most overlooked and ignored aspects of
|
||
cryptology, especially of Chaum's work. And no one in
|
||
Cypherpunks or anywhere else is currently working on "blinded
|
||
credentials" for everyday use.
|
||
11.14.2. "Is proof of identity needed?"
|
||
- This question is debated a lot, and is important. Talk of a
|
||
national ID card (what wags call an "internal passport") is
|
||
in the air, as part of health care, welfare, and
|
||
immigration legislation. Electronic markets make this also
|
||
an issue for the ATM/smart card community. This is also
|
||
closely tied in with the nature of anonymous reamailers
|
||
(where physical identity is of course generally lacking).
|
||
+ First, "identity" can mean different things:
|
||
- Conventional View of Identity: Physical person, with
|
||
birthdate, physical characteristics, fingerprints, social
|
||
security numbers, passports, etc.--the whole cloud of
|
||
"identity" items. (Biometric.)
|
||
- Pseudonym View of Identity: Persistent personnas,
|
||
mediated with cryptography. "You are your key."
|
||
- Most of us deal with identity as a mix of these views: we
|
||
rarely check biometric credentials, but we also count on
|
||
physical clues (voice, appearance, etc.). I assume that
|
||
when I am speaking to "Duncan Frissell," whom I've never
|
||
met in person, that he is indeed Duncan Frissell. (Some
|
||
make the jump from this expectation to wanting the
|
||
government enforce this claim, that is, provided I.D.)
|
||
+ It is often claimed that physical identity is important in
|
||
order to:
|
||
- track down cheaters, welchers, contract breakes, etc.
|
||
- permit some people to engage in some transactions, and
|
||
forbid others to (age credentials, for drinking, for
|
||
example, or---less benignly--work permits in some field)
|
||
- taxation, voting, other schemes tied to physical
|
||
existence
|
||
+ But most of us conduct business with people without ever
|
||
verifying their identity credentials...mostly we take their
|
||
word that they are "Bill Stewart" or "Scott Collins," and
|
||
we never go beyond that.
|
||
- this could change as digital credentials proliferate and
|
||
as interactions cause automatic checks to be made (a
|
||
reason many of us have to support Chaum's "blinded
|
||
credentials" idea--without some crypto protections, we'll
|
||
be constantly tracked in all interactions).
|
||
+ A guiding principle: Leave this question of whether to
|
||
demand physical ID credentials up to the *parties
|
||
involved*. If Alice wants to see Bob's "is-a-person"
|
||
credential, and take his palmprint, or whatever, that's an
|
||
issue for them to work out. I see no moral reason, and
|
||
certainly no communal reason, for outsiders to interfere
|
||
and insist that ID be produced (or that ID be forbidden,
|
||
perhaps as some kind of "civil rights violation"). After
|
||
all, we interact in cyberspace, on the Cypherpunks list,
|
||
without any such external controls on identity.
|
||
- and business contracts are best negotiated locally, with
|
||
external enforcement contracted by the parties (privately-
|
||
produced law, already seen with insurance companies,
|
||
bonding agents, arbitration arrangements, etc.)
|
||
- Practically speaking, i.e., not normatively speaking,
|
||
people will find ways around identity systems. Cash is one
|
||
way, remailers are another. Enforcement of a rigid identity-
|
||
based system is difficult.
|
||
11.14.3. "Do we need "is-a-person" credentials for things like votes
|
||
on the Net?"
|
||
- That is, any sysadmin can easily create as many user
|
||
accounts as he wishes. And end users can sign up with
|
||
various services under various names. The concern is that
|
||
this Chicago-style voting (fictitious persons) may be used
|
||
to skew votes on Usenet.
|
||
- Similar concerns arise elsewhere.
|
||
- In my view, this is a mighty trivial reason to support "is-
|
||
a-person" credentials.
|
||
11.14.4. Locality, credentials, validations
|
||
+ Consider the privacy implications of something so simple as
|
||
a parking lot system. Two main approaches:
|
||
- First Approach. Cash payment. Car enters lot, driver pays
|
||
cash, a "validation" is given. No traceability exists.
|
||
(There's a small chance that one driver can give his
|
||
sticker to a new driver, and thus defraud the parking
|
||
lot. This tends not to happen, due to the inconveniences
|
||
of making a market in such stickers (coordinating with
|
||
other car, etc.) and because the sticker is relatively
|
||
inexpensive.)
|
||
- Second Approach. Billing of driver, recording of license
|
||
plates. Traceability is present, especially if the local
|
||
parking lot is tied in to credit card companies, DMV,
|
||
police, etc. (these link-ups are on the wish list of
|
||
police agencies, to further "freeze out" fugitives, child
|
||
support delinquents, and other criminals).
|
||
- These are the concerns of a society with a lot of
|
||
electronic payments but with no mechanisms for preserving
|
||
privacy. (And there is currently no great demand for this
|
||
kind of privacy, for a variety of reasons, and this
|
||
undercuts the push for anonymous credential methods.)
|
||
- An important property of true cash (gold, bank notes that
|
||
are well-trusted) is that it settles immediately, requiring
|
||
no time-binding of contracts (ability to track down the
|
||
payer and collect on a bad transaction)
|
||
|
||
11.15. Records of all UseNet postings
|
||
11.15.1. (ditto for CompuServe, GEnie, etc.) will exist
|
||
11.15.2. "What kinds of monitoring of the Net is possible?"
|
||
- Archives of all Usenet traffic. This is already done by
|
||
commercial CD-ROm suppliers, and others, so this would be
|
||
trivial for various agencies.
|
||
- Mail archives. More problematic, as mail is ostensibly not
|
||
public. But mail passes through many sites, usually in
|
||
unencrypted form.
|
||
- Traffic analysis. Connections monitored. Telnet, ftp, e-
|
||
mail, Mosaid, and other connections.
|
||
- Filtered scans of traffic, with keyword-matched text stored
|
||
in archives.
|
||
11.15.3. Records: note that private companies can do the same thing,
|
||
except that various "right to privacy" laws may try to
|
||
interfere with this
|
||
- which causes its own constitutional privacy problems, of
|
||
course
|
||
11.15.4. "How can you expect that something you sent on the UseNet to
|
||
several thousand sites will not be potentially held against
|
||
you? You gave up any pretense of privacy when you broadcast
|
||
your opinions-and even detailed declarations of your
|
||
activities-to an audience of millions. Did you really think
|
||
that these public messages weren't being filed away? Any
|
||
private citizen would find it almost straightforward to sort
|
||
a measly several megabytes a day by keywords, names of
|
||
posters, etc." [I'm not sure if I wrote this, or if someone
|
||
else who I forgot to make a note of did]
|
||
11.15.5. this issue is already coming up: a gay programmer who was
|
||
laid-off discussed his rage on one of the gay boards and said
|
||
he was thinking of turning in his former employer for
|
||
widespread copying of Autocad software...an Autodesk employee
|
||
answered him with "You just did!"
|
||
11.15.6. corporations may use GREP and On Location-like tools to
|
||
search public nets for any discussion of themselves or their
|
||
products
|
||
- by big mouth employees, by disgruntled customers, by known
|
||
critics, etc.
|
||
- even positive remarks that may be used in advertising
|
||
(subject to various laws)
|
||
11.15.7. the 100% traceability of public postings to UseNet and other
|
||
bulletin boards is very stifling to free expression and
|
||
becomes one of the main justifications for the use of
|
||
anonymous (or pseudononymous) boards and nets
|
||
- there may be calls for laws against such compilation, as
|
||
with the British data laws, but basically there is little
|
||
that can be done when postings go to tens of thousands of
|
||
machines and are archived in perpetuity by many of these
|
||
nodes and by thousands of readers
|
||
- readers who may incorporate the material into their own
|
||
postings, etc. (hence the absurdity of the British law)
|
||
|
||
11.16. Effects of Surveillance on the Spread of Crypto
|
||
11.16.1. Surveillance and monitoring will serve to increase the use of
|
||
encryption, at first by people with something to hide, and
|
||
then by others
|
||
- a snowballing effect
|
||
- and various government agencies will themselves use
|
||
encryption to protect their files and their privacy
|
||
11.16.2. for those in sensitive positions, the availability of new
|
||
bugging methods will accelerate the conversion to secure
|
||
systems based on encrypted telecommunications and the
|
||
avoidance of voice-based systems
|
||
11.16.3. Surveillance Trends
|
||
+ Technology is making citizen-unit surveillance more and
|
||
more trivial
|
||
+ video cameras on every street corners are technologically
|
||
easy to implement, for example
|
||
- or cameras in stores, in airports, in other public
|
||
places
|
||
- traffic cameras
|
||
- tracking of purchases with credit cards, driver's
|
||
licenses, etc.
|
||
- monitoring of computer emissions (TEMPEST issues, often a
|
||
matter of paranoid speculation)
|
||
+ interception of the Net...wiretapping, interception of
|
||
unencrypted communications, etc.
|
||
- and compilation of dossier entries based on public
|
||
postings
|
||
+ This all makes the efforts to head-off a person-tracking,
|
||
credentials-based society all the more urgent.
|
||
Monkeywrenching, sabotage, public education, and
|
||
development of alternatives are all needed.
|
||
- If the surveillance state grows as rapidly as it now
|
||
appears to be doing, more desperate measures may be
|
||
needed. Personally, I wouldn't shed any tears if
|
||
Washington, D.C. and environs got zapped with a terrorist
|
||
nuke; the innocents would be replaced quickly enough, and
|
||
the death of so many political ghouls would surely be
|
||
worth it. The destruction of Babylon.
|
||
+ We need to get the message about "blinded credentials"
|
||
(which can show some field, like age, without showing all
|
||
fields, including name and such) out there. More
|
||
radically, we need to cause people to question why
|
||
credentials are as important as many people seem to
|
||
think.
|
||
- I argue that credentials are rarely needed for mutually
|
||
agreed-upon transactions
|
||
|
||
11.17. Loose Ends
|
||
11.17.1. USPS involvement in electronic mail, signatures,
|
||
authentication (proposed in July-August, 1994)
|
||
+ Advantages:
|
||
- many locations
|
||
- a mission already oriented toward delivery
|
||
+ Disadvantages:
|
||
- has performed terribly, compared to allowed compettion
|
||
(Federal Express, UPS, Airborne, etc.)
|
||
- it's linked to the goverment (now quasi-independent, but
|
||
not really)
|
||
- could become mandatory, or competition restricted to
|
||
certain niches (as with the package services, which
|
||
cannot have "routes" and are not allowed to compete in
|
||
the cheap letter regime)
|
||
- a large and stultified bureaucracy, with union labor
|
||
- Links to other programs (software key escrow, Digital
|
||
Telephony) not clear, but it seems likely that a quasi-
|
||
governemt agency like the USPS would be cooperative with
|
||
government, and would place limits on the crypto systems
|
||
allowed.
|
||
11.17.2. the death threats
|
||
+ An NSA official threatened to have Jim Bidzos killed if he
|
||
did not change his position on some negotiation underway.
|
||
This was reported in the newspaper and I sought
|
||
confirmation:
|
||
- "Everything reported in the Merc News is true. I am
|
||
certain that he wasnot speaking for the agency, but when
|
||
it happened he was quite serious, at least appeared to
|
||
be. There was a long silence after he made the threat,
|
||
with a staring contest. He was quite intense.
|
||
|
||
"I respect and trust the other two who were in the room
|
||
(they were shocked and literally speechless, staring into
|
||
their laps) and plan to ask NSA for a written apology and
|
||
confirmation that he was not speaking for the agency.
|
||
We'll see if I get it. If the incident made it into
|
||
their trip reports, I have a chance of getting a letter."
|
||
[jim@RSA.COM (Jim Bidzos), personal communication, posted
|
||
with permission to talk.politics.crypto, 1994-06-28]
|
||
11.17.3. False identities...cannot just be "erased" from the computer
|
||
memory banks. The web of associations, implications, rule
|
||
firings...all mean that simple removal (or insertion of a
|
||
false identity) produces discontinuities, illogical
|
||
developments, holes...history is not easily changed.
|
||
|
||
12. Digital Cash and Net Commerce
|
||
|
||
12.1. copyright
|
||
THE CYPHERNOMICON: Cypherpunks FAQ and More, Version 0.666,
|
||
1994-09-10, Copyright Timothy C. May. All rights reserved.
|
||
See the detailed disclaimer. Use short sections under "fair
|
||
use" provisions, with appropriate credit, but don't put your
|
||
name on my words.
|
||
|
||
12.2. SUMMARY: Digital Cash and Net Commerce
|
||
12.2.1. Main Points
|
||
- strong crypto makes certain forms of digital cash possible
|
||
- David Chaum is, once again, centrally involved
|
||
- no real systems deployed, only small experiments
|
||
- the legal and regulatory tangle will likely affect
|
||
deployment in major ways (making a "launch" of digital cash
|
||
a notrivial matter)
|
||
12.2.2. Connections to Other Sections
|
||
- reputations
|
||
- legal situation
|
||
- crypto anarchy
|
||
12.2.3. Where to Find Additional Information
|
||
- http://digicash.support.nl/
|
||
12.2.4. Miscellaneous Comments
|
||
- a huge area, filled with special terms
|
||
- many financial instruments
|
||
- the theory of digital cash is not complete, and confusion
|
||
abounds
|
||
- this section is also more jumbled and confusing than I'd
|
||
like; I'll clean it up in fufure releases.
|
||
|
||
12.3. The Nature of Money
|
||
12.3.1. The nature of money, of banking and finance, is a topic that
|
||
suffuses most discussions of digital cash. Hardly surprising.
|
||
But also an area that is even more detailed than is crypto.
|
||
And endless confusion of terms, semantic quibblings on the
|
||
list, and so on. I won't be devoting much space to trying to
|
||
explain economics, banking, and the deep nature or money.
|
||
12.3.2. There are of course many forms of cash or money today (these
|
||
terms are not equivalent...)
|
||
+ coins, bills (presumed to be difficult to forge)
|
||
- "ontological conservation laws"--the money can't be in
|
||
two places at once, can't be double spent
|
||
- this is only partly true, and forgery technology is
|
||
making it all moot
|
||
- bearer bonds and other "immediately cashable" instruments
|
||
- diamonds, gold, works of art, etc. ("portable wealth")
|
||
12.3.3. Many forms of digital money. Just as there are dozens of
|
||
major forms of instruments, so too will there be many forms
|
||
of digital money. Niches will be filled.
|
||
12.3.4. The deep nature of money is unclear to me. There are days
|
||
when I think it's just a giant con game, with value in money
|
||
only because others will accept it. Other days when I think
|
||
it's somewhat tied to "real things" like gold and silver. And
|
||
other days when I'm just unconcerned (so long as I have it,
|
||
and it works).
|
||
12.3.5. The digital cash discussions get similarly confused by the
|
||
various ideas about money. Digital cash is not necessarily a
|
||
form of _currency_, but is instead a transfer mechanism. More
|
||
like a "digital check," in fact (though it may give rise to
|
||
new currencies, or to wider use of some existing
|
||
currency...at some point, it may become indistinguishable
|
||
from a currency).
|
||
12.3.6. I advise that people not worry overly much about the true and
|
||
deep nature of money, and instead think about digital cash as
|
||
a transfer protocol for some underlyng form of money, which
|
||
might be gold coins, or Swiss francs, or chickens, or even
|
||
giant stone wheels.
|
||
12.3.7. Principle vs. Properties of Money
|
||
- Physical coins, as money, have certain basic properties:
|
||
difficult to counterfeit, pointless to counterfeit if made
|
||
of gold or silver, fungibility, immediate settling (no need
|
||
to clear with a distant bank, no delays, etc.),
|
||
untraceability, etc.
|
||
- Digital cash, in various flavors, has dramatically
|
||
different properties, e.g., it may require clearing, any
|
||
single digtital note is infinitely copyable, it may allow
|
||
traceability, etc. A complicated mix of properties.
|
||
+ But why is physical money (specie) the way it is? What
|
||
properties account for this? What are the core principles
|
||
that imply these properties?
|
||
- hardware (specie like gold) vs. software (bits, readily
|
||
copyable)
|
||
- immediale, local clearing, because of rational faith that
|
||
the money will clear
|
||
- limits on rate of transfer of physical money set by size,
|
||
weight of money, whereas "wire fraud" and variants can
|
||
drain an account in seconds
|
||
- My notion is that we spend too much time thinking about the
|
||
_principles_ (such as locality, transitivity, etc.) and
|
||
expect to then _derive_ the properties. Maybe we need to
|
||
instead focus on the _objects_, the sets of protocol-
|
||
derived things, and examine their emergent properties. (I
|
||
have my own thinking along these lines, involving "protocol
|
||
ecologies" in which agents bang against each other, a la
|
||
Doug Lenat's old "Eurisko" system, and thus discover
|
||
weaknesses, points of strength, and even are genetically
|
||
programmed to add new methods which increase security.
|
||
This, as you can guess, is a longterm, speculative
|
||
project.)
|
||
12.3.8. "Can a "digital coin" be made?"
|
||
- The answer appears to be "no"
|
||
+ Software is infinitely copyable, which means a software
|
||
representation of digital money could be replicated many
|
||
times
|
||
- this is not to say it could be _spent_ many times,
|
||
depending on the clearing process...but then this is not
|
||
a "coin" in the sense we mean
|
||
- Software is trivially replicable, unlike gold or silver
|
||
coins, or even paper currency. If and when paper currency
|
||
becomes trivially replicable (and color copiers have almost
|
||
gotten there), expect changes in the nature of cash.
|
||
(Speculation: cash will be replaced by smart cards,
|
||
probably not of the anonymous sort we favor.)
|
||
+ bits can always be duplicated (unless tied to hardware, as
|
||
with TRMs), so must look elsewhere
|
||
+ could tie the bits to a specific location, so that
|
||
duplication would be obvious or useless
|
||
- the idea is vaguely that an agent could be placed in
|
||
some location...duplications would be both detectable
|
||
and irrelevant (same bits, same behavior, unmodifiable
|
||
because of digital signature)
|
||
- (this is formally similar to the idea of an active agent
|
||
that is unforgeable, in the sense that the agent or coin is
|
||
"standalone")
|
||
12.3.9. "What is the 'granularity' of digital cash?"
|
||
+ fine granularity, e.g., sub-cent amounts
|
||
- useful for many online transactions
|
||
- inside computers
|
||
- add-on fees by interemediaries
|
||
- very small purchases
|
||
+ medium granularity
|
||
- a few cents, up to a dollar (for example)
|
||
- also useful for many small purchases
|
||
- close equivalent to "loose change" or small bills, and
|
||
probably useful for the same purposes
|
||
- tolls, fees, etc.
|
||
- This is roughly the level many DigiCash protocols are
|
||
aimed at
|
||
+ large granularity
|
||
- multiple dollars
|
||
- more like a "conventional" online transaction
|
||
-
|
||
- the transaction costs are crucial; online vs. offline
|
||
clearing
|
||
- Digital Silk Road is a proposal by Dean Tribble and Norm
|
||
Hardy to reduce transaction costs
|
||
12.3.10. Debate about money and finance gets complicated
|
||
- legal terms, specific accounting jargon, etc.
|
||
- I won't venture into this thicket here. It's a specialty
|
||
unto itself, with several dozen major types of instruments
|
||
and derivatives. And of course with big doses of the law.
|
||
|
||
12.4. Smart Cards
|
||
12.4.1. "What are smart cards and how are they used?"
|
||
+ Most smart cards as they now exist are very far from being
|
||
the anonymous digital cash of primary interest to us. In
|
||
fact, most of them are just glorified credit cards.
|
||
- with no gain to consumers, since consumes typically don't
|
||
pay for losses by fraud
|
||
- (so to entice consumes, will they offer inducements?)
|
||
- Can be either small computers, typically credit-card-sized,
|
||
or just cards that control access via local computers.
|
||
+ Tamper-resistant modules, e.g., if tampered with, they
|
||
destroy the important data or at the least give evidence of
|
||
having been tampered with.
|
||
+ Security of manufacturing
|
||
- some variant of "cut-and-choose" inspection of
|
||
premises
|
||
+ Uses of smart cards
|
||
- conventional credit card uses
|
||
- bill payment
|
||
- postage
|
||
- bridge and road tolls
|
||
- payments for items received electronically (not
|
||
necessarily anonymously)
|
||
12.4.2. Visa Electronic Purse
|
||
12.4.3. Mondex
|
||
|
||
12.5. David Chaum's "DigiCash"
|
||
12.5.1. "Why is Chaum so important to digital cash?"
|
||
- Chaum's name appears frequently in this document, and in
|
||
other Cypherpunk writings. He is without a doubt the
|
||
seminal thinker in this area, having been very nearly the
|
||
first to write about several areas: untraceable e-mail,
|
||
digital cash, blinding, unlinkable credentials, DC-nets,
|
||
etc.
|
||
- I spoke to him at the 1988 "Crypto" conference, telling him
|
||
about my interests, my 'labyrinth' idea for mail-forwarding
|
||
(which he had anticipated in 1981, unbeknownst to me at the
|
||
time), and a few hints about "crypto anarchy." It was clear
|
||
to me that Chaum had thought long and deeply about these
|
||
issues.
|
||
- Chaum's articles should be read by all interested in this
|
||
area. (No, his papers are _not_ "on-line." Please see the
|
||
"Crypto" Proceedings and related materials.)
|
||
- [DIGICASH PRESS RELEASE, "World's first electronic cash
|
||
payment over computer networks," 1994-05-27]
|
||
12.5.2. "What's his motivation?"
|
||
- Chaum appears to be a libertarian, at least on social
|
||
issues, and is very worried about "Big Brother" sorts of
|
||
concerns (recall the title of his 1985 CACM article).
|
||
- His work in Europe has mostly concentrated on unlinkable
|
||
credentials for toll road payments, electronic voting, etc.
|
||
His company, DigiCash, is working on various aspects of
|
||
digital cash.
|
||
12.5.3. "How does his system work?"
|
||
- There have been many summaries on the Cypherpunks list. Hal
|
||
Finney has written at least half a dozen, and others have
|
||
been contributed by Eric Hughes, Karl Barrus, etc. I won't
|
||
be including any of them here....it just takes too many
|
||
pages to explain how digital cash works in detail.
|
||
- (The biggest problem people have with digital cash is in
|
||
not taking the time to understand the basics of the math,
|
||
of blinding, etc. They wrongly assume that "digital cash"
|
||
can be understood by common-sense reasoning about existing
|
||
cash, etc. This mistake has been repeated in several of the
|
||
half-assed proposals for "net cash" and "digi dollars.")
|
||
+ Here's the opening few paragraphs from one of Hal's
|
||
explanations, to provide a glimpse:
|
||
- "Mike Ingle asks about digicash. The simplest system I
|
||
know of that is anonymous is the one by Chaum, Fiat, and
|
||
Naor, which we have discussed here a few times. The idea
|
||
is that the bank chooses an RSA modulus, and a set of
|
||
exponents e1, e2, e3, ..., where each exponent ei
|
||
represents
|
||
a denomination and possibly a date. The exponents must
|
||
be relatively prime to (p-1)(q-1). PGP has a GCD routine
|
||
which can be used to check for valid exponents..
|
||
|
||
"As with RSA, to each public exponent ei corresponds a
|
||
secret exponent di, calculated as the multiplicative
|
||
inverse of ei mod (p-1)(q-1). Again, PGP has a routine
|
||
to calculate multiplicative inverses.
|
||
|
||
"In this system, a piece of cash is a pair (x, f(x)^di),
|
||
where f() is a one-way function. MD5 would be a
|
||
reasonable choice for f(), but notice that it produces a
|
||
128-bit result. f() should take this 128-bit output of
|
||
MD5 and "reblock" it to be an multi-precision number by
|
||
padding it; PGP has a "preblock" routine which does this,
|
||
following the PKCS standard.
|
||
|
||
"The way the process works, with the blinding, is like
|
||
this. The user chooses a random x. This should probably
|
||
be at least 64 or 128 bits, enough to preclude exhaustive
|
||
search. He calculates f(x), which is what he wants the
|
||
bank to sign by raising to the power di. But rather than
|
||
sending f(x) to the bank directly, the user first blinds
|
||
it by choosing a random number r, and calculating D=f(x)
|
||
* r^ei. (I should make it clear that ^ is the power
|
||
operator, not xor.) D is what he sends to the bank,
|
||
along with some information about what ei is, which tells
|
||
the denomination of the cash, and also information about
|
||
his account number." [Hal Finney, 1993-12-04]
|
||
12.5.4. "What is happening with DigiCash?"
|
||
- "Payment from any personal computer to any other
|
||
workstation, over email or Internet, has been demonstrated
|
||
for the first time, using electronic cash technology. "You
|
||
can pay for access to a database, buy software or a
|
||
newsletter by email, play a computer game over the net,
|
||
receive $5 owed you by a friend, or just order a pizza. The
|
||
possibilities are truly unlimited" according to David
|
||
Chaum, Managing Director of DigiCash TM, who announced and
|
||
demonstrated the product during his keynote address at the
|
||
first conference on the World Wide Web, in Geneva this
|
||
week." [DIGICASH PRESS RELEASE, "World's first electronic
|
||
cash payment over computer networks," 1994-05-27]
|
||
- DigiCash is David Chaum's company, set up to commercialize
|
||
this work. Located near Amsterdam.
|
||
+ Chaum is also centrally invovled in "CAFE," a European
|
||
committee investigating ways to deploy digital cash in
|
||
Europe
|
||
- mostly standards, issues of privacy, etc.
|
||
- toll roads, ferries, parking meters, etc.
|
||
- http://digicash.support.nl/
|
||
- info@digicash.nl
|
||
- People have been reporting that their inquiries are not
|
||
being answered; could be for several reasons.
|
||
12.5.5. The Complexities of Digital Cash
|
||
- There is no doubt as to the complexity: many protocols,
|
||
semantic confusion, many parties, chances for collusion,
|
||
spoofing, repudiation, and the like. And many derivative
|
||
entities: agents, escrow services, banks.
|
||
- There's no substitute for _thinking hard_ about various
|
||
scenarios. Thinking about how to arrange off-line clearing,
|
||
how to handle claims of people who claim their digital
|
||
money was stolen, people who want various special kinds of
|
||
services, such as receipts, and so on. It's an ecology
|
||
here, not just a set of simple equations.
|
||
|
||
12.6. Online and Offline Clearing, Double Spending
|
||
12.6.1. (this section still under construction)
|
||
12.6.2. This is one of the main points of division between systems.
|
||
12.6.3. Online Clearing
|
||
- (insert explanation)
|
||
12.6.4. Offline Clearing
|
||
- (insert explanation)
|
||
12.6.5. Double spending
|
||
- Some approaches involve constantly-growing-in-size coins at
|
||
each transfer, so who spent the money first can be deduced
|
||
(or variants of this). And N. Ferguson developed a system
|
||
allowing up to N expenditures of the same coin, where N is
|
||
a parameter. [Howard Gayle reminded me of this, 1994-08-29]
|
||
- "Why does everyone think that the law must immediately be
|
||
invoked when double spending is detected?....Double
|
||
spending is an informational property of digital cash
|
||
systems. Need we find malicious intent in a formal
|
||
property? The obvious moralism about the law and double
|
||
spenders is inappropriate. It evokes images of revenge and
|
||
retribution, which are stupid, not to mention of negative
|
||
economic value." [Eric Hughes, 1994-08-27] (This also
|
||
relates to Eric's good point that we too often frame crypto
|
||
issue in terms of loaded terms like "cheating," "spoofing,"
|
||
and "enemies," when more neutral terms would carry less
|
||
meaning-obscuring baggage and would not give our "enemies"
|
||
(:-}) the ammunition to pass laws based on such terms.)
|
||
12.6.6. Issues
|
||
+ Chaum's double-spending detection systems
|
||
- Chaum went to great lengths to develop system which
|
||
preserve anonymity for single-spending instances, but
|
||
which break anonymity and thus reveal identity for double-
|
||
spending instances. I'm not sure what market forces
|
||
caused him to think about this as being so important, but
|
||
it creates many headaches. Besides being clumsy, it
|
||
require physical ID, it invokes a legal system to try to
|
||
collect from "double spenders," and it admits the
|
||
extremely serious breach of privacy by enabling stings.
|
||
For example, Alice pays Bob a unit of money, then quickly
|
||
Alice spends that money before Bob can...Bob is then
|
||
revealed as a "double spender," and his identity revealed
|
||
to whomver wanted it...Alice, IRS, Gestapo, etc. A very
|
||
broken idea. Acceptable mainly for small transactions.
|
||
+ Multi-spending vs. on-line clearing
|
||
- I favor on-line clearing. Simply put: the first spending
|
||
is the only spending. The guy who gets to the train
|
||
locker where the cash is stored is the guy who gets it.
|
||
This ensure that the burden of maintaining the secret is
|
||
on the secret holder.
|
||
- When Alice and Bob transfer money, Alice makes the
|
||
transfer, Bob confirms it as valid (or verifies that his
|
||
bank has received the deposit), and the transaction is
|
||
complete.
|
||
- With network speeds increasing dramatically, on-line
|
||
clearing should be feasible for most transactions. Off-
|
||
line systems may of course be useful, especially for
|
||
small transactions, the ones now handled with coins and
|
||
small bills.
|
||
-
|
||
12.6.7. "How does on-line clearing of anonymous digital cash work?"
|
||
- There's a lot of math connected with blinding,
|
||
exponentions, etc. See Schneier's book for an introduction,
|
||
or the various papers of Chaum, Brands, Bos, etc.
|
||
- On-line clearing is similar to two parties in a transaction
|
||
exchanging goods and money. The transaction is clearled
|
||
locally, and immediately. Or they could arrange transfer of
|
||
funds at a bank, and the banker could tell them over the
|
||
phone that the transaction has cleared--true "on-line
|
||
clearing." Debit cards work this way, with money
|
||
transferred effectively immediately out of one account and
|
||
into another. Credit cards have some additional wrinkles,
|
||
such as the credit aspect, but are basically still on-line
|
||
clearing.
|
||
- Conceptually, the guiding principle idea is simple: he who
|
||
gets to the train locker where the cash is stored *first*
|
||
gets the cash. There can never be "double spending," only
|
||
people who get to the locker and find no cash inside.
|
||
Chaumian blinding allows the "train locker" (e.g., Credit
|
||
Suisse) to give the money to the entity making the claim
|
||
without knowing how the number correlates to previous
|
||
numbers they "sold" to other entities. Anonymity is
|
||
preserved, absolutely. (Ignoring for this discussion issues
|
||
of cameras watching the cash pickup, if it ever actually
|
||
gets picked up.)
|
||
- Once the "handshaking" of on-line clearing is accepted,
|
||
based on the "first to the money gets it" principle, then
|
||
networks of such clearinghouses can thrive, as each is
|
||
confident about clearing. (There are some important things
|
||
needed to provide what I'll dub "closure" to the circuit.
|
||
People need to ping the system, depositing and withdrawing,
|
||
to establish both confidence and cover. A lot like remailer
|
||
networks. In fact, very much like them.)
|
||
- In on-line clearing, only a number is needed to make a
|
||
transfer. Conceptually, that is. Just a number. It is up to
|
||
the holder of the number to protect it carefully, which is
|
||
as it should be (for reasons of locality, or self-
|
||
responsibility, and because any other option introduces
|
||
repudiation, disavowal, and the "Twinkies made me do it"
|
||
sorts of nonsense). Once the number is transferred and
|
||
reblinded, the old number no longer has a claim on the
|
||
money stored at Credit Suisse, for example. That money is
|
||
now out of the train locker and into a new one. (People
|
||
always ask, "But where is the money, really?" I see digital
|
||
cash as *claims* on accounts in existing money-holding
|
||
places, typically banks. There are all kinds of "claims"--
|
||
Eric Hughes has regaled us with tales of his explorations
|
||
of the world of commericial paper. My use of the term
|
||
"claim" here is of the "You present the right number, you
|
||
get access" kind. Like the combination to a safe. The train
|
||
locker idea makes this clearer, and gets around the
|
||
confusion about "digimarks" of "e$" actually _being_ any
|
||
kind of money it and of itself.)
|
||
|
||
12.7. Uses for Digital Cash
|
||
12.7.1. Uses for digital cash?
|
||
- Privacy protection
|
||
- Preventing tracking of movements, contacts, preferences
|
||
+ Illegal markets
|
||
- gambling
|
||
- bribes, payoffs
|
||
- assassinations and other contract crimes
|
||
- fencing, purchases of goods
|
||
+ Tax avoidance
|
||
- income hiding
|
||
- offshore funds transfers
|
||
- illegal markets
|
||
- Online services, games, etc.
|
||
+ Agoric markets, such as for allocation of computer
|
||
resources
|
||
- where programs, agents "pay" for services used, make
|
||
"bids" for future services, collect "rent," etc.
|
||
+ Road tolls, parking fees, where unlinkablity is desired.
|
||
This press release excerpt should give the flavor of
|
||
intended uses for road tolls:
|
||
- "The product was developed by DigiCash TM Corporation's
|
||
wholly owned Dutch subsidiary, DigiCash TM BV. It is
|
||
related to the firm's earlier released product for road
|
||
pricing, which has been licensed to Amtech TM
|
||
Corporation, of Dallas, Texas, worldwide leader in
|
||
automatic road toll collection. This system allows
|
||
privacy protected payments for road use at full highway
|
||
speed from a smart card reader affixed to the inside of a
|
||
vehicle. Also related is the approach of the EU supported
|
||
CAFE project, of which Dr. Chaum is Chairman, which uses
|
||
tamper-resistant chips inserted into electronic wallets."
|
||
[DIGICASH PRESS RELEASE, "World's first electronic cash
|
||
payment over computer networks," 1994-05-27]
|
||
12.7.2. "What are some motivations for anonymous digital cash?"
|
||
+ Payments that are unlinkable to identity, especially for
|
||
things like highway tolls, bridge tolls, etc.
|
||
- where linkablity would imply position tracking
|
||
- (Why not use coins? This idea is for "smart card"-type
|
||
payment systems, involving wireless communication.
|
||
Singapore planned (and perhaps has implemented) such a
|
||
system, except there were no privacy considerations.)
|
||
+ Pay for things while using pseudonyms
|
||
- no point in having a pseudonym if the payment system
|
||
reveals one's identity
|
||
+ Tax avoidance
|
||
- this is the one the digicash proponents don't like to
|
||
talk about too loudly, but it's obviously a time-honored
|
||
concern of all taxpayers
|
||
+ Because there is no compelling reason why money should be
|
||
linked to personal identity
|
||
- a general point, subsuming others
|
||
|
||
12.8. Other Digital Money Systems
|
||
12.8.1. "There seem to be many variants....what's the story?"
|
||
- Lots of confusion. Lots of systems that are not at all
|
||
anonymous, that are just extensions of existing systems.
|
||
The cachet of digital cash is such that many people are
|
||
claiming their systems are "digital cash," when of course
|
||
they are not (at least not in the Chaum/Cypherpunk sense).
|
||
- So, be careful. Caveat emptor.
|
||
12.8.2. Crypto and Credit Cards (and on-line clearing)
|
||
+ Cryptographically secure digital cash may find a major use
|
||
in effectively extending the modality of credit cards to
|
||
low-level, person-to-person transactions.
|
||
- That is, the convenience of credit cards is one of their
|
||
main uses (others being the advancing of actual credit,
|
||
ignored here). In fact, secured credit cards and debit
|
||
cards don't offer this advancement of credit, but are
|
||
mainly used to accrue the "order by phone" and "avoid
|
||
carrying cash" advantages.
|
||
- Checks offer the "don't carry cash" advantage, but take
|
||
time to clear. Traveller's checks are a more pure form of
|
||
this.
|
||
- But individuals (like Alice and Bob) cannot presently use
|
||
the credit card system for mutual transactions. I'm not
|
||
sure of all the reasons. How might this change?
|
||
- Crypto can allow unforgeable systems, via some variant of
|
||
digital signatures. That is, Alice can accept a phoned
|
||
payment from Bob without ever being able to sign Bob's
|
||
electronic signature herself.
|
||
- "Crypto Credit Cards" could allow end users (customers, in
|
||
today's system) to handle transactions like this, without
|
||
having merchants as intermediaries.
|
||
- I'm sure the existing credit card outfits would have
|
||
something to say about this, and there may be various
|
||
roadblocks in the way. It might be best to buy off the VISA
|
||
and MasterCard folks by working through them. (And they
|
||
probably have studied this issue; what may change their
|
||
positions is strong crypto, locally available to users.)
|
||
- (On-line clearing--to prevent double-spending and copying
|
||
of cash--is an important aspect of many digital cash
|
||
protocols, and of VISA-type protocols. Fortunately,
|
||
networks are becoming ubiquitous and fast. Home use is
|
||
still a can of worms, though, with competing standards
|
||
based on video cable, fiber optics, ISDN, ATM, etc.)
|
||
12.8.3. Many systems being floated. Here's a sampling:
|
||
+ Mondex
|
||
- "Unlike most other electronic purse systems, Mondex, like
|
||
cash, is anonymous. The banks that issue Mondex cards
|
||
will not be able to keep track of who gets the payments.
|
||
Indeed, it is the only system in which two card holders
|
||
can transfer money to each other.
|
||
|
||
""If you want to have a product that replaces cash, you
|
||
have to do everything that cash does, only better,"
|
||
Mondex's senior executive, Michael Keegan said. "You can
|
||
give money to your brother who gives it to the chap that
|
||
sells newspapers, who gives it to charity, who puts it in
|
||
the bank, which has no idea where it's been. That's what
|
||
money is."" [New York Times, 1994-09-06, provided by John
|
||
Young]
|
||
+ CommerceNet
|
||
- allows Internet users to buy and sell goods.
|
||
- "I read in yesterday's L.A. Times about something called
|
||
CommerceNet, where sellers and buyers of workstation
|
||
level equipment can meet and conduct busniess....Near the
|
||
end of the article, they talked about a proposed method
|
||
for exchanging "digital signatures" via Moasic (so that
|
||
buyers and sellers could _know_ that they were who they
|
||
said they were) and that they were going to "submit it to
|
||
the Internet Standards body"" [Cypher1@aol.com, 1994-06-
|
||
23]
|
||
+ NetCash
|
||
- paper published at 1st ACM Conference on Computer and
|
||
Communications Security, Nov. 93, available via anonymous
|
||
ftp from PROSPERO.ISI.EDU as /pub/papers/security/netcash-
|
||
cccs93.ps.Z
|
||
- "NetCash: A design for practical electronic currency on
|
||
the Internet ... Gennady Medvinsky and Clifford Neuman
|
||
|
||
"NetCash is a framework that supports realtime electronic
|
||
payments with provision of anonymity over an unsecure
|
||
network. It is designed to enable new types of services
|
||
on the Internet which have not been practical to date
|
||
because of the absence of a secure, scalable, potentially
|
||
anonymous payment method.
|
||
|
||
"NetCash strikes a balance between unconditionally
|
||
anonymous electronic currency, and signed instruments
|
||
analogous to checks that are more scalable but identify
|
||
the principals in a transaction. It does this by
|
||
providing the framework within which proposed electronic
|
||
currency protocols can be integrated with the scalable,
|
||
but non-anonymous, electronic banking infrastructure that
|
||
has been proposed for routine transactions."
|
||
+ Hal Finney had a negative reaction to their system:
|
||
- "I didn't think it was any good. They have an
|
||
incredibly simplistic model, and their "protocols" are
|
||
of the order, A sends the bank some paper money, and B
|
||
sends A some electronic cash in return.....They don't
|
||
even do blinding of the cash. Each piece of cash has a
|
||
unique serial number which is known to the currency
|
||
provider. This would of course allow matching of
|
||
withdrawn and deposited coins....These guys seem to
|
||
have read the work in the field (they reference it) but
|
||
they don't appear to have understood it." [Hal Finney,
|
||
1993-08-17]
|
||
+ VISA Electronic Purse
|
||
- (A lot of stuff appeared on this, including listings of
|
||
the alliance partners (like Verifone), the technology,
|
||
the plans for deployment, etc. I regret that I can't
|
||
include more here. Maybe when this FAQ is a Web doc, more
|
||
can be included.)
|
||
- "PERSONAL FINANCE - Seeking the Card That Would Create A
|
||
Cashless World. The Washington Post, April 03, 1994,
|
||
FINAL Edition By: Albert B. Crenshaw, Washington Post ...
|
||
|
||
"Now that credit cards are in the hands of virtually
|
||
every living, breathing adult in the country-not to
|
||
mention a lot of children and the occasional family pet-
|
||
and now that almost as many people have ATM cards,
|
||
card companies are wondering where future growth will
|
||
come from.
|
||
|
||
"At *Visa* International, the answer is: Replace cash
|
||
with plastic.
|
||
|
||
"Last month, the giant association of card issuers
|
||
announced it had formed a coalition of banking and
|
||
technology companies to develop technical standards for
|
||
a product it dubbed the "Electronic Purse," a plastic
|
||
card meant to replace coins and bills in small
|
||
transactions." [provided by Duncan Frissell, 1994-04-05]
|
||
- The talk of "clearinghouses" and the involvement of VISA
|
||
International and the Usual Suspects suggest
|
||
identity-blinding protocols are not in use. I also see no
|
||
mention of DigiCash, or even RSA (but maybe I missed that-
|
||
-and the presence of RSA would not necessairly mean
|
||
identity-blinding protocols were being planned).
|
||
|
||
Likely Scenario: This is *not* digital cash as we think
|
||
of it. Rather, this is a future evolution of the cash ATM
|
||
card and credit card, optimized for faster and cheaper
|
||
clearing.
|
||
|
||
Scary Scenario: This could be the vehicle for the long-
|
||
rumored "banning of cash." (Just because conspiracy
|
||
theorists and Number of the Beast Xtian fundamentalists
|
||
belive it doesn't render it implausible.)
|
||
- Almost nothing of interest for us. No methods for
|
||
anonymity. Make no mistake, this is not the digital cash
|
||
that Cypherpunks espouse. This gives the credit agencies
|
||
and the government (the two work hand in hand) complete
|
||
traceability of all purchases, automatic reporting of
|
||
spending patterns, target lists for those who frequent
|
||
about-to-be-outlawed businesses, and invasive
|
||
surveillance of all inter-personal economic transactions.
|
||
This is the AntiCash. Beware the Number of the AntiCash.
|
||
12.8.4. Nick Szabo:
|
||
- "Internet commercialization in itself is a _huge_ issue
|
||
full of pitfall and opportunity: Mom & Pop BBS's,
|
||
commercial MUDs, data banks, for-profit pirate and porn
|
||
boards, etc. are springing up everywhere like weeds,
|
||
opening a vast array of both needs of privacy and ways to
|
||
abuse privacy. Remailers, digital cash, etc. won't become
|
||
part of this Internet commerce way of life unless they are
|
||
deployed soon, theoretical flaws and all, instead of
|
||
waiting until The Perfect System comes along. Crypto-
|
||
anarchy in the real world will be messy, "nature red in
|
||
tooth and claw", not all nice and clean like it says in the
|
||
math books. Most of thedebugging will be done not in any
|
||
ivory tower, but by the bankruptcy of businesses who
|
||
violate their customer's privacy, the confiscation of BBS
|
||
operators who stray outside the laws of some jurisdication
|
||
and screw up their privacy arrangements, etc. Anybody who
|
||
thinks they can flesh out a protocol in secret and then
|
||
deploy it, full-blown and working, is in for a world of
|
||
hurt. For those who get their Pretty Good systems out
|
||
there and used, there is vast potential for business growth
|
||
-- think of the $trillions confiscated every year by
|
||
governments around the world, for example." [Nick Szabo,
|
||
1993-8-23]
|
||
12.8.5. "What about _non-anonymous_ digital cash?"
|
||
- a la the various extensions of existing credit and debit
|
||
cards, traveller's checks, etc.
|
||
+ There's still a use for this, with several motivations"
|
||
* for users, it may be _cheaper_ (lower transaction costs)
|
||
than fully anonymous digital cash
|
||
* for banks, it may also be cheaper
|
||
* users may wish audit trails, proof, etc.
|
||
* and of course governments have various reasons for
|
||
wanting traceable cash systems
|
||
- law enforcement
|
||
- taxes, surfacing the underground economy
|
||
12.8.6. Microsoft plans to enter the home banking business
|
||
- "PORTLAND, Ore. (AP) -- Microsoft Corp. wants to replace
|
||
your checkbook with a home computer that lets the bank do
|
||
all the work of recording checks, tallying up credit card
|
||
charges and paying bills.... The service also tracks credit
|
||
card accounts, withdrawals from automated teller machines,
|
||
transfers from savings or other accounts, credit lines,
|
||
debit cards, stocks and other investments, and bill
|
||
payments." [Associated Press, 1994-07-04]
|
||
- Planned links with a consortium of banks, led by U.S.
|
||
Bancorp, using its "Money" software package.
|
||
- Comment: Such moves as this--and don't forget the cable
|
||
companies--could result in a rapid transition to a form of
|
||
home banking and "digital money." Obviously this kind of
|
||
digital money, as it is being planned today, is very from
|
||
the kind of digital cash that interests us. In fact, it is
|
||
the polar opposite of what we want.
|
||
12.8.7. Credit card clearing...individuals can't use the system
|
||
- if something nonanonymous like credit cards cannot be used
|
||
by end users (Alice and Bob), why would we expect an
|
||
anonymous version of this would be either easier to use or
|
||
more possible?
|
||
- (And giving users encrypted links to credit agencies would
|
||
at least stop the security problems with giving credit card
|
||
numbers out over links that can be observed.)
|
||
- Mondex claims their system will allow this kind of person-
|
||
to-person transfer of anonymous digital cash (I'll believe
|
||
it when I see it).
|
||
|
||
12.9. Legal Issues with Digital Cash
|
||
10.8.1. "What's the legal status of digital cash?"
|
||
- It hasn't been tested, like a lot of crypto protocols. It
|
||
may be many years before these systems are tested.
|
||
10.8.2. "Is there a tie between digital cash and money laundering?"
|
||
- There doesn't have to be, but many of us believe the
|
||
widespread deployment of digital, untraceable cash will
|
||
make possible new approaches
|
||
- Hence the importance of digital cash for crypto anarchy and
|
||
related ideas.
|
||
- (In case it isn't obvious, I consider money-laundering a
|
||
non-crime.)
|
||
10.8.3. "Is it true the government of the U.S. can limit funds
|
||
transfers outside the U.S.?"
|
||
- Many issues here. Certainly some laws exist. Certainly
|
||
people are prosecuted every day for violating currency
|
||
export laws. Many avenues exist.
|
||
- "LEGALITY - There isn't and will never be a law restricting
|
||
the sending of funds outside the United States. How do I
|
||
know? Simple. As a country dependant on international
|
||
trade (billions of dollars a year and counting), the
|
||
American economy would be destroyed." [David Johnson,
|
||
privacy@well.sf.ca.us, "Offshore Banking & Privacy,"
|
||
alt.privacy, 1994-07-05]
|
||
10.8.4. "Are "alternative currencies" allowed in the U.S.? And what's
|
||
the implication for digital cash of various forms?
|
||
- Tokens, coupons, gift certificates are allowed, but face
|
||
various regulations. Casino chips were once treated as
|
||
cash, but are now more regulated (inter-casino conversion
|
||
is no longer allowed).
|
||
- Any attempt to use such coupons as an alternative currency
|
||
face obstacles. The coupons may be allowed, but heavily
|
||
regulated (reporting requirements, etc.).
|
||
- Perry Metzger notes, bearer bonds are now illegal in the
|
||
U.S. (a bearer bond represented cash, in that no name was
|
||
attached to the bond--the "bearer" could sell it for cash
|
||
or redeem it...worked great for transporting large amounts
|
||
of cash in compact form).
|
||
+ Note: Duncan Frissell claims that bearer bonds are _not_
|
||
illegal.
|
||
- "Under the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of
|
||
1982 (TEFRA), any interest payments made on *new* issues
|
||
of domestic bearer bonds are not deductible as an
|
||
ordinary and necessary business expense so none have been
|
||
issued since then. At the same time, the Feds
|
||
administratively stopped issuing treasury securities in
|
||
bearer form. Old issues of government and corporate debt
|
||
in bearer form still exist and will exist and trade for
|
||
30 or more years after 1982. Additionally, US residents
|
||
can legally buy foreign bearer securities." [Duncan
|
||
Frissell, 1994-08-10]
|
||
- Someone else has a slightly different view: "The last US
|
||
Bearer Bond issues mature in 1997. I also believe that to
|
||
collect interest, and to redeem the bond at maturity, you
|
||
must give your name and tax-id number to the paying
|
||
agent. (I can check with the department here that handles
|
||
it if anyone is interested in the pertinent OCC regs that
|
||
apply)" [prig0011@gold.tc.umn.edu, 1994-08-10]
|
||
- I cite this gory detail to give readers some idea about
|
||
how much confusion there is about these subjects. The
|
||
usual advice is to "seek competent counsel," but in fact
|
||
most lawyers have no clear ideas about the optimum
|
||
strategies, and the run-of-the-mill advisor may mislead
|
||
one dangerously. Tread carefully.
|
||
- This has implications for digital cash, of course.
|
||
10.8.5. "Why might digital cash and related techologies take hold
|
||
early in illegal markets? That is, will the Mob be an early
|
||
adopter?"
|
||
- untraceability needed
|
||
- and reputations matter to them
|
||
- they've shown in the past that they will try new
|
||
approaches, a la the money movements of the drug cartels,
|
||
novel methods for security, etc.
|
||
10.8.6. "Electronic cash...will it have to comply with laws, and
|
||
how?"
|
||
- Concerns will be raised about the anonymity aspects, the
|
||
usefulness for evading taxes and reporting requirements,
|
||
etc.
|
||
- a messy issue, sure to be debated and legislated about for
|
||
many years
|
||
+ split the cash into many pieces...is this "structuring"? is
|
||
it legal?
|
||
- some rules indicate the structuring per se is not
|
||
illegal, only tax evasion or currency control evasion
|
||
- what then of systems which _automatically_, as a basic
|
||
feature, split the cash up into multiple pieces and move
|
||
them?
|
||
10.8.7. Currency controls, flight capital regulations, boycotts,
|
||
asset seizures, etc.
|
||
- all are pressures to find alternate ways for capital to
|
||
flow
|
||
- all add to the lack of confidence, which, paradoxically to
|
||
lawmakers, makes capital flight all the more likely
|
||
10.8.8. "Will banking regulators allow digital cash?"
|
||
- Not easily, that's for sure. The maze of regulations,
|
||
restrictions, tax laws, and legal rulings is daunting. Eric
|
||
Hughes spent a lot of time reading up on the laws regarding
|
||
banks, commercial paper, taxes, etc., and concluded much
|
||
the same. I'm not saying it's impossible--indeed, I believe
|
||
it will someday happen, in some form--but the obstacles are
|
||
formidable.
|
||
+ Some issues:
|
||
+ Will such an operation be allowed to be centered or based
|
||
in the U.S.?
|
||
- What states? What laws? Bank vs. Savings and Loan vs.
|
||
Credit Union vs. Securities Broker vs. something else?
|
||
+ Will customers be able to access such entities offshore,
|
||
outside the U.S.?
|
||
- strong crypto makes communication possible, but it may
|
||
be difficult, not part of the business fabric, etc.
|
||
(and hence not so useful--if one has to send PGP-
|
||
encrypted instructions to one's banker, and can't use
|
||
the clearing infrastructure....)
|
||
+ Tax collection, money-laundering laws, disclosure laws,
|
||
"know your customer" laws....all are areas where a
|
||
"digital bank" could be shut down forthwith. Any bank not
|
||
filling out the proper forms (including mandatory
|
||
reporting of transactions of certain amounts and types,
|
||
and the Social Security/Taxpayer Number of customers)
|
||
faces huge fines, penalties, and regulatory sanctions.
|
||
- and the existing players in the banking and securities
|
||
business will not sit idly by while newcomers enter
|
||
their market; they will seek to force newcomers to jump
|
||
through the same hoops they had to (studies indicate
|
||
large corporations actually _like_ red tape, as it
|
||
helps them relative to smaller companies)
|
||
- Concluson: Digital banks will not be "launched" without a
|
||
*lot* of work by lawyers, accountants, tax experts,
|
||
lobbyists, etc. "Lemonade stand digital banks" (TM) will
|
||
not survive for long. Kids, don't try this at home!
|
||
- (Many new industries we are familiar with--software,
|
||
microcomputers--had very little regulation, rightly so. But
|
||
the effect is that many of us are unprepared to understand
|
||
the massive amount of red tape which businesses in other
|
||
areas, notably banking, face.)
|
||
10.8.9. Legal obstacles to digital money. If governments don't want
|
||
anonymous cash, they can make things tough.
|
||
+ As both Perry Metzger and Eric Hughes have said many times,
|
||
regulations can make life very difficult. Compliance with
|
||
laws is a major cost of doing business.
|
||
- ~"The cost of compliance in a typical USA bank is 14% of
|
||
operating costs."~ [Eric Hughes, citing an "American
|
||
Banker" article, 1994-08-30]
|
||
+ The maze of regulations is navigable by larger
|
||
institutions, with staffs of lawyers, accountants, tax
|
||
specialists, etc., but is essentially beyond the
|
||
capabilities of very small institutions, at least in the
|
||
U.S.
|
||
- this may or may not remain the case, as computers
|
||
proliferate. A "bank-in-a-box" program might help. My
|
||
suspicion is that a certain size of staff is needed just
|
||
to handle the face-to-face meetings and hoop-jumping.
|
||
+ "New World Order"
|
||
- U.S. urging other countries to "play ball" on banking
|
||
secrecy, on tax evasion extradition, on immigration, etc.
|
||
- this is closing off the former loopholes and escape
|
||
hatches that allowed people to escape repressive
|
||
taxation...the implications for digital money banks are
|
||
unclear, but worrisome.
|
||
|
||
12.10. Prospects for Digital Cash Use
|
||
12.10.1. "If digital money is so great, why isn't it being used?"
|
||
- Hasn't been finished. Protocols are still being researched,
|
||
papers are still being published. In any single area, such
|
||
as toll road payments, it may be possible to deploy an
|
||
application-specific system, but there is no "general"
|
||
solution (yet). There is no "digital coin" or unforgeable
|
||
object representing value, so the digital money area is
|
||
more similar to the similarly nonsimple markets in
|
||
financial instruments, commercial papers, bonds, warrants,
|
||
checks, etc. (Areas that are not inherently simple and that
|
||
have required lots of computerization and communications to
|
||
make manageable.)
|
||
- Flakiness of Nets. Systems crash, mail gets delayed
|
||
inexplicably, subscriptions to lists get lunched, and all
|
||
sorts of other breakages occur. Most interaction on the
|
||
Nets involves a fair amount of human adaptation to changing
|
||
conditions, screwups, workarounds, etc. These are not
|
||
conditions that inspire confidence in automated money
|
||
systems!
|
||
- Hard to Use. Few people will use systems that require
|
||
generating code, clients, etc. Semantic gap (generating
|
||
stuff on a Unix workstation is not at all like taking one's
|
||
checkbook out). Protocols in crypto are generally hard to
|
||
use and confusing.
|
||
- Lack of compelling need. Although people have tried various
|
||
experiments with digital money tokens or coupons (Magic
|
||
Money/Tacky Tokens, the HeX market, etc.), there is little
|
||
real world incentive to experiment with them. And most of
|
||
the denominated tokens are for truly trivial amounts of
|
||
money, not for anything worth spending time learning. No
|
||
marketplace for buyers to "wander around in." (You don't
|
||
buy what you don't see.)
|
||
- Legal issues. The IRS does not look favorably on
|
||
alternative currencies, especially if used in attempts to
|
||
bypass ordinary tax collection schemes. This and related
|
||
legal issues (redemptions into dollars) put a roadblock in
|
||
front of serious plans to use digital money.
|
||
- Research Issues. Not all problems resolved. Still being
|
||
developed, papers being published. Chaum's system does not
|
||
seem to be fully ready for deployment, certainly not
|
||
outside of well-defined vertical markets.
|
||
12.10.2. "Why isn't digital money in use?"
|
||
- The Meta Issue: *what* digital money? Various attempts at
|
||
digital cash or digital money exist, but most are flawed,
|
||
experimental, crufty, etc. Chaum's DigiCash was announced
|
||
(Web page, etc.), but is apparently not even remotely
|
||
usable.
|
||
+ Practical Reasons:
|
||
- nothing to buy
|
||
- no standard systems that are straightforward to use
|
||
- advantages of anonymity and untraceability are seldom
|
||
exploited
|
||
- The Magic Money/Tacky Tokens experiment on the Cypherpunks
|
||
list is instrucive. Lots of detailed work, lots of posts--
|
||
and yet not used for anything (granted, there's not much
|
||
being bought and sold on the List, so...).
|
||
- Scenario for Use in the Near Future: A vertical
|
||
application, such as a bridge toll system that offers
|
||
anonymity. In a vertical app, the issues of compatibility,
|
||
interfaces, and training can be managed.
|
||
12.10.3. "why isn't digital cash being used?"
|
||
+ many reasons, too many reasons!
|
||
+ hard issues, murky issues
|
||
- technical developments not final, Chaum, Brands, etc.
|
||
+ selling the users
|
||
- who don't have computers, PDAs, the means to do the
|
||
local computations
|
||
- who want portable versions of the same
|
||
+ The infrastructure for digital money (Chaum anonymous-
|
||
style, and variants, such as Brands) does not now exist,
|
||
and may not exist for several more years. (Of course, I
|
||
thought it would take "several more years" back in 1988,
|
||
so what do I know?)
|
||
- The issues are familiar: lack of standards, lack of
|
||
protocols, lack of customer experience, and likely
|
||
regulatory hurdles. A daunting prospect.
|
||
- Any "launches" will either have to be well-funded, well-
|
||
planned, or done sub rosa, in some quasi-legal or even
|
||
illegal market (such as gambling).
|
||
- "The american people keep claiming in polls that they want
|
||
better privacy protection, but the fact is that most aren't
|
||
willing to do anything about it: it's just a preference,
|
||
not a solid imperative. Until something Really Bad happens
|
||
to many people as a result of privacy loss, I really don't
|
||
think much will be done that requires real work and
|
||
inconvenience from people, like moving to something other
|
||
than credit cards for long-distance transactions... and
|
||
that's a tragedy."[L. Todd Masco , 1994-08-20]
|
||
12.10.4. "Is strong crypto needed for digital cash?"
|
||
- Yes, for the most bulletproof form, the form of greatest
|
||
interest to us and especially for agents, autonomous
|
||
systems
|
||
+ No, for certain weak versions (non-cryptographic methods of
|
||
security, access control, biometric security, etc. methods)
|
||
- for example, Internet billing is not usually done with
|
||
crypto
|
||
- and numbered Swiss accounts can be seen as a weak form of
|
||
digital cash (with some missing features)
|
||
- "warehouse receipts," as in gold or currency shipments
|
||
12.10.5. on why we may not have it for a while, from a non-Cypherpunk
|
||
commenter:
|
||
- "Government requires information on money flows, taxable
|
||
items, and large financial transactions.....As a result, it
|
||
would be nearly impossible to set up a modern anonymous
|
||
digital cash system, despite the fact that we have the
|
||
technology.....I think we have more of a right to privacy
|
||
with digicash transactions, and I also think there is a
|
||
market for anonymous digicash systems. " [Thomas Grant
|
||
Edwards. talk.politics.crypto, 1994-09-06]
|
||
12.10.6. "Why do a lot of schemes for things like digital money have
|
||
problems on the Net?
|
||
+ Many reasons
|
||
- lack of commercial infrastructure in general on the
|
||
Net...people are not used to buying things, advertising
|
||
is discouraged (or worse), and almost everything is
|
||
"free."
|
||
- lack of robustness and completeness in the various
|
||
protocols: they are "not ready for prime time" in most
|
||
cases (PGP is solid, and some good shells exist for PGP,
|
||
but the many other crypto protocols are mostly not
|
||
implemented at all, at least not widely).
|
||
+ The Net runs "open-loop," as a store-and-forward delivery
|
||
system
|
||
- The Net is mostly a store-and-forward netword, at least
|
||
at the granularity seen by the user in sending
|
||
messages, and hence is "open loop." Messages may or may
|
||
not be received in a timely way, and there is little
|
||
opportunity for negotiaton on a real-time basis.
|
||
- This open-loop nature usually works...messages get
|
||
through most of the time. And the "message in a bottle"
|
||
nature fits in with anonymous remailers (with
|
||
latency/delay), with message pools, and with other
|
||
schemes to make traffic analysis harder. A "closed-
|
||
loop," responsive system is likelier to be traffic-
|
||
analyzed by correlation of packets, etc.
|
||
- but the sender does not know if it gets through (return
|
||
receipts not commonly implemented...might be a nice
|
||
feature to incorporate; agent-based systems
|
||
(Telescript?) will certainly do this)
|
||
- this open-loop nature makes protocols, negotiation,
|
||
digital cash very tough to use--too much human
|
||
intervention needed
|
||
- Note: These comments apply mainly to _mail_ systems,
|
||
which is where most of us have experimented with these
|
||
ideas. Non-mail systems, such as Mosaic or telnet or
|
||
the like, have better or faster feedback mechanisms and
|
||
may be preferable for implementation of Cypherpunks
|
||
goals. It may be that the natural focus on mailing
|
||
lists, e-mail, etc., has distracted us. Perhaps a focus
|
||
on MUDs, or even on ftp, would have been more
|
||
fruitful...but we're a mailing list, and most people
|
||
are much more familiar with e-mail than with archie or
|
||
gopher or WAIS, etc.
|
||
- The legal and regulatory obstacles to a real system, used
|
||
for real transactions, are formidable. (The obstacles to
|
||
a "play" system are not so severe, but then play systems
|
||
tend not to get much developer attention.)
|
||
12.10.7. Scenario for deployment of digital cash
|
||
- Eric Hughes has spent time looking into this. Too many
|
||
issues to go into here, but he had this interesting
|
||
scenario, repeated almost in toto here:
|
||
- "It's very unlikely that a USA bank will be the one to
|
||
deploy anonymous digital dollars first. It's much more
|
||
likely that the first dollar digital cash will be issued
|
||
overseas, possibly London. By the same token, the non-
|
||
dollar regulation on banks in this country is not the same
|
||
as the dollar regulation, so it's quite possible that the
|
||
New York banks may be the first issuers of digital cash, in
|
||
pounds sterling, say.
|
||
|
||
"There will be two stages in actually deploying digital
|
||
cash. By digital cash, here, I mean a retail phenomenon,
|
||
available anybody. The first will be to digitize money, and
|
||
the second will be to anonymize it. Efforts are already
|
||
well underway to make more-or-less secure digital funds
|
||
transfers with reasonably low transaction fees (not
|
||
transaction costs, which are much more than just fees).
|
||
These efforts, as long as they retain some traceability,
|
||
will almost certainly succeed first in the marketplace,
|
||
because (and this is vital) the regulatory environment
|
||
against anonymity is not compromised.
|
||
|
||
"Once, however, money has been digitized, one of the
|
||
services available for purchase can be the anonymous
|
||
transfer of funds. I expect that the first digitization of
|
||
money won't be fully fungible. For example, if you allow
|
||
me to take money out of your checking account by automatic
|
||
debit, there is risk that the money won't be there when I
|
||
ask for it. Therefore that kind of money won't be
|
||
completely fungible, because money authorized from one
|
||
person won't be completely identical with money from
|
||
another. It may be a risk issue, it may be a timeliness
|
||
issue, it may be a fee issue; I don't know, but it's
|
||
unlikely to be perfect.
|
||
|
||
"Now, as the characteristic size of a business decreases,
|
||
the relative costs of dealing with whatever imperfection
|
||
there is will be greater. To wit, the small player will
|
||
still have some problem getting paid, although certainly
|
||
less than now. Digital cash solves many of these problems.
|
||
The clearing is immediate and final (no transaction
|
||
reversals). The number of entities to deal with is greatly
|
||
reduced, hopefully to one. The need and risk and cost of
|
||
accounts receivables is eliminated. It's anonymous. There
|
||
will be services which will desire these advantages, enough
|
||
to support a digital cash infrastructure. [Eric Hughes,
|
||
Cypherpunks list, 1994-08-03]
|
||
|
||
12.11. Commerce on the Internet
|
||
12.11.1. This has been a brewing topic for the past couple of years.
|
||
In 1994 thing heated up on several fronts:
|
||
- DigiCash announcement
|
||
- NetMarket announcement
|
||
- various other systems, including Visa Electronic Purse
|
||
12.11.2. I have no idea which ones will succeed...
|
||
12.11.3. NetMarket
|
||
- Mosaic connections, using PGP
|
||
+ "The NetMarket Company is now offering PGP-encrypted Mosaic
|
||
sessions for securely transmitting credit card information
|
||
over the Internet. Peter Lewis wrote an article on
|
||
NetMarket on page D1 of today's New York Times (8/12/94).
|
||
For more information on NetMarket, connect to
|
||
http://www.netmarket.com/ or, telnet netmarket.com." [
|
||
Guy H. T. Haskin <guy@netmarket.com>, 1994-08-12]
|
||
- Uses PGP. Hailed by the NYT as the first major use of
|
||
crypto for some form of digital money, but this is not
|
||
correct.
|
||
12.11.4. CommerceNet
|
||
- allows Internet users to buy and sell goods.
|
||
- "I read in yesterday's L.A. Times about something called
|
||
CommerceNet, where sellers and buyers of workstation level
|
||
equipment can meet and conduct busniess....Near the end of
|
||
the article, they talked about a proposed method for
|
||
exchanging "digital signatures" via Moasic (so that buyers
|
||
and sellers could _know_ that they were who they said they
|
||
were) and that they were going to "submit it to the
|
||
Internet Standards body"" [Cypher1@aol.com, 1994-06-23]
|
||
12.11.5. EDI, purchase orders, paperwork reduction, etc.
|
||
- Nick Szabo is a fan of this approach
|
||
12.11.6. approaches
|
||
- send VISA numbers in ordinary mail....obviously insecure
|
||
- send VISA numbers in encrypted mail
|
||
+ establish two-way clearing protocols
|
||
- better ensures that recipient will fulfill service...like
|
||
a receipt that customer signs (instead of the "sig taken
|
||
over the phone" approach)
|
||
- various forms of digital money
|
||
12.11.7. lightweight vs. heavyweight processes for Internet commerce
|
||
- Chris Hibbert
|
||
- and the recurring issue of centralized vs. decentralized
|
||
authentication and certification
|
||
|
||
12.12. Cypherpunks Experiments ("Magic Money")
|
||
12.12.1. What is Magic Money?
|
||
- "Magic Money is a digital cash system designed for use over
|
||
electronic mail. The system is online and untraceable.
|
||
Online means that each transaction involves an exchange
|
||
with a server, to prevent double-spending. Untraceable
|
||
means that it is impossible for anyone to trace
|
||
transactions, or to match a withdrawal with a deposit, or
|
||
to match two coins in any way."
|
||
|
||
"The system consists of two modules, the server and the
|
||
client. Magic Money uses the PGP ascii-armored message
|
||
format for all communication between the server and client.
|
||
All traffic is encrypted, and messages from the server to
|
||
the client are signed. Untraceability is provided by a
|
||
Chaum-style blind signature. Note that the blind signature
|
||
is patented, as is RSA. Using it for experimental purposes
|
||
only shouldn't get you in trouble.
|
||
|
||
"Digicash is represented by discrete coins, the
|
||
denominations of which are chosen by the server operator.
|
||
Coins are RSA-signed, with a different e/d pair for each
|
||
denomination. The server does not store any money. All
|
||
coins are stored by the client module. The server accepts
|
||
old coins and blind- signs new coins, and checks off the
|
||
old ones on a spent list."
|
||
[...rest of excellent summary elided...highly recommended
|
||
that you dig it up (archives, Web site?) and read it]
|
||
[Pr0duct Cypher, Magic Money Digicash System, 1992-02-04]
|
||
+ Magic Money
|
||
- ftp://csn.org/pub/mpj/crypto_XXXXXX (or something like
|
||
that) <Derek Atkins, 4-7-94>
|
||
- ftp:csn.org//mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp_too
|
||
ls <Michael Paul Johnson, 4-7-94>
|
||
12.12.2. Matt Thomlinson experimented with a derivative version called
|
||
"GhostMarks"
|
||
12.12.3. there was also a "Tacky Tokens" derivative
|
||
12.12.4. Typical Problems with Such Experiments
|
||
- Not worth anything...making the money meaningful is an
|
||
obstacle to be overcome
|
||
- If worth anything, not worth the considerable effort to use
|
||
it ("creating Magic Money clients" and other scary Unix
|
||
stuff!)
|
||
- robustness...sites go down, etc.
|
||
- same problems were seen on Extropians list with "HEx"
|
||
exchange and its currency, the "thorne." (I even paid real
|
||
money to Edgar Swank to buy some thorned...alas, the market
|
||
was too thinly traded and the thornes did me no good.)
|
||
|
||
12.13. Practical Issues and Concerns with Digital Cash
|
||
12.13.1. "Is physical identity proof needed for on-line clearing?"
|
||
- No, not if the cash outlook is taken. Cash is cash. Caveat
|
||
emptor.
|
||
- The "first to the locker" approach causes the bank not to
|
||
particularly care about this, just as a Swiss bank will
|
||
allow access to a numbered account by presentation of the
|
||
number, and perhaps a key. Identity proof *may* be needed,
|
||
depending on the "protocol" they and the customer
|
||
established, but it need not be. And the last thing the
|
||
bank is worried about is being able to "find and prosecute"
|
||
anyone, as there is no way they can be liable for a double
|
||
spending incident. The beauties of local clearing! (Which
|
||
is what gold coins do, and paper money if we really think
|
||
we can pass it on to others.)
|
||
12.13.2. "Is digital cash traceable?"
|
||
- There are several flavors of "digital cash," ranging from
|
||
versions of VISA cards to fully untraceable (Chaumian)
|
||
digital cash.
|
||
- This comes up a lot, with people in Net newsgroups even
|
||
warning others not to use digital cash because of the ease
|
||
of traceability. Not so.
|
||
- "Not the kind proposed by David Chaum and his colleagues in
|
||
the Netherlands. The whole thrust of their research over
|
||
the last decade has been the use of cryptographic
|
||
techniques to make electronic transactions secure from
|
||
fraud while at the same time protecting personal privacy.
|
||
They, and others, have developed a number of schemes for
|
||
UNTRACEABLE digital cash." [Kevin Van Horn,
|
||
talk.politics.crypto, 1994-07-03]
|
||
12.13.3. "Is there a danger that people will lose the numbers that
|
||
they need to redeem money? That someone could steal the
|
||
number and thus steal their money?"
|
||
- Sure. There's the danger that I'll lose my bearer bonds, or
|
||
forget my Swiss bank account number, or lose my treasure
|
||
map to where I buried my money (as Alan Turing supposedly
|
||
did in WW II).
|
||
- People can take steps to limit risk. More secure computers.
|
||
Dongles worn around their necks. Protocols that involve
|
||
biometric authentication to their local computer or key
|
||
storage PDA, etc. Limits on withdrawals per day, etc.
|
||
People can store key numbers with people they trust,
|
||
perhaps encrypted with other keys, can leave them with
|
||
their lawyers, etc. All sorts of arrangements can be made.
|
||
Personal identification is but one of these arrangements.
|
||
Often used, but not essential to the underlyng protocol.
|
||
Again, the Swiss banks (maybe now the Liechtenstein
|
||
anstalts are a better example) don't require physical ID
|
||
for all accounts. (More generally, if Charles wants to
|
||
create a bank in which deposits are made and then given out
|
||
to the first person who sings the right tune, why should we
|
||
care? This extreme example is useful in pointing out that
|
||
_contractual arrangements_ need not involve governmental or
|
||
societal norms about what constitutes proof of identity.)
|
||
|
||
12.14. Cyberspace and Digital Money
|
||
12.14.1. "You can't eat cyberspace, so what good is digital money?"
|
||
- This comes up a lot. People assume there is no practical
|
||
way to transfer assets, when in fact it is done all the
|
||
time. That is, money flows from the realm of the purely
|
||
"informational" realm to the physcial realm Consultants,
|
||
writers, traders, etc., all use their heads and thereby
|
||
earn real money.
|
||
- Same will apply to cyberspace.
|
||
12.14.2. "How can I remain anonymous when buying physical items using
|
||
anonymous digital cash?'
|
||
- Very difficult. Once you are seen, and your picture can be
|
||
taken( perhaps unknown to you), databases will have you.
|
||
Not much can be done about this.
|
||
- People have proposed schemes for anonymous shipment and
|
||
pickup, but the plain fact is that physical delivery of any
|
||
sort compromises anonymity, just as in the world today.
|
||
- The purpose of anonymous digital cash is partly to at least
|
||
make it more difficult, to not give Big Brother your
|
||
detailed itinerary from toll road movements, movie theater
|
||
payments, etc. To the extent that physical cameras can
|
||
still track cars, people, shipments, etc., anonymous
|
||
digital cash doesn't solve this surveillance problem.
|
||
|
||
12.15. Outlawing of Cash
|
||
12.15.1. "What are the motivations for outlawing cash?"
|
||
- (Note: This has not happened. Many of us see signs of it
|
||
happening. Others are skeptical.)
|
||
+ Reasons for the Elimination of Cash:
|
||
- War on Drugs....need I say more?
|
||
- surface the underground economy, by withdrawing paper
|
||
currency and forcing all monetary transaction into forms
|
||
that can be easily monitored, regulated, and taxed.
|
||
- tax avoidance, under the table economy (could also be
|
||
motive for tamper-resistant cash registers, with spot
|
||
checks to ensure compliance)
|
||
+ welfare, disability, pension, social security auto-
|
||
deposits
|
||
- fraud, double-dipping
|
||
- reduce theft of welfare checks, disability payments,
|
||
etc....a problem in some locales, and automatic
|
||
deposit/cash card approaches are being evaluated.
|
||
- general reduction in theft, pickpockets
|
||
- reduction of paperwork: all transfers electronic (could
|
||
be part of a "reinventing government" initiative)
|
||
+ illegal immigrants, welfare cheats, etc. Give everyone a
|
||
National Identity Card (they'll call it something
|
||
different. to make it more palatable, such as "Social
|
||
Services Portable Inventory Unit" or "Health Rights
|
||
Document").
|
||
- (Links to National Health Care Card, to Welfare Card,
|
||
to other I.D. schemes designed to reduce fraud, track
|
||
citizen-units, etc.)
|
||
+ rationing systems that depend on non-cash transactions
|
||
(as explained elsewhere, market distortions from
|
||
rationing systems generally require identification,
|
||
correlation to person or group, etc.)
|
||
- this rationing can included subsidized prices, denial
|
||
of access (e.g., certain foods denied to certain
|
||
people)
|
||
12.15.2. Lest this be considered paranoid ranting, let me point out
|
||
that many actions have already been taken that limit the form
|
||
of money (banking laws, money laundering, currency
|
||
restrictions...even the outlawing of competing currencies
|
||
itself)
|
||
12.15.3. Dangers of outlawing cash
|
||
- Would freeze out all transactions, giving Big Brother
|
||
unprecedented power (unless the non-cash forms were
|
||
anonymous, a la Chaum and the systems we support)
|
||
- Would allow complete traceability....like the cellular
|
||
phones that got Simpson
|
||
- 666, Heinlein, Shockwave Rider, etc.
|
||
12.15.4. Given that there is no requirement for identity to be
|
||
associated with money, we should fight any system which
|
||
proposed to link the two.
|
||
12.15.5. The value of paying cash
|
||
- makes a transaction purely local, resolved on the spot
|
||
- the alternative, a complicated accounting system involving
|
||
other parties, etc., is much less attractive
|
||
- too many transactions these days are no longer handled in
|
||
cash, which increases costs and gets other parties involved
|
||
where they shouldn't be involved.
|
||
12.15.6. "Will people accept the banning of cash?"
|
||
- There was a time when I would've said Americans, at least,
|
||
would've rejected such a thing. Too many memories of
|
||
"Papieren, bitte. Macht schnell!" But I now think most
|
||
Americans (and Europeans) are so used to producing
|
||
documents for every transaction, and so used to using VISA
|
||
cards and ATM cards at gas stations, supermarkets, and even
|
||
at flea markets, that they'll willingly--even eagerly--
|
||
adopt such a system.
|
||
|
||
12.16. Novel Opportunities
|
||
12.16.1. Encrypted open books, or anonymous auditing
|
||
- Eric Hughes has worked on a scheme using a kind of blinding
|
||
to do "encrypted open books," whereby observers can verify
|
||
that a bank is balancing its books without more detailed
|
||
looks at individual accounts. (I have my doubts about
|
||
spoofs, attacks, etc., but such are always to be considered
|
||
in any new protocol.)
|
||
- "Kent Hastings wondered how an offshore bank could provide
|
||
assurances to depositors. I wondered the same thing a few
|
||
months ago, and started working on what Perry calls the
|
||
anonymous auditing problem. I have what I consider to be
|
||
the core of a solution.
|
||
...The following is long.... [TCM Note: Too long to include
|
||
here. I am including just enough to convince readers that
|
||
some new sorts of banking ideas may come out of
|
||
cryptography.]
|
||
|
||
"If we use the contents of the encrypted books at the
|
||
organizational boundary points to create suitable legal
|
||
opbligations, we can mostly ignore what goes on inside of
|
||
the mess of random numbers. That is, even if double books
|
||
were being kept, the legal obligations created should
|
||
suffice to ensure that everything can be unwound if needed.
|
||
This doesn't prevent networks of corrupt businesses from
|
||
going down all at once, but it does allow networks of
|
||
honest businesses to operate with more assurance of
|
||
honesty." [Eric Hughes, PROTOCOL: Encrypted Open Books,
|
||
1993-08-16]
|
||
12.16.2. "How can software components be sold, and how does crypto
|
||
figure in?"
|
||
+ Reusable Software, Brad Cox, Sprague, etc.
|
||
- good article in "Wired" (repeated in "Out of Control")
|
||
- First, certainly software is sold. The issues is why the
|
||
"software components" market has not yet developed, and why
|
||
such specific instances of software as music, art, text,
|
||
etc., have not been sold in smaller chunks.
|
||
+ Internet commerce is a huge area of interest, and future
|
||
development.
|
||
- currently developing very slowly
|
||
- lots of conflicting information...several mailing
|
||
lists...lots of hype
|
||
+ Digital cash is often cited as a needed enabling tool, but
|
||
I think the answer is more complicated than that.
|
||
- issues of convenience
|
||
- issues of there being no recurring market (as there is
|
||
in, say, the chip business...software doesn't get bought
|
||
over and over again, in increasing unit volumes)
|
||
|
||
12.17. Loose Ends
|
||
12.17.1. Reasons to have no government involvement in commerce
|
||
- Even a small involvement, through special regulations,
|
||
granted frachises, etc., produces vested interests. For
|
||
example, those in a community who had to wait to get
|
||
building permits want _others_ to wait just as long, or
|
||
longer. Or, businesses that had to meet certain standard,
|
||
even if unreasonable, will demand that new businesses do so
|
||
also. The effect is an ever-widening tar pit of rules,
|
||
restrictions, and delays. Distortions of the market result.
|
||
+ Look at how hard it is for the former U.S.S.R. to
|
||
disentangle itself from 75 years of central planning. They
|
||
are now an almost totally Mafia-controlled state (by this I
|
||
mean that "privatization" of formerly non-private
|
||
enterprises benefitted those who had amassed money and
|
||
influence, and that these were mainly the Russian Mafia and
|
||
former or current politicians...the repercussions of this
|
||
"corrupt giveaway" will be felt for decades to come).
|
||
- An encouraging sign: The thriving black market in Russia-
|
||
-which all Cypherpunks of course cheer--will gradually
|
||
displace the old business systems with new ones, as in
|
||
all economies. Eventually the corruptly-bought businesses
|
||
will sink or swim based on merit, and newly-created
|
||
enterprises will compete with them.
|
||
12.17.2. "Purist" Approach to Keys, Cash, Responsibility
|
||
+ There are two main approaches to the issue:
|
||
- Key owner is responsible for uses of his key
|
||
- or, Others are responsible
|
||
+ There may be mixed situations, such as when a key is
|
||
stolen...but this needs also to be planned-for by the key
|
||
owner, by use of protocols that limit exposure. For
|
||
example, few people will use a single key that accesses
|
||
immediately their net worth...most people will partition
|
||
their holding and their keyed access in such a way as to
|
||
naturally limit exposure if any particular key is lost or
|
||
compromised. Or forgotten.
|
||
- could involve their bank holding keys, or escrow agents
|
||
- or n-out-of-m voting systems
|
||
- Contracts are the essence...what contracts do people
|
||
voluntarily enter into?
|
||
- And locality--who better to keep keys secure than the
|
||
owner? Anything that transfers blame to "the banks" or to
|
||
"society" breaks the feedback loop of responsibility,
|
||
provides an "out" for the lazy, and encourages fraud
|
||
(people who disavow contracts by claiming their key was
|
||
stolen).
|
||
|
||
13. Activism and Projects
|
||
|
||
13.1. copyright
|
||
THE CYPHERNOMICON: Cypherpunks FAQ and More, Version 0.666,
|
||
1994-09-10, Copyright Timothy C. May. All rights reserved.
|
||
See the detailed disclaimer. Use short sections under "fair
|
||
use" provisions, with appropriate credit, but don't put your
|
||
name on my words.
|
||
|
||
13.2. SUMMARY: Activism and Projects
|
||
13.2.1. Main Points
|
||
13.2.2. Connections to Other Sections
|
||
13.2.3. Where to Find Additional Information
|
||
13.2.4. Miscellaneous Comments
|
||
|
||
13.3. Activism is a Tough Job
|
||
13.3.1. "herding cats"..trying to change the world through
|
||
exhortation seems a particulary ineffective notion
|
||
13.3.2. There's always been a lot of wasted time and rhetoric on the
|
||
Cypherpunks list as various people tried to get others to
|
||
follow their lead, to adopt their vision. (Nothing wrong with
|
||
this, if done properly. If someone leads by example, or has a
|
||
particularly compelling vision or plan, this may naturally
|
||
happen. Too often, though, the situation was that someone's
|
||
vague plans for a product were declared by them to be the
|
||
standards that others should follow. Various schemes for
|
||
digital money, in many forms and modes, has always been the
|
||
prime example of this.)
|
||
13.3.3. This is related also to what Kevin Kelley calls "the fax
|
||
effect." When few people own fax machines, they're not of
|
||
much use. Trying to get others to use the same tools one has
|
||
is like trying to convince people to buy fax machines so that
|
||
you can communicate by fax with them...it may happen, but
|
||
probably for other reasons. (Happily, the interoperability of
|
||
PGP provided a common communications medium that had been
|
||
lacking with previous platform-specific cipher programs.)
|
||
13.3.4. Utopian schemes are also a tough sell. Schemes about using
|
||
digital money to make inflation impossible, schemes to
|
||
collect taxes with anonymous systems, etc.
|
||
13.3.5. Harry Browne's "How I Found Freedom in an Unfree World" is
|
||
well worth reading; he advises against getting upset and
|
||
frustrated that the world is not moving in the direction one
|
||
would like.
|
||
|
||
13.4. Cypherpunks Projects
|
||
13.4.1. "What are Cypherpunks projects?"
|
||
- Always a key part--perhaps _the_ key part--of Cypherpunks
|
||
activity. "Cypherpunks write code." From work on PGP to
|
||
remailers to crypto toolkits to FOIA requests, and a bunch
|
||
of other things, Cypherpunks hack the system in various
|
||
ways.
|
||
- Matt Blaze's LEAF blower, Phil Karn's "swIPe" system, Peter
|
||
Wayner's articles....all are examples. (Many Cypherpunks
|
||
projects are also done, or primarily done, for other
|
||
reasons, so we cannot in all cases claim credit for this
|
||
work.)
|
||
13.4.2. Extensions to PGP
|
||
13.4.3. Spread of PGP and crypto in general.
|
||
- education
|
||
- diskettes containing essays, programs
|
||
- ftp sites
|
||
- raves, conventions, gatherings
|
||
13.4.4. Remailers
|
||
+ ideal Chaumian mix has certain properties
|
||
- latency to foil traffic analysis
|
||
- encryption
|
||
- no records kept (hardware tamper-resistance, etc.)
|
||
- Cyperpunks remailers
|
||
- julf remailers
|
||
+ abuses
|
||
- flooding, because mail transmission costs are not borne
|
||
by sender
|
||
+ anonymity produces potential for abuses
|
||
- death threats, extortion
|
||
- Progress continues, with new features added. See the
|
||
discussion in the remailers section.
|
||
13.4.5. Steganography
|
||
- hiding the existence of a message, for at least some amount
|
||
of time
|
||
- security through obscurity
|
||
- invisible ink, microdots
|
||
+ Uses
|
||
- in case crypto is outawed, may be useful to avoid
|
||
authorities
|
||
- if enough people do it, increases the difficulty of
|
||
enforcing anti-crypto laws (all
|
||
+ Stego
|
||
- JSTEG:
|
||
soda.berkeley.edu:/pub/cypherpunks/applications/jsteg
|
||
- Stego: sumex-aim.stanford.edu
|
||
13.4.6. Anonymous Transaction Systems
|
||
13.4.7. Voice Encryption, Voice PGP
|
||
- Clipper, getting genie out of bottle
|
||
- CELP, compression, DSPs
|
||
- SoundBlaster approach...may not have enough processing
|
||
power
|
||
+ hardware vs. pure software
|
||
- newer Macs, including av Macs and System 7 Pro, have
|
||
interesting capabilities
|
||
+ Zimmermann's plans have been widely publicized, that he is
|
||
looking for donations, that he is seeking programming help,
|
||
etc.
|
||
- which does not bode well for seeing such a product from
|
||
him
|
||
- frankly, I expect it will come from someone else
|
||
- Eric Blossom is pursuing own hardware board, based on 2105
|
||
+ "Is anyone building encrypted telephones?"
|
||
-
|
||
+ Yes, several such projects are underway. Eric Blossom
|
||
even showed a
|
||
- PCB of one at a Cypherpunks meeting, using an
|
||
inexpensive DSP chip.
|
||
-
|
||
+ Software-only versions, with some compromises in speech
|
||
quality
|
||
- probably, are also underway. Phil Zimmermann
|
||
described his progress at
|
||
+ the last Cypherpunks meeting.
|
||
-
|
||
- ("Software-only" can mean using off-the-shelf, widely-
|
||
available DSP
|
||
+ boards like SoundBlasters.)
|
||
-
|
||
- And I know of at least two more such projects.
|
||
Whether any will
|
||
+ materialize is anyone's guess.
|
||
-
|
||
- And various hacks have already been done. NeXT users
|
||
have had
|
||
- voicemail for years, and certain Macs now offer
|
||
something similar.
|
||
+ Adding encryption is not a huge obstacle.
|
||
-
|
||
- A year ago, several Cypherpunks meeting sites around
|
||
the U.S. were
|
||
- linked over the Internet using DES encryption. The
|
||
sound quality was
|
||
- poor, for various reasons, and we turned off the DES
|
||
in a matter of
|
||
- minutes. Still, an encrypted audio conference call.
|
||
13.4.8. DC-Nets
|
||
- What it is, how it works
|
||
- Chaum's complete 1988 "Journal of Cryptology" article is
|
||
available at the Cypherpunks archive site,
|
||
ftp.soda.csua.edu, in /pub/cypherpunks
|
||
+ Dining Cryptographers Protocols, aka "DC Nets"
|
||
+ "What is the Dining Cryptographers Problem, and why is it
|
||
so important?"
|
||
+ This is dealt with in the main section, but here's
|
||
David Chaum's Abstract, from his 1988 paper"
|
||
- Abstract: "Keeping confidential who sends which
|
||
messages, in a world where any physical transmission
|
||
can be traced to its origin, seems impossible. The
|
||
solution presented here is unconditionally or
|
||
cryptographically secure, depending on whether it is
|
||
based on one-time-use keys or on public keys.
|
||
respectively. It can be adapted to address
|
||
efficiently a wide variety of practical
|
||
considerations." ["The Dining Cryptographers Problem:
|
||
Unconditional Sender and Recipient Untraceability,"
|
||
David Chaum, Journal of Cryptology, I, 1, 1988.]
|
||
-
|
||
- DC-nets have yet to be implemented, so far as I know,
|
||
but they represent a "purer" version of the physical
|
||
remailers we are all so familiar with now. Someday
|
||
they'll have have a major impact. (I'm a bigger fan of
|
||
this work than many seem to be, as there is little
|
||
discussion in sci.crypt and the like.)
|
||
+ "The Dining Cryptographers Problem: Unconditional Sender
|
||
and Recipient Untraceability," David Chaum, Journal of
|
||
Cryptology, I, 1, 1988.
|
||
- available courtesy of the Information Liberation Front
|
||
at the soda.csua.berkeley.edu site
|
||
- Abstract: "Keeping confidential who sends which
|
||
messages, in a world where any physical transmission
|
||
can be traced to its origin, seems impossible. The
|
||
solution presented here is unconditionally or
|
||
cryptographically secure, depending on whether it is
|
||
based on one-time-use keys or on public keys.
|
||
respectively. It can be adapted to address efficiently
|
||
a wide variety of practical considerations." ["The
|
||
Dining Cryptographers Problem: Unconditional Sender and
|
||
Recipient Untraceability," David Chaum, Journal of
|
||
Cryptology, I, 1, 1988.]
|
||
- Note that the initials "D.C." have several related
|
||
meanings: Dining Cryptographers, Digital Cash/DigiCash,
|
||
and David Chaum. Coincidence?
|
||
+ Informal Explanation
|
||
- Note: I've posted this explanation, and variants,
|
||
several times since I first wrote it in mid-1992. In
|
||
fact, I first posted it on the "Extropians" mailing
|
||
list, as "Cypherpunks" did not then exist.
|
||
- Three Cypherpunks are having dinner, perhaps in Palo
|
||
Alto. Their waiter tells them that their bill has
|
||
already been paid, either by the NSA or by one of them.
|
||
The waiter won't say more. The Cypherpunks wish to know
|
||
whether one of them paid, or the NSA paid. But they
|
||
don't want to be impolite and force the Cypherpunk
|
||
payer to 'fess up, so they carry out this protocol (or
|
||
procedure):
|
||
|
||
Each Cypherpunk flips a fair coin behind a menu placed
|
||
upright between himself and the Cypherpunk on his
|
||
right. The coin is visible to himself AND to the
|
||
Cypherpunk on his left. Each Cypherpunk can see his own
|
||
coin and the coin to his right. (STOP RIGHT HERE!
|
||
Please take the time to make a sketch of the situation
|
||
I've described. If you lost it here, all that follows
|
||
will be a blur. It's too bad the state of the Net today
|
||
cannot support figures and diagrams easily.)
|
||
|
||
Each Cypherpunk then states out loud whether the two
|
||
coins he can see are the SAME or are DIFFERENT, e.g.,
|
||
"Heads-Tails" means DIFFERENT, and so forth. For now,
|
||
assume the Cypherpunks are truthful. A little bit of
|
||
thinking shows that the total number of "DIFFERENCES"
|
||
must be either 0 (the coins all came up the same), or
|
||
2. Odd parity is impossible.
|
||
|
||
Now the Cypherpunks agree that if one of them paid, he
|
||
or she will SAY THE OPPOSITE of what they actually see.
|
||
Remember, they don't announce what their coin turned up
|
||
as, only whether it was the same or different as their
|
||
neighbor.
|
||
|
||
Suppose none of them paid, i.e., the NSA paid. Then
|
||
they all report the truth and the parity is even
|
||
(either 0 or 2 differences). They then know the NSA
|
||
paid.
|
||
|
||
Suppose one of them paid the bill. He reports the
|
||
opposite of what he actually sees, and the parity is
|
||
suddenly odd. That is, there is 1 difference reported.
|
||
The Cypherpunks now know that one of them paid. But can
|
||
they determine which one?
|
||
|
||
Suppose you are one of the Cypherpunks and you know you
|
||
didn't pay. One of the other two did. You either
|
||
reported SAME or DIFFERENT, based on what your neighbor
|
||
to the right (whose coin you can see) had. But you
|
||
can't tell which of the other two is lying! (You can
|
||
see you right-hand neighbor's coin, but you can't see
|
||
the coin he sees to his right!)
|
||
|
||
This all generalizes to any number of people. If none
|
||
of them paid, the parity is even. If one of them paid,
|
||
the parity is odd. But which one of them paid cannot be
|
||
deduced. And it should be clear that each round can
|
||
transmit a bit, e.g., "I paid" is a "1". The message
|
||
"Attack at dawn" could thus be "sent" untraceably with
|
||
multiple rounds of the protocol.
|
||
- The "Crypto Ouija Board": I explain this to people as a
|
||
kind of ouija board. A message, like "I paid" or a more
|
||
interesting "Transfer funds from.....," just "emerges"
|
||
out of the group, with no means of knowing where it
|
||
came from. Truly astounding.
|
||
+ Problems and Pitfalls
|
||
- In Chaum's paper, the explanation above is given
|
||
quickly, in a few pages. The _rest_ of the paper is
|
||
then devoted to dealing with the many "gotchas" and
|
||
attacks that come up and that must be dealt with before
|
||
the DC protocol is even remotely possible. I think all
|
||
those interested in protocol design should read this
|
||
paper, and the follow-on papers by Bos, Pfitzmann,
|
||
etc., as object lessons for dealing with complex crypto
|
||
protocols.
|
||
+ The Problems:
|
||
- 1. Collusion. Obviously the Cypherpunks can collude
|
||
to deduce the payer. This is best dealt with by
|
||
creating multiple subcircuits (groups doing the
|
||
protocol amongst themselves). Lots more stuff here.
|
||
Chaum devotes most of the paper to these kind of
|
||
issues and their solutions.
|
||
|
||
2. With each round of this protocol, a single bit is
|
||
transmitted. Sending a long message means many coin
|
||
flips. Instead of coins and menus, the neighbors
|
||
would exchange lists of random numbers (with the
|
||
right partners, as per the protocol above, of course.
|
||
Details are easy to figure out.)
|
||
|
||
3. Since the lists are essentially one-time pads, the
|
||
protocol is unconditionally secure, i.e., no
|
||
assumptions are made about the difficulty of
|
||
factoring large numbers or any other crypto
|
||
assumptions.
|
||
|
||
4. Participants in such a "DC-Net" (and here we are
|
||
coming to the heart of the "crypto anarchy" idea)
|
||
could exchange CD-ROMs or DATs, giving them enough
|
||
"coin flips" for zillions of messages, all
|
||
untraceable! The logistics are not simple, but one
|
||
can imagine personal devices, like smart card or
|
||
Apple "Newtons," that can handle these protocols
|
||
(early applications may be for untraceable
|
||
brainstorming comments, secure voting in corportate
|
||
settings, etc.)
|
||
|
||
5. The lists of random numbers (coin flips) can be
|
||
generated with standard cryptographic methods,
|
||
requiring only a key to be exchanged between the
|
||
appropriate participants. This eliminates the need
|
||
for the one-time pad, but means the method is now
|
||
only cryptographically secure, which is often
|
||
sufficient. (Don't think "only cryptographically
|
||
secure" means insecure....the messages may remain
|
||
encrypted for the next billion years)
|
||
|
||
6. Collisions occur when multiple messages are sent
|
||
at the same time. Various schemes can be devised to
|
||
handle this, like backing off when you detect another
|
||
sender (when even parity is seen instead of odd
|
||
parity). In large systems this is likely to be a
|
||
problem. Deliberate disruption, or spamming, is a
|
||
major problem--a disruptor can shut down the DC-net
|
||
by sending bits out. As with remailes, anonymity
|
||
means freedom from detection. (Anonymous payments to
|
||
send a message may help, but the details are murky to
|
||
me.)
|
||
+ Uses
|
||
- * Untraceable mail. Useful for avoiding censorship, for
|
||
avoiding lawsuits, and for all kinds of crypto anarchy
|
||
things.
|
||
- * Fully anonymous bulletin boards, with no traceability
|
||
of postings or responses. Illegal materials can be
|
||
offered for sale (my 1987 canonical example, which
|
||
freaked out a few people: "Stealth bomber blueprints
|
||
for sale. Post highest offer and include public key.").
|
||
Think for a few minutes about this and you'll see the
|
||
profound implications.
|
||
- * Decentralized nexus of activity. Since messages
|
||
"emerge" (a la the ouija board metaphor), there is no
|
||
central posting area. Nothing for the government to
|
||
shut down, complete deniability by the participants.
|
||
- * Only you know who your a partners are....in any given
|
||
circuit. And you can be in as many circuits as you
|
||
wish. (Payments can be made to others, to create a
|
||
profit motive. I won't deal with this issue, or with
|
||
the issue of how reputations are handled, here.)
|
||
- It should be clear that DC-nets offer some amazing
|
||
opportunities. They have not been implemented at all, and
|
||
have received almost no attention compared to ordinary
|
||
Cypherpunks remailers. Why is this? The programming
|
||
complexity (and the underlying cryptographic primitives
|
||
that are needed) seems to be the key. Several groups have
|
||
announced plans to imlement some form of DC-net, but
|
||
nothing has appeared.
|
||
- software vs. hardware,
|
||
- Yanek Martinson, Strick, Austin group, Rishab
|
||
- IMO, this is an ideal project for testing the efficacy of
|
||
software toolkits. The primitives needed, including bit
|
||
commitment, synchronization, and collusion handling, are
|
||
severe tests of crypto systems. On the downside, I doubt
|
||
that even the Pfaltzmans or Bos has pulled off a running
|
||
simulation...
|
||
13.4.9. D-H sockets, UNIX, swIPe
|
||
+ swIPe
|
||
- Matt Blaze, John I. (did coding), Phil Karn, Perry
|
||
Metzger, etc. are the main folks involved
|
||
- evolved from "mobile IP," with radio links, routing
|
||
- virtual networks
|
||
- putting encryption in at the IP level, transparently
|
||
- bypassing national borders
|
||
- Karn
|
||
- at soda site
|
||
+ swIPe system, for routing packets
|
||
- end to end, gateways, links, Mach, SunOS
|
||
13.4.10. Digital Money, Banks, Credit Unions
|
||
- Magic Money
|
||
- Digital Bank
|
||
- "Open Encrypted Books"
|
||
- not easy to do...laws, regulations, expertise in banking
|
||
- technical flaws, issues in digital money
|
||
+ several approaches
|
||
- clearing
|
||
- tokens, stamps, coupons
|
||
- anonymity-protected transactions
|
||
13.4.11. Data Havens
|
||
+ financial info, credit reports
|
||
- bypassing local jurisdictions, time limits, arcane rules
|
||
- reputations
|
||
- insider trading
|
||
- medical
|
||
- technical, scientific, patents
|
||
- crypto information (recursively enough)
|
||
- need not be any known location....distributed in
|
||
cyberspace
|
||
- One of the most commercially interesting applications.
|
||
13.4.12. Related Technologies
|
||
- Agorics
|
||
- Evolutionary Systems
|
||
- Virtual Reality and Cyberspace
|
||
- Agents
|
||
+ Computer Security
|
||
+ Kerberos, Gnu, passwords
|
||
- recent controversy
|
||
- demon installed to watch packets
|
||
- Cygnus will release it for free
|
||
- GuardWire
|
||
+ Van Eck, HERF, EMP
|
||
- Once Cypherpunk project proposed early on was the
|
||
duplication of certain NSA capabilities to monitor
|
||
electronic communications. This involves "van Eck"
|
||
radiation (RF) emitted by the CRTs and other electronics
|
||
of computers.
|
||
+ Probably for several reasons, this has not been pursued,
|
||
at least not publically.
|
||
- legality
|
||
- costs
|
||
- difficulty in finding targets of opportunity
|
||
- not a very CPish project!
|
||
13.4.13. Matt Blaze, AT&T, various projects
|
||
+ a different model of trust...multiple universes
|
||
- not heierarchical interfaces, but mistrust of interfaces
|
||
- heterogeneous
|
||
- where to put encryption, where to mistrust, etc.
|
||
+ wants crypto at lowest level that is possible
|
||
- almost everything should be mistrusted
|
||
- every mistrusted interface shoud be cryptographically
|
||
protected...authentication, encryption
|
||
+ "black pages"---support for cryptographic communication
|
||
- "pages of color"
|
||
- a collection of network services that identiy and deliver
|
||
security information as needed....keys, who he trusts,
|
||
protocols, etc.
|
||
+ front end: high-level API for security requirements
|
||
- like DNS? caching models?
|
||
- trusted local agent....
|
||
+ "people not even born yet" (backup tapes of Internet
|
||
communications)
|
||
- tapes stored in mountains, access by much more powerful
|
||
computers
|
||
+ "Crytptographic File System" (CFS)
|
||
- file encryption
|
||
- no single DES mode appears to be adequate...a mix of
|
||
modes
|
||
+ swIPe system, for routing packets
|
||
- end to end, gateways, links, Mach, SunOS
|
||
13.4.14. Software Toolkits
|
||
+ Henry Strickland's TCL-based toolkit for crypto
|
||
- other Cypherpunks, including Hal Finney and Marianne
|
||
Mueller, have expressed good opinions of TCL and TCL-TK
|
||
(toolkit)
|
||
- Pr0duct Cypher's toolkit
|
||
- C++ Class Libraries
|
||
- VMX, Visual Basic, Visual C++
|
||
- Smalltalk
|
||
|
||
13.5. Responses to Our Projects (Attacks, Challenges)
|
||
13.5.1. "What are the likely attitudes toward mainstream Cypherpunks
|
||
projects, such as remailers, encryption, etc.?"
|
||
- Reaction has already been largely favorable. Journalists
|
||
such as Steven Levy, Kevin Kelly, John Markoff, and Julian
|
||
Dibbell have written favorably. Reaction of people I have
|
||
talked to has also been mostly favorable.
|
||
13.5.2. "What are the likely attitudes toward the more outre
|
||
projects, such as digital money, crypto anarchy, data havens,
|
||
and the like?"
|
||
- Consternation is often met. People are frightened.
|
||
- The journalists who have written about these things (those
|
||
mentioned above) have gotten beyond the initial reaction
|
||
and seem genuinely intrigued by the changes that are
|
||
coming.
|
||
13.5.3. "What kinds of _attacks_ can we expect?"
|
||
+ Depends on the projects, but some general sorts of attacks
|
||
are likely. Some have already occurred. Examples:
|
||
* flooding of remailers, denial of service attacks--to
|
||
swamp systems and force remailers to reconsider
|
||
operations
|
||
- this is fixed (mostly) with "digital postage" (if
|
||
postage covers costs, and generates a profit, then the
|
||
more the better)
|
||
* deliberately illegal or malicicious messages, such as
|
||
death threats
|
||
- designed to put legal and sysop pressures on the
|
||
remailer operator
|
||
- several remailers have been attacked this way, or at
|
||
least have had these messages
|
||
- source-blocking sometimes works, though not of course
|
||
if another remailer is first used (many issues here)
|
||
* prosecution for content of posts
|
||
+ copyright violations
|
||
- e.g., forwarding ClariNet articles through Hal
|
||
Finney's remailer got Brad Templeton to write warning
|
||
letters to Hal
|
||
- pornography
|
||
- ITAR violations, Trading with the Enemy Act
|
||
- espionage, sedition, treason
|
||
- corporate secrets,
|
||
- These attacks will test the commitment and courage of
|
||
remailer or anonymizing service operators
|
||
|
||
13.6. Deploying Crypto
|
||
13.6.1. "How can Cypherpunks publicize crypto and PGP?"
|
||
- articles, editorials, radio shows, talking with friends
|
||
- The Net itself is probably the best place to publicize the
|
||
problems with Clipper and key escrow. The Net played a
|
||
major role--perhaps the dominant role--in generating scorn
|
||
for Clipper. In many way the themes debated here on the Net
|
||
have tremendous influence on media reaction, on editorials,
|
||
on organizational reactions, and of course on the opinion
|
||
of technical folks. News spreads quickly, zillions of
|
||
theories are aired and debated, and consensus tends to
|
||
emerge quickly.
|
||
- raves, Draper
|
||
- Libertarian Party, anarchists...
|
||
+ conferences and trade shows
|
||
- Arsen Ray Arachelian passed out diskettes at PC Expo
|
||
13.6.2. "What are the Stumbling Blocks to Greater Use of Encryption
|
||
(Cultural, Legal, Ethical)?"
|
||
+ "It's too hard to use"
|
||
- multiple protocols (just consider how hard it is to
|
||
actually send encrypted messages between people today)
|
||
- the need to remember a password or passphrase
|
||
+ "It's too much trouble"
|
||
- the argument being that people will not bother to use
|
||
passwords
|
||
- partly because they don't think anything will happen to
|
||
them
|
||
+ "What have you got to hide?"
|
||
- e.g.,, imagine some comments I'd have gotten at Intel had
|
||
I encrypted everything
|
||
- and governments tend to view encryption as ipso facto
|
||
proof that illegalities are being committed: drugs, money
|
||
laundering, tax evasion
|
||
- recall the "forfeiture" controversy
|
||
- BTW, anonymous systems are essentially the ultimate merit
|
||
system (in the obvious sense) and so fly in the face of the
|
||
"hiring by the numbers" de facto quota systems now
|
||
creeeping in to so many areas of life....there may be rules
|
||
requiring all business dealings to keep track of the sex,
|
||
race, and "ability group" (I'm kidding, I hope) of their
|
||
employees and their consultants
|
||
+ Courts Are Falling Behind, Are Overcrowded, and Can't Deal
|
||
Adequately with New Issues-Such as Encryption and Cryonics
|
||
- which raises the issue of the "Science Court" again
|
||
- and migration to private adjudication
|
||
- scenario: any trials that are being decided in 1998-9
|
||
will have to have been started in 1996 and based on
|
||
technology and decisions of around 1994
|
||
+ Government is taking various steps to limit the use of
|
||
encryption and secure communication
|
||
- some attempts have failed (S.266), some have been
|
||
shelved, and almost none have yet been tested in the
|
||
courts
|
||
- see the other sections...
|
||
13.6.3. Practical Issues
|
||
- Education
|
||
- Proliferation
|
||
- Bypassing Laws
|
||
13.6.4. "How should projects and progress best be achieved?"
|
||
- This is a tough one, one we've been grappling with for a
|
||
couple of years now. Lots of approaches.
|
||
- Writing code
|
||
- Organizational
|
||
- Lobbying
|
||
- I have to say that there's one syndrome we can probably do
|
||
w,the Frustrated Cyperpunks Syndrome. Manifested by someone
|
||
flaming the list for not jumping in to join them on their
|
||
(usually) half-baked scheme to build a digital bank, or
|
||
write a book, or whatever. "You guys just don't care!" is
|
||
the usual cry. Often these flamers end up leaving the list.
|
||
- Geography may play a role, as folks in otherwise-isolated
|
||
areas seem to get more attached to their ideas and then get
|
||
angry when the list as a whole does not adopt them (this is
|
||
my impression, at least).
|
||
13.6.5. Crypto faces the complexity barrier that all technologies
|
||
face
|
||
- Life has gotten more complicated in some ways, simpler in
|
||
other ways (we don't have to think about cooking, about
|
||
shoeing the horses, about the weather, etc.). Crypto is
|
||
currently fairly complicated, especially if multiple
|
||
paradigms are used (encryption, signing, money, etc.).
|
||
- As a personal note, I'm practically drowning in a.c.
|
||
adaptors and power cords for computers, laser printers,
|
||
VCRs, camcorders, portable stereos, laptop computers,
|
||
guitars, etc. Everything with a rechargeable battery has to
|
||
be charged, but not overcharged, and not allowed to run-
|
||
down...I forgot to plug in my old Powerbook 100 for a
|
||
couple of months, and the lead-acid batteries went out on
|
||
me. Personally, I'm drowning in this crap.
|
||
- I mention this only because I sense a backlash
|
||
coming...people will say "screw it" to new technology that
|
||
actually complicates their lives more than it simplifies
|
||
their lives. "Crypto tweaks" who like to fool around with
|
||
"creating a client" in order to play with digital cash will
|
||
continue to do so, but 99% of the sought-after users won't.
|
||
(A nation that can't--or won't--set its VCR clock will
|
||
hardly embrace the complexities of digital cash. Unless
|
||
things change, and use becomes as easy as using an ATM.)
|
||
13.6.6. "How can we get more people to worry about security in
|
||
general and encryption in particular?"
|
||
- Fact is, most people never think about real security. Safe
|
||
manufacturers have said that improvements in safes were
|
||
driven by insurance rates. A direct incentive to spend more
|
||
money to improve security (cost of better safe < cost of
|
||
higher insurance rate).
|
||
|
||
Right now there is almost no economic incentive for people
|
||
to worry about PIN security, about protecting their files,
|
||
etc. (Banks eat the costs and pass them on...any bank which
|
||
tried to save a few bucks in losses by requiring 10-digit
|
||
PINs--which people would *write down* anyway!--would lose
|
||
customers. Holograms and pictures on bank cards are
|
||
happening because the costs have dropped enough.)
|
||
|
||
Personally, my main interests is in ensuring the Feds don't
|
||
tell me I can't have as much security as I want to buy. I
|
||
don't share the concern quoted above that we have to find
|
||
ways to give other people security.
|
||
- Others disagree with my nonchalance, pointing out that
|
||
getting lots of other people to use crypto makes it easier
|
||
for those who already protect themselves. I agree, I just
|
||
don't focus on missionary work.
|
||
- For those so inclined, point out to people how vulnerable
|
||
their files are, how the NSA can monitor the Net, and so
|
||
on. All the usual scare stories.
|
||
|
||
13.7. Political Action and Opposition
|
||
13.7.1. Strong political action is emerging on the Net
|
||
- right-wing conspiracy theorists, like Linda Thompson
|
||
+ Net has rapid response to news events (Waco, Tienenmen,
|
||
Russia)
|
||
- with stories often used by media (lots of reporters on
|
||
Net, easy to cull for references, Net has recently become
|
||
tres trendy)
|
||
- Aryan Nation in Cyberspace
|
||
- (These developments bother many people I mention them to.
|
||
Nothing can be done about who uses strong crypto. And most
|
||
fasicst/racist situations are made worse by state
|
||
sponsorship--apartheid laws, Hitler's Germany, Pol Pot's
|
||
killing fields, all were examples of the state enforcing
|
||
racist or genocidal laws. The unbreakable crypto that the
|
||
Aryan Nation gets is more than offset by the gains
|
||
elsewhere, and the undermining of central authority.)
|
||
- shows the need for strong crypto...else governments will
|
||
infiltrate and monitor these political groups
|
||
13.7.2. Cypherpunks and Lobbying Efforts
|
||
+ "Why don't Cypherpunks have a lobbying effort?"
|
||
+ we're not "centered" near Washington, D.C., which seems
|
||
to be an essential thing (as with EFF, ACLU, EPIC, CPSR,
|
||
etc.)
|
||
- D.C. Cypherpunks once volunteered (April, 1993) to make
|
||
this their special focus, but not much has been heard
|
||
since. (To be fair to them, political lobbying is
|
||
pretty far-removed from most Cypherpunks interests.)
|
||
- no budget, no staff, no office
|
||
+ "herding cats" + no financial stakes = why we don't do
|
||
more
|
||
+ it's very hard to coordinate dozens of free-thinking,
|
||
opinionated, smart people, especially when there's no
|
||
whip hand, no financial incentive, no way to force them
|
||
into line
|
||
- I'm obviously not advocating such force, just noting a
|
||
truism of systems
|
||
+ "Should Cypherpunks advocate breaking laws to achieve
|
||
goals?"
|
||
- "My game is to get cryptography available to all, without
|
||
violating the law. This mean fighting Clipper, fighting
|
||
idiotic export restraints, getting the government to
|
||
change it's stance on cryptography, through arguements
|
||
and letter pointing out the problems ... This means
|
||
writing or promoting strong cryptography....By violating
|
||
the law, you give them the chance to brand you
|
||
"criminal," and ignore/encourage others to ignore what
|
||
you have to say." [Bob Snyder, 4-28-94]
|
||
13.7.3. "How can nonlibertarians (liberals, for example) be convinced
|
||
of the need for strong crypto?"
|
||
- "For liberals, I would examine some pet cause and examine
|
||
the consequences of that cause becoming "illegal." For
|
||
instance, if your friends are "pro choice," you might ask
|
||
them what they would do if the right to lifers outlawed
|
||
abortion. Would they think it was wrong for a rape victim
|
||
to get an abortion just because it was illegal? How would
|
||
they feel about an abortion "underground railroad"
|
||
organized via a network of "stations" coordinated via the
|
||
Internet using "illegal encryption"? Or would they trust
|
||
Clipper in such a situation?
|
||
|
||
"Everyone in America is passionate about something. Such
|
||
passion usually dispenses with mere legalism, when it comes
|
||
to what the believer feels is a question of fundamental
|
||
right and wrong. Hit them with an argument that addresses
|
||
their passion. Craft a pro-crypto argument that helps
|
||
preserve the object of that passion." [Sandy Sandfort, 1994-
|
||
06-30]
|
||
13.7.4. Tension Between Governments and Citizens
|
||
- governments want more monitoring...big antennas to snoop on
|
||
telecommunications, "
|
||
- people who protect themselves are sometimes viewed with
|
||
suspicion
|
||
+ Americans have generally been of two minds about privacy:
|
||
- None of your damn business, a man's home is his
|
||
castle..rugged individualism, self-sufficiency, Calvinism
|
||
- What have you got to hide? Snooping on neighbors
|
||
+ These conflicting views are held simultaneously, almost
|
||
like a tensor that is not resolvable to some resultant
|
||
vector
|
||
- this dichotomy cuts through legal decisions as well
|
||
13.7.5. "How does the Cypherpunks group differ from lobbying groups
|
||
like the EFF, CPSR, and EPIC?"
|
||
- We're more disorganized (anarchic), with no central office,
|
||
no staff, no formal charter, etc.
|
||
- And the political agenda of the aforementioned groups is
|
||
often at odds with personal liberty. (support by them for
|
||
public access programs, subsidies, restrictions on
|
||
businesses, etc.)
|
||
- We're also a more radical group in nearly every way, with
|
||
various flavors of political extremism strongly
|
||
represented. Mostly anarcho-capitalists and strong
|
||
libertarians, and many "no compromises" privacy advocates.
|
||
(As usual, my apologies to any Maoists or the like who
|
||
don't feel comfortable being lumped in with the
|
||
libertarians....if you're out there, you're not speaking
|
||
up.) In any case, the house of Cypherpunks has many rooms.
|
||
- We were called "Crypto Rebels" in Steven Levy's "Wired"
|
||
article (issue 1.2, early 1993). We can represent a
|
||
_radical alternative_ to the Beltway lawyers that dominate
|
||
EFF, EPIC, etc. No need to compromise on things like
|
||
Clipper, Software Key Escrow, Digital Telephony, and the
|
||
NII. But, of course, no input to the legislative process.
|
||
- But there's often an advantage to having a much more
|
||
radical, purist body out in the wings, making the
|
||
"rejectionist" case and holding the inner circle folks to a
|
||
tougher standard of behavior.
|
||
- And of course there's the omnipresent difference that we
|
||
tend to favor direct action through technology over
|
||
politicking.
|
||
13.7.6. Why is government control of crypto so dangerous?
|
||
+ dangers of government monopoly on crypto and sigs
|
||
- can "revoke your existence"
|
||
- no place to escape to (historically an important social
|
||
relief valve)
|
||
13.7.7. NSA's view of crypto advocates
|
||
- "I said to somebody once, this is the revenge of people
|
||
who couldn't go to Woodstock because they had too much trig
|
||
homework. It's a kind of romanticism about privacy and the
|
||
kind of, you know, "you won't get my crypto key until you
|
||
pry it from my dead cold fingers" kind of stuff. I have to
|
||
say, you know, I kind of find it endearing." [Stuart Baker,
|
||
counsel, NSA, CFP '94]
|
||
13.7.8. EFF
|
||
- eff@eff.org
|
||
+ How to Join
|
||
- $40, get form from many places, EFFector Online,
|
||
- membership@eff.org
|
||
+ EFFector Online
|
||
- ftp.eff.org, pub/EFF/Newsletters/EFFector
|
||
+ Open Platform
|
||
- ftp://ftp.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/Open_Platform
|
||
- National Information Infrastructure
|
||
13.7.9. "How can the use of cryptography be hidden?"
|
||
+ Steganography
|
||
- microdots, invisible ink
|
||
- where even the existence of a coded message gets one shot
|
||
+ Methods for Hiding the Mere Existence of Encrypted Data
|
||
+ in contrast to the oft-cited point (made by crypto
|
||
purists) that one must assume the opponent has full
|
||
access to the cryptotext, some fragments of decrypted
|
||
plaintext, and to the algorithm itself, i.e., assume the
|
||
worst
|
||
- a condition I think is practically absurd and
|
||
unrealistic
|
||
- assumes infinite intercept power (same assumption of
|
||
infinite computer power would make all systems besides
|
||
one-time pads breakable)
|
||
- in reality, hiding the existence and form of an
|
||
encrypted message is important
|
||
+ this will be all the more so as legal challenges to
|
||
crypto are mounted...the proposed ban on encrypted
|
||
telecom (with $10K per day fine), various governmental
|
||
regulations, etc.
|
||
- RICO and other broad brush ploys may make people very
|
||
careful about revealing that they are even using
|
||
encryption (regardless of how secure the keys are)
|
||
+ steganography, the science of hiding the existence of
|
||
encrypted information
|
||
- secret inks
|
||
- microdots
|
||
- thwarting traffic analysis
|
||
- LSB method
|
||
+ Packing data into audio tapes (LSB of DAT)
|
||
+ LSB of DAT: a 2GB audio DAT will allow more than 100
|
||
megabytes in the LSBs
|
||
- less if algorithms are used to shape the spectrum to
|
||
make it look even more like noise
|
||
- but can also use the higher bits, too (since a real-
|
||
world recording will have noise reaching up to
|
||
perhaps the 3rd or 4th bit)
|
||
+ will manufacturers investigate "dithering" circuits?
|
||
(a la fat zero?)
|
||
- but the race will still be on
|
||
+ Digital video will offer even more storage space (larger
|
||
tapes)
|
||
- DVI, etc.
|
||
- HDTV by late 1990s
|
||
+ Messages can be put into GIFF, TIFF image files (or even
|
||
noisy faxes)
|
||
- using the LSB method, with a 1024 x 1024 grey scale
|
||
image holding 64KB in the LSB plane alone
|
||
- with error correction, noise shaping, etc., still at
|
||
least 50KB
|
||
- scenario: already being used to transmit message
|
||
through international fax and image transmissions
|
||
+ The Old "Two Plaintexts" Ploy
|
||
- one decoding produces "Having a nice time. Wish you
|
||
were here."
|
||
- other decoding, of the same raw bits, produces "The
|
||
last submarine left this morning."
|
||
- any legal order to produce the key generates the first
|
||
message
|
||
+ authorities can never prove-save for torture or an
|
||
informant-that another message exists
|
||
- unless there are somehow signs that the encrypted
|
||
message is somehow "inefficiently encrypted,
|
||
suggesting the use of a dual plaintext pair method"
|
||
(or somesuch spookspeak)
|
||
- again, certain purist argue that such issues (which are
|
||
related to the old "How do you know when to stop?"
|
||
question) are misleading, that one must assume the
|
||
opponent has nearly complete access to everything
|
||
except the actual key, that any scheme to combine
|
||
multiple systems is no better than what is gotten as a
|
||
result of the combination itself
|
||
- and just the overall bandwidth of data...
|
||
13.7.10. next Computers, Freedom and Privacy Conference will be March
|
||
1995, San Francisco
|
||
13.7.11. Places to send messages to
|
||
- cantwell@eff.org, Subject: I support HR 3627
|
||
- leahy@eff.org, Subject: I support hearings on Clipper
|
||
13.7.12. Thesis: Crypto can become unstoppable if critical mass is
|
||
reached
|
||
- analogy: the Net...too scattered, too many countries, too
|
||
many degrees of freedom
|
||
- so scattered that attempts to outlaw strong crypto will be
|
||
futile...no bottlenecks, no "mountain passes" (in a race to
|
||
the pass, beyond which the expansion cannot be halted
|
||
except by extremely repressive means)
|
||
13.7.13. Keeping the crypto genie from being put in the bottle
|
||
- (though some claim the genie was never _in_ the bottle,
|
||
historically)
|
||
- ensuring that enough people are using it, and that the Net
|
||
is using it
|
||
- a _threshold_, a point of no return
|
||
13.7.14. Activism practicalities
|
||
+ "Why don't we buy advertising time like Perot did?"
|
||
+ This and similar points come up in nearly all political
|
||
discussions (I'm seeing in also in talk.politics.guns).
|
||
The main reasons it doesn't happen are:
|
||
- ads cost a lot of money
|
||
- casual folks rarely have this kind of money to spend
|
||
- "herding cats" comes to mind, i.e., it's nearly
|
||
impossible to coordinate the interests of people to
|
||
gather money, set up ad campaigns, etc.
|
||
- In my view, a waste of efforts. The changes I want won't
|
||
come through a series of ads that are just fingers in the
|
||
dike. (More cynically, Americans are getting the government
|
||
they've been squealing for. My interest is in bypassing
|
||
their avarice and repression, not in changing their minds.)
|
||
- Others feel differently, from posts made to the list.
|
||
Practically speaking, though, organized political activity
|
||
is difficult to achieve with the anarchic nonstructure of
|
||
the Cypherpunks group. Good luck!
|
||
|
||
13.8. The Battle Lines are Being Drawn
|
||
13.8.1. Clipper met with disdain and scorn, so now new strategies are
|
||
being tried...
|
||
13.8.2. Strategies are shifting, Plan B is being hauled out
|
||
- fear, uncertainty, and doubt
|
||
- fears about terrorists, pornographers, pedophiles, money
|
||
launderers
|
||
13.8.3. corporate leaders like Grove are being enlisted to make the
|
||
Clipper case
|
||
13.8.4. Donn Parker is spreading panic about "anarchy" (similar to my
|
||
own CA)
|
||
13.8.5. "What can be done in the face of moves to require national ID
|
||
cards, use official public key registries, adhere to key
|
||
escrow laws, etc?"
|
||
- This is the most important question we face.
|
||
- Short of leaving the country (but for where?) or living a
|
||
subsistence-level lifestyle below the radar screens of the
|
||
surveillance state, what can be done?
|
||
+ Some possibilities, not necessarily good ones:
|
||
+ civil disobedience
|
||
- mutilation of cards, "accidental erasure," etc.
|
||
- forgeries of cards...probably not feasible (we understand
|
||
about digital sigs)
|
||
- creation of large black markets...still doesn't cover
|
||
everything, such as water, electricity, driver's
|
||
licenses, etc....just too many things for a black market
|
||
to handle
|
||
- lobby against these moves...but it appears the momentum
|
||
is too strong in the other direction
|
||
|
||
13.9. "What Could Make Crypto Use more Common?"
|
||
13.9.1. transparent use, like the fax machine, is the key
|
||
13.9.2. easier token-based key and/or physical metrics for security
|
||
- thumbprint readers
|
||
- tokens attached to employee badges
|
||
- rings, watches, etc. that carry most of key (with several
|
||
bits remembered, and a strict "three strikes and you're
|
||
out" system)
|
||
13.9.3. major security scares, or fears over "back doors" by the
|
||
government, may accelerate the conversion
|
||
- all it may take are a couple of very large scandals
|
||
13.9.4. insurance companies may demand encryption, for several
|
||
reasons
|
||
- to protect against theft, loss, etc.
|
||
- to provide better control against viruses and other
|
||
modifications which expose the companies they ensure to
|
||
liability suits
|
||
- same argument cited by safe makers: when insurance
|
||
companies demanded better safes, that's when customers
|
||
bought them (and not before)
|
||
13.9.5. Networks will get more complex and will make conventional
|
||
security systems unacceptable
|
||
- "Fortress" product of Los Altos Technologies
|
||
- too many ways for others to see passwords being given to a
|
||
remote host, e.g., with wireless LANs (which will
|
||
necessitate ZKIPS)
|
||
- ZKIPS especially in networks, where the chances of seeing a
|
||
password being transmitted are much greater (an obvious
|
||
point that is not much discussed)
|
||
- the whole explosion in bandwidth
|
||
13.9.6. The revelations of surveillance and monitoring of citizens
|
||
and corporations will serve to increase the use of
|
||
encryption, at first by people with something to hide, and
|
||
then by others. Cypherpunks are already helping by spreading
|
||
the word of these situations.
|
||
- a snowballing effect
|
||
- and various government agencies will themselves use
|
||
encryption to protect their files and their privacy
|
||
13.9.7. for those in sensitive positions, the availability of new
|
||
bugging methods will accelerate the conversion to secure
|
||
systems based on encrypted telecommunications and the
|
||
avoidance of voice-based systems
|
||
13.9.8. ordinary citizens are being threatened because of what they
|
||
say on networks, causing them to adopt pseudonyms
|
||
- lawsuits, ordinary threats, concerns about how their
|
||
employers will react (many employers may adopt rules
|
||
limiting the speech of their employees, largely because of
|
||
concerns they'll get sued)
|
||
+ and some database providers are providing cross-indexed
|
||
lists of who has posted to what boards-this is freely
|
||
available information, but it is not expected by people
|
||
that their postings will live forever
|
||
- some may see this as extortion
|
||
- but any proposed laws are unlikely to succeed
|
||
- so, as usual, the solution is for people to protect
|
||
themselves via technological means
|
||
13.9.9. "agents" that are able to retransmit material will make
|
||
certain kinds of anonymous systems much easier to use
|
||
|
||
13.10. Deals, the EFF, and Digital Telephony Bill
|
||
13.10.1. The backroom deals in Washington are flying...apparently the
|
||
Administration got burned by the Clipper fiasco (which they
|
||
could partly write-off as being a leftover from the Bush era)
|
||
and is now trying to "work the issues" behind the scenes
|
||
before unveiling new and wide-reaching programs. (Though at
|
||
this writing, the Health Bill is looking mighty amateurish
|
||
and seems ulikely to pass.)
|
||
13.10.2. We are not hearing about these "deals" in a timely way. I
|
||
first heard that a brand new, and "in the bag," deal was
|
||
cooking when I was talking to a noted journalist. He told me
|
||
that a new deal, cut between Congress, the telecom industry,
|
||
and the EFF-type lobbying groups, was already a done deal and
|
||
would be unveiled so. Sure enough, the New and Improved
|
||
Digital Telephony II Bill appears a few weeks later and is
|
||
said by EFF representatives to be unstoppable. [comments by
|
||
S. McLandisht and others, comp.org.eff.talk, 1994-08]
|
||
13.10.3. Well, excuse me for reminding everyone that this country is
|
||
allegedly still a democracy. I know politics is done behinde
|
||
closed doors, as I'm no naif, but deal-cutting like this
|
||
deserves to be exposed and derided.
|
||
13.10.4. I've announced that I won't be renewing my EFF membership. I
|
||
don't expect them to fight all battles, to win all wars, but
|
||
I sure as hell won't help *pay* for their backrooms deals
|
||
with the telcos.
|
||
13.10.5. This may me in trouble with my remaining friends at the EFF,
|
||
but it's as if a lobbying groups in Germany saw the
|
||
handwriting on the wall about the Final Solution, deemed it
|
||
essentially unstoppable, and so sent their leaders to
|
||
Berchtesgaden/Camp David to make sure that the death of the
|
||
Jews was made as painless as possible. A kind of joint
|
||
Administration/Telco/SS/IG Farben "compromise." While I don't
|
||
equate Mitch, Jerry, Mike, Stanton, and others with Hitler's
|
||
minions, I certainly do think the inside-the-Beltway
|
||
dealmaking is truly disgusting.
|
||
13.10.6. Our freedoms are being sold out.
|
||
|
||
13.11. Loose ends
|
||
13.11.1. Deals, deals, deals!
|
||
- pressures by Administration...software key escrow, digital
|
||
telephony, cable regulation
|
||
+ and suppliers need government support on legislation,
|
||
benefits, spectrum allocation, etc
|
||
- reports that Microsoft is lobbying intensively to gain
|
||
control of big chunks of spectrum...could fit with cable
|
||
set-top box negotiations, Teledesic, SKE, etc.
|
||
- EFF even participates in some of these deals. Being "inside
|
||
the Beltway" has this kind of effect, where one is either a
|
||
"player" or a "non-player." (This is my interpretation of
|
||
how power corrupts all groups that enter the Beltway.)
|
||
Shmoozing and a desire to help.
|
||
13.11.2. using crypto to bypass laws on contacts and trade with other
|
||
countries
|
||
- one day it's illegal to have contact with China, the next
|
||
day it's encouraged
|
||
+ one day it's legal to have contact with Haiti, the next day
|
||
there's an embargo (and in the case of Haiti, the economic
|
||
effects fall on on the poor--the tens of thousands fleeing
|
||
are not fleeing the rulers, but the poverty made worse by
|
||
the boycott
|
||
- (The military rulers are just the usual thugs, but
|
||
they're not "our" thugs, for reasons of history. Aristide
|
||
would almost certainly be as bad, being a Marxist priest.
|
||
Thus, I consider the breakin of the embargo to be a
|
||
morally good thing to do.
|
||
- who's to say why Haiti is suddenly to be shunned? By force
|
||
of law, no less!
|
||
13.11.3. Sun Tzu's "Art of War" has useful tips (more useful than "The
|
||
Prince")
|
||
- work with lowliest
|
||
- sabotage good name of enemy
|
||
- spread money around
|
||
- I think the events of the past year, including...
|
||
13.11.4. The flakiness of current systems...
|
||
- The current crypto infrastructure is fairly flaky, though
|
||
the distributed web-of-trust model is better than some
|
||
centralized system, of coure. What I mean is that many
|
||
aspects are slow, creaky, and conducive to errors.
|
||
- In the area of digital cash, what we have now is not even
|
||
as advanced as was seen with real money in Sumerian times!
|
||
(And I wouldn't trust the e-mail "message in a bottle"
|
||
approach for any nontrivial financial transactions.)
|
||
- Something's got to change. The NII/Superhighway/Infobahn
|
||
people have plans, but their plans are not likely to mesh
|
||
well with ours. A challenge for us to consider.
|
||
13.11.5. "Are there dangers in being too paranoid?"
|
||
+ As Eric Hughes put it, "paranoia is cryptography's
|
||
occupational hazard."
|
||
- "The effect of paranoia is self-delusion of the following
|
||
form--that one's possible explanations are skewed toward
|
||
malicious attacks, by individuals, that one has the
|
||
technical knowledge to anticipate. This skewing creates
|
||
an inefficient allocation of mental energy, it tends
|
||
toward the personal, downplaying the possibility of
|
||
technical error, and it begins to close off examination
|
||
of technicalities not fully understood.
|
||
|
||
"Those who resist paranoia will become better at
|
||
cryptography than those who do not, all other things
|
||
being equal. Cryptography is about epistemology, that
|
||
is, assurances of truth, and only secondarily about
|
||
ontology, that is, what actually is true. The goal of
|
||
cryptography is to create an accurate confidence that a
|
||
system is private and secure. In order to create that
|
||
confidence, the system must actually be secure, but
|
||
security is not sufficient. There must be confidence
|
||
thatthe way by which this security becomes to be believed
|
||
is robust and immune to delusion.
|
||
|
||
"Paranoia creates delusion. As a direct and fundamental
|
||
result, it makes one worse at cryptography. At the
|
||
outside best, it makes one slower, as the misallocation
|
||
of attention leads one down false trails. Who has the
|
||
excess brainpower for that waste? Certainly not I. At
|
||
the worst, paranoia makes one completely ineffective, not
|
||
only in technical means but even more so in the social
|
||
context in which cryptography is necessarily relevant."
|
||
[Eric Hughes, 1994-05-14]
|
||
+ King Alfred Plan, blacks
|
||
- plans to round up 20 million blacks
|
||
- RFK, links to LAPD, Western Goals, Birch, KKK
|
||
- RFA #9, 23, 38
|
||
+ organized crime situation, perhaps intelligence
|
||
community
|
||
- damaging to blacks, psychological
|
||
13.11.6. The immorality of U.S. boycotts and sanctions
|
||
- as with Haiti, where a standard and comparatively benign
|
||
and harmless military dictatorship is being opposed, we are
|
||
using force to interfere with trade, food shipments,
|
||
financial dealings, etc.
|
||
- invasion of countries that have not attacked other
|
||
countries...a major new escalation of U.S. militarism
|
||
- crypto will facillitate means of underming imperialism
|
||
13.11.7. The "reasonableness" trap
|
||
- making a reasonable thing into a mandatory thing
|
||
- this applies to what Cypherpunks should ever be prepared to
|
||
support
|
||
+ An example: A restaurant offers to replace dropped items
|
||
(dropped on the floor, literally) for free...a reasonable
|
||
thing to offer customers (something I see frequently). So
|
||
why not make it the law? Because then the reasonable
|
||
discretion of the restaurant owner would be lost, and some
|
||
customers could "game against" (exploit the letter of the
|
||
law) the system. Even threaten lawsuits.
|
||
- (And libertarians know that "my house, my rules" applies
|
||
to restaurants and other businesses, absent a contract
|
||
spelling exceptions out.)
|
||
- A more serious example is when restaurants (again) find it
|
||
"reasonable" to hire various sorts of qualified people.
|
||
What may be "reasonable" is one thing, but too often the
|
||
government decides to _formalize_ this and takes away the
|
||
right to choose. (In my opinion, no person or group has any
|
||
"right" to a job unless the employer freely offers it. Yes,
|
||
this could included discrimination against various groups.
|
||
Yes, we may dislike this. But the freedom to choose is a
|
||
much more basic right than achieving some ideal of equality
|
||
is.)
|
||
- And when "reasonableness" is enforced by law, the game-
|
||
playing increases. In effect, some discretion is needed to
|
||
reject claims that are based on gaming. Markets naturally
|
||
work this way, as no "basic rights" or contracts are being
|
||
violated.
|
||
- Fortunately, strong crypto makes this nonsense impossible.
|
||
Perforce, people will engage in contracts only voluntarily.
|
||
13.11.8. "How do we get agreement on protocols?"
|
||
- Give this idea up immediately! Agreement to behave in
|
||
certain ways is almost never possible.
|
||
- Is this an indictment of anarchy?
|
||
- No, because the way agreement is sort of reached is through
|
||
standards or examplars that people can get behind. Thus, we
|
||
don't get "consensus" in advance on the taste of Coca
|
||
Cola...somebody offers Coke for sale and then the rest is
|
||
history.
|
||
- PGP is a more relevant example. The examplar is on a "take
|
||
it or leave it" basis, with minor improvements made by
|
||
others, but within the basic format.
|
||
|
||
14. Other Advanced Crypto Applications
|
||
|
||
14.1. copyright
|
||
THE CYPHERNOMICON: Cypherpunks FAQ and More, Version 0.666,
|
||
1994-09-10, Copyright Timothy C. May. All rights reserved.
|
||
See the detailed disclaimer. Use short sections under "fair
|
||
use" provisions, with appropriate credit, but don't put your
|
||
name on my words.
|
||
|
||
14.2. SUMMARY: Other Advanced Crypto Applications
|
||
14.2.1. Main Points
|
||
14.2.2. Connections to Other Sections
|
||
14.2.3. Where to Find Additional Information
|
||
- see the various "Crypto" Proceedings for various papers on
|
||
topics that may come to be important
|
||
14.2.4. Miscellaneous Comments
|
||
|
||
14.3. Digital Timestamping
|
||
14.3.1. digital timestamping
|
||
- The canonical reference for digital timestamping is the
|
||
work of Stu Haber and Scott Stornetta, of Bellcore. Papers
|
||
presented at various Crypto conferences. Their work
|
||
involves having the user compute a hash of the document he
|
||
wishes to be stamped and sending the hash to them, where
|
||
they merge this hash with other hashes (and all previous
|
||
hashes, via a tree system) and then they *publish* the
|
||
resultant hash in a very public and hard-to-alter forum,
|
||
such as in an ad in the Sunday "New York Times."
|
||
|
||
In their parlance, such an ad is a "widely witnessed
|
||
event," and attempts to alter all or even many copies of
|
||
the newspaper would be very difficult and expensive. (In a
|
||
sense, this WWE is similar to the "beacon" term Eric Hughes
|
||
used.)
|
||
|
||
Haber and Stornetta plan some sort of commercial operation
|
||
to do this.
|
||
|
||
This service has not yet been tested in court, so far as I
|
||
know. The MIT server is an experiment, and is probably
|
||
useful for experimenting. But it is undoubtedly even less
|
||
legally significant, of course.
|
||
14.3.2. my summary
|
||
|
||
14.4. Voting
|
||
14.4.1. fraud, is-a-person, forging identies, increased "number"
|
||
trends
|
||
14.4.2. costs also high
|
||
14.4.3. Chaum
|
||
14.4.4. voting isomorphic to digital money
|
||
- where account transfers are the thing being voted on, and
|
||
the "eligible voters" are oneself...unless this sort of
|
||
thing is outlawed, which would create other problems, then
|
||
this makes a form of anonymous transfer possible (more or
|
||
less)
|
||
|
||
14.5. Timed-Release Crypto
|
||
14.5.1. "Can anything like a "cryptographic time capsule" be built?"
|
||
- This would be useful for sealing diaries and records in
|
||
such a way that no legal bodies could gain access, that
|
||
even the creator/encryptor would be unable to decrypt the
|
||
records. Call it "time escrow." Ironically, a much more
|
||
correct use of the term "escrow" than we saw with the
|
||
government's various "key escrow" schemes.
|
||
- Making records undecryptable is easy: just use a one-way
|
||
function and the records are unreachable forever. The trick
|
||
is to have a way to get them back at some future time.
|
||
+ Approaches:
|
||
+ Legal Repository. A lawyer or set of lawyers has the key
|
||
or keys and is instructed to release them at some future
|
||
time. (The key-holding agents need not be lawyers, of
|
||
course, though that is the way things are now done.
|
||
- The legal system is a time-honored way of protecting
|
||
secrets of various kinds, and any system based on
|
||
cryptography needs to compete strongly with this simple
|
||
to use, well-established system.
|
||
- If the lawyer's identity is known, he can be
|
||
subpoenaed. Depends on jurisdictional issues, future
|
||
political climate, etc.
|
||
- But identity-hiding protocols can be used, so that the
|
||
lawyer cannot be reached. All that is know, for
|
||
example, is that "somewhere out there" is an agent who
|
||
is holding the key(s). Reputation-based systems should
|
||
work well here: the agent gains little and loses a lot
|
||
by releasing a key early, hence has no economic
|
||
motivation to do so. (Picture also a lot of "pinging"
|
||
going to "rate" the various ti<w agents.)
|
||
- Cryptography with Beacons. A "beacon agent" makes very
|
||
public a series of messages, somehow. Details fuzzy. [I
|
||
have a hunch that using digital time-stamping services
|
||
could be useful here.]
|
||
+ Difficulty of factoring, etc.
|
||
+ The idea here is to-use a function which is presently
|
||
hard to invert, but which may be easier in the future.
|
||
This is fraught with problems, including
|
||
unpredictability of the difficulty, imprecision in the
|
||
timing of release, and general clumsiness. As Hal
|
||
Finney notes:
|
||
- "There was an talk on this topic at either the Crypto
|
||
92 or 93 conference, I forget which. It is available
|
||
in the proceedings....The method used was similar to
|
||
the idea here of encrypting with a public key and
|
||
requiring factoring of the modulus to decrypt. But
|
||
the author had more techniques he used, iterating
|
||
functions forward which would take longer to iterate
|
||
backwards. The purpose was to give a more
|
||
predictable time to decrypt.....One problem with this
|
||
is that it does not so much put a time floor on the
|
||
decryption, but rather a cost floor. Someone who is
|
||
willing to spend enough can decrypt faster than
|
||
someone who spends less. Another problem is the
|
||
difficulty of forecasting the growth of computational
|
||
power per dollar in the future." [Hal Finney,
|
||
sci.crypt, 1994-8-04]
|
||
+ Tamper-resistant modules. A la the scheme to send the
|
||
secrets to a satellite in orbit and expect that it will
|
||
be prohibitively expensive to rendezvous and enter this
|
||
satellite.
|
||
- Or to gain access to tamper-resistant modules located
|
||
in bank vaults, etc.
|
||
- But court orders and black bag jobs still are factors.
|
||
14.5.2. Needs
|
||
- journalism
|
||
+ time-stamping is a kind of example
|
||
- though better seen in the conventional analysis
|
||
- persistent institutions
|
||
- shell games for moving money around, untraceably
|
||
14.5.3. How
|
||
- beacons
|
||
- multi-part keys
|
||
- contracted-for services (like publishing keys)
|
||
- Wayner, my proposal, Eric Hughes
|
||
|
||
14.6. Traffic Analysis
|
||
14.6.1. digital form, and headers, LEAF fields, etc., make it vastly
|
||
easier to know who has called whom, for how long, etc.
|
||
14.6.2. (esp. in contrast to purely analog systems)
|
||
|
||
14.7. Steganography
|
||
14.7.1. (Another one of the topics that gets a lot of posts)
|
||
14.7.2. Hiding messages in other messages
|
||
- "Kevin Brown makes some interesting points about
|
||
steganography and steganalysis. The issue of recognizing
|
||
whether a message has or mighthave a hidden message has two
|
||
sides. One is for the desired recipient to be clued that
|
||
he should try desteganizing and decrypting the message, and
|
||
the other is for a possible attacker to discover illegal
|
||
uses of cryptography.
|
||
|
||
"Steganography should be used with a "stealthy"
|
||
cryptosystem (secret key or public key), one in which the
|
||
cyphertext is indistinguishable from a random bit string.
|
||
You would not want it to have any headers which could be
|
||
used to confirm that a desteganized message was other than
|
||
random noise." [Hal Finney, 1993-05-25]
|
||
14.7.3. Peter Wayner's "Mimic"
|
||
- "They encode a secret message inside a harmless looking
|
||
ASCII text file. This is one of the very few times
|
||
the UNIX tools "lex" and "yacc" have been used in
|
||
cryptography, as far as I know. Peter Wayner, "Mimic
|
||
Functions", CRYPTOLOGIA Volume 16, Number 3, pp. 193-214,
|
||
July 1992.[Michael Johnson, sci.crypt, 1994-09-05]
|
||
14.7.4. I described it in 1988 or 89 and many times since
|
||
- Several years ago I posted to sci.crypt my "novel" idea for
|
||
packing bits into the essentially inaudible "least
|
||
significant bits" (LSBs) of digital recordings, such as
|
||
DATs and CDs. Ditto for the LSBs in an 8-bit image or 24-
|
||
bit color image. I've since seen this idea reinvented
|
||
_several_ times on sci.crypt and elsewhere...and I'm
|
||
willing to bet I wasn't the first, either (so I don't claim
|
||
any credit).
|
||
|
||
A 2-hour DAT contains about 10 Gbits (2 hours x 3600 sec/hr
|
||
x 2 channels x 16 bits/sample x 44K samples/sec), or about
|
||
1.2 Gbytes. A CD contains about half this, i.e., about 700
|
||
Mbytes. The LSB of a DAT is 1/16th of the 1.2 Gbytes, or 80
|
||
Mbytes. This is a _lot_ of storage!
|
||
|
||
A home-recorded DAT--and I use a Sony D-3 DAT Walkman to
|
||
make tapes--has so much noise down at the LSB level--noise
|
||
from the A/D and D/A converters, noise from the microphones
|
||
(if any), etc.--that the bits are essentially random at
|
||
this level. (This is a subtle, but important, point: a
|
||
factory recorded DAT or CD will have predetermined bits at
|
||
all levels, i.e., the authorities could in principle spot
|
||
any modifications. But home-recorded, or dubbed, DATs will
|
||
of course not be subject to this kind of analysis.) Some
|
||
care might be taken to ensure that the statistical
|
||
properties of the signal bits resemble what would be
|
||
expected with "noise" bits, but this will be a minor
|
||
hurdle.
|
||
|
||
Adobe Photoshop can be used to easily place message bits in
|
||
the "noise" that dominates things down at the LSB level.
|
||
The resulting GIF can then be posted to UseNet or e-mailed.
|
||
Ditto for sound samples, using the ideas I just described
|
||
(but typically requiring sound sampling boards, etc.). I've
|
||
done some experiments along these lines.
|
||
|
||
This doesn't mean our problems are solved, of course.
|
||
Exchanging tapes is cumbersome and vulnerable to stings.
|
||
But it does help to point out the utter futility of trying
|
||
to stop the flow of bits.
|
||
14.7.5. Stego, other versions
|
||
- Romana Machado's Macintosh stego program is located in the
|
||
compression files, /cmp, in the sumex-aim@stanford.edu info-
|
||
mac archives.
|
||
- "Stego is a tool that enables you to embed data in, and
|
||
retrieve data from, Macintosh PICT format files, without
|
||
changing the appearance of the PICT file. Though its
|
||
effect is visually undetectable, do not expect
|
||
cryptographic security from Stego. Be aware that anyone
|
||
with a copy of Stego can retrieve your data from your PICT
|
||
file. Stego can be used as an "envelope" to hide a
|
||
_previously encrypted_ data file in a PICT file, making it
|
||
much less likely to be detected." [Romana Machado, 1993-11-
|
||
23]
|
||
14.7.6. WNSTORM, Arsen Ray Arachelian
|
||
14.7.7. talk about it being used to "watermark" images
|
||
14.7.8. Crypto and steganography used to plant false and misleading
|
||
nuclear information
|
||
- "Under a sub-sub-sub-contract I once worked on some phony
|
||
CAD drawings for the nuclear weapons production process,
|
||
plotting false info that still appears in popular books,
|
||
some of which has been posted here....The docs were then
|
||
encrypted and stegonagraphied for authenticity. We were
|
||
told that they were turned loose on the market for this
|
||
product in other countries." [John Young, 1994-08-25]
|
||
- Well...
|
||
14.7.9. Postscript steganography
|
||
- where info is embedded in spacings, font characteristics
|
||
(angles, arcs)
|
||
- ftp://research.att.com/dist/brassil/infocom94.ps
|
||
- the essential point: just another haystack to hide a needle
|
||
|
||
14.8. Hiding cyphertext
|
||
14.8.1. "Ciphertext can be "uncompressed" to impose desired
|
||
statistical properties. A non-adaptive first-order
|
||
arithmetic decompression will generate first-order symbol
|
||
frequencies that emulate, for instance, English text." [Rick
|
||
F. Hoselton, sci.crypt, 1994-07-05]
|
||
|
||
14.9. 'What are tamper-responding or tamper-resistant modules?"
|
||
14.9.1. The more modern name for what used to be called "tamper-proof
|
||
boxes"
|
||
14.9.2. Uses:
|
||
- alarmed display cases, pressure-sensitive, etc. (jewels,
|
||
art, etc.)
|
||
+ chips with extra layers, fuses, abrasive comounds in the
|
||
packaging
|
||
- to slow down grinding, etching, other depotting or
|
||
decapping methods
|
||
- VLSI Technology Inc. reportedly uses these methods in its
|
||
implementation of the MYK-78 "Clipper" (EES) chip
|
||
- nuclear weapons ("Permissive Action Links," a la Sandia,
|
||
Simmons)
|
||
- smartcards that give evidence of tampering, or that become
|
||
inactive
|
||
+ as an example, disk drives that erase data when plug is
|
||
pulled, unless proper code is first entered
|
||
- whew! pretty risky (power failures and all), but needed
|
||
by some
|
||
- like "digital flash paper"
|
||
14.9.3. Bypassing tamper-responding or tamper-resistant technologies
|
||
- first, you have to _know_
|
||
|
||
14.10. Whistleblowing
|
||
14.10.1. This was an early proposed use (my comments on it go back to
|
||
1988 at least), and resulted in the creation of
|
||
alt.whisteblowers.
|
||
- So far, nothing too earth-shattering
|
||
14.10.2. outing the secret agents of a country, by posting them
|
||
anonymously to a world-wide Net distribution....that ought to
|
||
shake things up
|
||
|
||
14.11. Digital Confessionals
|
||
14.11.1. religious confessionals and consultations mediated by digital
|
||
links...very hard for U.S. government to gain access
|
||
14.11.2. ditto for attorney-client conversations, for sessions with
|
||
psychiatrists and doctors, etc.
|
||
14.11.3. (this does not meen these meetings are exempt from the
|
||
law...witness Feds going after tainted legal fees, and
|
||
bugging offices of attorneys suspected of being in the drug
|
||
business)
|
||
|
||
14.12. Loose Ends
|
||
14.12.1. Feigenbaum's "Computing with Encrypted Instances"
|
||
work...links to Eric Hughes's "encrypted open books" ideas.
|
||
- more work needed, clearly
|
||
|
||
15. Reputations and Credentials
|
||
|
||
15.1. copyright
|
||
THE CYPHERNOMICON: Cypherpunks FAQ and More, Version 0.666,
|
||
1994-09-10, Copyright Timothy C. May. All rights reserved.
|
||
See the detailed disclaimer. Use short sections under "fair
|
||
use" provisions, with appropriate credit, but don't put your
|
||
name on my words.
|
||
|
||
15.2. SUMMARY: Reputations and Credentials
|
||
15.2.1. Main Points
|
||
- "a man's word is his bond"
|
||
- reputations matter
|
||
- the expectation of future interaction/business is crucial
|
||
15.2.2. Connections to Other Sections
|
||
- see section on Crypto Anarchy for why reputations matter
|
||
15.2.3. Where to Find Additional Information
|
||
- very little published on this
|
||
- Bruce Benson's "The Enterprise of Law"
|
||
15.2.4. Miscellaneous Comments
|
||
- this is another "transition" chapter, laying the groundwork
|
||
for Crypto Anarchy
|
||
|
||
15.3. The Nature of Reputations
|
||
15.3.1. The claim by many of us that "reputations" will take care of
|
||
many problems in crypto anarchic markets is disputed by some
|
||
(notably Eric Hughes). To be sure, it will not be a trivial
|
||
issue. Institutions take years or decades to evolve.
|
||
15.3.2. However, think of how often we use reputations: friends,
|
||
books, movies, restaurants, etc
|
||
15.3.3. Reputations and other institutions will take time to evolve.
|
||
Saying "the market will talke care of things" may be true,
|
||
but this may take time. The "invisible hand" doesn't
|
||
necessarily move swiftly.
|
||
15.3.4. "What are 'reputations' and why are they so important?"
|
||
- a vague concept related to degree of believability, of
|
||
trust, etc.
|
||
+ "we know it when we see it"
|
||
- (sorry for the cop out, but I don't have a good
|
||
definition handy....James Donald says studying reputatons
|
||
is "nominalist hot air" [1994-09-02], but I think it's
|
||
quite important)
|
||
+ obvious, in ordinary life, but in the cyberspatial context
|
||
- reputation-based systems
|
||
- escrow, expectations
|
||
- "reputation capital"
|
||
- like book or music recommendations
|
||
- web of trust (is different than just "trust"---tensor,
|
||
rather than scalar)
|
||
+ Actually very common: how most of us deal with our friends,
|
||
our enemies, the books we read, the restaurants we
|
||
frequent, etc.
|
||
- we mentally downcheck and upcheck on the basis of
|
||
experience; we learn
|
||
- Are there examples?
|
||
- Eric's objections
|
||
15.3.5. "How are reputations acquired, ruined, transferred, etc.?"
|
||
+ First, reputations are not "owned" by the person to whom
|
||
they are attached by others
|
||
+ the algebra is tricky...maybe Eric Hughes or one of the
|
||
other pure math types can help straighten out the
|
||
"calculus of reputations"
|
||
- reputations are not symmetric: just because Alice
|
||
esteems Bob does mean the reverse is so
|
||
- reputations are not transitive, though they are
|
||
partially transitive: if Alice esteems Bob and Bob
|
||
esteems Charles, this may cause Alice to be somewhat
|
||
more esteemful of Charles.
|
||
- a tensor matrix?
|
||
- a graph?
|
||
+ Any holder of a reputation can "spend" some of his
|
||
reputation capital
|
||
- in praise or criticism of another agent
|
||
- in reviews (think of Siskel and Ebert "spending" some of
|
||
their reputation capital in the praise of a movie, and
|
||
how their own reptutations will go up and down as a
|
||
function of many things, including especially how much
|
||
the viewing audience agrees with them)
|
||
15.3.6. "Are they foolproof? Are all the questions answered?"
|
||
- Of course not.
|
||
- And Eric Hughes has in the past said that too much
|
||
importance is being invested in this idea of reputations,
|
||
though many or even most of us (who comment on the matter)
|
||
clearly think otherwise.
|
||
- In any case, much more study is needed. Hal Finney and I
|
||
have debated this a couple of times (first on the
|
||
Extropians list, then a couple or more times on the
|
||
Cypherpunks list), and we are mostly in agreement that this
|
||
area is very promising and is deserving of much more
|
||
thought--and even experimentation. (One of my interests in
|
||
crypto simulations, in "protocol ecologies," is to simulate
|
||
agents which play games involving reputations, spoofing,
|
||
transfers of reputations, etc.)
|
||
15.3.7. Reputations have many aspects
|
||
+ the trading firm which runs others people's money is
|
||
probably less "reputable" in an important sense than the
|
||
trading firm in which partners have their own personal
|
||
fortunes riding....or at least I know which one I'd trust!
|
||
- (But how to guarantee one isn't being fooled, by a spoof,
|
||
a sham? Hard to say. Perhaps the "encrypted open books"
|
||
protocol Eric Hughes is working on will be of use here.)
|
||
|
||
15.4. Reputations, Institutions
|
||
|
||
15.5. Reputation-Based Systems and Agoric Open Systems
|
||
15.5.1. Evolutionary systems and markets
|
||
+ markets, emergent order, Hayek, connectionism
|
||
- many related ideas...spontaneous order, self interest,
|
||
agents, etc.
|
||
+ a critique of "blind rationalism"
|
||
- or hyperrationalism, the idea that a form model can
|
||
always be found
|
||
- order can develop even in anonymous systems, provding
|
||
certain types of contacts are established, certain other
|
||
things
|
||
15.5.2. shell games...who knows what?
|
||
15.5.3. key is that would-be "burners" must never know when they are
|
||
actually being tested
|
||
- with devastating effects if they burn the tester
|
||
+ example: how to guarantee (to some degree of certainty)
|
||
that an anonymous bank is not renegging (or whatever)?
|
||
- e.g., a Swiss bank that denies knowledge of an account
|
||
- key is that bank never know when a withdrawal is just a
|
||
test (and these tests may be done frequently)
|
||
- the importance of repeat business
|
||
15.5.4. another key: repeat business....when the gains from burning
|
||
someone are greater than the expected future business.....
|
||
15.5.5. reputations are what keep CA systems from degenerating into
|
||
flamefests
|
||
- digital pseudonyms mean a trail is left, kill files can be
|
||
used, and people will take care about what they say
|
||
- and the systems will not be truly anonymous: some people
|
||
will see the same other people, allowing the development of
|
||
histories and continued interactions (recall that in cases
|
||
where no future interaction is exected, rudeness and
|
||
flaming creeps in)
|
||
+ "Rumormonger" at Apple (and elsewhere) always degenerates
|
||
into flames and crudities, says Johann Strandberg
|
||
- but this is what reputations will partly offset
|
||
15.5.6. "brilliant pennies" scam
|
||
15.5.7. "reputation float" is how money can be pulled out of the
|
||
future value of a reputation
|
||
15.5.8. Reputation-based systems and repeat business
|
||
+ reputations matter...this is the main basis of our economic
|
||
system
|
||
- repeat business....people stop doing business with those
|
||
they don't trust, or who mistreat them, or those who just
|
||
don't seem to be reputable
|
||
- and even in centrally-controlled systems, reputations
|
||
matter (can't force people to undertake some relations)
|
||
- credit ratings (even for pseudonyms) matter
|
||
- escrow agents, bonding, etc.
|
||
- criminal systems still rely on reputations and even on
|
||
honor
|
||
- ironically, it is often in cases where there are
|
||
restrictions on choice that the advantages of reputations
|
||
are lost, as when the government bans discrimination,
|
||
limits choice, or insists on determining who can do
|
||
business with who
|
||
+ Repeat business is the most important aspect
|
||
- granularity of transactions, cash flow, game-theoretic
|
||
analysis of advantages of "defecting"
|
||
- anytime a transaction has a value that is very large
|
||
(compared to expected future profits from transactions,
|
||
or on absolute basis), watch out
|
||
- ideally, a series of smaller transactions are more
|
||
conducive to fair trading...for example, if one gets a
|
||
bad meal at a restaurant, one avoids that restaurant in
|
||
the future, rather than suing (even though one can claim
|
||
to have been "damaged")
|
||
- issues of contract as well
|
||
|
||
15.6. Reputations and Evolutionary Game Theory
|
||
15.6.1. game of "chicken," where gaining a rep as tough guy, or king
|
||
of the hill, can head off many future challenges (and hence
|
||
aid in survival, differential reproduction)
|
||
|
||
15.7. Positive Reputations
|
||
15.7.1. better than negative reputations, because neg reps can be
|
||
discarded by pseudonym holdes (neg reps are like allowing a
|
||
credit card to be used then abandoned with a debt on it)
|
||
15.7.2. "reputation capital"
|
||
|
||
15.8. Practical Examples
|
||
15.8.1. "Are there any actual examples of software-mediated
|
||
reputation systems?"
|
||
- credit databases...positive and negative reputations
|
||
15.8.2. Absent laws which ban strong crypto (and such laws are
|
||
themselves nearly unenforceable), it will be essentially
|
||
impossible to stop anonymous transactions and purely
|
||
reputation-based systems.
|
||
- For example, Pr0duct Cypher and Sue D. Nym will be able to
|
||
use private channels of their own choosing (possibly using
|
||
anonymous pools, etc.) to communicate and arrange deals. If
|
||
some form of digital cash exists, they will even be able to
|
||
transfer this cash. (If not, barter of informations,
|
||
whatever.)
|
||
- So, the issues raised by Hal Finney and others, expressing
|
||
doubts about the adequacy of reputation capital as a
|
||
building block (and good concerns they are, by the way),
|
||
become moot. Society cannot stop willing participants from
|
||
using reputation and anonymity. This is a major theme of
|
||
crypto anarchy: the bypassing of convention by willing
|
||
participants.
|
||
+ If Alice and Bob don't care that their physical identies
|
||
are unknown to each other, why should we care? That is, why
|
||
should society step in and try to ban this arrangement?
|
||
- they won't be using "our" court systems, so that's not an
|
||
issue (and longer term, PPLs will take the place of
|
||
courts, many of us feel)
|
||
- only if Alice and Bob are counting on society, on third
|
||
parties to the transaction, to do certain things, can
|
||
society make a claim to be involved
|
||
- (A main reason to try to ban anonymity will be to stop
|
||
"bad" activities, which is a separate issue; banning of
|
||
"bad" activity is usually pointless, and leads to
|
||
repressive states. But I digress.)
|
||
15.8.3. Part of the "phase change": people opt out of the permission-
|
||
slip society via strong crypto, making their own decisions on
|
||
who to trust, who to deal with, who to make financial
|
||
arrangements with
|
||
+ example: credit rating agencies that are not traceable, not
|
||
prosecutable in any court...people deal with them only if
|
||
they think they are getting value for their money
|
||
- no silly rules that credit rating data can "only" go back
|
||
some arbitrary number of years (7, in U.S.)...no silly
|
||
rules about how certain bankruptcies "can't" be
|
||
considered, how one's record is to be "cleared" if
|
||
conditions are met, etc.
|
||
- rather, all data are considered....customer decides how
|
||
to weight the data...(if a customer is too persnickety
|
||
about past lapsed bills, or a bad debt many years in the
|
||
past, he'll find himself never lending any money, so the
|
||
"invisible hand" of the free market will tend to correct
|
||
such overzealousnesses)
|
||
+ data havens, credit havens, etc. (often called "offshore
|
||
data havens," as the current way to do this would be to
|
||
locate in Caymans, Isle of Man, etc.)
|
||
- but clearly they can be "offshore in cyberspace"
|
||
(anonymous links, etc.)
|
||
|
||
15.9. Credentials and Reputations
|
||
15.9.1. debate about credentials vs. reputations
|
||
- James Donald, Hal Finney, etc.
|
||
- (insert details of debate here)
|
||
15.9.2. Credentials are not as important as many people seem to think
|
||
- "Permisssion slips" for various behaviors: drinking age,
|
||
admission to movie theaters, business licenses, licenses to
|
||
drive taxicabs, to read palms (yes, here in Santa Cruz one
|
||
must have a palm-reading license, separate from the normal
|
||
"business license")
|
||
+ Such credentials often are inappropriate extensions of
|
||
state power into matters which only parents should handle
|
||
- underage drinking? Not my problem! Don't force bars to be
|
||
babysitters.
|
||
- underage viewing of movies? Ditto, even more so.
|
||
15.9.3. Proving possession of some credential
|
||
|
||
15.10. Fraud and False Accusations
|
||
15.10.1. "What if someone makes a false accusation?"
|
||
- one's belief in an assertion is an emergent phenomenon
|
||
+ assertion does not equal proof
|
||
- (even "proof" is variable, too)
|
||
- false claims eventually reflect on false claimant
|
||
15.10.2. Scams, Ponzi Schemes, and Oceania
|
||
+ Scams in cyberspace will abound
|
||
- anonymous systems will worsen the situaion in some ways,
|
||
but perhaps help in other ways
|
||
- certainly there is the risk of losing one's electronic
|
||
cash very quickly and irretrievably (it's pretty far gone
|
||
once it's passed through several remailers)
|
||
- conpersons (can't say "con men" anymore!) will be there,
|
||
too
|
||
+ Many of you will recall the hype about "Oceania," a
|
||
proposed independent nation to be built on concrete
|
||
pontoons, or somesuch. People were encouraged to send in
|
||
donations. Apparently the scheme/scam collapsed:
|
||
+ "It turned out to all be a scam, actually. The key
|
||
people involved, Eric Kline and Chuck Geshlieder,
|
||
allegedly had a scheme set up where they repeatedly paid
|
||
themselves out of all of the proceeds." [anonymous post,
|
||
altp.privacy, (reprint of Scott A. Kjar post on
|
||
Compuserve), 1994-07-28]
|
||
- or was it Eric Klein?
|
||
|
||
15.11. Loose Ends
|
||
15.11.1. Selective disclosure of truth
|
||
- More euphemestic than "lying."
|
||
- Consider how we react when someone asks us about something
|
||
we consider overly personal, while a friend or loved one
|
||
may routinely ask such questions.
|
||
- Is "personal" the real issue? Or is that we understand
|
||
truth is a commodity with value, to be given out for
|
||
something in return?
|
||
- At one extreme, the person who casually and consistently
|
||
lies earns a poor reputation--anyone encountering them is
|
||
never certain if the truth is being told. At the other
|
||
extreme, the "always honest" person essentially gives too
|
||
much away, revealing preferences, plans, and ideas without
|
||
consideration.
|
||
- I'm all for secrets--and lies, when needed. I believe in
|
||
selective disclosure of the truth, because the truth
|
||
carries value and need not be "given away" to anyone who
|
||
asks.
|
||
15.11.2. Crytography allows virtual networks to arrange by
|
||
cryptographic collusion certain goals. Beyond just the
|
||
standard "cell" system, it allows arrrangements, plans, and
|
||
execution.
|
||
- collecting money to have someone killed is an example,
|
||
albeit a distasteful one
|
||
|
||
16. Crypto Anarchy
|
||
|
||
16.1. copyright
|
||
THE CYPHERNOMICON: Cypherpunks FAQ and More, Version 0.666,
|
||
1994-09-10, Copyright Timothy C. May. All rights reserved.
|
||
See the detailed disclaimer. Use short sections under "fair
|
||
use" provisions, with appropriate credit, but don't put your
|
||
name on my words.
|
||
|
||
16.2. SUMMARY: Crypto Anarchy
|
||
16.2.1. Main Points
|
||
- "...when you want to smash the State, everything looks like
|
||
a hammer."
|
||
- strong crypto as the "building material" for cyberspace
|
||
(making the walls, the support beams, the locks)
|
||
16.2.2. Connections to Other Sections
|
||
- this section ties all the other sections together
|
||
16.2.3. Where to Find Additional Information
|
||
- again, almost nothing written on this
|
||
- Vinge, Friedman, Rand, etc.
|
||
16.2.4. Miscellaneous Comments
|
||
- a very long section, possibly confusing to many
|
||
|
||
16.3. Introduction
|
||
16.3.1. "The revolution will not be televised. The revolution *will*,
|
||
however, be digitized." Welcome to the New Underworld Order!
|
||
(a term I have borrowed from writer Claire Sterling.)
|
||
16.3.2. "Do the views here express the views of the Cypherpunks as a
|
||
whole?"
|
||
- This section is controversial. Hence, even more warnings
|
||
than usual about being careful not to confuse these
|
||
comments with the beliefs of all or even most Cypherpunks.
|
||
- In fairness, libertarianism is undeniably the most
|
||
represented ideology on the list, as it is in so much of
|
||
the Net. The reasons for this have been extensively debated
|
||
over the years, but it's a fact. If other major ideologies
|
||
exists, they are fairly hidden on the Cypherpunks list.
|
||
- Yes, some quasi-socialist views are occasionally presented.
|
||
My friend Dave Mandl, for example, has at times argued for
|
||
a less-anarchocapitalist view (but I think our views are
|
||
actually fairly similar...he just has a different language
|
||
and thinks there's more of a difference than their actually
|
||
is--insert smiley here).
|
||
- And several Cypherpunks who've thought about the issues of
|
||
crypto anarchy have been disturbed by the conclusions that
|
||
seem inevitable (markets for corporate information,
|
||
assassianation made more liquid, data havens, espionage
|
||
made much easier, and other such implications to be
|
||
explored later in this section).
|
||
- So, take this section with these caveats.
|
||
- And some of the things I thing are inevitable, and in many
|
||
cases positive, will be repugnant to some. The end of
|
||
welfare, the end of subsidies of inner city breeders, for
|
||
example. The smashing of the national security state
|
||
through digital espionage, information markets, and
|
||
selective assassinations are not things that everyone will
|
||
take comfort in. Some may even call it illegal, seditious,
|
||
and dangerous. So be it.
|
||
16.3.3. "What are the Ideologies of Cyperpunks?"
|
||
+ I mentioned this in an earlier section, but now that I'm
|
||
discussing "crypto anarchy" in detail it's good to recap
|
||
some points about the ideology of Cypherpunks.
|
||
- an area fraught with dangers, as many Cypherpunks have
|
||
differing views of what's important
|
||
+ Two main foci for Cypherpunks:
|
||
- Personal privacy in an increasingly watchful society
|
||
- Undermining of states and governments
|
||
- Of those who speak up, most seem to lean toward the
|
||
libertarian position, often explicitly so (libertarians
|
||
often are to be found on the Internet, so this correlation
|
||
is not surprising)
|
||
+ Socialists and Communitarians
|
||
- Should speak up more than they have. Dave Mandl is the
|
||
only one I can recall who's given a coherent summary of
|
||
his views.
|
||
+ My Personal Outlook on Laws and Ideology:
|
||
- (Obviously also scattered thoughout this document.)
|
||
+ Non-coercion Principle
|
||
- avoid initiation of physical aggression
|
||
- "to each his own" (a "neo-Calvinist" perspective of
|
||
letting each person pick his path, and not interfering)
|
||
- I support no law which can easily be circumvented.
|
||
(Traffic laws are a counterexample...I generally agree
|
||
with basic traffic laws....)
|
||
- And I support no law I would not personally be willing to
|
||
enforce and punish. Murder, rape, theft, etc, but not
|
||
"victimless crimes, " not drug laws, and not 99.9998% of
|
||
the laws on the books.
|
||
- Crypto anarchy is in a sense a throwback to the pre-state
|
||
days of individual choice about which laws to follow. The
|
||
community exerted a strong force.
|
||
- With strong crypto ("fortress crypto," in law enforcement
|
||
terms), only an intrusive police state can stop people
|
||
from accessing "illegal" sites, from communicating with
|
||
others, from using "unapproved" services, and so on. To
|
||
pick one example, the "credit data haven" that keeps any
|
||
and all financial records--rent problems from 1975,
|
||
bankruptcy proceedings from 1983, divorce settlements,
|
||
results from private investigators, etc. In the U.S.,
|
||
many such records are "unusable": can't use credit data
|
||
older than 7 years (under the "Fair Credit Reporting
|
||
Act"), PI data, etc. But if I am thinking about lending
|
||
Joe Blow some money, how the hell can I be told I can't
|
||
"consider" the fact that he declared bankruptcy in 1980,
|
||
ran out on his debts in Haiti in 1989, and is being sued
|
||
for all his assets by two ex-wives? The answer is simple:
|
||
any law which says I am not allowed to take into account
|
||
information which comes my way is _flawed_ and should be
|
||
bypassed. Dialing in to a credit haven in Belize is one
|
||
approach--except wiretaps might still get me caught.
|
||
Cyberspace allows much more convenient and secure
|
||
bypasses of these laws.
|
||
- (For those of you who think such bypasses of laws are
|
||
immoral, tough. Strong crypto allows this. Get used to it.)
|
||
16.3.4. Early history of crypto anarchy
|
||
+ 1987-8, AMIX, Salin, Manifesto
|
||
- discussed crypto implications with Phil Salin and Gayle
|
||
Pergamit, in December of 1987
|
||
- with a larger group, including Marc Stiegler, Dave Ross,
|
||
Jim Bennett, Phil Salin, etc., in June 1988.
|
||
- released "The Crypto Anarchist Manifesto" in August 1988.
|
||
- Fen LaBalme had "Guerillan Information Net" (GIN), which he
|
||
and I discussed in 1988 at the Hackers Conference
|
||
+ "From Crossbows to Cryptography," 1987?
|
||
- made similar points, but some important differences
|
||
- TAZ also being written at this time
|
||
|
||
16.4. The Crypto Anarchist Manifesto
|
||
16.4.1. Unchanged since it's writing in mid-1988, except for my e-
|
||
mail address.
|
||
- There are some changes I'd make, but...
|
||
- It was written quickly, and in a style to deliberately
|
||
mimic what I remembered of the "Communist Manifesto." (for
|
||
ironic reasons)
|
||
- Still., I'm proud that more than six years ago I correctly
|
||
saw some major points which Cypherpunks have helped to make
|
||
happen: remailers, anonymous communictation, reputation-
|
||
based systems, etc.
|
||
- For history's sake, here it is:
|
||
16.4.2.
|
||
|
||
The Crypto Anarchist Manifesto
|
||
|
||
Timothy C. May
|
||
tcmay@netcom.com
|
||
|
||
A specter is haunting the modern world, the specter of crypto
|
||
anarchy.
|
||
|
||
Computer technology is on the verge of providing the ability
|
||
for individuals and groups to communicate and interact with
|
||
each other in a totally anonymous manner. Two persons may
|
||
exchange messages, conduct business, and negotiate electronic
|
||
contracts without ever knowing the True Name, or legal
|
||
identity, of the other. Interactions over networks will be
|
||
untraceable, via extensive re-routing of encrypted packets
|
||
and tamper-proof boxes which implement cryptographic
|
||
protocols with nearly perfect assurance against any
|
||
tampering. Reputations will be of central importance, far
|
||
more important in dealings than even the credit ratings of
|
||
today. These developments will alter completely the nature of
|
||
government regulation, the ability to tax and control
|
||
economic interactions, the ability to keep information
|
||
secret, and will even alter the nature of trust and
|
||
reputation.
|
||
|
||
The technology for this revolution--and it surely will be
|
||
both a social and economic revolution--has existed in theory
|
||
for the past decade. The methods are based upon public-key
|
||
encryption, zero-knowledge interactive proof systems, and
|
||
various software protocols for interaction, authentication,
|
||
and verification. The focus has until now been on academic
|
||
conferences in Europe and the U.S., conferences monitored
|
||
closely by the National Security Agency. But only recently
|
||
have computer networks and personal computers attained
|
||
sufficient speed to make the ideas practically realizable.
|
||
And the next ten years will bring enough additional speed to
|
||
make the ideas economically feasible and essentially
|
||
unstoppable. High-speed networks, ISDN, tamper-proof boxes,
|
||
smart cards, satellites, Ku-band transmitters, multi-MIPS
|
||
personal computers, and encryption chips now under
|
||
development will be some of the enabling technologies.
|
||
|
||
The State will of course try to slow or halt the spread of
|
||
this technology, citing national security concerns, use of
|
||
the technology by drug dealers and tax evaders, and fears of
|
||
societal disintegration. Many of these concerns will be
|
||
valid; crypto anarchy will allow national secrets to be trade
|
||
freely and will allow illicit and stolen materials to be
|
||
traded. An anonymous computerized market will even make
|
||
possible abhorrent markets for assassinations and extortion.
|
||
Various criminal and foreign elements will be active users of
|
||
CryptoNet. But this will not halt the spread of crypto
|
||
anarchy.
|
||
|
||
Just as the technology of printing altered and reduced the
|
||
power of medieval guilds and the social power structure, so
|
||
too will cryptologic methods fundamentally alter the nature
|
||
of corporations
|
||
and of government interference in economic transactions.
|
||
Combined with emerging information markets, crypto anarchy
|
||
will create a liquid market for any and all material which
|
||
can be put into words and pictures. And just as a seemingly
|
||
minor invention like barbed wire made possible the fencing-
|
||
off of vast ranches and farms, thus altering forever the
|
||
concepts of land and property rights in the frontier West, so
|
||
too will the seemingly minor discovery out of an
|
||
arcane branch of mathematics come to be the wire clippers
|
||
which dismantle the barbed wire around intellectual property.
|
||
|
||
Arise, you have nothing to lose but your barbed wire fences!
|
||
|
||
16.5. Changes are Coming
|
||
16.5.1. Technology is dramatically altering the nature of
|
||
governments.
|
||
- It may sound like newage trendiness, but strong crypto is
|
||
"technological empowerment." It literally gives power to
|
||
individuals. Like Sam Colt, it makes them equal.
|
||
- "Politics has never given anyone lasting freedom, and it
|
||
never will. Anything gained through politics will be lost
|
||
again as soon as the society feels threatened. If most
|
||
Americans have never been oppressed by the government
|
||
(aside from an annual mugging) it is because most of them
|
||
have never done anything to threaten the government's
|
||
interests." [Mike Ingle, 1994-01-01]
|
||
+ Thesis: Strong crypto is a good thing
|
||
- tool against governments of all flavors, left and right
|
||
- religious freedom
|
||
- personal choice
|
||
16.5.2. Dangers of democracy in general and electronic democracy in
|
||
particular
|
||
- mob rule, rights of minority ignored
|
||
- too many things get decided by vote that have no business
|
||
being voted on
|
||
- "don't tax me...", De Tocqueville's warning
|
||
+ electronic democracy is even worse
|
||
- moves further from republican, representative system to
|
||
electronc mob rule
|
||
- too rapid a system
|
||
- Detweiler's "electrocrasy" (spelling?)...brain-damaged,
|
||
poorly thought-out
|
||
16.5.3. The collapse of democracy is predicted by many
|
||
+ the "tipping factor" exceeded, with real taxation rates at
|
||
50% or more in most developed countries, with conditions of
|
||
"taxation without representation" far beyond anything in
|
||
American colonial times
|
||
- with professional politicians...and mostly millionaires
|
||
running for office
|
||
- the Cincinnatus (sp?) approach of going into government
|
||
just for a few years, then returning to the farm or
|
||
business, is a joke
|
||
+ rise of nominalism [argued by James Donald]
|
||
- "After Athenian democracy self destructed, the various
|
||
warring parties found that they could only have peace if
|
||
they disowned omnipotent government. They put together a
|
||
peace agreement that in part proclaimed limits to
|
||
government, in part acknowledged inherent limits to what
|
||
was proper for governments to do and in part guaranteed
|
||
that the government would not go beyond what it was
|
||
proper for government to do, that the majority could not
|
||
do as it pleased with the minority, that not any act of
|
||
power was a law, that law was not merely whatever the
|
||
government willed.
|
||
|
||
They did not agree on a constitution but agreed to
|
||
respect an unwritten constitution that already existed in
|
||
some sense.
|
||
|
||
A similar arrangement underlies the American constitution
|
||
(now defunct) and the English declaration of right (also
|
||
defunct)
|
||
|
||
The problem with such formal peace agreements is that
|
||
they can only be put together after government has
|
||
substantially collapsed. Some of us wish to try other
|
||
possibilities in the event of collapse.
|
||
|
||
The American constitution collapsed because of the rise
|
||
of nominalist theories "The constitution says whatever
|
||
the courts say that it says." [James Donald, 1994-08-31]
|
||
- War on Drugs, conspiracy charges, random searches,
|
||
emergency preparedness orders (Operation Vampire Killer,
|
||
Operation Night Train, REX-84). The killings of more than a
|
||
dozen reporters and tipsters over the past decade, many of
|
||
them covering the Iran-Contra story, the drug deals, the
|
||
CIA's dealings...the Farm appears to be "swamping" more and
|
||
more of these troublemakers in the headlong march toward
|
||
fascism.
|
||
+ De Tocqueville's warning that the American experiment in
|
||
democracy would last only until voters discovered they
|
||
could pick the pockets of others at the ballot box
|
||
- a point reached about 60 years ago
|
||
- (prior to the federal income tax and then the "New Deal,"
|
||
there were systemic limitations on this ability to the
|
||
pockets of others, despite populist yearnings by
|
||
some....after the New Deal, and the Great Society, the
|
||
modern era of runaway taxation commenced.)
|
||
16.5.4. Depredations of the State
|
||
+ "Discrimination laws"..choice no longer allowed
|
||
- the strip club in LA forced to install wheelchair access-
|
||
-for the dancers!
|
||
- age no longer allowed to be a factor...gag!
|
||
+ democracy run rampant....worst fears of Founders
|
||
- votes on everything...
|
||
- gun control, seizures, using zoning laws (with FFL
|
||
inspections as informants)
|
||
- welfare state,...Murray, inner cities made worse...theft
|
||
- "currency export" laws...how absurd that governments
|
||
attempt to control what folks do with their own money!
|
||
16.5.5. Things are likely to get worse, financially (a negative
|
||
view,though there are also reasons to be optimistic)
|
||
+ a welfare state that is careening toward the edge of a
|
||
cliff...escalating spending, constantly increasing national
|
||
debt (with no signs that it will ever be paid down)
|
||
- pension burdens are rising dramatically, according to
|
||
"Economist", 1994-08.
|
||
- the link to crypto is that folks had better find ways to
|
||
immunize themselves from the coming crunch
|
||
+ Social Security, other pension plans are set to take 30-40%
|
||
of all GDP
|
||
- too many promies, people living longer
|
||
- estimate: $20 trillion in "unfunded liabilities"
|
||
- health care expectations... growing national debt
|
||
16.5.6. Borders are becoming transparent to data...terabytes a day
|
||
are flowing across borders, with thousands of data formats
|
||
and virtually indistinguishable from other messages.
|
||
Compressed files, split files, images, sounds, proprietary
|
||
encryption formats, etc. Once can _almost_ pity the NSA in
|
||
the hopelessness of their job.
|
||
|
||
16.6. Free Speech and Liberty--The Effects of Crypto
|
||
16.6.1. "What freedom of speech is becoming."
|
||
+ An increased willingness to limit speech, by attaching
|
||
restrictions based on it being "commercial" or "hate
|
||
speech."
|
||
+ advertising laws being the obvious example: smoking,
|
||
alcohol, etc.
|
||
- doctors, lawyers, etc.
|
||
- sex, nudity
|
||
- even laws that say billboards can't show guns
|
||
- A chilling but all too common sentiment on the Net is shown
|
||
by this quote: "Is it freedom of speech to spew racism ,
|
||
and steriotypes, just because you lack the intellectual
|
||
capacity to comprehend that , perhaps, somewhere, there is
|
||
a different way of life, which is not congruent with your
|
||
pre-conceived notions?" [Andrew Beckwith, soc.culture.usa]
|
||
16.6.2. We don't really have free speech
|
||
- election laws
|
||
- advertising laws
|
||
+ "slander" and "libel"
|
||
- thankfully, anonymous systems will make this moot
|
||
+ permission needed...licensing, approval, certification
|
||
- "qualifications"
|
||
- granted, Supremes have made it clear that political
|
||
comments cannot be restricted, but many other areas have
|
||
- often the distinction involves 'for pay"
|
||
- Perhaps you are thinking that these are not really examples
|
||
of government censorship, just of _other crimes_ and
|
||
_other rights_ taking precedence. Thus, advertisers can't
|
||
make false or misleading claims, and can't advertise
|
||
dangerous or otherwise unapproved items. And I can't make
|
||
medical diagnoses, or give structural and geological
|
||
advice, and so on...a dozen good examples. But these
|
||
restrictions emasculate free speech, leaving only banal
|
||
expression of appropriately-hedged "personal opinions" as
|
||
the free speech that is allowed...and even that is ofen
|
||
subject to crazy lawsuits and threats of legal action.
|
||
|
||
16.7. The Nature of Anarchies
|
||
16.7.1. Anarchy doesn't mean chaos and killing
|
||
- As J. Bruce Dawson put it in a review of Linux in the
|
||
September, 1994 "Byte," "It's anarchy at its best."
|
||
+ Ironically, crypto anarchy does admit the possibility (and
|
||
hence probablility) of more contract killings as an
|
||
ultimate enforcement mechanism for contracts otherwise
|
||
unenforceable.
|
||
- which is what is occurring in drug and other crime
|
||
situaions: the parties cannot go to the police or courts
|
||
for righting of wrongs, so they need to have the ultimate
|
||
threat of death to enforce deals. It makes good sense
|
||
from a reputation/game theory point of view.
|
||
16.7.2. Leftists can be anarchists, too
|
||
- In fact, this tends to be the popular interpretation of
|
||
anarchy. (Besides the bomb-throwing, anti-Tsar anarchists
|
||
of the 19th century, and the bomb-throwing anarchists of
|
||
the U.S. early this century.)
|
||
+ "Temporary Autonomous Zones" (TAZ)
|
||
- Hakim Bey (pseudonym for )
|
||
- Mondo 2000, books, (check with Dave Mandl, who helps to
|
||
publish them)
|
||
16.7.3. Anarchic development
|
||
+ Markets and emergent behaviors vs. planned development
|
||
- principles of locality come into play (the local players
|
||
know what they want and how much they'll pay for it)
|
||
- central planners have "top-down" outlooks
|
||
- Kevin Kelley's "Out of Control" (1994). Also, David
|
||
Friedman's "Technologies of Freedom."
|
||
- An example I heard about recently was Carroll College, in
|
||
Wisconsin. Instead of building pathways and sidewalks
|
||
across the newly-constructed grounds, the ground was left
|
||
bare. After some time, the "emergent pathways" chosen by
|
||
students and faculty were then turned into paved pathways,
|
||
neatly solving the problem of people not using the
|
||
"planned" pathways. I submit that much of life works this
|
||
way. So does the Net (the "information footpaths"?).
|
||
- anarchies are much more common than most people
|
||
think...personal relationships, choices in life, etc.
|
||
16.7.4. The world financial system is a good example: beyond the
|
||
reach of any single government, even the U.S. New World
|
||
Order, money moves and flows as doubts and concerns appear.
|
||
Statist governments are powerless to stop the devaluation of
|
||
their currencies as investors move their assets (even slight
|
||
moves can have large marginal effects).
|
||
- "anarchy" is not a term most would apply, but it's an
|
||
anarchy in the sense of there being no rulers ("an arch"),
|
||
no central command structure.
|
||
|
||
16.8. The Nature of Crypto Anarchy
|
||
16.8.1. "What is Crypto Anarchy?"
|
||
+ "Why the name?"
|
||
+ a partial pun on several things"
|
||
- "crypto," meaning "hidden," as used in the term "crypto
|
||
fascist" (Gore Vidal called William F. Buckley this)
|
||
- "crypto anarchy" meaning the anarchy will be hidden,
|
||
not necessarily visible
|
||
- and of course cryptology is centrally invovled
|
||
+ Motivation
|
||
- Vernor Vinge's "True Names"
|
||
- Ayn Rand was one of the prime motivators of crypto
|
||
anarchy. What she wanted to do with material technology
|
||
(mirrors over Galt's Gulch) is _much_ more easily done
|
||
with mathematical technology.
|
||
16.8.2. "Anarchy turns people off...why not a more palatable name?"
|
||
- people don't understand the term; if people understood the
|
||
term, it might be more acceptable
|
||
- some have suggested I call it "digital liberty" or
|
||
somesuch, but I prefer to stick with the historical term
|
||
16.8.3. Voluntary interactions involve Schelling points, mutually-
|
||
agreed upon points of agreement
|
||
16.8.4. Crypto anarchy as an ideology rather than as a plan.
|
||
- Without false modesty, I think crypto anarchy is one of the
|
||
few real contributions to ideology in recent memory. The
|
||
notion of individuals becoming independent of states by
|
||
bypassing ordinary channels of control is a new one. While
|
||
there have been hints of this in the cyberpunk genre of
|
||
writing, and related areas (the works of Vinge especially),
|
||
the traditional libertarian and anarchist movements have
|
||
mostly been oblivious to the ramifications of strong
|
||
crypto.
|
||
- Interestingly, David Friedman, son of Milton and author of
|
||
"The Machinery of Freedom," became a convert to the ideas.
|
||
At least enough so as to give a talk in Los Angeles
|
||
entitles "Crypto Anarchy and the State."
|
||
- Conventional political ideology has failed to realize the
|
||
huge changes coming over the next several decades.
|
||
Focussing on unwinnable battles at the ballot box, they
|
||
fritter away their energies; they join the political
|
||
process, but they have nothing to "deal" with, so they
|
||
lose. The average American actually _wants_ to pick the
|
||
pockets of his neighbors (to pay for "free" health care, to
|
||
stop companies from laying-off unneeded workers, to bring
|
||
more pork back to the local enonomy), so the average voter
|
||
is highly unlikely to ever vote for a prinicpled
|
||
Libertarian candidate.
|
||
- Fortunately, how people vote has little effect on certain
|
||
"ground truths" that emerge out of new technologies and new
|
||
economic developments.
|
||
|
||
16.9. Uses of Crypto Anarchy
|
||
16.9.1. Markets unfettered by local laws (digital black markets, at
|
||
least for items that can be moved through cyberspace)
|
||
16.9.2. Espionage
|
||
|
||
16.10. The Implications-Negative and Positive-of Crypto Anarchy
|
||
16.10.1. "What are some implications of crypto anarchy?"
|
||
+ A return to contracts
|
||
- whiners can't go outside contracts and complain
|
||
- relates to: workers, terms of employment, actions, hurt
|
||
feelings
|
||
- with untraceable communication, virtual networks....
|
||
+ Espionage
|
||
+ Spying is already changing dramatically.
|
||
+ Steele's (or Steeler?) "open sources"
|
||
- collecting info from thousands of Internet sources
|
||
- Well, this cuts both ways..
|
||
+ Will allow:
|
||
- BlackNet-type solicitations for military secrets ("Will
|
||
pay $300,000 for xxxx")
|
||
+ Digital Dead Drops
|
||
- totally secure, untraceable (pools, BlackNet mode)
|
||
- no Coke cans near the base of oak trees out on Route
|
||
42
|
||
- no chalk marks on mailboxes to signal a message is
|
||
ready
|
||
- no "burning" of spies by following them to dead drops
|
||
- No wonder the spooks are freaked out!
|
||
- Strong crypto will also have a major effect on NSA, CIA,
|
||
and FBI abilities to wiretap, to conduct surveillance,
|
||
and to do domestic and foreign counterintelligence
|
||
- This is not altogether a great thing, as there may be
|
||
_some_ counterintelligence work that is useful (I'm
|
||
perhaps betraying my lingering biases), but there's
|
||
really only one thing to say about it: get used to it.
|
||
Nothing short of a totalitarian police state (and
|
||
probably not even that, given the spread of strong
|
||
crypto) can stop these trends.
|
||
-
|
||
+ Bypassing sanctions and boycotts
|
||
- Just because Bill Clinton doesn't like the rulers of
|
||
Haiti is no reason for me to honor his "sanctions"
|
||
- Individual choice, made possible by strong crypto
|
||
(untraceable transactions, pseudonyms, black markets)
|
||
+ Information Markets and Data Havens
|
||
- medical
|
||
- scientific
|
||
- corporate knowledge
|
||
- dossiers
|
||
+ credit reports
|
||
- without the absurd rules limiting what people can store
|
||
on their computers (e.g., if Alice keeps records going
|
||
back more than 7 years, blah blah, can be thrown in
|
||
jail for violating the "Fair Credit Reporting Act")
|
||
- bypassing such laws
|
||
- true, governments can attempt to force disclosure of
|
||
"reasons" for all decisions (a popular trend, where
|
||
even one's maid cannot be dismissed without the
|
||
"reasons" being called into question!); this means that
|
||
anyone accessing such offshore (or in cyberspace...same
|
||
difference) data bases must find some acceptable reason
|
||
for the actions they take...shouldn't be too hard
|
||
- (as with so many of these ideas, the beauty is that the
|
||
using of such services is voluntary....)
|
||
+ Consulting
|
||
- increased liquidity of information
|
||
+ illegal transactions
|
||
+ untraceability and digital money means many "dark"
|
||
possibilities
|
||
- markets for assassinations
|
||
- stolen property
|
||
- copyright infringement
|
||
+ Espionage
|
||
- information markets (a la AMIX)
|
||
- "digital dead drops"
|
||
- Offshore accounts
|
||
- Money-laundering
|
||
+ Markets for Assassinations
|
||
- This is one of the more disturbing implications of crypto
|
||
anarchy. Actually, it arises immediately out of strong,
|
||
unbreakable and untraceable communication and some form
|
||
of untraceable digital cash. Distrurbing it may be, but
|
||
the implications are also interesting to consider...and
|
||
inevitable.
|
||
- And not all of the implications are wholly negative.
|
||
+ should put the fear of God into politicians
|
||
- "Day of the Jackal" made electronic
|
||
- any interest group that can (anonymously) gather money
|
||
can have a politician zapped. Positive and negative
|
||
implications, of course.
|
||
- The fact is, some people simply need killing. Shocking as
|
||
that may sound to many, surely everyone would agree that
|
||
Hitler deserved killing. The "rule of law" sounds noble,
|
||
but when despicable people control the law, other
|
||
measures are called for.
|
||
- Personally, I hold that anyone who threatens what I think
|
||
of as basic rights may need killing. I am held back by
|
||
the repercussions, the dangers. With liquid markets for
|
||
liquidations, things may change dramatically.
|
||
16.10.2. The Negative Side of Crypto Anarchy
|
||
+ Comment:
|
||
- There are some very real negative implications;
|
||
outweighed on the whole by the benefits. After all, free
|
||
speech has negatives. Poronography has negatives. (This
|
||
may not be very convincing to many....I can't do it here-
|
||
-the gestalt has to be absorbed and considered.)
|
||
+ Abhorrent markets
|
||
- contract killings
|
||
- can collect money anonymously to have someone
|
||
whacked...nearly anyone who is controversial can generate
|
||
enough "contributions"
|
||
- kidnapping, extortion
|
||
+ Contracts and assassinations
|
||
- "Will kill for $5000"
|
||
+ provides a more "liquid" market (pun intended)
|
||
- sellers and buyers more efficiently matched
|
||
- FBI stings (which are common in hiring hit men) are
|
||
made almost impossible
|
||
- the canonical "dark side" example--Eric Drexler, when
|
||
told of this in 1988, was aghast and claimed I was
|
||
immoral to even continue working on the implications of
|
||
crypto anarchy!
|
||
- made much easier by the inability to trace payments, the
|
||
lack of physical meetings, etc.
|
||
+ Potential for lawlessness
|
||
- bribery, abuse, blackmail
|
||
- cynicism about who can manipulate the system
|
||
+ Solicitation of Crimes
|
||
- untraceably, as we have seen
|
||
+ Bribery of Officials and Influencing of Elections
|
||
- and direct contact with officials is not even
|
||
needed...what if someone "lets it be known" that a
|
||
council vote in favor of some desired project will result
|
||
in campaign contributions?
|
||
+ Child molestors, pederasts, and rapists
|
||
- encrypting their diaries with PGP (a real case, says the
|
||
FBI)
|
||
- this raises the privacy issue in all its glory...privacy
|
||
protects illegality...it always has and it always will
|
||
+ Espionage is much easier
|
||
- from the guy watching ships leave a harbor to the actual
|
||
theft of defense secrets
|
||
- job of defending against spies becomes much more
|
||
difficult: and end to microdots and invisible ink, what
|
||
with the LSB method and the like that even hides the very
|
||
existence of encrypted messages!
|
||
+ Theft of information
|
||
- from corporations and individuals
|
||
- corporations as we know them today will have to change
|
||
- liquidity of information
|
||
- selling of corporate secrets, or personal information
|
||
+ Digilantes and Star Chambers
|
||
- a risk of justice running amok?
|
||
+ Some killers are not rehabilitated and need to be
|
||
disposed of through more direct means
|
||
+ Price, Rhode Island, 21, 4 brutal killings
|
||
- stabbings of children, mother, another
|
||
+ for animals like this, vigilantism...discreet
|
||
execution...is justified...
|
||
- or, at least some of us will consider it justified
|
||
- which I consider to be a good thing
|
||
- this relates to an important theme: untraceable
|
||
communication and markets means the ability to "opt
|
||
out" of conventional morality
|
||
+ Loss of trust
|
||
+ even in families, especially if the government offers
|
||
bounties and rewards
|
||
- recall Pavel Morozov in USSR, DARE-type programs
|
||
(informing on parents)
|
||
- more than 50% of all IRS suits involve one spouse
|
||
informing to the IRS
|
||
+ how will taxes be affected by the increased black market?
|
||
- a kind of Laffer curve, in which some threshold of
|
||
taxation triggers disgust and efforts to evade the taxes
|
||
- not clear how large the current underground economy
|
||
is....authorities are motivated to misstate the size
|
||
(depending on their agenda)
|
||
+ Tax Evasion (I'm not defending taxation, just pointing out
|
||
what most would call a dark side of CA)
|
||
+ By conducting business secretly, using barter systems,
|
||
alternative currencies or credit systems, etc.
|
||
- a la the lawyers who use AMIX-like systems to avoid
|
||
being taxed on mutual consultations
|
||
+ By doing it offshore
|
||
- so that the "products" are all offshore, even though
|
||
many or most of the workers are telecommuting or using
|
||
CA schemes
|
||
- recall that many musicians left Europe to avoid 90% tax
|
||
rates
|
||
+ the "nest egg" scam: drawing on a lump sum not reported
|
||
+ Scenario: Alice sells something very valuable-perhaps
|
||
the specs on a new product-to Bob. She deposits the
|
||
fee, which is, say, a million dollars, in a series of
|
||
accounts. This fee is not reported to the IRS or anyone
|
||
else.
|
||
- the fee could be in cash or in a "promise"
|
||
- in multiple accounts, or just one
|
||
+ regardless, the idea is that she is now paid, say,
|
||
$70,000 a year for the next 20 years (what with
|
||
interest) as a "consultant" to the company which
|
||
represents her funds
|
||
- this of course does not CA of any form, merely some
|
||
discreet lawyers
|
||
- and of course Alice reports the income to the
|
||
IRS-they never challenge the taxpayer to "justify"
|
||
work done (and would be incapable of "disallowing"
|
||
the work, as Alice could call it a "retainer," or
|
||
as pay for Board of Directors duties, or
|
||
whatever...in practice, it's easiest to call it
|
||
consulting)
|
||
+ these scams are closely related to similar scams for
|
||
laundering money, e.g., by selling company assets at
|
||
artificially low (or high) prices
|
||
- an owner, Charles, could sell assets to a foreign
|
||
company at low prices and then be rewarded in tax-
|
||
free, under the table, cash deposited in a foreign
|
||
account, and we're back to the situation above
|
||
+ Collusion already is common; crypto methods will make some
|
||
such collusions easier
|
||
- antique dealers at an auction
|
||
+ espionage and trading of national secrets (this has
|
||
positive aspects as well)
|
||
- "information markets" and anonymous digital cash
|
||
- (This realization, in late 1987, was the inspiration for
|
||
the ideas behind crypto anarchy.)
|
||
- mistrust
|
||
- widening gap between rich and poor, or those who can use
|
||
the tools of the age and those who can't
|
||
16.10.3. The Positive Side of Crypto Anarchy
|
||
- (other positive reasons are implicitly scattered throughout
|
||
this outline)
|
||
+ a pure kind of libertarianism
|
||
- those who are afraid of CA can stay away (not strictly
|
||
true, as the effects will ripple)
|
||
- a way to bypass the erosion of morals, contracts, and
|
||
committments (via the central role of reputations and the
|
||
exclusion of distorting governments)
|
||
- individual responsibility
|
||
- protecting privacy when using hypertext and cyberspace
|
||
services (many issues here)
|
||
- "it's neat" (the imp of the perverse that likes to see
|
||
radical ideas)
|
||
+ A return to 4th Amendment protections (or better)
|
||
- Under the current system, if the government suspects a
|
||
person of hiding assets, of conspiracy, of illegal acts,
|
||
of tax evasion, etc., they can easily seize bank
|
||
accounts, stock accounts, boats, cars, ec. In particular,
|
||
the owner has little opportunity to protect these assets.
|
||
- increased liquidity in markets
|
||
+ undermining of central states
|
||
- loss of tax revenues
|
||
- reduction of control
|
||
- freedom, personal liberty
|
||
- data havens, to bypass local restrictive laws
|
||
+ Anonymous markets for assassinations will have some good
|
||
aspects
|
||
- the liquidation of politicians and other thieves, the
|
||
killing of those who have assisted in the communalization
|
||
of private property
|
||
- a terrible swift sword
|
||
16.10.4. Will I be sad if anonymous methods allow untraceable markets
|
||
for assassinations? It depends. In many cases, people deserve
|
||
death--those who have escaped justice, those who have broken
|
||
solemn commitments, etc. Gun grabbing politicians, for
|
||
example should be killed out of hand. Anonymous rodent
|
||
removal services will be a tool of liberty. The BATF agents
|
||
who murdered Randy Weaver's wife and son should be shot. If
|
||
the courts won't do it, a market for hits will do it.
|
||
- (Imagine for a moment an "anonymous fund" to collect the
|
||
money for such a hit. Interesting possibilities.)
|
||
- "Crypto Star Chambers," or what might be called
|
||
"digilantes," may be formed on-line, and untraceably, to
|
||
mete out justice to those let off on technicalities. Not
|
||
altogether a bad thing.
|
||
16.10.5. on interference in business as justified by "society supports
|
||
you" arguments (and "opting out)
|
||
+ It has been traditionally argued that society/government
|
||
has a right to regulate businesses, impose rules of
|
||
behavior, etc., for a couple of reasons:
|
||
- "to promote the general welfare" (a nebulous reason)
|
||
+ because government builds the infrastructure that makes
|
||
business possible
|
||
- the roads, transportation systems, etc. (actually, most
|
||
are privately built...only the roads and canal are
|
||
publically built, and they certainly don't _have_ to
|
||
be)
|
||
- the police forces, courts, enforcement of contracts,
|
||
disputes, etc.
|
||
- protection from foreign countries, tariff negotiations,
|
||
etc., even to the *physical* protection against
|
||
invading countries
|
||
+ But with crypto anarchy, *all* of these reasons vanish!
|
||
- society isn't "enabling" the business being transacted
|
||
(after all, the parties don't even necessarily know what
|
||
countries the other is in!)
|
||
- no national or local courts are being used, so this set
|
||
of reasons goes out the window
|
||
- no threat of invasion...or if there is, it isn't
|
||
something governments can address
|
||
+ So, in addition to the basic unenforceability of outlawing
|
||
crypto anarchy--short of outlawing encryption--there is
|
||
also no viable argument for having governments interfere on
|
||
these traditional grounds.
|
||
- (The reasons for them to interfere based on fears for
|
||
their own future and fears about unsavory and abominable
|
||
markets being developed (body parts, assassinations,
|
||
trade secrets, tax evasion, etc.) are of course still
|
||
"valid," viewed from their perspective, but the other
|
||
reasons just aren't.)
|
||
|
||
16.11. Ethics and Morality of Crypto Anarchy
|
||
16.11.1. "How do you square these ideas with democracy?"
|
||
- I don't; democracy has run amok, fulfilling de
|
||
Tocqueville's prediction that American democracy would last
|
||
only until Americans discovered they could pick the pockets
|
||
of their neighbors at the ballot box
|
||
- little chance of changing public opinion, of educating them
|
||
- crypto anarchy is a movement of individual opting out, not
|
||
of mass change and political action
|
||
16.11.2. "Is there a moral responsibility to ensure that the overall
|
||
effects of crypto anarchy are more favorable than unfavorable
|
||
before promoting it?"
|
||
- I don't think so, any more than Thomas Jefferson should
|
||
have analyzed the future implications of freedom before
|
||
pushing it so strongly.
|
||
- All decisions have implications. Some even cost lives. By
|
||
not becoming a doctor working in Sub-Saharan Africa, have I
|
||
"killed thousands"? Certainly I might have saved the lives
|
||
of thousands of villagers. But I did not kill them just
|
||
because I chose not to be a doctor. Likewise, by giving
|
||
money to starving peasants in Bangladesh, lives could
|
||
undeniably be "saved." But not giving the money does not
|
||
murder them.
|
||
- But such actions of omission are not the same, in my mind,
|
||
as acts of comission. My freedom, via crypto anarchy, is
|
||
not an act of force in and of itself.
|
||
- Developing an idea is not the same as aggression.
|
||
- Crypto anarchy is about personal withdrawal from the
|
||
system, the "technologies of disconnection," in Kevin
|
||
Kelly's words.
|
||
16.11.3. "Should individuals have the power to decide what they will
|
||
reveal to others, and to authorities?"
|
||
- For many or even most of us, this has an easy answer, and
|
||
is axiomatically true. But others have doubts, and more
|
||
people may have doubts as some easily anticipated
|
||
develpoments occur.
|
||
- (For example, pedophiles using the much-feared "fortress
|
||
crypto," terrorists communicating in unbreakable codes, tza
|
||
evaders, etc. Lots of examples.)
|
||
- But because some people use crypto to do putatively evil
|
||
things, should basic rights be given up? Closed doors can
|
||
hide criminal acts, but we don't ban closed doors.
|
||
16.11.4. "Aren't there some dangers and risks to letting people pick
|
||
and choose their moralities?"
|
||
- (Related to questions about group consensus, actions of the
|
||
state vs. actions of the individual, and the "herd.)
|
||
- Indeed, there are dangers and risks. In the privacy of his
|
||
home, my neighbor might be operating a torture dungeon for
|
||
young children he captures. But absent real evidence of
|
||
this, most nations have not sanctioned the random searches
|
||
of private dwellings (not even in the U.S.S.R., so far as I
|
||
know).
|
||
16.11.5. "As a member of a hated minority (crypto anarchists) I'd
|
||
rather take my chances on an open market than risk official
|
||
discrimination by the state.....Mercifully, the technology we
|
||
are developing will allow everyone who cares to to decline to
|
||
participate in this coercive allocation of power." [Duncan
|
||
Frissell, 1994-09-08]
|
||
16.11.6. "Are there technologies which should be "stopped" even before
|
||
they are deployed?"
|
||
- Pandora's Box, "things Man was not meant to know," etc.
|
||
- It used to be that my answer was mostly a clear "No," with
|
||
nuclear and biological weapons as the only clear exception.
|
||
But recent events involving key escrow have caused me to
|
||
rethink things.
|
||
- Imagine a company that's developing home surveillance
|
||
cameras...perhaps for burglar prevention, child safety,
|
||
etc. Parents can monitor Junior on ceiling-mounted cameras
|
||
that can't easily be tampered with or disconnected, without
|
||
sending out alarms. All well and good.
|
||
- Now imagine that hooks are put into these camera systems to
|
||
send the captured images to a central office. Again, not
|
||
necessarily a bad idea--vacationers may want their security
|
||
company to monitor their houses, etc.
|
||
- The danger is that a repressive government could make the
|
||
process mandatory....how else to catch sexual deviates,
|
||
child molestors, marijuana growers, counterfeiters, and the
|
||
like?
|
||
- Sound implausible, unacceptable, right? Well, key escrow is
|
||
a form of this.
|
||
- The Danger. That OS vendors will put these SKE systems in
|
||
place without adequate protections against key escrow being
|
||
made mandatory at some future date.
|
||
16.11.7. "Won't crypto anarchy allow some people to do bad things?"
|
||
- Sure, so what else is new? Private rooms allows plotters to
|
||
plot their plots. Etc.
|
||
- Not to sound too glib, but most of the things we think of
|
||
as basic rights allow various illegal, distasteful, or
|
||
crummy things to go on. Part of the bargain we make.
|
||
- "Of course you could prevent contract killings by requiring
|
||
everyone to carry government "escrowed" tape recordings to
|
||
record all their conversations and requiring them to keep a
|
||
diary at all times alibing their all their activities.
|
||
This would also make it much easier to stamp out child
|
||
pornography, plutonium smuggling, and social discrimination
|
||
against the politically correct." [James Donald, 1994-09-
|
||
09]
|
||
|
||
16.12. Practical Problems with Crypto Anarchy
|
||
16.12.1. "What if "bad guys" use unbreakable crypto?"
|
||
- What if potential criminals are allowed to have locks on
|
||
their doors? What if potential rapists can buy pornography?
|
||
What if....
|
||
- These are all straw men used in varous forms throughout
|
||
history by tyrants to control their populations. The
|
||
"sheepocracies" of the modern so-called democratic era are
|
||
voting away their former freedoms in favor of cradle to
|
||
grave safety and security.
|
||
- The latest tack is to propose limits on privacy to help
|
||
catch criminals, pedophile, terrorists, and father rapers.
|
||
God help us if this comes to pass. But Cypherpunks don't
|
||
wait for God, they write code!
|
||
16.12.2. Dealing with the "Abhorrent Markets"
|
||
- such as markets for assassinations and extortion
|
||
+ Possibilities:
|
||
+ physical protection, physical capure
|
||
- make it risky
|
||
- (on the other hand, sniping is easy)
|
||
+ "flooding" of offers
|
||
- "take a number" (meaning: get in line)
|
||
- attacking reputations
|
||
- I agree that more thought is needed, more thorough analysis
|
||
- Some people have even pointed out the benefits of killing
|
||
off tens of thousands of the corrupt politicians, narcs,
|
||
and cops which have implemented fascist, collectivist
|
||
policies for so long. Assassination markets may make this
|
||
much more practical.
|
||
16.12.3. "How is *fraud* dealt with in crypto anarchy?"
|
||
- When the perpetrators can't even be identified.
|
||
- One of the most interesting problems.
|
||
- First, reputations matter. Repeat business is not assured.
|
||
It is always best to not have too much at stake in any
|
||
single transaction.
|
||
16.12.4. "How do we know that crypto anarchy will work? How do we know
|
||
that it won't plunge the world into barbarism, nuclear war,
|
||
and terror?"
|
||
- We don't know, of course. We never can.
|
||
- However, things are already pretty bad. Look at Bosnia,
|
||
Ruanda, and a hundred other hellholes and flashpoints
|
||
around the world. Look at the nuclear arsenals of the
|
||
superpowers, and look at who starts the wars. In nearly all
|
||
cases, statism is to blame. States have killed a hundred
|
||
million or more people in this century alone--think of
|
||
Hitler, Stalin, Mao, and Pol Pot--through forced starvation
|
||
of entire provinces, liquidation of the peasantry, killing
|
||
of intellectuals, and mass exterminations of religious and
|
||
ethnic groups. It's hard to imagine crypto anarchy causing
|
||
anything that bad!
|
||
- Crypto anarchy is a cyberspatially-mediated personal course
|
||
of action; by itself it involves no actions such as
|
||
terrorism or nuclear blackmail. One could just as easily
|
||
ask, "Will freedom lead to nuclear blackmail, weapons
|
||
trading, and pedophilia?" The answer is the same: maybe,
|
||
but so what?
|
||
16.12.5. It is true that crypto anarchy is not for everyone. Some will
|
||
be too incompetent to prepare to protect themselves, and will
|
||
want a protector. Others will have poor business sense.
|
||
16.12.6. "But what will happen to the poor people and those on welfare
|
||
if crypto anarchy really succeeds?"
|
||
- "So?"
|
||
- Many of us would see this as a good thing. Not just for
|
||
Calvinist-Randite reasons, but also because it would break
|
||
the cycle of dependency which has actually made things
|
||
worse for the underclass in America (at least). See Charles
|
||
Murray's "Losing Ground" for more on this.
|
||
- And remember that a collapse of the tax system will mean
|
||
more money left in the hands of former taxpayers, and hence
|
||
more left over for true charity (for those who truly cannot
|
||
help themselves).
|
||
|
||
16.13. Black Markets
|
||
16.13.1. "Why would anyone use black markets?"
|
||
+ when the advantages of doing so outweigh the disadvantages
|
||
- including the chance of getting caught and the
|
||
consequences
|
||
- (As the chances decline, this suggests a rise in
|
||
punishment severity)
|
||
- businesses will tend to shy away from illegal markets,
|
||
unless...
|
||
+ Anonymous markets for medical products
|
||
- to reduce liability, local ethical and religious laws
|
||
- Example: Live AIDS vaccine...considered too risky for any
|
||
company to introduce, due to inability to get binding
|
||
waivers of liability (even for "fully informed" patients
|
||
who face likely death)
|
||
- markets in body parts...
|
||
16.13.2. Crypto anarchy opens up some exciting possibilities for
|
||
collusion in financial deals, for insider trading, etc.
|
||
- I'm not claiming that this will mean instant riches, as
|
||
markets are fairly efficient (*) and "insiders" often don't
|
||
do well in the market. (* Some argue that relaxing laws
|
||
against insider trading will make for an even fairer
|
||
market...I agree with this.)
|
||
- What I am claiming is the SEC and FinCEN computers will be
|
||
working overtime to try to keep up with the new
|
||
possibilities crypto anarchy opens up. Untraceable cash, as
|
||
in offshore bank accounts that one can send anonymous
|
||
trading instructions to (or for), means insider trading
|
||
simply can't be stopped...all that happens is that insiders
|
||
see their bank accounts increase (to the extent they win
|
||
because of the insider trading...like I said, a debatable
|
||
point).
|
||
- Price signalling, a la the airline case of a few years back
|
||
(which, you won't be surprised to hear, I have no problems
|
||
with), will be easier. Untraceable communications, virtual
|
||
meetings, etc.
|
||
16.13.3. Information Markets
|
||
- a la "information brokering," but mediated
|
||
cryptographically
|
||
- recall the 1981 market in Exocet missile codes (France,
|
||
Argentina--later of relevance when an Exocet sank a British
|
||
ship)
|
||
16.13.4. Black Markets, Informal Economies, Export Laws
|
||
+ Transborder data flow, legal issues
|
||
+ complex..laws, copyrights, "national sovereignty"
|
||
- e.g., Phillipines demanded in-the-clear transmissions
|
||
during bank loan renegotiations..and several Latin
|
||
American countries forbid encrypted transmissions.
|
||
+ Export, Technology Export, Export Control
|
||
- Export Control Act
|
||
- Office of Munitions (as in "Munitions Act", circa 1918)
|
||
+ export of some crypto gear shifted from Dept. of State,
|
||
Office of Munitions, to Dept. of Commerce
|
||
- Commodity Control List, allows s/w that is freely
|
||
available to the public to be exported without
|
||
additional paperwork
|
||
- Munitions used to be stickier about export (some would
|
||
say justifiably paranoid)
|
||
- Commodity Jurisdiction request, to see whether product
|
||
for export falls under State or Commerce regulations
|
||
- Trading with the Enemy Act
|
||
- Exocet codes--black market sales of emasculated chips
|
||
16.13.5. Smuggling and Black Markets
|
||
+ Black Markets in the USSR and Other Former East Bloc
|
||
Nations
|
||
+ a major issue, because the normal mechanisms for free
|
||
markets-property laws, shops, stock markets, hard
|
||
currencies, etc.-have not been in place
|
||
- in Russia, have never really existed
|
||
+ Role of "Mafia"
|
||
- various family-related groups (which is how trade
|
||
always starts, via contacts and connections and family
|
||
loyalty, until corporations and their own structures of
|
||
loyalty and trust can evolve)
|
||
+ how the Mafia in Russia works
|
||
- bribes to "lose" materials, even entire trainloads
|
||
- black market currency (dollars favored)
|
||
+ This could cause major discontent in Russia
|
||
- as the privileged, many of them ex-Communist officials,
|
||
are best prepared to make the transition to capitalism
|
||
+ those in factory jobs, on pensions, etc., will not
|
||
have the disposable income to take advantage of the new
|
||
opportunities
|
||
- America had the dual advantages of a frontier that
|
||
people wanted to move to (Turner, Protestant ethic,
|
||
etc.) and a high-growth era (industrialization)
|
||
- plus, there was no exposure to other countries at
|
||
vastly higher living standards
|
||
+ Smuggling in the EEC
|
||
+ the dream of tariff-free borders has given way to the
|
||
reality of a complex web of laws dictating what is
|
||
politically correct and what is not:
|
||
- animal growth hormones
|
||
- artificial sweeteners are limited after 1-93 to a small
|
||
list of approved foods: and the British are finding
|
||
that their cherished "prawn cocktail-flavored crisps"
|
||
are to be banned (for export to EEC or completely?)
|
||
because they're made with saccharin or aspartame
|
||
- "European content" in television and movies may limit
|
||
American productions...as with Canada, isn't this a
|
||
major abridgement of basic freedoms?
|
||
+ this may lead to a new kind of smuggling in "politically
|
||
incorrect" items
|
||
- could be argued that this is already the case with bans
|
||
on drugs, animal skins, ivory, etc. (so tediously
|
||
argued by Brin)
|
||
- recall Turgut Ozal's refreshing comments about loosening
|
||
up on border restrictions
|
||
+ as more items are declared bootleg, smuggling will
|
||
increase...politically incorrect contraband (fur, ivory,
|
||
racist and sexist literature)
|
||
+ the point about sexist and racist literature being
|
||
contraband is telling: such literature (books, magazines)
|
||
may not be formally banned, for that would violate the
|
||
First Amendment, but may still be imported anonymously
|
||
(smuggled) and distributed as if they were banned (!) for
|
||
the reason of avoiding the "damage claims" of people who
|
||
claim they were victimized, assaulted, etc. as a result
|
||
of the literature!
|
||
+ avoidance of prosecution or damage claims for writing,
|
||
editing, distributing, or selling "damaging" materials
|
||
is yet another reason for anonymous systems to emerge:
|
||
those involved in the process will seek to immunize
|
||
themselves from the various tort claims that are
|
||
clogging the courts
|
||
- producers, distributors, directors, writers, and even
|
||
actors of x-rated or otherwise "unacceptable"
|
||
material may have to have the protection of anonymous
|
||
systems
|
||
- imagine fiber optics and the proliferation of videos
|
||
and talk shows....bluenoses and prosecutors will use
|
||
"forum shopping" to block access, to prosecute the
|
||
producers, etc.
|
||
+ Third World countries may declare "national sovereignty
|
||
over genetic resources" and thus block the free export
|
||
and use of plant- and animal-derived drugs and other
|
||
products
|
||
- even when only a single plant is taken
|
||
- royalties, taxes, fees, licenses to be paid to local
|
||
gene banks
|
||
- these gene banks would be the only ones allowed to do
|
||
genetic cataloguing
|
||
- the problem is of course one of enforcement
|
||
+ technology, programs
|
||
- scenario: many useful programs are priced for
|
||
corporations (as with hotel rooms, airline tickets,
|
||
etc.), and price-sensitive consumers will not pay $800
|
||
for a program they'll use occasionally to grind out term
|
||
papers and church newsletters
|
||
+ Scenario: Anonymous organ donor banks
|
||
+ e.g., a way to "market" rare blood types, or whatever,
|
||
without exposing one's self to forced donation or other
|
||
sanctions
|
||
- "forced donation" involves the lawsuits filed by the
|
||
potential recipient
|
||
- at the time of offer, at least...what happens when the
|
||
deal is consummated is another domain
|
||
- and a way to avoid the growing number of government
|
||
stings
|
||
+ the abortion and women's rights underground...a hopeful
|
||
ally (amidst the generally antiliberty women's movement)
|
||
- RU-486, underground abortion clinics (because many
|
||
clinics have been firebombed, boycotted out of existence,
|
||
cut off from services and supplies)
|
||
+ Illegal aliens and immigration
|
||
- "The Boxer Barrier" used to seal barriers...Barbara Boxer
|
||
wants the military and national guard to control illegal
|
||
immigration, so it would be poetic justice indeed if this
|
||
program has her name on it
|
||
16.13.6. Organized Crime and Cryptoanarchy
|
||
+ How and Why
|
||
+ wherever money is to be made, some in the underworld will
|
||
naturally take an interest
|
||
- loan sharking, numbers games, etc.
|
||
+ they may get involved in the setup of underground banks,
|
||
using CA protocols
|
||
- shell games, anonymity
|
||
- such Mafia involvement in an underground monetary system
|
||
could really spread the techniques
|
||
+ but then both sides may be lobbying with the Mafia
|
||
- the CA advocates make a deal with the devil
|
||
- and the government wants the Mob to help eradicate the
|
||
methods
|
||
+ Specific Programs
|
||
+ False Identities
|
||
- in the computerized world of the 90s, even the Mob (who
|
||
usually avoid credit cards, social security numbers,
|
||
etc.) will have to deal with how easily their movements
|
||
can be traced
|
||
+ so the Mob will involve itself in false IDs
|
||
- as mentioned by Koontz
|
||
- Money Laundering, naturally
|
||
+ but some in the government see some major freelance
|
||
opportunities in CA and begin to use it (this undermines
|
||
the control of CA and actually spreads it, because the
|
||
government is working at cross purposes)
|
||
- analogous to the way the government's use of drug trade
|
||
systems spread the techniques
|
||
16.13.7. "Digital Escrow" accounts for mutually suspicious parties,
|
||
especially in illegal transactions
|
||
- drug deals, information brokering, inside information, etc.
|
||
+ But why will the escrow entity be trusted?
|
||
+ reputations
|
||
- their business is being a reliable escrow holder, not
|
||
it destroying their reputation for a bribe or a threat
|
||
+ anonymity means the escrow company won't know who it's
|
||
"burning," should it try to do so
|
||
- they never know when they themselves are being tested
|
||
by some service
|
||
- and potential bribers will not know who to contact,
|
||
although mail could be addressed to the escrow company
|
||
easily enough
|
||
16.13.8. Private companies are often allies of the government with
|
||
regards to black markets (or grey markets)
|
||
- they see uncontrolled trade as undercutting their monopoly
|
||
powers
|
||
- a way to limit competition
|
||
|
||
16.14. Money Laundering and Tax Avoidance
|
||
16.14.1. Hopelessness of controlling money laundering
|
||
+ I see all this rise in moneylaundering as an incredibly
|
||
hopeful trend, one that will mesh nicely with the use of
|
||
cryptography
|
||
- why should export of currency be limited?
|
||
- what's wrong with tax evasion, anyway?
|
||
- corrupting, affects all transactions
|
||
- vast amounts of money flowing
|
||
- 2000 banks in Russia, mostly money-laundering
|
||
+ people and countries are so starved for hard currency that
|
||
most banks outside the U.S. will happily take this money
|
||
- no natural resources in many of these countries
|
||
- hopeless to control
|
||
- being presented as "profits vs. principals," but I think
|
||
this is grossly misguided
|
||
+ Jeffery Robinson, "The Landrymen," interviewed on CNN, 6-24-
|
||
94
|
||
- "closer to anarchy" (yeah!)
|
||
- hopeless to control
|
||
- dozens of new countries, starved for hard currency, have
|
||
autonomy to set banking policies (and most European
|
||
countries turn a blind eye toward most of the anti-
|
||
laundering provisions)
|
||
16.14.2. Taxes and Crypto
|
||
- besides avoidance, there are also issues of tax records,
|
||
sales tax, receipts, etc.
|
||
+ this is another reason government may demand access to
|
||
cyberspace:
|
||
- to ensure compliance, a la a tamper-resistant cash
|
||
register
|
||
- to avoid under-the-table transactions
|
||
- bribery, side payments, etc.
|
||
- Note: It is unlikely that such access to records would stop
|
||
all fraud or tax evasion. I'm just citing reasons for them
|
||
to try to have access.
|
||
- I have never claimed the tax system will collapse totally,
|
||
or overnight, or without a fight. Things take time.
|
||
+ tax compliance rates dropping
|
||
+ the fabric has already unraveled in many countries, where
|
||
the official standard of living is below the _apparent_
|
||
standard of living (e.g., Italy).
|
||
- tax evasion a major thing
|
||
- money runs across the border into Switzerland and
|
||
Austria
|
||
- Frissell's figures
|
||
- media reports
|
||
+ Tax issues, and how strong crypto makes it harder and
|
||
harder to enforce
|
||
- hiding income, international markets, consultants,
|
||
complexly structured transactions
|
||
16.14.3. Capital Flight
|
||
- "The important issue for Cypherpunks is how we should
|
||
respond to this seemingly inevitable increased mobility of
|
||
capital. Does it pose a threat to privacy? If so, let's
|
||
write code to thwart the threat. Does it offer us any
|
||
tools we can use to fight the efforts of nation-states to
|
||
take away our privacy? If so, let's write code to take
|
||
advantage of those tools." [ Sandy Sandfort, Decline and
|
||
Fall, 1994--06-19]
|
||
16.14.4. Money Laundering and Underground Banks
|
||
+ a vast amount of money is becoming available under the
|
||
table: from skimming, from tax avoidance, and from illegal
|
||
activities of all kinds
|
||
- can be viewed as part of the internationalization of all
|
||
enterprises: for example, the Pakistani worker who might
|
||
have put his few rupees into some local bank now deposits
|
||
it with the BCCI in Karachi, gaining a higher yield and
|
||
also increasing the "multiplier" (as these rupees get
|
||
lent out many times)
|
||
- is what happened in the U.S. many years ago
|
||
- this will accelerate as governments try to get more taxes
|
||
from their most sophisticated and technical taxpayers,
|
||
i.e., clever ways to hide income will be sought
|
||
+ BCCI, Money-Laundering, Front Banks, CIA, Organized Crime
|
||
+ Money Laundering
|
||
- New York City is the main clearinghouse, Federal
|
||
Reserve of New York oversees this
|
||
- Fedwire system
|
||
- trillions of dollars pass through this system, daily
|
||
+ How money laundering can work (a maze of techniques)
|
||
- a million dollars to be laundered
|
||
- agent wires it, perhaps along with other funds, to
|
||
Panama or to some other country
|
||
- bank in Panama can issue it to anyone who presents
|
||
the proper letter
|
||
- various ways for it to move to Europe, be issued as
|
||
bearer stock, etc.
|
||
- 1968, offshore mutual funds, Bernie Kornfield
|
||
+ CIA often prefers banks with Mob connections
|
||
- because Mob banks already have the necessary security
|
||
and anonymity
|
||
- and are willing to work with the Company in ways that
|
||
conventional banks may not be
|
||
+ links go back to OSS and Mafia in Italy and Sicily, and
|
||
to heroin trade in SE Asia
|
||
- Naval Intelligence struck a deal in WW2 with Mafia,
|
||
wherby Meyer Lansky would protect the docks against
|
||
strikes (presumably in exchange for a "cut"), if
|
||
Lucky Luciano would be released at the end of the war
|
||
(he was)
|
||
- Operation Underworld: Mafia assisted Allied troops in
|
||
Sicily
|
||
- "the Corse"
|
||
+ Luciano helped in 1947 to reopen Marseilles when
|
||
Communist strikers had shut it down
|
||
- continuing the pattern of cooperation begun during
|
||
the war
|
||
- thus establishing the French Connection!
|
||
- Nugan Hand Bank
|
||
+ BCCI and Bank of America favored by CIA
|
||
- Russbacher says B of A a favored cover
|
||
+ we will almost certainly discover that BCCI was the
|
||
main bank used, with the ties to Bank of America
|
||
offices in Vienna
|
||
+ Bank of America has admitted to having had early
|
||
ties with BCCI in the early 1970s, but claims to
|
||
have severed those ties
|
||
- however, Russbacher says that CIA used B of A as
|
||
their preferred bank in Europe, especially since
|
||
it had ties to companies like IBM that were used
|
||
as covers for their covert ops
|
||
- Vienna was a favored money-laundering center for CIA,
|
||
especially using Bank of America
|
||
+ a swirl of paper fronts, hiding the flows from regulators
|
||
and investors
|
||
- "nominees" used to hide true owners and true activities
|
||
- various nations have banking secrecy laws, creating the
|
||
"veil" that cannot be pierced
|
||
+ CIA knew about all of the flights to South America (and
|
||
probably elsewhere, too)
|
||
- admitted Thomas Polgar, a senior ex-CIA official, in
|
||
testimony on 9-19-91
|
||
- this indicates that CIA knew about the arms deals, the
|
||
drug deals, and the various other schemes and scams
|
||
+ Earlier CIA-Bank Scandals (Nugan Hand and Castle Bank)
|
||
+ Nugan Hand Bank, Australia
|
||
+ Frank Nugan, Sydney, Australia, died in 1980
|
||
+ apparent suicide, but clearly rigged
|
||
- Mercedes, rifle with no fingerprints, position
|
||
all wrong
|
||
- evidence that he'd had a change of heart-was
|
||
praying daily, a la Charles Colson-and was
|
||
thinking about getting out of the business
|
||
+ set up Nugan Hand Bank in 1973
|
||
- private banking services, tax-free deposits in
|
||
Caymans
|
||
+ used by CIA agents, both for Agency operations and
|
||
for their own private slush/retirement funds
|
||
- several CIA types on the payroll (listed their
|
||
addresses as same as Air America)
|
||
- William Colby on Board, and was their lawyer
|
||
+ links to organized crime, e.g., Santo Trafficante,
|
||
Jr.
|
||
- Florida, heroin, links to JFK assassination
|
||
- trafficante was known as "the Cobra" and handled
|
||
many transactions for the CIA
|
||
+ money-laundering for Asian drug dealers
|
||
+ Golden Triangle: N-H even had branches in GT
|
||
- and branch in Chiang Mai, in Thailand
|
||
- links to arms dealers, like Edwin P. Wilson
|
||
+ U.S. authorites refused to cooperate with
|
||
investigations
|
||
- and when info was released, it was blacked out with
|
||
a "B-1" note, implying national security
|
||
implications
|
||
+ investigations by Australian Federal Bureau of
|
||
Narcotics were thwarted-agents transferred and
|
||
Bureau disbanded shortly thereafter
|
||
- similar to "Don't fuck with us" message sent to
|
||
FBI and DEA by CIA
|
||
+ N-H Bank had close working relation with Australian
|
||
Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO)
|
||
- NSA tapped phone conversations (speculative) of
|
||
Nugan that indicated ASIO collusion with N-H Bank
|
||
in the drug trade
|
||
+ Pine Gap facility, near Alice Springs (NSA, NRO)
|
||
- P.M. Gough Whitlam's criticism of Pine Gap led to
|
||
CIA-ASIO plot to destroy the Whitlam gov't.
|
||
- November 1975 fall instigated with wiretaps and
|
||
forgeries
|
||
+ Nugan Hand Bank was also involved with "Task Force
|
||
157," a Naval Intelligence covert operation, given
|
||
the cover name "Pierce Morgan" (a good name?)
|
||
- reported to Henry Kissinger
|
||
- recall minor point that Navy is often the preferred
|
||
service for the ruling elite (the real preppies)
|
||
+ and George Bush's son, George W. Bush, was involved
|
||
with Nugan Hand:
|
||
- linked to William Quasha, who handled N-H deals in
|
||
Phillipines
|
||
+ owners of Harken Energy Corp. a Texas-based company
|
||
that bought G.W. Bush's oil company "Spectrum 7" in
|
||
1986
|
||
- later got offshore drilling rights to Bahrain's
|
||
oil-with G.W. Bush on the Board of Directors
|
||
- could this be another link to Gulf Crisis?
|
||
+ Castle Bank, Bahamas, Paul E. Helliwell
|
||
+ OSS (China). CIA
|
||
- Mitch WerBell, White Russian specialist in
|
||
assassination, silencers, worked for him in China
|
||
- Howard Hunt worked for him
|
||
- after WW2, set up Sea Supply Inc., CIA front in Miami
|
||
+ linked to Resorts International
|
||
- law firm of Helliwell, Melrose and DeWolf
|
||
- lent money to Bahamian P.M. Lynden Pindling in
|
||
exchange for extension of gambling license
|
||
+ Robert Vesco, Bebe Rebozo, and Howard Hughes
|
||
- in contrast to the "Eastern Establishment," these
|
||
were Nixon's insiders
|
||
- links with ex-CIA agent Robert Maheu (who worked
|
||
for Hughes); onvolved withTrafficante, CIA plot to
|
||
kill Castro, and possible links to JFK
|
||
assassination
|
||
- Vesco active in drug trade
|
||
+ also involved in purchase of land for Walt Disney
|
||
World
|
||
- 27,000 acres near Orlando
|
||
- Castle Bank was a CIA conduit
|
||
+ Operation Tradewinds, IRS probe of bank money flows
|
||
- late 60s
|
||
- investigation of "brass plate" companies in Caymans,
|
||
Bahamas
|
||
+ Plot Scenario: Operation Tradewinds uncovered many
|
||
UltraBlack operations, forcing them to retrench and
|
||
dig in deeper, sacrificing several hundred million
|
||
- circa 1977 (Castle Bank shut down)
|
||
+ World Finance Corporation (WFC)
|
||
+ started in 1971 in Coral Gables
|
||
- first known as Republic National Corporation
|
||
- Walter Surrey, ex-OSS, like Helliwell of Castle
|
||
Bank, helped incorporate it
|
||
+ Business
|
||
- exploited cash flows in Florida
|
||
- dealt with CIA, Vesco, Santo Trafficante, Jr.
|
||
- also got loan deposits from Arabs
|
||
- links to Narodny Bank, the Soviet bank that also
|
||
pay agents
|
||
+ a related company was Dominion Mortgage Company,
|
||
located at same address as WFC
|
||
- linked to narcotics flow into Las Vegas
|
||
- and to Trafficante, Jr.
|
||
- suitcases of cash laundered from Las Vegas to
|
||
Miami
|
||
- Jefferson Savings and Loan Association, Texas
|
||
+ Guilermo Hern‡ndez Cartaya, ex-Havana banker, Cuban
|
||
exile, was chief figure
|
||
- veteran of Bay of Pigs (likely CIA contacts)
|
||
- investigated by R. Jerome Sanford, Miami assistant
|
||
U.S. attorney
|
||
- Dade County Organized Crime Bureau also involved in
|
||
the 1978 investigation
|
||
- Rewald and his banking deals
|
||
- BCCI was a successor to this bank
|
||
+ CIA and DEA Links to Drug Trade
|
||
- former agents and drug traffickers were frequently
|
||
recruited by DEA and CIA to run their own drug
|
||
operation, sometimes with political motivations
|
||
- Carlos Hern‡ndez recruited by BNDD (Bureau of Narcotics
|
||
and Dangerous drugs, predecessor to DEA) to form a
|
||
death squad to assassinate other drug traffickers
|
||
+ possible links of the drug dealers to
|
||
UltraBlack/Witness Security Program
|
||
- agents in Florida, the stock broker killing in 1987
|
||
- Seal was betrayed by the DEA and CIA, allowed to be
|
||
killed by the Columbians
|
||
+ Afghan Rebels, Arms to Iran (and Iraq), CIA, Pakistan
|
||
- there was a banking and arms-running network centered
|
||
in Karachi, home of BCCI, for the various arms deals
|
||
involving Afghan rebels
|
||
- Karachi, Islamabad, other cities
|
||
+ Influence Peddling, Agents
|
||
- a la the many senior lawyers hired by BCCI (Clark
|
||
Clifford, Frank Manckiewicz [spelling?]
|
||
+ illustrates again the basic corruptability of a
|
||
centralized command economy, where regulators and
|
||
lawmakers are often in the pockets of corrupt
|
||
enterprises
|
||
- clearly some scandals and losses will occur in free
|
||
markets, but at least the free markets will not be
|
||
backed up with government coercion
|
||
+ Why CIA is Involved in So Many Shady Deals?
|
||
+ ideal cover for covert operations
|
||
- outside audit channels
|
||
- links to underworld
|
||
+ agents providing for their own retirements, their own
|
||
private deals, and feathering their own nests
|
||
- freedom from interferance
|
||
- greed
|
||
+ deals like that of Noriega, in which CIA-supported
|
||
dictators and agents provided for their own lavish
|
||
lifestyles\
|
||
- and the BCCI-Noriega links are believed to have
|
||
contributed to the CIA's unwillingness to question
|
||
the activities of the BCCI (actually, the Justice
|
||
Department)
|
||
+ Role of Banks in Iraq and Gulf War, Iraq-Gate, Scandals
|
||
- Export Import Bank (Ex-Im), CCC
|
||
- implicated in the arming of Iraq
|
||
- Banco Lavorzo Nazionale [spelling?]
|
||
+ CIA was using BNL to arrange $5B in transfers, to arm
|
||
Iraq, to ensure equality with Iran
|
||
- because BNL wouldn't ask where it came from
|
||
- federally guaranteed loans used to finance covert ops
|
||
+ the privatizing of covert ops by the CIA and NSA
|
||
- deniability
|
||
- they subcontracted the law-breaking
|
||
- the darker side of capitalism did the real work
|
||
- but the crooks learned quickly just how much they
|
||
could steal...probably 75% of stolen money
|
||
- insurance fraud...planes allowed to be stolen, then
|
||
shipped to Contras, with Ollie North arguing that
|
||
nobody was really hurt by this whole process
|
||
+ ironically, wealthy Kuwaitis were active in financing
|
||
"instant banks" for money laundering and arms
|
||
transactions, e.g., several in Channel Islands
|
||
- Ahmad Al Babtain Group of Companies, Ltd., a
|
||
Netherlands Antilles corporation
|
||
- Inslaw case fits in with this picture
|
||
+ Federal Reserve and SEC Lack the Power to "Peirce the
|
||
Veil" on Foreign Banks
|
||
- as the Morgenthau case in Manhattan develops
|
||
- a well-known issue
|
||
+ But should we be so surprised?
|
||
- haven't banks always funded wars and arms merchants?
|
||
- and haven't some of them failed?
|
||
- look at the Rothschilds
|
||
- what is surprising is that so many people knew what it
|
||
was doing, what its business was, and that it was even
|
||
nicknamed "Banks of Crooks and Criminals International"
|
||
+ Using software agents for money laundering and other
|
||
illegal acts
|
||
+ these agents act as semi-autonomous programs that are a
|
||
few steps beyond simple algortihms
|
||
- it is not at all clear that these agents could do
|
||
very much to run portfolio, because nothing really
|
||
works
|
||
- real use could be as "digital cutouts": transferring
|
||
wealth to other agents (also controlled from afar, like
|
||
marionettes)
|
||
- advantage is that they can be programmed to perform
|
||
operations that are perhaps illegal, but without
|
||
traceability
|
||
+ Information brokers as money launderers (the two are
|
||
closely related)
|
||
- the rise of AMIX-style information markets and Sterling-
|
||
style "data havens" will provide new avenues for money
|
||
laundering and asset-hiding
|
||
+ information is intrinsically hard to value, hard to put
|
||
a price tag on (it varies according to the needs of the
|
||
buyers)
|
||
- meaning that transnational flows of inforamation
|
||
cannot be accurately valued (assigned a cash value)
|
||
- is closely related to the idea of informal
|
||
consulting and the nontaxable nature of it
|
||
- cardboard boxes filled with cash, taped and strapped, but
|
||
still bursting open
|
||
- gym bags carrying relatively tiny amounts of the skim: a
|
||
mere hundred thousand in $100s
|
||
+ L.A. becoming a focus for much of this cash
|
||
- nearness to Mexico, large immigrant communities
|
||
- freeways and easy access
|
||
+ hundreds of airstrips, dozens of harbors
|
||
- though East Coast seems to have even more, so this
|
||
doesn't seem like a compelling reason
|
||
- Ventura County and Santa Barbara
|
||
16.14.5. Private Currencies, Denationalization of Money
|
||
- Lysander Spooner advocated these private currencies
|
||
- and "denationalization of money" is a hot topic
|
||
+ is effect, alternatives to normal currency already exist
|
||
- coupons, frequent flier coupons, etc.
|
||
+ telephone cards and coupons (widely used in Asia and
|
||
parts of Europe)
|
||
- ironically, U.S. had mostly opted for credit cards,
|
||
which are fully traceable and offer minimal privacy,
|
||
while other nations have embraced the anonymity of
|
||
their kind of cards...and this seems to be carrying
|
||
over to the toll booth systems being planned
|
||
- barter networks
|
||
- chop marks (in Asia)
|
||
+ "reputations" and favors
|
||
- if Al gives Bob some advice, is this taxable? (do
|
||
lawyers who talk amongst themselves report the
|
||
transactions/ od course not, and yet this is
|
||
effectively either a barter transaction or an outright
|
||
gift)
|
||
+ sophisticated financial alternatives to the dollar
|
||
- various instruments
|
||
- futures, forward contracts, etc.
|
||
- "information" (more than just favors)
|
||
+ art works and similar physical items
|
||
- not a liquid market, but for high rollers, an easy way
|
||
to transfer hundreds of millions of dollars (even with
|
||
the discounted values of a stolen item, and not all the
|
||
items will be stolen...many people will be very careful
|
||
to never travel with stolen art)
|
||
- diamonds, gems have long been a form of transportable
|
||
wealth
|
||
+ art works need not be declared at most (?) borders
|
||
- this may change with time
|
||
16.14.6. Tax Evasion Schemes
|
||
- unreported income, e.g., banks like the BCCI obviously did
|
||
not report what they or their customers were doing to the
|
||
various tax authorities (or anyone else)
|
||
- deferred income, via the kind of trust funds discussed here
|
||
(wherein payment is deferred and some kind of trust is used
|
||
to pay smaller amounts per year)
|
||
+ Asset-Hiding, Illegal Payments, Bribes, and Tax Evasion
|
||
Funds Can Be Protected in a "Retirement Fund"
|
||
+ e.g., a politician or information thief-perhaps an Intel
|
||
employee who sells something for $1M-can buy shares in a
|
||
crypto-fund that then ensures he is hired by a succession
|
||
of consulting firms for yearly consulting...or even just
|
||
placed on a "retainer" of, say, $100K a year
|
||
+ IRS may come to have doubts about such services, but
|
||
unless the government steps in and demands detailed
|
||
inspection of actual work done-and even then I think
|
||
this would be impossible and/or illegal-such
|
||
arrangements would seem to be foolproof
|
||
+ why can't government demand proof of work done?
|
||
- who judges the value of an employee?
|
||
- of advice given, of reports generated, or of the
|
||
value of having a consultant "on retainer"?
|
||
- such interference would devastate many vested
|
||
interests
|
||
+ tax and other advantages of these "crypto annuities"
|
||
- tax only paid on the yearly income, not on the lump
|
||
sum
|
||
- authorities are not alerted to the sudden receipt of
|
||
a lump sum (an ex-intelligence official who receives
|
||
a payement of $1 M will come under suspicion, exactly
|
||
as would a politician)
|
||
- and a lump sum payment might well arouse suspicions
|
||
and be considered evidence of some criminal activity
|
||
+ the original lump sum is protected from confiscation
|
||
by governments, by consideration in alimony or
|
||
bankruptcy cases, etc.
|
||
- such "consulting annuities" may be purchased just
|
||
so as to insulate earnings from alimony,
|
||
bankruptcy, etc.
|
||
- as usual, I'm not defending these steps as moral or
|
||
as good for the business climate of the world, just
|
||
as inevitable consequences of many current trends
|
||
and technical developments
|
||
+ the "shell game" is used to protect the funds
|
||
- with periodic withdrawals or transfers
|
||
- note that this whole scheme can pretty much be done by
|
||
attorneys and agents today, though they may be subpoenaed
|
||
or otherwise encouraged to blab
|
||
+ it may not even be illegal for a consultant to take his
|
||
fee over a period of many years
|
||
+ the IRS may claim the "discounted present value" as a
|
||
lump sum, but other folks already do things like this
|
||
- royalty streams (and nobody claims an author must
|
||
agree with the IRS to some estimated value of this
|
||
stream)
|
||
- percentages of the gross (and the like)
|
||
- engineers and other professionals are often kept on
|
||
payrolls not so much for their instantaneous
|
||
achievements as for their past and projected
|
||
achievements-are we to treat future accomplishments
|
||
in a lump sum way?
|
||
+ IRS and others may try to inspect the terms of the
|
||
employment or consulting agreement, but these seems too
|
||
invasive and cumbersome
|
||
+ it makes the government a third party in all
|
||
negotiations, requiring agents to be present in all
|
||
talks or at least to read and understand all
|
||
paperwork
|
||
- and even then, there could be claims that the
|
||
government didn't follow the deals
|
||
- not enough time or manpower to handle all these
|
||
things
|
||
- and the invasion of privacy is extreme!
|
||
+ Scenario: the Fincen-type agencies may deal with the
|
||
growing threat of CA-type systems (and encryption in
|
||
general) by involving the government in ostensibly
|
||
private deals
|
||
- analogous to the sales tax and bookkeeping
|
||
arrangements (where gov't. is a third party to all
|
||
transactions)
|
||
+ or EEOC, race and sex discimination cases
|
||
- will transcripts and recordings of all job
|
||
interviews come to be required?
|
||
- "laying track"
|
||
- OSHA, pollution, etc.
|
||
+ software copying laws (more to the point):
|
||
government seems to have the power to enter a
|
||
business to see if illegal copies are in use; this
|
||
may first require a warrant
|
||
+ how long before various kinds of software are
|
||
banned?
|
||
- with the argument being that some kinds of
|
||
software are analogous to lockpicks and other
|
||
banned burglar tools
|
||
- "used to facillitate the illegal copying of
|
||
protected software"
|
||
+ the threat of encryption for national security as
|
||
well as for the money-laundering and illegal
|
||
payments possibilities may cause the government
|
||
to place restrictions on the use of crypto
|
||
software for anything except approved uses
|
||
(external e-mail, etc.)
|
||
- and even these uses can of course be subverted
|
||
- and crypto techniques are not actually necessary: lawyers
|
||
and other discreet agents will suffice
|
||
+ furthermore, corporations have a fair amount of lattitude
|
||
in setting retirement policies and benefits, and so the
|
||
methods I've described to shelter current income may
|
||
become more widespread
|
||
+ though there may be some proviso that if benefits
|
||
exceeed some percentage of yearly income, factoring in
|
||
years on the job, that these benefits are taxed in some
|
||
punative way
|
||
- e.g.., a corporation that pays $100K a year to a
|
||
critical technical person for a year of work and then
|
||
pays him $60K a year for the next ten years could
|
||
reasonably be believed to have set up a system to
|
||
help him avoid taxes on a large lump sum payment
|
||
+ Asset-hiding, to avoid seizure in bankruptcies, lawsuits
|
||
+ e.g., funds placed in accounts which are secret, or in
|
||
systems/schemes over which the asset-hider has control
|
||
of some kind (voting, consulting, etc.)
|
||
- this is obscure: what I'm thinking of is some kind of
|
||
deal in which Albert is hired by Bob as an "advisor"
|
||
on financial matters: but Bob's money comes from
|
||
Albert and so the quid pro quo is that Bob will take
|
||
Albert's advice....hence the effective laundering and
|
||
protection
|
||
+ May also be used to create "multi-tier" currency systems,
|
||
e.g., where reported transactions are some fraction of
|
||
actuals
|
||
- suppose we agree to deal at some artificially low
|
||
value: electricians and plumbers may barter with each
|
||
other at a reported $5 an hour, while using underground
|
||
accounts to actually trade at more realistic levels
|
||
+ government (IRS) has laws about "fair value"-but how
|
||
could these laws be enforced for such intangibles as
|
||
software?
|
||
- if I sell a software program for $5000, can the
|
||
government declare this to be over or underpriced?
|
||
- likewise, if a plumber charges $5 an hour, can the
|
||
government, suspecting tax evasion, force him to
|
||
charge more?
|
||
- once again, the nature of taxation in our increasingly
|
||
many-dimensioned economy seems to necessitate major
|
||
invasions of privacy
|
||
16.14.7. "Denationalization of Money"
|
||
- as with the old SF standby of "credits"
|
||
+ cf. the books on denationalization of money, and the idea
|
||
of competing currencies
|
||
- digital cash can be denominated in these various
|
||
currencies, so it makes the idea of competing currencies
|
||
more practical
|
||
- to some extent, it already exists
|
||
+ the hard money advocates (gold bugs) are losing their
|
||
faith, as they see money moving around and never really
|
||
landing in any "hard" form
|
||
- of course, it is essential that governments and groups
|
||
not have the ability to print more money
|
||
- international networks will probably denominate
|
||
transactions in whatever currencies are the most stable and
|
||
least inflationary (or least unpredictably inflationary)
|
||
|
||
16.15. Intellectual Property
|
||
16.15.1. Concepts of property will have to change
|
||
- intellectual property; enforcement is becoming problematic
|
||
- when thieves cannot be caught
|
||
16.15.2. Intellectual property debate
|
||
- include my comment about airwaves
|
||
+ work on payment for items...Brad Cox, Peter Sprague, etc.
|
||
- Superdistribution, metered usage
|
||
- propertarian
|
||
- many issues
|
||
|
||
16.16. Markets for Contract Killings, Extortion, etc.
|
||
16.16.1. Note: This is a sufficiently important topic that it deserves
|
||
its own heading. There's material on this scattered around
|
||
this document, material I'll collect together when I get a
|
||
chance.
|
||
16.16.2. This topic came up several times on then Extropians mailing
|
||
list, where David Friedman (author of "The Machinery of
|
||
Freedom" and son of Nobel Prize winner Milton Friedman) and
|
||
Robin Hanson debated this with me.
|
||
16.16.3. Doug Cutrell summarized the concerns of many when he wrote:
|
||
- "...the availability of truly secure anonymity, strong
|
||
encryption, and untraceable digital cash could allow
|
||
contract killing to be an openly conducted business. For
|
||
example, an anonymous news post announces a public key
|
||
which is to be used to encode a contract kill order, along
|
||
with a digital cash payment. The person placing the
|
||
contract need only anonymously place the encrypted message
|
||
in alt.test. Perhaps it is even possible to make it
|
||
impossible to tell that the message was encrypted with the
|
||
contract killer's public key (the killer would have to
|
||
attempt decryption of all similarly encoded messages on
|
||
alt.test, but that might be quite feasible). Thus it could
|
||
be completely risk free for anyone to place a contract on
|
||
anyone else." [Doug Cutrell, 1994-09-09]
|
||
16.16.4. Abhorrent markets
|
||
- contract killings
|
||
- can collect money anonymously to have someone
|
||
whacked...nearly anyone who is controversial can generate
|
||
enough "contributions"
|
||
- kidnapping, extortion
|
||
16.16.5. Dealing with Such Things:
|
||
+ never link physical ID with pseudonyms! (they won't kill
|
||
you if they don't know who you are)
|
||
- and even if one pseudonym is linked, make sure your
|
||
financial records are not linkable
|
||
- trust no one
|
||
- increased physical security...make the effort of killing
|
||
much more potentially dangerous
|
||
- flooding attacks..tell extortionists to "get in line"
|
||
behind all the other extortionists
|
||
+ announce to world that one does not pay extortionists...set
|
||
up protocol to ensure this
|
||
- yes, some will die as a result of this
|
||
- console yourself with the fact that though some may die,
|
||
fewer are dying as a result of state-sponsored wars and
|
||
terrorism (historically a bigger killer than contract
|
||
killings!)
|
||
|
||
16.17. Persistent Institutions
|
||
16.17.1. Strong crypto makes possible the creation of institutions
|
||
which can persist for very long periods of time, perhaps for
|
||
centuries.
|
||
- such institutions already exist: churches (Catholics of
|
||
several orders), universities, etc.
|
||
16.17.2. all of these "persistent" services (digital banks, escrow
|
||
services, reputation servers, etc.) require much better
|
||
protections against service outages, seizures by governments,
|
||
natural disasters, and even financial collapse than do most
|
||
existing computer services-an opportunity for offshore escrow-
|
||
like services
|
||
- to maintain a distributed database, with unconditional
|
||
privacy, etc.
|
||
+ again, it is imperative that escrow companies require all
|
||
material placed in it to be encrypted
|
||
- to protect them against lawsuits and claims by
|
||
authorities (that they stole information, that they
|
||
censored material, that they are an espionage conduit,
|
||
etc.)
|
||
16.17.3. Escrow Services
|
||
+ "Digital Escrow" accounts for mutually suspicious parties,
|
||
especially in illegal transactions
|
||
- drug deals, information brokering, inside information,
|
||
etc.
|
||
+ But why will the escrow entity be trusted?
|
||
+ reputations
|
||
- their business is being a reliable escrow holder, not
|
||
it destroying their reputation for a bribe or a
|
||
threat
|
||
+ anonymity means the escrow company won't know who it's
|
||
"burning," should it try to do so
|
||
- they never know when they themselves are being tested
|
||
by some service
|
||
- and potential bribers will not know who to contact,
|
||
although mail could be addressed to the escrow company
|
||
easily enough
|
||
- like bonding agencies
|
||
- key is that these entities stand to gain very little by
|
||
stealing from their customers, and much to lose (hinges on
|
||
ratio of any single transaction to size of total market)
|
||
- useful for black markets and illegal transactions (a
|
||
reliable third party that both sides can trust, albeit not
|
||
completely)
|
||
16.17.4. Reputation-Based Systems
|
||
+ Credit Rating Services that are Immune from Meddling and
|
||
Lawsuits
|
||
+ with digital pseudonyms, true credit rating data bases
|
||
can be developed
|
||
- with none of the "5 year expirations" (I mean, who are
|
||
you to tell me I must not hold it against a person that
|
||
records show he's declares Chapter 7 every 5 years or
|
||
so?...such information is information, and cannot be
|
||
declared illegal, despite the policy issues that are
|
||
involved)
|
||
+ this could probably be done today, using offshore data
|
||
banks, but then there might develop injunctions against
|
||
use by Stateside companies
|
||
- how could this be enforced? stings? entrapment?
|
||
+ it may be that credit-granting entities will be
|
||
forced to use rigid formulas for their decisions,
|
||
with a complete audit trail available to the
|
||
applicant
|
||
- if any "discretion" or judgment is allowed, then
|
||
these extralegal or offshore inputs can be used
|
||
- related to "redlining" and other informal
|
||
signalling mechanisms
|
||
- remember that Prop. 103 attempted to bypass normal
|
||
laws of economics
|
||
+ AMIX-like services will offer multiple approaches here
|
||
+ ranging from conventional credit data bases, albeit
|
||
with lower costs of entry (e.g., a private citizen
|
||
could launch a "bankruptcy filings" data base, using
|
||
public records, with no expiration-they're just
|
||
reporting the truth, e.g., that Joe Blow filed for
|
||
personal bankruptcy in 1987
|
||
- this gets into some of the strange ideas involving
|
||
mandatory rewriting of the truth, as when "credit
|
||
records are expunged" (expunged from what? from my
|
||
personal data bases? from records that were public
|
||
and that I am now selling access to?)
|
||
+ there may be arguments that the "public records" are
|
||
copyrighted or otherwise owned by someone and hence
|
||
cannot be sold
|
||
- telephone book case (however, the Supremes held
|
||
that the "creative act" was the specific
|
||
arrangement)
|
||
- one ploy may be a Habitat-like system, where some of
|
||
the records are "historical"
|
||
- to offshore data bases
|
||
+ Book Reviews, Music Reviews
|
||
- sometimes with pseudonyms to protect the authors from
|
||
retaliation or even lawsuits
|
||
+ "What should I buy?" services, a la Consumer Reports
|
||
- again, protection from lawsuits
|
||
16.17.5. Crypto Banks and the "Shell Game" as a Central Metaphor
|
||
+ Central metaphor: the Shell Game
|
||
- description of conventional shell game (and some
|
||
allusions to con artists on a street corner-the hand is
|
||
quicker than the eye)
|
||
+ like entering a room filled with safe deposit boxes, with
|
||
no surveillance and no way to monitor activity in the
|
||
boxes....and user can buy new boxes anonymously,
|
||
transferring contents amongst the boxes
|
||
- only shutting down the entire system and forcing all
|
||
the boxes open would do anything-and this would "pool"
|
||
all of the contents (unless a law was passed saying
|
||
people could "declare" the contents before some
|
||
day....)
|
||
+ the shell game system can be "tested"-by testing
|
||
services, by suspicious individuals, whatever-at very low
|
||
cost by dividing some sum amongst many accounts and
|
||
verifying that the money is still there (by retrieving or
|
||
cashing them in)
|
||
- and remember that the accounts are anonymous and are
|
||
indistinguishable, so that the money cannot be seized
|
||
without repercussions
|
||
+ this is of course the way banks and similar reputation-
|
||
based institutions have always (or mostly) worked
|
||
- people trusted the banks not to steal their money by
|
||
verifying over some period of time that their money was
|
||
not vanishing
|
||
- and by relying upon some common sense ideas of what the
|
||
bank's basic business was (the notion that a bank
|
||
exists to continue in business and will make more money
|
||
over some long run period by being trustworthy than it
|
||
would make in a one-shot ripoff)
|
||
+ Numbered accounts
|
||
- recall that Switzerland has bowed to international
|
||
pressure and is now limiting (or eliminating) numbered
|
||
accounts (though other countries are still allowing some
|
||
form of such accounts, especially Lichtenstein and
|
||
Luxembourg)
|
||
+ with crypto numbers, even more security
|
||
- "you lose your number, tough"
|
||
- but the money must exist in some form at some time?
|
||
+ options for the physical form of the money
|
||
+ accounts are shares in a fund that is publicly invested
|
||
- shares act as "votes" for the distribution of
|
||
proceeds
|
||
- dividends are paid to the account (and sent wherever)
|
||
- an abstract, unformed idea: multiple tiers of money,
|
||
like unequal voting rights of stock...
|
||
+ could even be physical deposits
|
||
- perhaps even manipulated by automatic handling
|
||
systems (though this is very insecure)
|
||
- the Bennett-Ross proposal for Global Data Services is
|
||
essentially the early form of this
|
||
16.17.6. cryonicists will seek "crypto-trusts" to protect their assets
|
||
+ again, the "crypto" part is not really necessary, given
|
||
trustworthy lawyers and similar systems
|
||
- but the crypto part-digital money-further automates the
|
||
system, allowing smaller and more secure transactions
|
||
(overhead is lower, allowing more dispersions and
|
||
diffusion)
|
||
- and eliminates the human link
|
||
- thus protecting better against subpoenas, threats, etc.
|
||
+ and to help fund "persistent institutions" that will fund
|
||
research and protect them in suspension
|
||
- they may also place their funds in "politically correct"
|
||
longterm funds-which may or may not exert a postive
|
||
ifluence in the direction they wish, what with the law of
|
||
unintended consequences and all
|
||
opl
|
||
+ many avenues for laundering money for persistent
|
||
institutions
|
||
+ dummy corporations (or even real corporations)
|
||
- with longterm consulting arrangements
|
||
- "shell game" voting
|
||
+ as people begin to believe that they may just possibly be
|
||
revived at some future time, they will begin to worry about
|
||
protecting their current assets
|
||
+ recollections of "Why Call Them Back from Heaven?"
|
||
- worries about financial stability, about confiscation
|
||
of wealth, etc.
|
||
- no longer will ersatz forms of immortality-endowments fo
|
||
museums, universities, etc.-be as acceptable...people
|
||
will want the real thing
|
||
+ Investments that may outlive current institutions
|
||
- purchases of art works (a la Bill Gates, who is in fact a
|
||
possibel model for this kind of behavior)
|
||
- rights to famous works, with provision for the copyright
|
||
expirations, etc. (which is why physical possession is
|
||
preferable)
|
||
- shell games, of course (networks of reputation-based
|
||
accounts)
|
||
- Jim Bennett reports that Saul Kent is setting up such
|
||
things in Lichtenstein for Alcor (which is what I suggested
|
||
to Keith Henson several years ago)
|
||
|
||
16.18. Organized Crime: Triads, Yakuza, Mafia, etc.
|
||
16.18.1. "The New Underworld Order"
|
||
+ Claire Sterling's "Thieve's World"
|
||
- (Sterling is well-known for her conservative views on
|
||
political matters, having written the controversial "The
|
||
Terror Connection," which basically dismissed the role of
|
||
the CIA and other U.S. agencies in promoting terrorism.
|
||
"Thieve's World" continues the alarmist stance, but has
|
||
some juicy details anyway.)
|
||
- she argues for more law enforcement
|
||
+ but it was the corrupt police states of Nazi Germany,
|
||
Sovet Russia, etc., that gave so many opportunities for
|
||
modern corruption
|
||
- and the CIA-etc. drug trade, Cold War excuses, and
|
||
national security state waivers
|
||
+ in the FSU, the Russian Mafia is the chief beneficiary
|
||
of privatization...only they had the cash and the
|
||
connections to make the purchases (by threatening non-
|
||
Mob bidders, by killing them, etc.)
|
||
- as someone put in, the world's first complete
|
||
criminal state
|
||
16.18.2. "Is the criminal world interested in crypto? Could they be
|
||
early adopters of these advanced techniques?"
|
||
- early use: BBS/Compuserve messages, digital flash paper,
|
||
codes
|
||
- money-laundering, anstalts, banks
|
||
- Triads, chop marks
|
||
- Even though this use seem inevitable, we should probably be
|
||
careful here. Both because the clientele for our advice may
|
||
be violent, and ditto for law enforcement. The conspiracy
|
||
and RICO laws may be enough to get anyone who advises such
|
||
folks into major trouble. (Of course, advice and consulting
|
||
may happen throught the very same untraceable technology!)
|
||
16.18.3. crypto provides some schemes for more secure drug
|
||
distribution
|
||
- cells, dead drops, secure transfers to foreign accounts
|
||
- communication via pools, or remailers
|
||
- too much cash is usually the problem...
|
||
- "follow the money" (FinCEN)
|
||
- no moral qualms...nearly all drugs are less dangerous than
|
||
alcohol is...that drug was just too popular to outlaw
|
||
- this drug scenario is consistent with the Triad/Mob
|
||
scenario
|
||
|
||
16.19. Privately Produced Law, Polycentric Law, Anarcho-Capitalism
|
||
16.19.1. "my house, my rules"
|
||
16.19.2. a la David Friedman
|
||
16.19.3. markets for laws, Law Merchant
|
||
- corporations, other organizations have their own local
|
||
legal rules
|
||
- Extropians had much debate on this, and various competing
|
||
legal codes (as an experiment...not very sucessful, for
|
||
various reasons)
|
||
- "Snow Crash"
|
||
16.19.4. the Cypherpunks group is itself a good example:
|
||
- a few local rules (local to the group)
|
||
- a few constraints by the host machine environment (toad,
|
||
soda)
|
||
+ but is the list run on "United States law"?
|
||
- with members in dozens of countries?
|
||
- only when the external laws are involved (if one of us
|
||
threatened another, and even then this is iffy) could the
|
||
external laws....
|
||
- benign neglect, by necessity
|
||
16.19.5. I have absolutely no faith in the law when it comes to
|
||
cyberspatial matters (other matters, too).
|
||
- especially vis-a-vis things like remote access to files, a
|
||
la the AA BBS case
|
||
- "the law is an ass"
|
||
- patch one area, another breaks
|
||
- What then? Technology. Remailers, encryption
|
||
16.19.6. Contracts and Cryptography
|
||
+ "How can contracts be enforced in crypto anarchy
|
||
situations?"
|
||
- A key question, and one which causes many people to
|
||
question whether crypto anarchy can work at all.
|
||
+ First, think of how many situations are _already_
|
||
essentially outside the scope of the law...and yet in
|
||
which something akin to "contracts" are enforceable,
|
||
albeit not via the legal process.
|
||
- friends, relationships
|
||
+ personal preferences in food, books, movies, etc.
|
||
- what "recourse" does one have in cases where a meal
|
||
is unsatisfactory? Not going back to the restaurant
|
||
is usually the best recourse (this is also a hint
|
||
about the importance of "future expectation of
|
||
business" as a means of dealing with such things).
|
||
- In these cases, the law is not directly involved. In
|
||
fact, the law is not involved in _most_ human (and
|
||
nonhuman!) interactions.
|
||
+ The Main Approaches:
|
||
+ Reputations.
|
||
- reputations are important, are not lightly to be
|
||
regarded
|
||
- Repeat Business.
|
||
- Escrow Services.
|
||
+ The "right of contract" (and the duty to adhere to them, to
|
||
not try to change the contract after the facts) is a
|
||
crucial building block.
|
||
- Imagine a society in which contracts are valid. This
|
||
allows those willing to sign contracts setting limits on
|
||
malpractice to get cheaper health care, while those who
|
||
won't sign such contracts are free to sue--but will of
|
||
course have to pay more for health care. Nothing is free,
|
||
and frivolous malpractice lawsuits have increased
|
||
operating costs. (Recall the "psychic" who alleged that
|
||
her psychic powers were lost after a CAT scan. A jury
|
||
awarded her millions of dollars. Cf. Peter Huber's books
|
||
on liability laws.)
|
||
- Now imagine a society in which it is never clear if a
|
||
contract is valid, or whether courts will overturn or
|
||
amend a contract. This distorts the above analysis, and
|
||
so hospitals, for example, have to build in safety
|
||
margins and cushions.
|
||
+ Crypto can help by creating escrow or bonding accounts held
|
||
by third parties--untraceable to the other parties--which
|
||
act as bonding agents for completion of contracts.
|
||
- Such arrangements may not be allowed. For example, a
|
||
hospital which attempted to deal with such a bonding
|
||
agency, and which asked customers to also deal with them,
|
||
could face sanctions.
|
||
- "Secured credit cards" are a current example: a person pays
|
||
a reserve amount greater than the card limits (maybe 110%).
|
||
The reason for doing this is not to obtain "credit,"
|
||
obviously, but to be able to order items over the phone, or
|
||
to avoid carrying cash. (The benefit is thus in the
|
||
_channel_ of commerce).
|
||
16.19.7. Ostracism, Banishment in Privately Produced Law
|
||
+ Voluntary and discretionary electronic communities also
|
||
admit the easy possibility of banishment or ostracism
|
||
(group-selected kill files). Of course, enforcement is
|
||
generally difficult, e.g., there is nothing to stop
|
||
individuals from continuing to communicate with the
|
||
ostracized individual using secure methods.
|
||
- I can imagine schemes in which software key escrow is
|
||
used, but these seem overly complicated and intrusive.
|
||
- The ability of individuals, and even subgroups, to thwart
|
||
the ostracism is not at all a bad thing.
|
||
-
|
||
- "In an on-line world it would be much easier to enforce
|
||
banishment or selective ostracism than in real life.
|
||
Filtering agents could look for certificates from accepted
|
||
enforcement agencies before letting messages through. Each
|
||
user could have a set of agencies which were compatible
|
||
with his principles, and another set of "outlaws". You
|
||
could even end up with the effect of multiple "logical
|
||
subnets" of people who communicate with each other but not
|
||
outside their subnet. Some nets might respect intellectual
|
||
property, others not, and so on." [Hal Finney, 1994-08-21]
|
||
16.19.8. Governments, Cyberspaces, PPLs
|
||
- Debate periodically flares up on the List about this topic.
|
||
- Can't be convered here in sufficient detail.
|
||
- Friedman, Benson, Stephenson's "Snow Crash," etc.
|
||
16.19.9. No recourse in the courts with crypto-mediated systems
|
||
- insulated from the courts
|
||
- PPLs are essential
|
||
- reputations, escrow, mediation (crypto-mediated mediation?)
|
||
16.19.10. Fraud
|
||
- not exactly rare in the non-crypto world!
|
||
- new flavors of cons will likely arise
|
||
- anonymous escrow accounts, debate with Hal Finney on this
|
||
issue, etc.
|
||
16.19.11. PPLs, polycentric law
|
||
|
||
16.20. Libertaria in Cyberspace
|
||
16.20.1. what it is
|
||
16.20.2. parallels to Oceania, Galt's Gulch
|
||
16.20.3. Privacy in communications alters the nature of connectivity
|
||
- virtual communities, invisible to outsiders
|
||
- truly a crypto cabal
|
||
- this is what frightens the lawmakers the most...people can
|
||
opt out of the mainstream governmental system, at least
|
||
partly (and probably increasingly)
|
||
|
||
16.21. Cyberspace, private spaces, enforcement of rules, and technology
|
||
16.21.1. Consider the "law" based approach
|
||
- a discussion group that wants no men involved ("a protected
|
||
space for womyn")
|
||
- so they demand the civil law system enforce their rules
|
||
- practical example: sysadmins yank accounts when
|
||
"inappropriate posts" are made
|
||
- the C&S case of spamming is an example
|
||
- Note: The Net as currently constituted is fraught with
|
||
confusion about who owns what, about what are public and
|
||
what are private resources, and about what things are
|
||
allowed. If Joe Blow sends Suzy Creamcheese an "unwanted"
|
||
letter, is this "abuse" or "harassement"? Is it stealing
|
||
Suzy's resources? (In my opinion, of course not, but I
|
||
agree that things are confusing.)
|
||
16.21.2. The technological approach:
|
||
- spaces created by crypto...unbreachable walls
|
||
+ example: a mailing list with controls on membership
|
||
- could require nomination and vouching for by others
|
||
- presentation of some credential (signed by someone), e.g.
|
||
of femaleness
|
||
- pay as you go stops spamming
|
||
16.21.3. This is a concrete example of how crypto acts as a kind of
|
||
building material
|
||
- and why government limitations on crypto hurt those who
|
||
wish to protect their own spaces
|
||
- a private mailing list is a private space, inaccessible to
|
||
those outside
|
||
- "There are good engineering approaches which can force data
|
||
to behave itself. Many of them involve cryptography. Our
|
||
government's restrictions on crypto limit our ability to
|
||
build reliable computer systems. We need strong crypto for
|
||
basic engineering reasons." [Kent Borg, "Arguing Crypto:
|
||
The Engineering Approach," 1994-06-29]
|
||
16.21.4. Virtual Communities-the Use of Virtual Networks to Avoid
|
||
Government
|
||
- that is, alternatives to creating new countries (like the
|
||
Minerva project)
|
||
- the Assassin cult/sect in the mountains of Syria, Iraq,
|
||
Afghanistan, etc. had a network of couriers in the mountain
|
||
fastnessess
|
||
- pirate communities, networks of trading posts and watering
|
||
holes, exempt-if only for a few years-from the laws of the
|
||
imperial powers
|
||
16.21.5. These private spaces will, as technology makes them more
|
||
"livable" (I don't mean in a full sense, so don't send me
|
||
notes about how "you can't eat cyberspace"), become full-
|
||
functioned "spaces" that are outside the reach of
|
||
governments. A new frontier, untouchable by outside, coercive
|
||
governments.
|
||
- Vinge's "True Names" made real
|
||
16.21.6. "Can things really develop in this "cyberspace" that so many
|
||
of us talk about?"
|
||
- "You can't eat cyberspace!' is the usual point made. I
|
||
argue, however, that abstract worlds have always been with
|
||
us, in the forms of commerce, reputations, friends, etc.
|
||
And this will continue.
|
||
- Some people have objected to the sometimes over-
|
||
enthusiastic claims that economies and socities will
|
||
flourish in computer-mediated cyberspaces. The short form
|
||
of the objection is: "You can't eat cyberspace." Meaning,
|
||
that profits and gains made in cyberspace must be converted
|
||
to real world profits and gains.
|
||
- In "Snow Crash," this was made out to be difficult...Hiro
|
||
Protagonist was vastly wealthy in the Multiverse, but lived
|
||
in a cargo container at LAX in the "real world." A fine
|
||
novel, but this idea is screwy.
|
||
+ There are many ways to transfer wealth into the "real"
|
||
world:
|
||
+ all the various money-laundering schemes
|
||
- money in offshore accounts, accessible for vacations,
|
||
visits, etc.
|
||
- phony purchase orders
|
||
- my favorite: Cyberspace, Inc. hires one as a
|
||
"consultant" (IRS cannot and does not demand proof of
|
||
work being done, the nature of the work, one's
|
||
qualifications to perform the work, etc....In fact,
|
||
many consultants are hired "on retainer," merely to be
|
||
available should a need arise.)
|
||
- information-selling
|
||
- investments
|
||
-
|
||
16.21.7. Protocols for this are far from complete
|
||
- money, identity, walls, structures
|
||
- a lot of basic work is needed (though people will pursue it
|
||
locally, not after the work is done...so solutions will
|
||
likely be emergent)
|
||
|
||
16.22. Data Havens
|
||
16.22.1. "What are data havens?"
|
||
+ Places where data can be hidden or protected against legal
|
||
action.
|
||
- Sterling, "Islands in the Net," 1988
|
||
+ Medical experiments, legal advice, pornography, weapons
|
||
- reputations, lists of doctors, lawyers, rent deadbeats,
|
||
credit records, private eyes
|
||
- What to do about the mounting pressure to ban certain kinds
|
||
of research?
|
||
- One of the powerful uses of strong crypto is the creation
|
||
of journals, web sites, mailing lists, etc., that are
|
||
"untraceable." These are sometimes called "data havens,"
|
||
though that term, as used by Bruce Sterling in "Islands in
|
||
the Net" (1988), tends to suggest specific places like the
|
||
Cayman Islands that corporations might use to store data. I
|
||
prefer the emphasis on "cypherspace."
|
||
- "It is worth noting that private "data havens" of all sorts
|
||
abound, especially for financial matters, and most are not
|
||
subject to governmental regulation....Some banks have
|
||
research departments that are older and morecomprehensive
|
||
than credit reporting agencies. Favored customers can use
|
||
them for evaluation of private deals....Large law firms
|
||
maintain data banks that approach those of banks, and they
|
||
grow with each case, through additions of private
|
||
investigators paid for by successive clients....Security
|
||
professionals, like Wackenhut and Kroll, also market the
|
||
fruits of substantial data collections....To these add
|
||
those of insurance, bonding, investment, financial firms
|
||
and the like which help make or break business deals."
|
||
[John Young, 1994-09-07]
|
||
16.22.2. "Can there be laws about what can be done with data?"
|
||
- Normative laws ("they shouldn't keep such records and hence
|
||
we'll outlaw them") won't work in an era of strong crypto
|
||
and privacy. In fact, some of us support data havens
|
||
precisely to have records of, say, terminal diseases so
|
||
we'll not lend money to Joe-who-has-AIDS. It may not be
|
||
"fair" to Joe, but it's my money. (Same idea as in using
|
||
offshore or cryptospatial data havens to bypass the
|
||
nonsense in the "Fair Credit Reporting Act" that outlaws
|
||
the keeping of certain kinds of facts about credit
|
||
applicants, such as that they declared bankruptcy 10 years
|
||
ago or that they left a string of bad debts in Germany in
|
||
the 1970s, etc.)
|
||
16.22.3. Underground Networks, Bootleg Research, and Information
|
||
Smuggling
|
||
+ The Sharing of Forbidden Knowledge
|
||
- even if the knowledge is not actually forbidden, many
|
||
people relish the idea of trafficking in the forbidden
|
||
+ Some modern examples
|
||
+ drugs and marijuana cultivation
|
||
- drugs for life extension, AIDS treatments
|
||
- illegal drugs for recreational use
|
||
+ bootleg medical research, AIDS and cancer treatments,
|
||
etc.
|
||
- for example, self-help user groups that advise on
|
||
treatments, alternatives, etc.
|
||
+ lockpicking and similar security circumvention
|
||
techniques
|
||
- recall that possession of lockpicks may be illegal
|
||
- what about manuals? (note that most catalogs have a
|
||
disclaimer: "These materials are for educational
|
||
purposes only, ...")
|
||
- defense-related issues: limitations on debate on
|
||
national security matters may result in "anonymous
|
||
forums"
|
||
+ BTW, recent work on crab shells and other hard shells
|
||
has produced even stronger armor!
|
||
- this might be some of the genetic research that is
|
||
highly classified and is sold on the anonymous nets
|
||
+ Alchemists and the search for immortality
|
||
+ theory that the "Grandfather of all cults" (my term)
|
||
started around 4500 B.C.
|
||
- in both Egypt and Babylonia/Sumeria
|
||
+ ancestor of Gnostics, Sufis, Illuminati, etc.
|
||
- The Sufi mystic Gurdjieff claimed he was a member
|
||
of a mystical cult formed in Babylon about 4500
|
||
B.C.
|
||
- spider venom?
|
||
+ Speculation: a group or cult oriented toward life
|
||
extension, toward the search for immortality-perhaps
|
||
a link to The Epic of Gilgamesh.
|
||
+ The Gilgamesh legend
|
||
- Gilgamesh, Akkadian language stone tablets in
|
||
Nineveh
|
||
- made a journey to find Utnapishtim, survivor of
|
||
Babylonian flood and possessor of secret of
|
||
immortality (a plant that would renew youth)
|
||
- but Gilgamesh lost the plant to a serpent
|
||
+ Egyptians
|
||
- obviously the Egyptians had a major interest in
|
||
life extension and/or immortality
|
||
+ Osiris, God of Resurrection and Eternal Life
|
||
- also the Dark Companion of Serius (believed to
|
||
be a neutron star?)
|
||
- they devoted huge fraction of wealth to pyramids,
|
||
embalming, etc. (myrhh or frankincense from
|
||
desert city in modern Oman, discovered with
|
||
shuttle imaging radar)
|
||
+ "pyramid power": role on Great Seal, as sign of
|
||
Illuminati, and of theories about cosmic energy,
|
||
geometrical shapes, etc.
|
||
- and recall work on numerological significance
|
||
of Great Pyramid dimensions
|
||
-
|
||
+ Early Christianity
|
||
- focus on resurrection of Jesus Christ
|
||
+ Quest for immortality is a major character
|
||
motivation or theme
|
||
+ arguably for all people: via children,
|
||
achievements, lasting actions, or even "a good
|
||
life"
|
||
- "Living a good life is no substitute for living
|
||
forever"
|
||
- but some seek it explicitly
|
||
- "Million alive today will never die." (echoes of
|
||
past religious cults....Jehovah's Witnesses?)
|
||
- banned by the Church (the Inquisition)
|
||
+ research, such as it was, was kept alive by secret
|
||
orders that communicated secretly and in code and that
|
||
were very selective about membership
|
||
- classes of membership to protect against discovery
|
||
(the modern spy cell system)
|
||
- red herrings designed to divert attention away
|
||
+ all of this fits the structure of such groups as the
|
||
Masons, Freemason, Illuminati, Rosicrucians, and other
|
||
mystical groups
|
||
- with members like John Dee, court astrologer to Queen
|
||
Elizabeth
|
||
+ a genius writer-scientist like Goethe was probably a
|
||
member of this group
|
||
- Faust was his message of the struggle
|
||
- with the Age of Rationalism, the mystical, mumbo-jumbo
|
||
aspects of alchemical research were seen to be passŽ,
|
||
and groups like Crowleys O.T.O. became purely mystical
|
||
showmanship
|
||
+ but the need for secrecy was now in the financial
|
||
arena, with vast resources, corporate R & D labs, and
|
||
banks needed
|
||
- hence the role of the Morgans, Rothschilds, etc. in
|
||
these conspiracies
|
||
+ and modern computer networks will provide the next
|
||
step, the next system of research
|
||
- funded anonymously
|
||
- anonymous systems mean that researchers can publish
|
||
results in controversial areas (recall that
|
||
cryobiologists dare not mention cryonics, lest they
|
||
be expelled from American Cryobiology xxx)
|
||
+ Bootleg Medical Research (and Cryonics)
|
||
+ Cryonics Research and Anti-aging Treatments
|
||
+ Use of Nazi Data
|
||
- hypothermia experiments at Dachau
|
||
+ Anti-aging drugs and treatments
|
||
- fountain of youth, etc.
|
||
- many FDA restrictions, of course
|
||
- Mexico
|
||
+ Switzerland
|
||
- foetal calf cells?
|
||
- blood changing or recycling?
|
||
+ Illegal Experiments
|
||
- reports that hyperbaric oxygen may help revival of
|
||
patients from neat-death in freezing accidents
|
||
+ Black Markets in Drugs, Medical Treatments
|
||
+ RU-486, bans on it
|
||
- anti-abortion foes
|
||
- easy to synthesize
|
||
- NOW has indicated plans to distribute this drug
|
||
themselves, to create networks (thus creating de
|
||
facto allies of the libertarian-oriented users)
|
||
+ Organ Banks
|
||
+ establishing a profit motive for organ donors
|
||
- may be the only way to generate enough donations,
|
||
even from the dead
|
||
- some plans are being made for such motives,
|
||
especially to motivate the families of dying
|
||
patients
|
||
- ethical issues
|
||
+ what about harvesting from the still-living?
|
||
- libertarians would say: OK, if informed consent was
|
||
given
|
||
- the rich can go to overseas clinics
|
||
+ AIDS patients uniting via bulletin boards to share
|
||
treatment ideas, self-help, etc.
|
||
- with buying trips to Mexico and elsewhere
|
||
- authorities will try to halt such BBSs (on what
|
||
grounds, if no money is changing hands?)
|
||
+ Doctors may participate in underground research networks
|
||
to protect their own reputations and professional status
|
||
- to evade AMA or other professional organizations and
|
||
their restrictive codes of ethics
|
||
+ or lawsuits and bad publicity
|
||
- some groups, the "Guardian Angels" of the future,
|
||
seek to expose those who they think are committing
|
||
crimes: abortionists (even though legal), etc.
|
||
- "politically incorrect" research, such as vitamin
|
||
therapy, longevity research, cryonics
|
||
- breast implant surgery may be forced into black markets
|
||
(and perhaps doctors who later discover evidence of such
|
||
operations may be forced to report such operations)
|
||
+ Back Issues of Tests and Libraries of Term Papers
|
||
- already extant, but imagine with an AMIX-like frontend?
|
||
+ Different kinds of networks will emerge, not all of them
|
||
equally accessible
|
||
+ the equivalent of the arms and drug networks-one does not
|
||
gain entree merely by asking around a bit
|
||
- credibility, reputation, "making your bones"
|
||
- these networks are not open to the casual person
|
||
+ Some Networks May Be For the Support of Overseas
|
||
Researchers
|
||
+ who face restrictions on their research
|
||
- e.g., countries that ban birth control may forbid
|
||
researchers from communication with other researchers
|
||
+ suppose U.S. researchers are threatened with
|
||
sanctions-loss of their licenses, censure, even
|
||
prosecution-if they participate in RU-486 experiments?
|
||
- recall the AIDS drug bootleg trials in SF, c. 1990
|
||
- or to bypass export restrictions
|
||
- scenario: several anonymous bulletin boards are set
|
||
up-and then closed down by the authorities-to facillitate
|
||
anonymous hookups (much like "anonymous FTP")
|
||
+ Groups faced with debilitating lawsuits will "go
|
||
underground"
|
||
- Act Up! and Earth First! have no identifiable central
|
||
office that can be sued, shut down, etc.
|
||
- and Operation Rescue has done the same thing
|
||
16.22.4. Illegal Data
|
||
- credit histories that violate some current law about
|
||
records
|
||
- bootleg medical research
|
||
- stolen data (e.g., from competitors....a GDS system could
|
||
allow remote queries of a database, almost "oracular,"
|
||
without the stolen data being in a U.S. jurisdiction)
|
||
- customers in the U.K or Sweden that are forbidden to
|
||
compile data bases on individuals may choose to store the
|
||
data offshore and then access it discreetly (another reason
|
||
encryption and ZKIPS must be offered)
|
||
16.22.5. "the Switzerland of data"
|
||
- Brussells supposedly raises fewer eyebrows than
|
||
Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, Switzerland, etc.
|
||
- Cayman Islands, other small nations see possibilities
|
||
16.22.6. Information markets may have to move offshore, due to
|
||
licensing and other restrictions
|
||
- just as stock brokers and insurance brokers are licensed,
|
||
the government may insist that information resellers be
|
||
licensed (pass exams, be subject to audits and regulations)
|
||
|
||
16.23. Undermining Governments--Collapse of the State
|
||
16.23.1. "Is it legal to advocate the overthrow of governments or the
|
||
breaking of laws?"
|
||
- Although many Cypherpunks are not radicals, many others of
|
||
us are, and we often advocate "collapse of governments" and
|
||
other such things as money laundering schemes, tax evasion,
|
||
new methods for espionage, information markets, data
|
||
havens, etc. This rasises obvious concerns about legality.
|
||
- First off, I have to speak mainly of U.S. issues...the laws
|
||
of Russia or Japan or whatever may be completely different.
|
||
Sorry for the U.S.-centric focus of this FAQ, but that's
|
||
the way it is. The Net started here, and still is
|
||
dominantly here, and the laws of the U.S. are being
|
||
propagated around the world as part of the New World Order
|
||
and the collapse of the other superpower.
|
||
- Is it legal to advocate the replacement of a government? In
|
||
the U.S., it's the basic political process (though cynics
|
||
might argue that both parties represent the same governing
|
||
philosophy). Advocating the *violent overthrow* of the U.S.
|
||
government is apparently illegal, though I lack a cite on
|
||
this.
|
||
+ Is it legal to advocate illegal acts in general? Certainly
|
||
much of free speech is precisely this: arguing for drug
|
||
use, for boycotts, etc.
|
||
+ The EFF gopher site has this on "Advocating Lawbreaking,
|
||
Brandenburg v. Ohio. ":
|
||
- "In the 1969 case of Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Supreme
|
||
Court struck down the conviction of a Ku Klux Klan
|
||
member under a criminal syndicalism law and established
|
||
a new standard: Speech may not be suppressed or
|
||
punished unless it is intended to produce 'imminent
|
||
lawless action' and it is 'likely to produce such
|
||
action.' Otherwise, the First Amendment protects even
|
||
speech that advocates violence. The Brandenburg test is
|
||
the law today. "
|
||
16.23.2. Espionage and Subversion of Governments Will be
|
||
Revolutionized by Strong Crypto
|
||
- (I think they see what we see, too, and this is a
|
||
motivation for the attempts to limit the use of strong
|
||
crypto. Besides some of the more conventional reasons.)
|
||
+ Digital dead drops will revolutionize espionage
|
||
+ spies and their controllers can communicate securely,
|
||
relatively quickly, without fear of being watched, their
|
||
drops compromised, etc.
|
||
- no more nooks of trees, no more chalk marks on
|
||
mailboxes to signal a drop to be made
|
||
+ this must be freaking out the intelligence community!
|
||
- more insights into why the opposition to crypto is so
|
||
strong
|
||
+ Cell-Based Systems and Conventional Protection Systems
|
||
+ Cells are a standard way to limit the damage of exposure
|
||
- the standard is the 3-person cell so common in the
|
||
early days of Soviet espionage in the U.S.
|
||
- but computer systems may allow new kinds of cells, with
|
||
more complicated protocols and more security
|
||
+ Keeping files for protection is another standard
|
||
protection method
|
||
+ and with strong crypto, these files can be kept
|
||
encrypted and in locations not apparent (e.g., posted
|
||
on bulletin boards or other such places, with only the
|
||
key needed at a later time to open them)
|
||
- a la the "binary files" idea, wherein encrypted files
|
||
are widely available for some time before the key is
|
||
distributed (thus making it very hard for governments
|
||
to halt the distribution of the raw files)
|
||
16.23.3. "Xth Column" (X = encrypted)
|
||
- The possible need to use strong cryptography as a tool to
|
||
fight the state.
|
||
+ helping to undermine the state by using whistleblowers and
|
||
anonymous information markets to leak information
|
||
- the 63,451 people given false identities in the WitSec
|
||
program...leak their names, watch them be zapped by
|
||
vengeful enemies, and watch the government squirm
|
||
- auction off the details of the 1967 Inspector General's
|
||
report on CIA assassinations
|
||
16.23.4. use of clandestine, cell-based systems may allow a small
|
||
group to use "termite" methods to undermine a society, to
|
||
destroy a state that has become too repressive (sounds like
|
||
the U.S. to me)
|
||
- encrypted systems, anonymous pools, etc., allow truly
|
||
secure cell-based systems (this is, by the way, one of the
|
||
concerns many countries have about "allowing" cryptography
|
||
to be used...and they're right abou the danger!)
|
||
- subversion of fascist or socialist governments, undermining
|
||
the so-called democratic governments
|
||
16.23.5. "Why won't government simply ban such encryption methods?"
|
||
+ This has always been the Number One Issue!
|
||
- raised by Stiegler, Drexler, Salin, and several others
|
||
(and in fact raised by some as an objection to my even
|
||
discussing these issues, namely, that action may then be
|
||
taken to head off the world I describe)
|
||
+ Types of Bans on Encryption and Secrecy
|
||
- Ban on Private Use of Encryption
|
||
- Ban on Store-and-Forward Nodes
|
||
- Ban on Tokens and ZKIPS Authentication
|
||
- Requirement for public disclosure of all transactions
|
||
+ Recent news (3-6-92, same day as Michaelangelo and
|
||
Lawnmower Man) that government is proposing a surcharge
|
||
on telcos and long distance services to pay for new
|
||
equipment needed to tap phones!
|
||
- S.266 and related bills
|
||
- this was argued in terms of stopping drug dealers and
|
||
other criminals
|
||
- but how does the government intend to deal with the
|
||
various forms fo end-user encryption or "confusion"
|
||
(the confusion that will come from compression,
|
||
packetizing, simple file encryption, etc.)
|
||
+ Types of Arguments Against Such Bans
|
||
- The "Constitutional Rights" Arguments
|
||
+ The "It's Too Late" Arguments
|
||
- PCs are already widely scattered, running dozens of
|
||
compression and encryption programs...it is far too
|
||
late to insist on "in the clear" broadcasts, whatever
|
||
those may be (is program code distinguishable from
|
||
encrypted messages? No.)
|
||
- encrypted faxes, modem scramblers (albeit with some
|
||
restrictions)
|
||
- wireless LANs, packets, radio, IR, compressed text and
|
||
images, etc....all will defeat any efforts short of
|
||
police state intervention (which may still happen)
|
||
+ The "Feud Within the NSA" Arguments
|
||
- COMSEC vs. PROD
|
||
+ Will affect the privacy rights of corporations
|
||
- and there is much evidence that corporations are in
|
||
fact being spied upon, by foreign governments, by the
|
||
NSA, etc.
|
||
+ They Will Try to Ban Such Encryption Techniques
|
||
+ Stings (perhaps using viruses and logic bombs)
|
||
- or "barium," to trace the code
|
||
+ Legal liability for companies that allow employees to use
|
||
such methods
|
||
- perhaps even in their own time, via the assumption that
|
||
employees who use illegal software methods in their own
|
||
time are perhaps couriers or agents for their
|
||
corporations (a tenuous point)
|
||
16.23.6. "How will the masses be converted?"
|
||
- Probably they won't. Things will just happen, just as the
|
||
masses were not converted on issues of world financial
|
||
markets, derivative instruments, and a lot of similar
|
||
things.
|
||
- Crypto anarchy is largely a personal approach of
|
||
withdrawal, of avoidance. Mass consensus is not needed
|
||
(unless the police state option is tried).
|
||
- Don't think in terms of selling crypto anarchy to Joe
|
||
Average. Just use it.
|
||
16.23.7. As things seem to be getting worse, vis-a-vis the creation of
|
||
a police state in the U.S.--it may be a good thing that
|
||
anonymous assassination markets will be possible. It may
|
||
help to level the playing field, as the Feds have had their
|
||
hit teams for many years (along with their safe houses,
|
||
forged credentials, accommodation addresses, cut-outs, and
|
||
other accouterments of the intelligence state).
|
||
- (I won't get into conspiracies here, but the following
|
||
terms may trigger some memories: Gehlen Org, Wackenhut,
|
||
McKee Team, Danny Casolaro, Cabazon Indians, Gander crash,
|
||
Iraq arms deals, Pan Am 103, Bridegrooms of Death, French
|
||
Connection, Fascist Third Position, Phoenix Program, Bebe
|
||
Rebozo, Marex, Otto Skorzeny, Nixon, P-2, Klaus Barbie,
|
||
etc.)
|
||
- Plenty of evidence of misbehavior on a massive scales by
|
||
the intelligence agencies, the police forces, and states in
|
||
general. Absolute power has corrupted absolutely.
|
||
- I'm certainly not advocating the killing of Congressrodents
|
||
and other bureaucrats, just noting that this cloud may have
|
||
a silver lining.
|
||
|
||
16.24. Escrow Agents and Reputations
|
||
16.24.1. Escrow Agents as a way to deal with contract renegging
|
||
- On-line clearing has the possible danger implicit in all
|
||
trades that Alice will hand over the money, Bob will verify
|
||
that it has cleared into hisaccount (in older terms, Bob
|
||
would await word that his Swiss bank account has just been
|
||
credited), and then Bob will fail to complete his end of
|
||
the bargain. If the transaction is truly anonymous, over
|
||
computer lines, then of course Bob just hangs up his modem
|
||
and the connection is broken. This situation is as old as
|
||
time, and has always involved protcols in which trust,
|
||
repeat business, etc., are factors. Or escrow agents.
|
||
- Long before the "key escrow" of Clipper, true escrow was
|
||
planned. Escrow as in escrow agents. Or bonding agents.
|
||
- Alice and Bob want to conduct a transaction. Neither trusts
|
||
the other;
|
||
indeed, they are unknown to each other. In steps "Esther's
|
||
Escrow Service." She is _also utraceable_, but has
|
||
established a digitally-signed presence and a good
|
||
reputation for fairness. Her business is in being an escrow
|
||
agent, like a bonding agency, not in "burning" either
|
||
party. (The math of this is interesting: as long as the
|
||
profits to be gained from any small set of transactions is
|
||
less than her "reputation capital," it is in her interest
|
||
to forego the profits from burning and be honest. It is
|
||
also possible to arrange that Esther cannot profit from
|
||
burning either Alice or Bob or both of them, e.g., by
|
||
suitably encrypting the escrowed stuff.)
|
||
- Alice can put her part of the transaction into escrow with
|
||
Esther, Bob can do the same, and then Esther can release
|
||
the items to the parties when conditions are met, when both
|
||
parties agree, when adjudication of some sort occurs, etc.
|
||
(There a dozen issues here, of course, about how disputes
|
||
are settled, about how parties satisfy themselves that
|
||
Esther has the items she says she has, etc.)
|
||
16.24.2. Use of escrow services as a substute for government
|
||
+ as in underworld deals, international deals, etc.
|
||
- "Machinery of Freedom" (Friedman), "The Enterprise of
|
||
Law" (Benson)
|
||
- "It is important to note in any case that the use of third-
|
||
party escrow as a substitute for Government regulation was
|
||
a feature of the Northern European semi-anarchies of
|
||
Iceland and Ireland that have informed modern libertarian
|
||
thought." [Duncan Frissell, 1994-08-30]
|
||
16.24.3. Several people have raised the issue of someone in an
|
||
anonymous transaction simply taking the money and not
|
||
performing the service (or the flip side). This is where
|
||
_intermediaries_ come into the picture, just as in the real
|
||
worl (bonds, escrow agents, etc.).
|
||
16.24.4. Alice and Bob wish to conduct an anonymous transaction; each
|
||
is unknown to the other (no physical knowledge, no pseudonym
|
||
reputation knowledge). These "mutually suspicious agents," in
|
||
1960s- and 70s-era computer science lingo, must arrange
|
||
methods to conduct business while not trusting the other.
|
||
16.24.5. Various cryptographic protocols have been developed for such
|
||
things as "bit commitment" (useful in playing poker over the
|
||
phone, for example). I don't know of progress made at the
|
||
granularity of anonymous transactions, though. (Though the
|
||
cryptographic protocol building blocks at lower levels--such
|
||
as bit commitment and blobs--will presumably be used
|
||
eventually at higher levels, in markets.)
|
||
16.24.6. I believe there is evidence we can shorten the cycle by
|
||
borrowing noncryptographic protocols (heresy to purists!) and
|
||
adapting them. Reputations, for example. And escrow agents (a
|
||
form of reputation, in that the "value" of a bonding entity
|
||
or escrow agent lies in reputation capital).
|
||
16.24.7. if a single escrow agent is suspected of being untrustworthy
|
||
(in a reputation capital sense), then can use _multiple_
|
||
escrows
|
||
- with various protocols, caveat emptor
|
||
- n-out-of-m voting schemes, where n escrow agents out of m
|
||
are required to complete a transaction
|
||
- hard to compromise them all, especially if they have no
|
||
idea whether they are being "legitimately bribed" or merely
|
||
pinged by a reputation-rating service
|
||
- Hunch: the work of Chaum, Bos, and the Pfaltzmanns on DC-
|
||
nets may be direcly applicable here...issues of collusion,
|
||
sets of colluders, detection of collusion, etc.
|
||
|
||
16.25. Predictions vs. Implications
|
||
16.25.1. "How do we know that crypto anarchy will 'work,' that the
|
||
right institutions will emerge, that wrongs will be righted,
|
||
etc.?"
|
||
- We don't know. Few things are certain. Only time will tell.
|
||
These are emergent situations, where evolution will
|
||
determine the outcome. As in other areas, the forms of
|
||
solutions will take time to evolve.
|
||
- (The Founders could not have predicted the form corporate
|
||
law would take, as but one example.)
|
||
16.25.2. My thinking on crypto anarchy is not so much _prediction_ as
|
||
examination of trends and the implications of certain things.
|
||
Just as steel girders mean certain things for the design of
|
||
buildings, so too does unbreakable crypto mean certain things
|
||
for the design of social and economic systems.
|
||
16.25.3. Several technologies are involved:
|
||
- Unbreakable crypto
|
||
- Untraceable communication
|
||
- Unforgeable signatures
|
||
16.25.4. (Note: Yes, it's sometimes dangerous to say "unbreakable,"
|
||
"untraceable," and "unforgeable." Purists eschew such terms.
|
||
All crypto is economics, even information-theoretically
|
||
secure crypto (e.g., bribe someone to give you the key, break
|
||
in and steal it, etc.). And computationally-secure crypto--
|
||
such as RSA, IDEA, etc.--can in *principle* be brute-forced.
|
||
In reality, the costs may well be exhorbitantly
|
||
high...perhaps more energy than is available in the entire
|
||
universe would be needed. Essentially, these things are about
|
||
as unbreakable, untraceable, and unforgeable as one can
|
||
imagine.)
|
||
16.25.5. "Strong building materials" implies certain things. Highways,
|
||
bridges, jet engines, etc. Likewise for strong crypto, though
|
||
the exact form of the things that get built is still unknown.
|
||
But pretty clearly some amazing new structures will be built
|
||
this way.
|
||
16.25.6. Cyberspace, walls, bricks and mortar...
|
||
16.25.7. "Will strong crypto have the main effect of securing current
|
||
freedoms, or will it create new freedoms and new situations?"
|
||
- There's a camp that believe mainly that strong crypto will
|
||
ensure that current freedoms are preserved, but that this
|
||
will not change things materially, Communications can be
|
||
private, diaries can be secured, computer security will be
|
||
enhanced, etc.
|
||
- Another camp--of which I am a vocal spokesman--believes
|
||
that qualitatively different types of transactions will be
|
||
made possible. In addition, of course, to the securing of
|
||
liberties that the first camp things is the main effect.
|
||
+ These effects are specultative, but probably include:
|
||
- increased hiding of assets through untraceable banking
|
||
systems
|
||
- markets in illegal services
|
||
- increased espionage
|
||
- data havens
|
||
16.25.8. "Will all crypto-anarchic transactions be anonymous?"
|
||
- No, various parties will negotiate different arrangements.
|
||
All a matter of economics, of enforcement of terms, etc.
|
||
Some will, some won't. The key thing is that the decision
|
||
to reveal identity will be just another mutually negotiated
|
||
matter. (Think of spending cash in a store. The store owner
|
||
may _want_ to know who his customers are, but he'll still
|
||
take cash and remain ignorant in most cases. Unless a
|
||
government steps in and distorts the market by requiring
|
||
approvals for purchases and records of identities--think of
|
||
guns here.)
|
||
- For example, the local Mob may not lend me money if I am
|
||
anonymous to them, but they have a "hook" in me if they
|
||
know who I am. (Aspects of anonymity may still be used,
|
||
such as systems that leave no paper or computer trail
|
||
pointing to them or to me, to avoid stings.)
|
||
- "Enforcement" in underground markets, for which the
|
||
conventional legal remedies are impossible, is often by
|
||
means of physical force: breaking legs and even killing
|
||
welshers.
|
||
- (Personally, I have no problems with this. The Mob cannot
|
||
turn to the local police, so it has to enforce deals its
|
||
own way. If you can't pay, don't play.)
|
||
|
||
16.26. How Crypto Anarchy Will Be Fought
|
||
16.26.1. The Direct Attack: Restrictions on Encryption
|
||
+ "Why won't government simply ban such encryption methods?"
|
||
+ This has always been the Number One Issue!
|
||
- raised by Stiegler, Drexler, Salin, and several others
|
||
(and in fact raised by some as an objection to my even
|
||
discussing these issues, namely, that action may then
|
||
be taken to head off the world I describe)
|
||
+ Types of Bans on Encryption and Secrecy
|
||
- Ban on Private Use of Encryption
|
||
- Ban on Store-and-Forward Nodes
|
||
- Ban on Tokens and ZKIPS Authentication
|
||
- Requirement for public disclosure of all transactions
|
||
+ Recent news (3-6-92, same day as Michaelangelo and
|
||
Lawnmower Man) that government is proposing a surcharge
|
||
on telcos and long distance services to pay for new
|
||
equipment needed to tap phones!
|
||
- S.266 and related bills
|
||
- this was argued in terms of stopping drug dealers and
|
||
other criminals
|
||
- but how does the government intend to deal with the
|
||
various forms fo end-user encryption or "confusion"
|
||
(the confusion that will come from compression,
|
||
packetizing, simple file encryption, etc.)
|
||
+ Types of Arguments Against Such Bans
|
||
- The "Constitutional Rights" Arguments
|
||
+ The "It's Too Late" Arguments
|
||
- PCs are already widely scattered, running dozens of
|
||
compression and encryption programs...it is far too
|
||
late to insist on "in the clear" broadcasts, whatever
|
||
those may be (is program code distinguishable from
|
||
encrypted messages? No.)
|
||
- encrypted faxes, modem scramblers (albeit with some
|
||
restrictions)
|
||
- wireless LANs, packets, radio, IR, compressed text
|
||
and images, etc....all will defeat any efforts short
|
||
of police state intervention (which may still happen)
|
||
+ The "Feud Within the NSA" Arguments
|
||
- COMSEC vs. PROD
|
||
+ Will affect the privacy rights of corporations
|
||
- and there is much evidence that corporations are in
|
||
fact being spied upon, by foreign governments, by the
|
||
NSA, etc.
|
||
+ They Will Try to Ban Such Encryption Techniques
|
||
+ Stings (perhaps using viruses and logic bombs)
|
||
- or "barium," to trace the code
|
||
+ Legal liability for companies that allow employees to
|
||
use such methods
|
||
- perhaps even in their own time, via the assumption
|
||
that employees who use illegal software methods in
|
||
their own time are perhaps couriers or agents for
|
||
their corporations (a tenuous point)
|
||
- restrictions on: use of codes and ciphers
|
||
+ there have long been certain restrictions on the use of
|
||
encryption
|
||
- encryption over radio waves is illegal (unless the key is
|
||
provided to the government, as with Morse code)
|
||
+ in war time, many restrictions (by all governments)
|
||
- those who encrypt are ipso facto guilty and are shot
|
||
summarily, in many places
|
||
- even today, use of encryption near a military base or
|
||
within a defense contractor could violate laws
|
||
+ S.266 and similar bills to mandate "trapdoors"
|
||
+ except that this will be difficult to police and even to
|
||
detect
|
||
- so many ways to hide messages
|
||
- so much ordinary compression, checksumming, etc.
|
||
+ Key Registration Trail Balloon
|
||
- cite Denning's proposal, and my own postings
|
||
16.26.2. Another Direct Attack: Elimination of Cash
|
||
+ the idea being that elimination of cash, with credit cards
|
||
replacing cash, will reduce black markets
|
||
- "one person, one ID" (goal of many international
|
||
standards organizations)
|
||
- this elimination of cash may ultimately be tied in to the
|
||
key registration ideas...government becomes a third party
|
||
in all transactions
|
||
+ a favorite of conspiracy theorists
|
||
- in extreme form: the number of the Beast tattooed on us
|
||
(credit numbers, etc.)
|
||
- currency exchanges (rumors on the Nets about the imminent
|
||
recall of banknotes, ostensibly to flush out ill-gotten
|
||
gains and make counterfeiting easier)
|
||
+ but also something governments like to do at times, sort
|
||
of to remind us who's really in charge
|
||
- Germany, a couple of times
|
||
- France, in the late 1950s
|
||
- various other devaluations and currency reforms
|
||
+ Partial steps have already been made
|
||
- cash transactions greater than some value-$10,000 at this
|
||
time, though "suspicious" sub-$10K transactions must be
|
||
reported-are banned
|
||
+ large denomination bills have been withdrawn from
|
||
circulation
|
||
- used in drug deals, the argument goes
|
||
- Massachussetts has demanded that banks turn over all
|
||
account records, SS numbers, balances, etc.
|
||
+ "If what you're doing is legal, why do you need cash for
|
||
it?"
|
||
- part of the old American dichotomy: privacy versus "What
|
||
have you got to hide?"
|
||
+ But why the outlawing of cash won't work
|
||
+ if a need exists, black markets will arise
|
||
- i.e., the normal tradeoff between risk and reward:
|
||
there may be some "discounts" on the value, but cah
|
||
will still circulate
|
||
+ too many other channels exist: securities, secrets, goods
|
||
+ from trading in gold or silver, neither of which are
|
||
outlawed any longer, to trading in secrets, how can the
|
||
government stop this?
|
||
- art being used to transfer money across international
|
||
borders (avoids Customs)
|
||
- "consideration" given, a la the scam to hide income
|
||
+ total surveillance?
|
||
- it doesn't even work in Russia
|
||
- on the other hand, Russia lacks the "point of sale"
|
||
infrastructure to enforce a cashless system
|
||
16.26.3. Another Direct Attack: Government Control of Encryption,
|
||
Networks, and Net Access
|
||
- a la the old Bell System monopoly, which limited what could
|
||
be hooked up to a phone line
|
||
+ the government may take control of the networks in several
|
||
ways:
|
||
+ FCC-type restrictions, though it is hard to see how a
|
||
private network, on private property, could be restricted
|
||
- as it is not using part of the "public spectrum"
|
||
- but it is hard to build a very interesting network that
|
||
stays on private property....and as soon as it crosses
|
||
public property, BINGO!
|
||
+ "National Data Highway" could be so heavily subsidized
|
||
that alternatives will languish (for a while)
|
||
- the Al Gore proposals for a federally funded system
|
||
(and his wife, Tipper, is of course a leader of the
|
||
censorship wing)
|
||
- and then the government can claim the right and duty to
|
||
set the "traffic" laws: protocols, types of encryption
|
||
allowed, etc.
|
||
- key patents, a la RSA (if in fact gov't. is a silent
|
||
partner in RSA Data Security)
|
||
16.26.4. An Indirect Attack: Insisting that all economic transactions
|
||
be "disclosed" (the "Full Disclosure Society" scenario)
|
||
+ this sounds Orwellian, but the obvious precedent is that
|
||
businesses must keep records of all financial transactions
|
||
(and even some other records, to see if they're colluding
|
||
or manipulating something)
|
||
- for income and sales tax reasons
|
||
- and OSHA inspections, INS raids, etc.
|
||
+ there is currently no requirement that all transactions
|
||
be fully documented with the identies of all parties,
|
||
except in some cases like firearms purchases, but this
|
||
could change
|
||
- especially as electronic transactions become more
|
||
common: the IRS may someday insist on such records,
|
||
perhaps even insisting on escrowing of such records, or
|
||
time-stamping
|
||
+ this will hurt small businesses, due to the entry cost
|
||
and overhead of such systems, but big businesses will
|
||
probably support it (after some grumbling)
|
||
- big business always sees bureaucracy as one of their
|
||
competitive advantages
|
||
+ and individuals have not been hassled by the IRS on minor
|
||
personal transactions, though the web is tightening:
|
||
1099s are often required (when payments exceed some
|
||
amount, such as $500)
|
||
- small scale barter transactions
|
||
+ but the nature of CA is that many transactions can be
|
||
financial while appearing to be something else (like the
|
||
transfer of music or images, or even the writing of
|
||
letters)
|
||
- which is why a cusp is coming: full disclosure is one
|
||
route, protection of privacy is another
|
||
+ the government may cite the dangers of a "good old boy
|
||
network" (literally) that promulgates racist, sexist, and
|
||
ableist discrimination via computer networks
|
||
- i.e., that the new networks are "under-representing
|
||
people of color"
|
||
- and how can quotas be enforced in an anonymous system?
|
||
- proposals in California (7-92) that consultants file
|
||
monthly tax statements, have tax witheld, etc.
|
||
- a strategy for the IRS: require all computer network users
|
||
to have a "taxpayer ID number" for all transactions, so
|
||
that tax evasion can be checked
|
||
16.26.5. Attempts to discredit reputation-based systems by deceit,
|
||
fraud, nonpayment, etc.
|
||
- deliberate attacks on the reputation of services the
|
||
government doesn't want to see
|
||
- there may be government operations to sabotage businesses,
|
||
to undermine such efforts before they get started
|
||
- analogous to "mail-bombing" an anonymous remailer
|
||
16.26.6. Licensing of software developers may be one method used to
|
||
try to control the spread of anonymous systems and
|
||
information markets
|
||
- by requiring a "business license" attached to any and all
|
||
chunks of code
|
||
+ implemented via digital signatures, a la the code signing
|
||
protocols mentioned by Bob Baldwin as a means of reducing
|
||
trapdoors, sabotage, and other modifications by spies,
|
||
hackers, etc.
|
||
- proposals to require all chunks of code to be signed,
|
||
after the Sililcon Valley case in mid-80s, where
|
||
spy/saboteur went to several s/w companies and meddled
|
||
with code
|
||
- "seals" from some group such as "Software Writers
|
||
Laboratories," with formal specs required, source code
|
||
provided to a trusted keeper, etc.
|
||
+ such licensing and inspection will also serve to lock-in
|
||
the current players (Microsoft will love it) and make
|
||
foreign competition in software more difficult
|
||
- unless the foreign competition is "sanctioned," e.g.,
|
||
Microsoft opens a code facility in India
|
||
16.26.7. RICO-like seizures of computers and bulletin board systems
|
||
- sting operations and setups
|
||
- Steve Jackson Games is obvious example
|
||
- for illegal material (porno, drug advocacy, electronic
|
||
money, etc.) flowing through their systems
|
||
- even when sysop can prove he did not know illegal acts were
|
||
being committed on his system (precedents are the yachts
|
||
seized because a roach was found)
|
||
+ these seizures can occur even when a trial is never held
|
||
- e.g., the "administrative seizure" of cars in Portland in
|
||
prostitution cases
|
||
- and the seizures are on civil penalties, where the
|
||
standards of proof are much lower
|
||
+ in some cases a mere FBI investigation is enough to get
|
||
employees fired, renters kicked out, IRS audits started
|
||
+ reports that a woman in Georgia who posted some "ULs"
|
||
(unlisted numbers?) was fired by her company after the
|
||
FBI got involved, told by her landlord that her lease was
|
||
not being extended, and so forth
|
||
- "We don't truck with no spies"
|
||
- the IRS audit would not ostensibly be for harassment, but
|
||
for "probable cause" (or whatever term they use) that tax
|
||
avoidance, under-reporting, even money-laundering might
|
||
be involved
|
||
16.26.8. Outlawing of Digital Pseudonyms and Credentialling
|
||
+ may echoe the misguided controversy over Caller ID
|
||
- misguided because the free market solution is clear: let
|
||
those who wish to hide their numbers-rape and battering
|
||
support numbers, police, detectives, or even just
|
||
citizens requesting services or whatever-do so
|
||
- and let those who refuse to deal with these anonymous
|
||
callers also do so (a simple enough programming of
|
||
answering machines and telephones)
|
||
- for example, to prevent minors and felons from using the
|
||
systems, "true names" may be required, with heavy fines and
|
||
forfeitures of equipment and assets for anybody that fails
|
||
to comply (or is caught in stings and setups)
|
||
+ minors may get screened out of parts of cyberspace by
|
||
mandatory "age credentialing" ("carding")
|
||
- this could be a major threat to such free and open
|
||
systems, as with the various flaps over minors logging on
|
||
to the Internet and seeing X-rated images (however poorly
|
||
rendered) or reading salacious material in alt.sex
|
||
- there may be some government mood to insist that only
|
||
"true names" be used, to facillitate such age screening
|
||
(Fiat-Shamir passports, papers, number of the Beast?)
|
||
+ the government may argue that digital pseudonyms are
|
||
presumptively considered to be part of a conspiracy, a
|
||
criminal enterprise, tax evasion, etc.
|
||
- the old "what have you got to hide" theory
|
||
- closely related to the issue of whether false IDs can be
|
||
used even when no crimes are being committed (that is,
|
||
can Joe Average represent himself by other than his True
|
||
Name?)
|
||
- civil libertarians may fight this ban, arguing that
|
||
Americans are not required to present "papers" to
|
||
authorities unless under direct suspicion for a crime
|
||
(never mind the loitering laws, which take the other view)
|
||
16.26.9. Anonymous systems may be restricted on the grounds that they
|
||
constitute a public nuisance
|
||
- or that they promote crime, espionage, etc.
|
||
+ especially after a few well-publicized abuses
|
||
- possibly instigated by the government?
|
||
- operators may have to post bonds that effectively drive
|
||
them out of business
|
||
16.26.10. Corporations may be effectively forbidden to hire consultants
|
||
or subcontractors as individuals
|
||
+ the practical issue: the welter of tax and benefit laws
|
||
make individuals unable to cope with the mountains of forms
|
||
that have to be filed
|
||
- thus effectively pricing individuals out of this market
|
||
+ the tax law side: recall the change in status of
|
||
consultants a few years back...this may be extended further
|
||
- a strategy for the IRS: require all computer network
|
||
users to have a "taxpayer ID number" for all
|
||
transactions, so that tax evasion can be checked
|
||
- not clear how this differs from the point above, but I
|
||
feel certain more such pressures will be applied (after
|
||
all, most corporations tend to see independent
|
||
contractors as more of a negative than a positive)
|
||
- this may be an agenda of the already established companies:
|
||
they see consultants and free lancers as thieves and
|
||
knaves, stealing their secrets and disseminating the crown
|
||
jewels (to punningly mix some metaphors)
|
||
- and since the networks discussed here facilitate the use of
|
||
consultants, more grounds to limit them
|
||
16.26.11. There may be calls for U.N. control of the world banking
|
||
system in the wake of the BCCI and similar scandals
|
||
- to "peirce the veil" on transnationals
|
||
- calls for an end to banking secrecy
|
||
- talk about denying access to the money centers of New York
|
||
(but will this push the business offshore, in parallel to
|
||
the Eurodollar market?)
|
||
+ motivations and methods
|
||
- recall the UNESCO attempt a few years back to credential
|
||
reporters, ostensibly to prevent chaos and "unfair"
|
||
reporting...well, the BCCI and nuclear arms deals
|
||
surfacing may reinvigorate the efforts of
|
||
"credentiallers"
|
||
+ the USSR and other countries entering the world community
|
||
may sense an opportunity to get in on the formation of
|
||
"boards of directors" of these kinds of banks and
|
||
corporations and so may push the idea in the U.N.
|
||
- sort of like a World Bank or IMF with even more power
|
||
to step in and take control of other banks, and with
|
||
the East Bloc and USSR having seats!
|
||
16.26.12. "National security"
|
||
- if the situation gets serious enough, a la a full-blown
|
||
crypto anarchy system, mightn't the government take the
|
||
step of declaring a kind of national emergency?
|
||
- provisions exist: "401 Emergency" and FEMA plans
|
||
- of course, the USSR tried to intitiate emergency measures
|
||
and failed
|
||
- recall that a major goal of crypto anarchy is that the
|
||
systems described here will be so widely deployed as to be
|
||
essential or critical to the overall economy...any attempt
|
||
to "pull the plug" will also kill the economy
|
||
16.26.13. Can authorities force the disclosure of a key?
|
||
+ on the "Yes" side:
|
||
+ is same, some say, as forcing combination to a safe
|
||
containing information or stolen goods
|
||
- but some say-and a court may have ruled on this-that
|
||
the safe can always be cut open and so the issue is
|
||
mostly moot
|
||
- while forcing key disclosure is compelled testimony
|
||
- and one can always claim to have forgotten the key
|
||
- i.e., what happens when a suspect simply clams up?
|
||
- but authorities can routinely demand cooperation in
|
||
investigations, can seize records, etc.
|
||
+ on the "No" side:
|
||
- can't force a suspect to talk, whether about where he hid
|
||
the loot or where his kidnap victim is hidden
|
||
- practically speaking, someone under indictment cannot be
|
||
forced to reveal Swiss bank accounts....this would seem
|
||
to be directly analogous to a cryptographic key
|
||
- thus, the key to open an account would seem to be the
|
||
same thing
|
||
- a memorized key cannot be forced, says someone with EFF
|
||
or CPSR
|
||
- on balance, it seems clear that the disclosure of
|
||
cryptographic keys cannot be forced (though the practical
|
||
penalty for nondisclosure could be severe)
|
||
- but this has not really been tested, so far as I know
|
||
- and many people say that such cooperation can be
|
||
demanded...
|
||
|
||
16.27. How Crypto Anarchy Advocates Will Fight Back
|
||
16.27.1. Bypassing restrictions on commercial encryption packages by
|
||
not making them "commercial"
|
||
- public domain
|
||
- freely distributed
|
||
- after all, the basic algorithms are simple and don't really
|
||
deserve patent protection: money will not be made by the
|
||
originators of the code, but by the actual providers of
|
||
services (for transmission and storage of packets)
|
||
16.27.2. Noise and signals are often indistinguishable
|
||
- as with the LSB audio signal approach...unless the
|
||
government outlaws live recordings or dubs on digital
|
||
systems...
|
||
16.27.3. Timed-release files (using encryption) will be used to hide
|
||
files, to ensure that governments cannot remove material they
|
||
don't like
|
||
- easier said than done
|
||
16.27.4. Legal approaches will also be taken: fundamental
|
||
constitutional issues
|
||
- privacy, free speech, free association
|
||
16.27.5. The Master Plan to Fight Restrictions on Encryption
|
||
+ "Genie out of the bottle" strategy: deploy crypto widely
|
||
- intertwined with religions, games, whistleblower groups,
|
||
and other uses that cannot easily just be shut down
|
||
- scattered in amongst many other activities
|
||
- Media attention: get media to report on value of
|
||
encryption, privacy, etc.
|
||
+ Diffusion, confusion, and refusion
|
||
- Diffuse the use by scattering it around
|
||
- Confuse the issue by fake religions, games, other uses
|
||
- Refuse to cooperate with the government
|
||
- Free speech arguments: calling the discussions free speech
|
||
and forcing the government to prove that the free speech is
|
||
actually an economic transaction
|
||
+ links with religions, corporations, etc.
|
||
- private meetings protected
|
||
- voting systems
|
||
|
||
16.28. Things that May Hide the Existence of Crypto Anarchy
|
||
16.28.1. first and foremost, the incredible bandwidth, the bits
|
||
sloshing around the world's networks...tapes being exchanged,
|
||
PCs calling other PCs, a variety of data and compression
|
||
formats, ISDN, wireless transmission, etc.
|
||
16.28.2. in the coming years, network traffic will jump a thousand-
|
||
fold, what with digital fax, cellular phones and computers,
|
||
ISDN, fiber optics, and higher-speed modems
|
||
- and these links will be of all kinds: local, private,
|
||
corporate, business, commercial, bootleg (unrecorded),
|
||
cellular radio, etc.
|
||
16.28.3. corporations and small groups will have their own private
|
||
LANs and networks, with massive bandwidth, and with little
|
||
prospects that the government can police them-there can be no
|
||
law requiring that internal communications be readable by the
|
||
government!
|
||
- and the revelations that Ultra Black has been used to read
|
||
messages and use the information will be further proof to
|
||
corporations that they need to adopt very strong security
|
||
measures
|
||
+ and "partnerships" can be scattered across the country, and
|
||
even internationally, and have great lattitude in setting
|
||
up their own communication and encryption systems
|
||
- recall Cargill case
|
||
- and also remember that the government may crack down on
|
||
these systems
|
||
16.28.4. AMIX-like services, new services, virtual reality (for games,
|
||
entertainment, or just as a place of doing business) etc.
|
||
+ many users will encrypt their links to VR servers, with a
|
||
decryption agent at the other end, so that their activities
|
||
(characters, fantasies, purchases, etc.) cannot be
|
||
monitored and logged
|
||
+ this will further increase the bandwidth of encrypted
|
||
data and will complicate further the work of the NSA and
|
||
similar agencies
|
||
- attempts to force "in the clear" links will be doomed
|
||
by the welter of PC standards, compression utilities,
|
||
cellular modems, and the like...there will be no
|
||
"cleartext" that can be mandated
|
||
16.28.5. steganography
|
||
+ in general, impossible to know that a message contains
|
||
other encypted messages
|
||
- except in stings and setups, which may be ruled illegal
|
||
+ the LSB method, and variants
|
||
+ LSB of DAT, DCC, MD, etc., or even sound bites (chunks of
|
||
sampled sounds traded on bulletin boards)
|
||
- especially of live or analog-dubbed copies (the noise
|
||
floor of a typical consumer-grade mike is much higher
|
||
than the LSB of DAT)
|
||
+ of images, Adobe Photoshop images, artwork, etc.
|
||
+ imagine an "Online Art Gallery" that is used to store
|
||
messages, or a "Photo Gallery" that participants post
|
||
their best photos to, offering them for sale
|
||
- Sturges case
|
||
- LSB method
|
||
+ gets into some theoretical nitpicking about the true
|
||
nature of noise, especially if the entire LSB channel is
|
||
uncharacteristic of "real noise"
|
||
- but by reducing the bandwidth somewhat, the noise
|
||
profile can be made essentially undistinguishable from
|
||
real noise
|
||
- and a 2 GB DAT produces 130 MB of LSB, which is a lot
|
||
of margin!
|
||
+ what could the government do?
|
||
- stings and setups to catch and scare off potential
|
||
users
|
||
- an attempt to limit the wide use of digital
|
||
data-hopeless!
|
||
+ a requirement for government-approved "dithering"?
|
||
- this would be an enforcement nightmare
|
||
+ and would only cause the system to be moved into
|
||
higher bits
|
||
- and with enough error correction, even audible
|
||
dithering of the signal would not wipe out the
|
||
encrypted signal
|
||
+ variants: text justification, word selection
|
||
- bandwidth tends to be low
|
||
- but used in Three Days of the Condor
|
||
+ virtual reality art may further enable private
|
||
communications
|
||
- think of what can be encrypted into such digital images!
|
||
- and user has total privacy and is able to manipulate the
|
||
images and databases locally
|
||
16.28.6. in the sense that these other things, such as the governments
|
||
own networks of safe houses, false identities, and bootleg
|
||
payoffs, will tend to hide any other such systems that emerge
|
||
+ because investigators may think they've stumbled onto yet
|
||
another intelligence operation, or sting, or whatever
|
||
- this routinely cripples undercover investigations
|
||
- scenario: criminals even float rumors that another agency
|
||
is doing an operation....?
|
||
16.28.7. Government Operations that Resemble Cryptoanarchy will
|
||
Confuse the Issues
|
||
- various confidential networks already exist, operated by
|
||
State, DoD, the services, etc.
|
||
+ Witness Protection Program (or Witness Relocation Program)
|
||
- false IDs, papers, transcripts
|
||
- even money given to them (and the amounts seem to be
|
||
downplayed in the press and on t.v., with a sudden spate
|
||
of shows about how poorly they do in the middle of middle
|
||
America-sounds like a planted story to me)
|
||
- cooperation with certain companies and schools to assist
|
||
in this aspect
|
||
+ Payoffs of informants, unofficial agents
|
||
- like agents in place inside defense contractors
|
||
- vast amount of tips from freelancers, foreign citizens,
|
||
etc.
|
||
- operators of safe houses (like Mrs. Furbershaw)
|
||
+ Networks of CIA-funded banks, for various purposes
|
||
- a la the Nugan-Hand Bank, BCCI, etc.
|
||
- First American, Bank of Atlanta, Centrust Savings, etc.
|
||
- these banks and S&Ls act as conduits for controversial or
|
||
secret operations, for temporary parking of funds, for
|
||
the banking of profits, and even for the private
|
||
retirement funds of agents (a winked-at practice)
|
||
+ Confidential networks over computer lines
|
||
- e.g., encrypted teleconferencing of Jasons, PFIAB, etc.
|
||
+ these will increase, for many reasons
|
||
- concerns over terrorism
|
||
- demands on time will limit travel (especially for
|
||
groups of non-fulltime committee members)
|
||
- these suspected government operations will deter
|
||
investigation
|
||
16.28.8. Encrypted Traffic Will Increase Dramatically
|
||
- of all kinds
|
||
- mail, images, proposals, faxes, etc.
|
||
- acceptance of a P-K mail system will make wide use of
|
||
encryption nearly automatic (though some fraction, perhaps
|
||
the majority, will not even bother)
|
||
+ there may even be legal reasons for encryption to increase:
|
||
- requirements that employee records be protected, that
|
||
medical records be protected, etc.
|
||
- "prudent man" rules about the theft of information (could
|
||
mean that files are to be encrypted except when being
|
||
worked on)
|
||
- digital signatures
|
||
- echoes of the COMSEC vs. SIGINT (or PROD) debate, where
|
||
COMSEC wants to see more encryption (to protect American
|
||
industry against Soviet and commercial espionage)
|
||
+ Selling of "Anonymous Mailers"?
|
||
- using RSA
|
||
+ avoiding RSA and the P-K patent morass
|
||
- could sell packets of one-time pads
|
||
+ no effective guarantee of security, but adequate for
|
||
many simple purposes
|
||
+ especially if buyers swap them with others
|
||
- but how to ensure that copies are not kept?
|
||
- idea is to enable a kind of "Democracy Wall"
|
||
+ prepaid "coins," purchased anonymously
|
||
- as with the Japanese phone cards
|
||
- or the various toll booth electronic tokens being
|
||
developed
|
||
16.28.9. Games, Religions, Legal Consultation, and Other "Covers" for
|
||
the Introduction and Proliferation of Crypto Anarchy
|
||
- won't be clear what is real encryption and what is game-
|
||
playing
|
||
- imagine a game called "Cryptoanarchy"!
|
||
+ Comment on these "Covers"
|
||
- some of these will be quite legitimate, others will be
|
||
deliberately set up as covers for the spread of CA
|
||
methods
|
||
- perhaps subsidized just to increase traffic (and
|
||
encrypted traffic is already expected to increase for a
|
||
variety of reasons)
|
||
- people will have various reasons for wanting anonymity
|
||
+ Games
|
||
+ "Habitat"-style games and systems
|
||
- with "handles" that are much more secure than at
|
||
present (recall Chip's comments)
|
||
+ behaviors that are closely akin to real-world illegal
|
||
behaviors:
|
||
- a thieves area
|
||
- an espionage game
|
||
- a "democracy wall" in which anything can be posted
|
||
anonymously, and read by all
|
||
+ MUDs (Multi-user Domains, Multi-User Dungeons)
|
||
- lots of interest here
|
||
- topic of discussion at a special Cypherpunks meeting,
|
||
early 1994.
|
||
+ interactive role-playing games will provide cover for the
|
||
spread of systems: pseudonyms will have much more
|
||
protection than they now have
|
||
- though various methods may exist to "tag" a transaction
|
||
(a la barium), especially when lots of bandwidth is
|
||
involved, for analysis (e.g., "Dark Dante" is
|
||
identified by attaching specific bits to stream)
|
||
+ Dealing with Barium Tracers
|
||
- code is allowed to simmer in an offsite machine for
|
||
some time (and with twiddling of system clock)
|
||
- mutations added
|
||
+ Shared Worlds
|
||
- authors, artists, game-players, etc. may add to these
|
||
worlds
|
||
- hypertext links, reputation-based systems
|
||
+ hypothesize a "True Names" game on the nets, based
|
||
_explicitly_ on Vinge's work
|
||
- perhaps from an outfit like Steve Jackson Games, maker
|
||
of similar role-playing games
|
||
- with variable-resolution graphics (a la Habitat)
|
||
- virtual reality capabilities
|
||
+ a game like "Habitat" can be used as a virtual Labyrinth,
|
||
further confusing the line between reality and fantasy
|
||
- and this could provide a lot of bandwidth for cover
|
||
- the Smalltalk "Cryptoids" idea is related to this...it
|
||
looks like a simulation or a game, but can be used by
|
||
"outsiders"
|
||
+ Religions
|
||
+ a nearly ironclad system of liberties, though _some_
|
||
limits exist
|
||
- e.g., a church that uses its organization to transport
|
||
drugs or run a gambling operation would be shut down
|
||
quickly (recall the drug church?)
|
||
- and calls for tax-break limitations (which Bill of
|
||
Rights says nothing about)
|
||
- still, it will be _very_ difficult for the U.S.
|
||
government to interfere with the communications of a
|
||
"religion."
|
||
+ "ConfessionNet"
|
||
+ a hypothetical anonymous system that allows confessions
|
||
to be heard, with all of the privileges of privacy that
|
||
normal confessions have
|
||
- successors to 900 numbers?
|
||
+ virtually ironclad protections against government
|
||
interference
|
||
- "Congress shall make no law..."
|
||
+ but governments may try to restrict who can do this, a
|
||
la the restrictions in the 70s and 80s on "instant
|
||
Reverends"
|
||
- Kirby J. Hensley's Univeral Life Church
|
||
- various IRS restrictions, effectively establishing
|
||
two classes of religions: those grandfathered in and
|
||
given tax breaks and the like, and those that were
|
||
deemed invalid in some way
|
||
+ Scenario: A Scientology-like cult using CA as its chief
|
||
communications system?
|
||
- levels of initiation same as a cell system
|
||
- "clearing"
|
||
- New Age garbage: Ascended Masters, cells, money flowing
|
||
back and forth
|
||
- blackballing
|
||
+ Digital Personals
|
||
- the "personals" section of newspapers currently requires
|
||
the newspaper to provide the anonymity (until the parties
|
||
mutually agree to meet)
|
||
- what about on AMIX or similar services?
|
||
- a fully digital system could allow self-arranging systems
|
||
+ here's how it could work:
|
||
- Alice wants to meet a man. She writes up a typical ad,
|
||
"SWF seeks SWM for fun and walks on the beach..."
|
||
- Alice encloses her specially-selected public key, which
|
||
is effectively her only name. This is probably a one-
|
||
time deal, unlinkable to her in any way.
|
||
- She encrypts the entire package and sends it through a
|
||
remailing chain (or DC-Net) for eventual posting in a
|
||
public place.
|
||
- Everyone can download the relevant area (messages can
|
||
be sorted by type, or organized in interest groups),
|
||
with nobody else knowing which messages they're
|
||
reading.
|
||
- Bob reads her message and decides to repond. He
|
||
digitizes a photo of himself and includes some other
|
||
info, but not his real name. He also picks a public key
|
||
for Alice to communicate with him.
|
||
- Bob encrypts all of this with the public key of Alice
|
||
(though remember that he has no way of knowing who she
|
||
really is).
|
||
- Bob sends this message through a remailing chain and it
|
||
gets posted as an encrypted message addressed to the
|
||
public key of Alice. Again, some organization can
|
||
reduce the total bandwidth (e.g., an area for
|
||
"Replies").
|
||
- Alice scans the replies and downloads a group of
|
||
messages that includes the one she can see-and only she
|
||
can see!-is addressed to her.
|
||
- This has established a two-way communication path
|
||
between Alice and Bob without either of them knowing
|
||
who the other one is or where they live. (The business
|
||
about the photos is of course not conducive to
|
||
anonymity, but is consistent with the "Personals"
|
||
mode.)
|
||
- If Alice and Bob wish to meet in person it is then easy
|
||
for them to communicate real phone numbers and the
|
||
like.
|
||
+ Why is this interesting?
|
||
- it establishes a role for anonymous systems
|
||
- it could increase the bandwidth of such messages
|
||
+ Legal Services (Legitimate, i.e., not even the bootleg
|
||
stuff)
|
||
+ protected by attorney-client privileges, but various Bar
|
||
Associations may place limits on the use of networks
|
||
- but if viewed the way phones are, seems unlikely that
|
||
Bars could do much to limit the use of computer
|
||
networks
|
||
- and suppose a Nolo Press-type publishing venture started
|
||
up on the Nets? (publishing self-help info under
|
||
pseudonyms)
|
||
- or the scam to avoid taxes by incorporating as a
|
||
corporation or nonprofit?
|
||
+ Voting Systems
|
||
- with and without anonymity
|
||
+ Board of Directors-type voting
|
||
- with credentials, passwords, and (maybe) anonymity
|
||
(under certain conditions)
|
||
+ Blackballing and Memberships
|
||
- generally anonymous
|
||
- blackballing may be illegal these days (concerns about
|
||
racism, sexism, etc.)
|
||
- cf. Salomaa for discussion of indistinguishability of
|
||
blackballing from majority voting
|
||
+ Consumer Ratings and Evaluations
|
||
- e.g., there may be "guaranteed anonymous" evalution
|
||
systems for software and other high-tech items (Joe
|
||
Bluecollar won't mess with computers and complicated
|
||
voting systems)
|
||
+ Politically Active Groups May Have Anonymous Voting
|
||
- to vote on group policies, procedures, leadership
|
||
- or on boycott lists (recall the idea of the PC-Card
|
||
that doesn't allow politically incorrect purchases)
|
||
+ this may be to protect themselves from lawsuits (SLAPP)
|
||
and government harassment
|
||
- they fear government infiltrators will get the names
|
||
of voters and how they voted
|
||
+ Official Elections
|
||
- though this is unlikely for the barely-literate
|
||
majority
|
||
- the inevitable fraud cases will get wide exposure and
|
||
scare people and politicians off even more
|
||
- unlikely in next decade
|
||
+ Journal Refereeing
|
||
- some journals, such as Journal of Cryptology,
|
||
appropriately enough, are already using paper-based
|
||
versions of this
|
||
+ Xanadu-like systems may be early adopters
|
||
- there are of course reasons for just the opposite:
|
||
enhanced used of reputations
|
||
- but in some cases anonymity may be preferred
|
||
+ Groupware
|
||
- anonymous comment systems (picture a digital blackboard
|
||
with anonymous remarks showing up)
|
||
- these systems are promoted to encourage the quiet to have
|
||
an equal voice
|
||
- but they also provide another path to anonymous and/or
|
||
reputation-based systems
|
||
+ Psychological Consultations
|
||
- will require the licensing of counselors, of course
|
||
(under U.S. laws)
|
||
- what if people call offshore counselors?
|
||
+ and various limitations on privacy of records exist
|
||
- Tarisoff [spelling?]
|
||
- subpoenas
|
||
- record-keeping required
|
||
+ may be used by various "politically correct" groups
|
||
- battered women
|
||
- abused children
|
||
- perhaps in conjunction with the RU-486-type issues,
|
||
some common ground can be established (a new kind of
|
||
Underground Railroad)
|
||
+ Advice on Medicine (a la AIDS, RU 486)
|
||
- anonymity needed to protect against lawsuits and seizure
|
||
- NOW and other feminist groups could use crypto anarchy
|
||
methods to reduce the risks to their organizations
|
||
+ Anonymous Tip Lines, Whistleblower Services
|
||
+ for example, a newspaper might set up a reward system,
|
||
using the crypto equivalent of the "torn paper" key
|
||
- where informant holds onto the torn off "key"
|
||
- even something like the James Randi/Yuri Geller case
|
||
reveals that "anonymous critics" may become more common
|
||
+ corporate and defense contractor whistleblowers may seek
|
||
protection through crypto methods
|
||
- a "Deep Throat" who uses bulletin boards to communicate
|
||
with DS?
|
||
+ this presumes much wider use of computers and modems by
|
||
"average" people...and I doubt "Prodigy"-type systems
|
||
will support these activities!
|
||
- but there may be cheap systems based on video game
|
||
machines, a la the proposed Nintendo computers
|
||
- environmentalists set up these whistleblower lines, for
|
||
people to report illegal logging, spraying, etc.
|
||
+ Online, "Instant" Corporations
|
||
+ shell companies, duly incorporated in Delaware or
|
||
wherever (perhaps even foreign sites) are "sold" to
|
||
participants who wish to create a corporate cover for
|
||
their activities
|
||
- so that AMIX-like fees are part of the "internal
|
||
accounting"
|
||
+ Anonymous collaborative writing and criticism
|
||
- similar to anonymous voting
|
||
16.28.10. Compressed traffic will similarly increase
|
||
- and many compression algortithms will offer some form of
|
||
encryption as a freebie
|
||
- and will be difficult to decypher, based just on sheer
|
||
volume
|
||
- files will have to at least be decompressed before key word
|
||
searches can be done (though there may be shortcuts)
|
||
|
||
16.29. The Coming Phase Change
|
||
16.29.1. "We'd better hope that strong cypto, cheap telecoms and free
|
||
markets can provide the organizing basis for a workable
|
||
society because it is clear that coercion as an organizing
|
||
principle ain't what it used to be." [Duncan Frissell, in
|
||
his sig, 4-13-94]
|
||
16.29.2. "What is the "inevitability" argument?"
|
||
- Often made by me (Tim May), Duncan Frissell, Sandy
|
||
Sandfort, and Perry Metzger (with some twists). And Hal
|
||
Finney takes issue with certain aspects and contributes
|
||
incisive critiques.
|
||
+ Reasons:
|
||
- borders becoming more transparent to data flow
|
||
- encryption is not detectable/stoppable
|
||
- derivative financial instruments, money sloshing across
|
||
borders
|
||
- transnationalism
|
||
- cash machines, wire transfers
|
||
- "permanent tourists"
|
||
- Borders are becoming utterly transparent to massive data
|
||
flows. The rapid export of crypto is but an ironic example
|
||
of this. Mosaid, ftp, gopher, lynx...all cross borders
|
||
fluidly and nearly untraceably. It is probably too late to
|
||
stop these systems, short of "pulling the plug" on the Net,
|
||
and this pulling the plug is simply too expensive to
|
||
consider. (If the Feds ever really figure out the long-
|
||
range implications of this stuff, they may try it...but
|
||
probably not.)
|
||
16.29.3. "What is the "crypto phase change"?"
|
||
- I'm normally skeptical of claims that a "singularity" is
|
||
coming (nanotechnology being the usual place this is
|
||
claimed, a la Vinge), but "phase changes" are more
|
||
plausible. The effect of cheap printing was one such phase
|
||
change, altering the connectivity of society and the
|
||
dispersion of knowledge in a way that can best be described
|
||
as a phase change. The effects of strong crypto, and the
|
||
related ideas of digital cash, anonymous markets, etc., are
|
||
likely to be similar.
|
||
- transition
|
||
- tipping factors, disgust by populace, runaway taxation
|
||
+ "leverage effect"
|
||
- what Kelly called "the fax effect"
|
||
- crypto use spreads, made more popular by common use
|
||
- can nucleate in a small group...doesn't need mass
|
||
acceptance
|
||
16.29.4. "Can crypto anarchy be stopped?"
|
||
+ A goal is to get crypto widely enough deployed that it
|
||
cannot then be stopped
|
||
- to the point of no return, where the cost of withdrawing
|
||
or banning a technology is simply too high (not always a
|
||
guaranteee)
|
||
- The only recourse is a police state in which homes and
|
||
businesses are randomly entered and searched, in which
|
||
cryptography is outlawed and vigorously prosecuted, in
|
||
which wiretaps, video surveillance, and other forms of
|
||
surveillance are used aggressively, and in which perhaps
|
||
the very possession of computers and modems is restricted.
|
||
- Anything short of these police state tactics will allow the
|
||
development of the ideas discussed here. To some extent.
|
||
But enough to trigger the transition to a mostly crypto
|
||
anarchic situation.
|
||
- (This doesn't mean everyone, or even most, will use crypto
|
||
anarchy.)
|
||
16.29.5. Need not be a universal or even popular trend
|
||
- even if restricted to a minority, can be very influential
|
||
- George Soros, Quantum fund, central banks, Spain, Britain,
|
||
Germany
|
||
- and a minority trend can affect others
|
||
16.29.6. "National borders are just speedbumps on the digital
|
||
superhighway."
|
||
16.29.7. "Does crypto anarchy have to be a mass movement to succeed?"
|
||
- Given that only a tiny fraction is now aware of the
|
||
implications....
|
||
+ Precedents for "vanguard" movements
|
||
+ high finance in general is an elite thing
|
||
- Eurodollars, interest rate swaps, etc....not exactly
|
||
Joe Average...and yet of incredible importance (George
|
||
Soros has affected European central bank policy)
|
||
- smuggling is in general not a mass thing
|
||
- etc.
|
||
+ Thus, the users of crypto anarchic tools and instruments
|
||
can have an effect out of proportion to their numbers
|
||
- others will start to use
|
||
- resentment by the "suckers" will build
|
||
- the services themselves--the data havens, the credit
|
||
registries, the espionage markets--will of course have a
|
||
real effect
|
||
16.29.8. Strong crypto does not mean the end to law enforcement
|
||
- "...cryptography is not by any means a magic shield for
|
||
criminals. It eliminates, perhaps, one avenue by which
|
||
crimes might be discovered. However, it is most certainly
|
||
not the case that someone who places an open anonymous
|
||
contract for a murder in an open forum is doing so "risk
|
||
free". There are *plenty* of ways she might be found out.
|
||
Likewise, big secret societies that nefariously undermine
|
||
the free world via cryptography are as vulnerable as ever
|
||
to the motivations of their own members to expose the
|
||
groups in a double-cross." [Mike McNally, 1994-09-09]
|
||
|
||
16.30. Loose Ends
|
||
16.30.1. governments may try to ban the use of encryption in any
|
||
broadcast system, no matter how low the power, because of a
|
||
realization that all of them can be used for crypto anarchy
|
||
and espionage
|
||
- a losing battle, of course, what with wireless LANs of
|
||
several flavors, cellular modems, the ability to hide
|
||
information, and just the huge increase in bandwidth
|
||
16.30.2. "tontines"
|
||
- Eric Hughes wrote up some stuff on this in 1992 [try to get
|
||
it]
|
||
- Italian pseudo-insurance arrangements
|
||
- "digital tontines"?
|
||
16.30.3. Even in market anarchies, there are times when a top-down,
|
||
enforced set of behaviors is desirable. However, instead of
|
||
being enforced by threat of violence, the market itself
|
||
enforces a standard.
|
||
- For example, the Macintosh OS, with standardized commands
|
||
that program developers are "encouraged" to use. Deviations
|
||
are obviously allowed, but the market tends to punish such
|
||
deviations. (This has been useful in avoiding modal
|
||
software, where the same keystroke sequence might save a
|
||
file in one program and erase it in another. Sadly, the
|
||
complexity of modern software has outpaced the Mac OS
|
||
system, so that Command-Option Y often does different
|
||
things in different programs.)
|
||
- Market standards are a noncoercive counter to total chaos.
|
||
16.30.4. Of course, nothing stops people from hiring financial
|
||
advisors, lawyers, and even "Protectors" to shield them from
|
||
the predations of others. Widows and orphans could choose
|
||
conservative conservators, while young turks could choose to
|
||
go it alone.
|
||
16.30.5. on who can tolerate crypto anarchy
|
||
- Not much different here from how things have been in the
|
||
past. Caveat emptor. Look out for Number One. Beware of
|
||
snake oil.
|
||
16.30.6. Local enforcement of rules rather than global rules
|
||
+ e.g., flooding of Usenet with advertising and chain letters
|
||
+ two main approaches
|
||
- ban such things, or set quotas, global acceptable use
|
||
policies, etc. (or use tort law to prosecute & collect
|
||
damages)
|
||
- local carrriers decide what they will and will not
|
||
carry, and how much they'll charge
|
||
- it's the old rationing vs. market pricing argument
|
||
16.30.7. Locality is a powerful concept
|
||
- self-responsibility
|
||
- who better to make decisions than those affected?
|
||
- tighter feedback loops
|
||
- avoids large-scale governments
|
||
+ Nonlocally-arranged systems often result in calls to stop
|
||
"hogging" of resources, and general rancor and envy
|
||
+ water consumption is the best example: anybody seen
|
||
"wasting" water, regardless of their conservations
|
||
elsewhere or there priorities, is chastised and rebuked.
|
||
Sometimes the water police are called.
|
||
- the costs involved (perhaps a few pennies worth of
|
||
water, to wash a car or water some roses) are often
|
||
trivial...meanwhile, billions of acre-feet of water are
|
||
sold far below cost to farmers who grow monsoon crops
|
||
like rice in the California desert
|
||
- this hypocrisy is high on my list of reasons why free
|
||
markets are morally preferable to rationing-based
|
||
systems
|
||
|
||
17. The Future
|
||
|
||
17.1. copyright
|
||
THE CYPHERNOMICON: Cypherpunks FAQ and More, Version 0.666,
|
||
1994-09-10, Copyright Timothy C. May. All rights reserved.
|
||
See the detailed disclaimer. Use short sections under "fair
|
||
use" provisions, with appropriate credit, but don't put your
|
||
name on my words.
|
||
|
||
17.2. SUMMARY: The Future
|
||
17.2.1. Main Points
|
||
- where things are probably going
|
||
17.2.2. Connections to Other Sections
|
||
17.2.3. Where to Find Additional Information
|
||
17.2.4. Miscellaneous Comments
|
||
|
||
17.3. Progress Needed
|
||
17.3.1. "Why have most of the things Cypherpunks talk about *not*
|
||
happened?"
|
||
+ Except for remailers and basic crypto, few of the main
|
||
ideas talked about for so long have actually seen any kind
|
||
of realization. There are many reasons:
|
||
A. Difficult to achieve. Both Karl Kleinpaste and Eric
|
||
Hughes implemented simple first-generation remailers in a
|
||
matter of _days_, but "digital cash" and "aptical
|
||
foddering," for example, are not quite so
|
||
straightforward. (I am of course not taking anything away
|
||
from Kleinpaste, Hughes, Helsingius, Finney, etc., just
|
||
noting that redirecting mail messages--and even
|
||
implementing PGP and things like delay, batching, etc.,
|
||
into remailers--is a lot easier conceptually than DC-Nets
|
||
and the like.
|
||
B. Protocols are confusing, tough to implement. Only a tiny
|
||
fraction of the "crypto primitives" discussed at Crypto
|
||
Conferences, or in the various crypto books, have been
|
||
realized as runnable code. Building blocks like "bit
|
||
commitment" have not even--to my knowledge--been
|
||
adequately realized as reusable code. (Certainly various
|
||
groups, such as Chaum's, have cobbled-together things
|
||
like bit commitment....I just don't think there's a
|
||
consensus as to the form, and this has limited the
|
||
ability of nonspecialists to use these "objects.")
|
||
C. Semantic confusion as well. While it's fairly clear what
|
||
"encrypting" or "remailing" means, just what is a
|
||
"digital bank"? Or a "reputation server"?
|
||
D. Interoperablity is problematic. Many platforms, many
|
||
operating systems, many languages. Again, remailers and
|
||
encryption work because there is a de facto lowest common
|
||
denominator for them: the simple text block, used in e-
|
||
mail, editors, input and output from programs, etc. That
|
||
is, we all mostly know exactly what an ASCII text block
|
||
is, and crypto programs are expected to know how to
|
||
access and manipulate such blocks. This largely explains
|
||
the success of PGP across many platforms--text blocks are
|
||
the basic element. Ditto for Cypherpunks remialers, which
|
||
operate on the text blocks found in most mail systems.
|
||
The situation becomes much murkier for things like
|
||
digital money, which are not standalone objects and are
|
||
often multi-party protocols involving time delays,
|
||
offline processing, etc.
|
||
E. Lack of an economic motive. We on this list are not being
|
||
paid to develop anything, are not assisted by anyone, and
|
||
don't have the financial backing of corporations to
|
||
assist us. Since much of today's "software development"
|
||
is actually _deal-making_ and _standards negotiation_, we
|
||
are left out of lots of things.
|
||
|
||
17.4. Future Directions
|
||
17.4.1. "What are some future directions?"
|
||
17.4.2. The Future of the List
|
||
+ "What can be done about these situations?"
|
||
- That is, given that the Cypherpunks list often contains
|
||
sensitive material (see above), and given that the
|
||
current membership list can be accessed by..... what can
|
||
be done?
|
||
- Move central server to non-U.S. locale
|
||
- Or to "cyberspace" (distributed network, with no central
|
||
server...like FidoNet)
|
||
- subscribers can use pseudonyms, cutouts, remailers
|
||
17.4.3. What if encryption is outlawed?
|
||
- can uuencode (and similar), to at least slow down the
|
||
filter programs a bit (this is barely security through
|
||
obscurity, but....)
|
||
- underground movements?
|
||
- will Cypherpunks be rounded up?
|
||
17.4.4. "Should Cypherpunks be more organized, more like the CPSR,
|
||
EFF, and EPIC?"
|
||
- Those groups largely are lobbying groups, with a staff in
|
||
Washington supported by the membership donations of
|
||
thousands or tens of thousands of dues-paying members. They
|
||
perform a valuable service, of course.
|
||
- But that is not our model, nor can it plausibly be. We were
|
||
formed as an ad hoc group to explore crypto, were dubbed
|
||
"Cypherpunks," and have since acted as a techno-grasssroots
|
||
anarchy. No staff, no dues, no elections, no official rules
|
||
and regulations, and no leadership beyond what is provided
|
||
by the power of speech (and a slight amount of "final say"
|
||
provided by the list maintainer Eric Hughes and the machine
|
||
owner, John Gilmore, with support from Hugh Daniel).
|
||
- If folks want a lobbying group, with lawyers in Washington,
|
||
they should join the EFF and/or CPSR.
|
||
- And we fill a niche they don't try to fill.
|
||
17.4.5. Difficult to Set Directions
|
||
- an anarchy...no centralized control
|
||
- emergent interests
|
||
- everyone has some axe to grind, some temporary set of
|
||
priorities
|
||
- little economic motivation (and most have other jobs)
|
||
17.4.6. The Heart and Soul of Cypherpunks?
|
||
+ Competing Goals:
|
||
+ Personal Privacy
|
||
- PGP, integration with mailers
|
||
- education
|
||
+ Reducing the Power of Institutions
|
||
- whistelblowers group
|
||
-
|
||
- Crypto Anarchy
|
||
+ Common Purposes
|
||
+ Spreading strong crypto tools and knowledge
|
||
- PGP
|
||
+ Fighting government restrictions and regulations
|
||
- Clipper/Skipjack fight was a unifying experience
|
||
+ Exploring new directions in cryptology
|
||
- digital mixes, digital cash, voting
|
||
17.4.7. Possible Directions
|
||
+ Crypto Tools...make them ubiquitous "enough" so that the
|
||
genie cannot be put back in the bottle
|
||
- can worry about the politics later (socialists vs.
|
||
anarchocapitalists, etc.) (Although socialists would do
|
||
well to carefully think about the implications of
|
||
untraceable communications, digital cash, and world-wide
|
||
networks of consultants and workers--and what this does
|
||
to tax collection and social spending programs--before
|
||
they work with the libertarians and anarchocapitalists to
|
||
bring on the Crypto Millenium.)
|
||
+ Education
|
||
- educating the masses about crypto
|
||
- public forums
|
||
- this was picked by the Cambridge/MIT group as their
|
||
special interest
|
||
+ Lobbying
|
||
- talking to Congressional aides and committee staffers,
|
||
attending hearings, submitting briefs on proposed
|
||
legislation
|
||
- coordinating with EFF, CPSR, ACLU, etc.
|
||
- this was picked by the Washington group as their special
|
||
interest, which is compellingly appropriate (Calif. group
|
||
is simply too far away)
|
||
- Legal Challenges
|
||
+ mixture of legal and illegal
|
||
- use legal tools, and illegal tools
|
||
- fallback positions
|
||
- enlist illegal users as customers...help it spread in
|
||
these channels (shown to be almost uncontrollable)
|
||
17.4.8. Goals (as I see them)
|
||
+ Get strong crypto deployed in such a way as to be
|
||
unstoppable, unrecallable
|
||
- "fire and forget" crypto
|
||
- genie out of the bottle
|
||
- Note that this does _not_ necessarily that crypto be
|
||
_widely_ deployed, though that's generally a good idea.
|
||
It may mean seeding key sites outside the U.S. with
|
||
strong crypto tools, with remailers, and with the other
|
||
acouterments.
|
||
+ Monkeywrench threats to crypto freedom.
|
||
- economic sabotage of those who use statist contracts to
|
||
thwart freedom (e.g., parts of AT&T)
|
||
+ direct sabotage
|
||
- someday, viruses, HERF, etc.
|
||
17.4.9. A Vision of the Future
|
||
- encrypted, secure, untraceable communications
|
||
- hundreds of remailers, in many countries
|
||
- interwoven with ordinary traffic, ensuring that any attempt
|
||
to quash crypto would also have a dramatic effect on
|
||
business
|
||
- data havens, credit, renters, etc.
|
||
- information markets
|
||
- ability to fight wars is hindered
|
||
- U.S. is frantic, as its grip on the world loosens...Pax
|
||
Americana dies
|
||
17.4.10. Key concepts are the way to handle the complexity of crypto
|
||
- The morass of protocols, systems, and results is best
|
||
analyzed, I think, by not losing sight of the basic
|
||
"primitives," the things about identity, security,
|
||
authentication, etc. that make crypto systems work the way
|
||
they do.
|
||
+ Axiom systems, with theorems and lemmas derivable from the
|
||
axioms
|
||
- with alternate axioms giving the equivalent of "non-
|
||
Euclidean geometries" (in a sense, removing the physical
|
||
identity postulate and replacing it with the "the key is
|
||
the identity" postulate gives a new landscape of
|
||
interactions, implications, and structures).
|
||
- (Markets, local references, voluntary transactions, etc.)
|
||
- (ecologies, predators, defenders, etc.)
|
||
- (game theory, economics, etc..)
|
||
|
||
17.5. Net of the Future
|
||
17.5.1. "What role, if any, will MUDs, MOOs, and Virtual Realities
|
||
play?"
|
||
- "True Names," "Snow Crash," "Shockwave Rider"
|
||
- Habitat, online services
|
||
+ the interaction is far beyond just the canonical "text
|
||
messages" that systems like Digital Telephony are designed
|
||
to cope with
|
||
- where is the nexus of the message?
|
||
- what about conferences scattered around the world, in
|
||
multiple jurisdictions?
|
||
- crypto = glue, mortar, building blocks
|
||
- "rooms" = private places; issues of access control
|
||
- Unless cops are put into these various "rooms," via a
|
||
technology we can barely imagine today (agents?), it will
|
||
be essentially impossible to control what happens in these
|
||
rooms and places. Too many degrees of freedom, too many
|
||
avenues for exchange.
|
||
- cyberspaces, MUDs, virtual communities, private law,
|
||
untouchable by physical governments
|
||
17.5.2. keyword-based
|
||
- can be spoofed by including dictionaries
|
||
17.5.3. dig sig based (reputation-based)
|
||
17.5.4. pools and anonymous areas may be explicitly supported
|
||
17.5.5. better newsreaders, screens, filters
|
||
17.5.6. Switches
|
||
- "switching fabrics"
|
||
- ATM
|
||
- Intel's flexible mesh interconnects, iWARP, etc.
|
||
- all of these will make for an exponential increase in
|
||
degrees of freedom for remailer networks (labyrinths). On-
|
||
chip remailing is esentially what is needed for Chaum's
|
||
mixes. ATM quanta (packets) are the next likely target for
|
||
remailers.
|
||
17.5.7. "What limits on the Net are being proposed?"
|
||
- NII
|
||
+ Holding carriers liable for content
|
||
- e.g., suing Compuserve or Netcom
|
||
- often done with bulletin boards
|
||
- "We have to do something!"
|
||
+ Newspapers are complaining about the Four Horsemen of the
|
||
Infocalypse:
|
||
- terrorists, pedophiles, drug dealers, and money
|
||
launderers
|
||
+ The "L.A. Times" opines:
|
||
- "Designers of the new Information Age were inspired by
|
||
noble dreams of free-flowing data as a global
|
||
liberating force, a true democratizing agent. Sadly,
|
||
the crooks and creeps have also climbed aboard. The
|
||
time has come for much tighter computer security.
|
||
After all, banks learned to put locks on their vaults."
|
||
["L.A. Times," editorial, 1994-07-13]
|
||
|
||
17.6. The Effects of Strong Crypto on Society
|
||
17.6.1. "What will be the effects of strong crypto, ultimately, on
|
||
the social fabric?"
|
||
- It's hard to know for sure.
|
||
+ These effects seem likely:
|
||
- Starvation of government tax revenues, with concommitant
|
||
effects on welfare, spending, etc.
|
||
- increases in espioage
|
||
- trust issues
|
||
17.6.2. The revelations of surveillance and monitoring of citizens
|
||
and corporations will serve to increase the use of
|
||
encryption, at first by people with something to hide, and
|
||
then by others. Cypherpunks are already helping by spreading
|
||
the word of these situations.
|
||
- a snowballing effect
|
||
- and various government agencies will themselves use
|
||
encryption to protect their files and their privacy
|
||
17.6.3. People making individual moral choices
|
||
- people will make their own choices as to what to reveal,
|
||
what they think will help world peace, or the future, or
|
||
the dolphins, or whatever
|
||
- and this will be a liquid market, not just souls shouting
|
||
in the desert
|
||
- of course, not everything will be revealed, but the "mosaic
|
||
effect" ensures that mostly the truth will emerge
|
||
- every government's worst fear, that it's subjects will
|
||
decide for themselves what is secret, what is not, what can
|
||
be told to foreigners, etc.
|
||
|
||
17.7. New Software Tools and Programming Frameworks
|
||
17.7.1. Needed software
|
||
- Drop-in crypto modules are a needed development. As V.
|
||
Bontchev says, "it would be nice if disk encryption
|
||
software allowed the user to plug in their own modules.
|
||
This way everybody could use whatever they trust - MDC/SHA,
|
||
MDC/MD5, DES, IDEA, whatever." [V.B., sci.crypt, 1994-07-
|
||
01]
|
||
+ Robustness
|
||
- Security and robustness are often at odds
|
||
- Files that are wiped at the first hint of intrusion
|
||
(digital flash paper), remailer sites that go down at the
|
||
first signs of trouble, and file transmission systems
|
||
that split files into multiple pieces--any one of which
|
||
can be lost, thus destroying the whole transmission--are
|
||
not exactly models of robustness.
|
||
- Error correction usually works by decreasing entropy
|
||
through redundancy, which is bad for crypto.
|
||
- The military uses elaborate (and expensive) systems to
|
||
ensure that systems do not go down, keys are not lost,
|
||
etc. Most casual users of crypto are unwilling to take
|
||
these steps.
|
||
- And so keys are lost, passphrases are forgotten (or are
|
||
written down on Post-It Notes and taped to terminals),
|
||
and remailers are taken down when operators go on
|
||
vacation. All very flaky and non-robust.
|
||
- Look at how flaky mail delivery is!
|
||
+ A challenge is to create systems which are:
|
||
- robust
|
||
- not too complicated and labor-intensive to use
|
||
- where redundancy does not compromise security
|
||
+ Crypto workbench
|
||
- An overused term, perhaps, but one that captures the
|
||
metaphor of a large set of tools, templates, programming
|
||
aids, etc.
|
||
+ QKS and "Agents Construction Kit" (under development)
|
||
- along with Dylan, DylanAgents, Telescript, and probably
|
||
several other attempts to develop agent toolkits
|
||
- Henry Strickland is using "tcl" (sort of a scripting
|
||
language, like "perl") as a basis.
|
||
+ Software crisis
|
||
- tools, languages, frameworks, environments, objects,
|
||
class libraries, methods, agents, correctness,
|
||
robustness, evolution, prototyping
|
||
+ Connections between the software crisis and cryptography
|
||
- complex systems, complicated protocols
|
||
- price of being "wrong" can be very high, whether it's
|
||
an airport that can't open on time (Denver) or a
|
||
digital bank that has its assets drained in seconds
|
||
- agents, objects are hoped to be the "silver bullets"
|
||
+ The need for better software methodologies
|
||
- "silver bullets"
|
||
- failures, errors, flaws, methods
|
||
- provably correct designs? (a la Viper)
|
||
- It is often said that much better methodologies are
|
||
needed for _real time programming_, due to the time-
|
||
criticality and (probably) the difficulty of doing
|
||
realistic testing. But surely the same should be said
|
||
of _financial programming_, a la the banking and
|
||
digicash schemes that interest us so much.
|
||
- "the one aspect of software that most makes it the
|
||
flaky industry it is is that it is unusual for
|
||
practitioners to study the work of others. Programmers
|
||
don't read great programs. Designers don't study
|
||
outstanding designs. The consequences ... no, just look
|
||
for yourself. [Cameron Laird, comp.software-eng, 1994-
|
||
08-30]
|
||
+ Large Software Constructs
|
||
- The software crisis becomes particularly acute when
|
||
large systems are built, such as--to apply this to
|
||
Cypherpunks issues--when digital money systems and
|
||
economies are built.
|
||
17.7.2. Object-oriented tools
|
||
+ While tres trendy, some very real gains are being reported;
|
||
more than just a buzzword, especially when combined with
|
||
other tools:
|
||
- frameworks, toolkits
|
||
+ dynamic languages
|
||
- greater flexibility than with static, strongly-typed
|
||
langueages (but also less safety, usually)
|
||
- OpenStep, Visual Age, Visual Basic, Dylan, Telescript (more
|
||
agent-oriented), Lisp, Smalltalk, etc
|
||
17.7.3. Protocol Ecologies
|
||
- Behavioral simulations of agents, digital money, spoofing,
|
||
etc.
|
||
- the world in which Alice and Bob and their crypto friends
|
||
live
|
||
- defense, attack, spoofing, impersonation, theft
|
||
- elements that are cryptographically strong (like D-H key
|
||
exchanges), but combined in complex ways that almost have
|
||
to be simulated to find weaknesses
|
||
- "middle-out" instead of "top-down" (conventional, formal)
|
||
or "bottom-up" (emergent, A-LIFE)
|
||
- like Eurisko (Lenat), except oriented toward the domain of
|
||
financial agents
|
||
17.7.4. Use of autonomous agents (slaves?)
|
||
- "An advanced telecommunications environment offers a number
|
||
of ways to protect yourself against the problems involved
|
||
in dealing with anonymous entities in a situation in which
|
||
there is no monopoly Government.....When one's PBX finds
|
||
that one's call is not going through via a particular long
|
||
distance carrier, it automatically switches to another one.
|
||
It is easy to imagine one's intelligent agents testing
|
||
various sorts of transaction completions and switching
|
||
vendors when one fails. Professional checkers can supply
|
||
information on vendor status for a fee. After all, we don't
|
||
care if a company we are dealing with changes if its
|
||
service is unaffected." [Duncan Frissell, 1994-08-30]
|
||
17.7.5. Tools
|
||
+ "Languages within languages" is a standard way to go to
|
||
implement abstractions
|
||
- "Intermediate Design Languages" (IDLs)
|
||
- abstract concepts: such as "engines" and "futures"
|
||
- Lisp and Scheme have been favored languages for this
|
||
- other languages as well: Smalltalk, Dylan
|
||
+ For crypto, this seems to be the case: abstractions
|
||
represented as classes or objects
|
||
- with programming then the selective subclassing
|
||
- and sometimes gener
|
||
+ "type checking" of crypto objects is needed
|
||
- to ensure compliance with protocols, with forms expected,
|
||
etc.
|
||
- check messages for form, removal of sigs, etc. (analogous
|
||
to checking a letter before mailing for proper
|
||
addressing, for stamp, sealing, etc.)
|
||
- much of the nonrobustness of mail and crypto comes from
|
||
the problems with exception handling--things that a human
|
||
involved might be able to resolve, in conventional mail
|
||
systems
|
||
- "dead letter department"?
|
||
- Note: In the "Crypto Anarchy Game" we played in
|
||
September, 1992, many sealed messages were discarded for
|
||
being in the wrong form, lacking the remailer fee that
|
||
the remailer required, etc. Granted, human beings make
|
||
fairly poor maintainers of complex constraints....a lot
|
||
of people just kept forgetting to do what was needed. A
|
||
great time was had by all.
|
||
17.7.6. "What programming framework features are needed?"
|
||
- What follows are definitely my opnions, even more my own
|
||
opinions than most of what I've written. Many people will
|
||
disagree.
|
||
+ Needed:
|
||
- Flexibility over speed
|
||
- Rapid prototyping, to add new features
|
||
- Evolutionary approaches
|
||
- Robustness (provably correct would be nice, but...)
|
||
17.7.7. Frameworks, Tools, Capabilities
|
||
- Nearly all the cutting-edge work in operating systems, from
|
||
"mutually suspicious cooperating processes" to "deadlock"
|
||
to "persistence," show up in the crypto areas we are
|
||
considering.
|
||
+ Software of the Net vs. Software to Access the Net
|
||
- The Net--is current form adequate?
|
||
- Software for Accessing the Net
|
||
+ OpenDoc and OLE
|
||
- components working together, on top of various operating
|
||
systems, on top of various hardware platforms
|
||
+ Persistent Object Stores
|
||
- likely to be needed for the systems we envision
|
||
- robust, so that one's "money" doesn't evaporate when a
|
||
system is rebooted!
|
||
- interesting issues here...
|
||
- CORBA. OpenDoc, OLE II, SOM, DOE, Gemstone, etc.
|
||
+ Programming Frameworks
|
||
- Dynamic languages may be very useful when details are
|
||
fuzzy, when the ideas need exploration (this is not a
|
||
call for nondeterminism, for random futzing around, but a
|
||
recognition that the precise, strongly-typed approach of
|
||
some languages may be less useful than a rich,
|
||
exploratory environment. This fits with the "ecology"
|
||
point of view.
|
||
-
|
||
+ Connectivity
|
||
- needs to be more robust, not flaky the way current e-mail
|
||
is
|
||
- handshakes, agents, robust connections
|
||
- ATM, SONET, agents, etc....the "Net of the Future"
|
||
|
||
17.8. Complexity
|
||
17.8.1. The shifting sands of modern, complex systems
|
||
- lots of cruft, detail...changing..related to the "software
|
||
crisis"...the very flexibilty of modern software systems
|
||
promotes the frequent changing of features and behaviors,
|
||
thus playing hob with attempts of others to understand the
|
||
structure...evolution in action
|
||
- humans who use these systems forget how the commands work,
|
||
where things are stored, how to unsubscribe from lists,
|
||
etc. (This is just one reason the various sub-lists of our
|
||
list have seldom gotten much traffic: people use what they
|
||
are most used to using, and forget the rest.)
|
||
- computer agents (scripts, programs) which use these systems
|
||
often "break" when the underlying system changes. A good
|
||
example of this are the remailer sites, and scripts to use
|
||
them. As remailer sites go up and down, as keys change, as
|
||
other things change, the scripts must change to keep pace.
|
||
- This very document is another example. Scattered throughout
|
||
are references to sites, programs, sources, etc. As time
|
||
goes by, more and more of them will (inevitably) become
|
||
obsolete. (My hope is that enough of the pointers will
|
||
point to still-extant things so as to make the pointers
|
||
remain useful. And I'll try to update/correct the bad
|
||
pointers.)
|
||
17.8.2. "Out of Control"
|
||
- Kevin Kelly's book
|
||
- inability to have precise control, and how this is
|
||
consistent with evolution, emergent properties, limits of
|
||
formal models
|
||
- crypto, degrees of freedom
|
||
+ imagine nets of the near future
|
||
- ten-fold increase in sites, users, domains
|
||
- ATM switching fabrics..granularity of transactions
|
||
changes...convergence of computing and communications...
|
||
+ distributed computation ( which, by the way, surely needs
|
||
crypto security!)
|
||
- Joule, Digital Silk Road
|
||
- agents, etc.
|
||
+ can't control the distribution of information
|
||
+ As with the Amateur Action BBS case, access can't be
|
||
controlled.
|
||
- "The existance of gateways and proxy servers means that
|
||
there is no effective way to determine where any
|
||
information you make accessible will eventually end up.
|
||
Somebody in, say, Tennessee can easily get at an FTP
|
||
site in California through a proxy in Switzerland.
|
||
Even detailed information about what kind of
|
||
information is considered contraband in every
|
||
jurisdiction in the world won't help, unless every
|
||
*gateway* in the world has it and uses it as well."
|
||
[Stephen R. Savitzky, comp.org.eff.talk, 1994-08-08]
|
||
17.8.3. A fertile union of cryptology, game theory, economics, and
|
||
ecology
|
||
+ crypto has long ignored economics, except peripherally, as
|
||
an engineering issue (how long encryption takes, etc.)
|
||
- in particular, areas of reputation, risk, etc. have not
|
||
been treated as central idea...perhaps proper for
|
||
mathematical algorithm work
|
||
- but economics is clearly central to the systems being
|
||
planned...digital cash, data havens, remailers, etc.
|
||
+ why cash works so well...locality of reference, immediate
|
||
clearing of transactions, forces computations down to
|
||
relevant units
|
||
- reduces complaints, "he made me do it" arguments...that
|
||
is, increases self-responsibility...caveat emptor
|
||
+ game theory
|
||
+ ripe for treatment of "Alice and Bob" sorts of
|
||
situations, in which agents with different agendas are
|
||
interacting and competing
|
||
- "defecting" as in Prisoner's Dilemma
|
||
- payoff matrices for various behaviors
|
||
- evolutionary game theory
|
||
- evolutionary learning, genetic algorithms/programmming
|
||
- protocol ecologies
|
||
|
||
17.9. Crypto Standards
|
||
17.9.1. The importance of standards
|
||
- a critical role
|
||
+ Part of standards is validation, test suites, etc.
|
||
- validating the features and security of a remailer,
|
||
through pings, tests, performance tests, reliability,
|
||
etc.
|
||
- thus imposing a negative hit on those who fail
|
||
+ There are many ways to do this standards testing
|
||
- market reports (as with commercial chips, software)
|
||
- "seals of approval" (especially convenient with digital
|
||
sigs)
|
||
|
||
17.10. Crypto Research
|
||
17.10.1. Academic research continues to increase
|
||
17.10.2. "What's the future of crypto?"
|
||
- Predicting the future is notoriously difficult. IBM didn't
|
||
think many computers would ever be sold, Western Union
|
||
passed on the chance to buy Bell's telephone patents. And
|
||
so on. The future is always cloudy, the past is always
|
||
clear and obvious.
|
||
- We'll know in 30 years which of our cypherpunkish and
|
||
cryptoanarchist predictions came to pass--and which didn't.
|
||
17.10.3. Ciphers are somewhat like knots...the right sequence of moves
|
||
unties them, the wrong sequence only makes them more tangled.
|
||
("Knot theory" is becoming a hot topic in math and physics
|
||
(work of Vaughn Jones, string theory, etc.) and I suspect
|
||
there are some links between knot theory and crypto.)
|
||
17.10.4. Game theory, reputations, crypto -- a lot to be done here
|
||
- a missing link, an area not covered in academic cryptology
|
||
research
|
||
- distributed trust models, collusion, cooperation,
|
||
evolutionary game theory, ecologies, systems
|
||
17.10.5. More advanced areas, newer approaches
|
||
+ some have suggested quasigroups, Latin squares, finite
|
||
automata, etc. Quasigroups are important in the IDEA
|
||
cipher, and in some DES work. (I won't speculate furher
|
||
about an area I no almost nothing about....I'd heard of
|
||
semigroups, but not quasigroups.)
|
||
- "The "Block Mixing Transform" technology which I have
|
||
been promoting on sci.crypt for much of this spring and
|
||
summer is a Latin square technology. (This was part of
|
||
my "Large Block DES" project, which eventually produced
|
||
the "Fenced DES" cipher as a possible DES
|
||
upgrade.)....Each of the equations in a Block Mixing
|
||
Transform is the equation for a Latin square. The
|
||
multiple equations in such a transform together represent
|
||
orthogonal Latin squares. [Terry Ritter, sci.crypt, 1994-
|
||
08-15]
|
||
+ But what about for public key uses? Here's something Perry
|
||
Metzger ran across:
|
||
- ""Finte Automata, Latin arrays, and Cryptography" by Tao
|
||
Renji, Institute of Software, Academia Sinica, Beijing.
|
||
This (as yet unpublished) paper covers several
|
||
fascinating topics, including some very fast public key
|
||
methods -- unfortunately in too little detail. Hopefully
|
||
a published version will appear soon..." [P.M.,
|
||
sci.crypt, 1994-08-14]
|
||
17.10.6. Comments on crypto state of the art today vs. what is likely
|
||
to be coming
|
||
- Perry Metzger comments on today's practical difficulties:
|
||
"...can the difference between "crypto can be transforming
|
||
when the technology matures" and "crypto is mature now" be
|
||
that unobvious?....One of the reasons I'm involved with the
|
||
IETF IPSP effort is because the crypto stuff has to be
|
||
transparent and ubiquitous before it is going to be truly
|
||
useful -- in its current form its just junk. Hopefully,
|
||
later versions of PGP will also interface well with the new
|
||
standards being developed for an integrated secure message
|
||
body type in MIME. (PGP also requires some sort of scalable
|
||
and reverse mapable keyid system -- the current keyids are
|
||
not going to allow key servers to scale in a distributed
|
||
manner.) Yes, I've seen the shell scripts and the rest, and
|
||
they really require too much effort for most people -- and
|
||
at best, once you have things set up, you can now securely
|
||
read some email at some sites. I know that for myself,
|
||
given that I read a large fraction of my mail while working
|
||
at clients, where I emphatically do not trust the hardware,
|
||
every encrypted message means great inconvenience,
|
||
regardless." [Perry Metzger, 1994-08-25]
|
||
|
||
17.11. Crypto Armageddon? Cryptageddon?
|
||
17.11.1. "Will there be a "Waco in cyberspace"?"
|
||
- while some of us are very vocal here, and are probably
|
||
known to the authorities, this is not generally the case.
|
||
Many of the users of strong crypto will be discreet and
|
||
will not give outward appearances of being code-using
|
||
crypto anarchist cultists.
|
||
17.11.2. Attacks to come
|
||
- "You'll see these folks attacking anonymous remailers,
|
||
cryptography, psuedonymous accounts, and other tools of
|
||
coercion-free expression and information interchange on
|
||
the net, ironically often in the name of promoting
|
||
"commerce". You'll hear them rant and rave about
|
||
"criminals" and "terrorists", as if they even had a good
|
||
clue about the laws of the thousands of jurisdictions
|
||
criss-crossed by the Internet, and as if their own attempts
|
||
to enable coercion bear no resemblance to the practice of
|
||
terrorism. The scary thing is, they really think they
|
||
have a good idea about what all those laws should be, and
|
||
they're perfectly willing to shove it down our throats,
|
||
regardless of the vast diversity of culture, intellectual,
|
||
political, and legal opinion on the planet."
|
||
[<an50@desert.hacktic.nl> (Nobody), libtech-l@netcom.com,
|
||
1994-06-08]
|
||
+ why I'm not sanguine about Feds
|
||
- killing Randy Weaver's wife and son from a distance,
|
||
after trumped-up weapons charges
|
||
- burning alive the Koresh compound, on trumped-up charges
|
||
of Satanism, child abuse, and wife-insulting
|
||
- seizures of boats, cars, etc., on "suspicion" of
|
||
involvement with drugs
|
||
|
||
17.12. "The Future's So Bright, I Gotta Wear Shades"
|
||
17.12.1. Despite the occasionally gloomy predictions, things look
|
||
pretty good.No guarantees, of course, but trends that are
|
||
favorable. No reason for us to rest, though.
|
||
17.12.2. Duncan Frissell puts it this way:
|
||
- "Trade is way up. Wealth is way up. International travel
|
||
is way up. Migration is way up. Resource prices are the
|
||
lowest in human history. Communications costs are way
|
||
down. Electronics costs are way down. We are in a zero or
|
||
negative inflation environment. The quantity and quality
|
||
of goods and services offered on the markets is at an all-
|
||
time high. The percentage of the world's countries headed
|
||
by dictators is the lowest it's ever been.
|
||
|
||
"What all this means is that political philosophies that
|
||
depend on force of arms to push people into line, will
|
||
increasingly fail to work. Rich people with choices will,
|
||
when coerced, tend to change their investments and
|
||
business affairs into a friendlier form or to move to a
|
||
friendlier environment. Choice is real. If choices
|
||
exist, they will be made. An ever higher proportion of the
|
||
world's people will be "rich" in wealth and choice as the
|
||
years go on.
|
||
|
||
"Only a political philosophy that depends on the uncoerced
|
||
cooperation of very different people has a chance of
|
||
functioning in the future." [Duncan Frissell, 1994-09-09]
|
||
|
||
17.13. "Will cryptography really bring on the Millenium?"
|
||
17.13.1. Yes. And cats will move in with dogs, Snapple will rain from
|
||
the sky, and P will be shown unequal to NP.
|
||
17.13.2. Seriously, the implications of strong privacy, of
|
||
cyberspatial economies, and of borders becoming transparent
|
||
are enormous. The way governments do business is already
|
||
changing, and this will change things even more dramatically.
|
||
The precise form may be unpredictable, but certain end states
|
||
are fairly easy to predict in broad brush strokes.
|
||
17.13.3. "How do we know the implications of crypto are what I've
|
||
claimed?"
|
||
- We can't know the future.
|
||
- Printing, railroads, electrification
|
||
17.13.4. "When will it all happen? When will strong crypto really
|
||
begin to have a major effect on the economy?"
|
||
+ Stages:
|
||
- The Prehistoric Era. Prior to 1975. NSA and other
|
||
intelligence agencies controlled most crypto work.
|
||
Cryptography seen as a hobby. DES just starting to be
|
||
deployed by banks and financial institutions.
|
||
- The Research Era. 1975-1992. Intense interest in public
|
||
key discovery, in various protocols. Start of several
|
||
"Crypto" conferences. Work on digital money, DC-Nets,
|
||
timestamping, etc.
|
||
- The Activism Era. 1992--?? (probably 1998). PGP 2.0
|
||
released. Cypherpunks formed. Clipper announced--meets
|
||
firestorm of protest. EFF, CPSR, EPIC, other groups.
|
||
"Wired" starts publication. Digital Telelphony, other
|
||
bills. Several attempts to start crypto businesses are
|
||
made...most founder.
|
||
- The Transition Era. After about 1999. Businesses start.
|
||
Digital cash needed for Net transactions. Networks and
|
||
computers fast enough to allow more robust protocols. Tax
|
||
havens flourish. "New Underworld Order" (credit to Claire
|
||
Sterling) flourishes.
|
||
- It is premature to expect that the current environment--
|
||
technological and regulatory--will be beneficial to the
|
||
type of strong crypto we favor. Too many pieces are
|
||
missing. Several more advances are needed. A few more
|
||
failures are also needed (gulp!) to show better how not to
|
||
proceed.
|
||
17.13.5. "But will crypto anarchy actually happen?"
|
||
- To a growing extent, it already is happening. Look at the
|
||
so-called illegal markets, the flows of drug money around
|
||
the world, the transfer of billions of dollars a day on
|
||
mere "chop marks," and the thriving trade in banned items.
|
||
- "Grey and black capitalism is already a major component of
|
||
international cash flows....Once adequate user friendly
|
||
software is available, the internet will accellerate this
|
||
already existing trend....Crypto anarchy is merely the
|
||
application of modern tools to assist covert capitalism."
|
||
[James Donald, 1994-08-29]
|
||
- There are arguments that a Great Crackdown is coming, that
|
||
governments will shut down illegal markets, will stop
|
||
strong crypto, will force underground economies
|
||
aboveground. This is doubtful--it's been tried for the past
|
||
several decades (or more). Prohibition merely made crime
|
||
more organized; ditto for the War on (Some) Drugs.
|
||
17.13.6. "Has the point of no return been passed on strong crypto?"
|
||
- Actually, I think that in the U.S. at least, the point was
|
||
passed decades ago, possibly a century or more ago, and
|
||
that any hope of controlling strong crypto and private
|
||
communication evaporated long ago. Abuses by the FBI in
|
||
wiretapping Americans, and reports of NSA monitoring of
|
||
domestic communications notwithstanding, it is
|
||
essentially.....
|
||
|
||
17.14. Loose Ends
|
||
17.14.1. firewalls, virtual perimeters, swIPe-type encrypted tunnels,
|
||
an end to break-ins,
|
||
17.14.2. "What kind of encryption will be used with ATM?"
|
||
- (ATM = Asynchronous Transfer Mode, not Automated Teller
|
||
Machine)
|
||
- some reports that NSA is developing standards for ATM
|
||
17.14.3. Shapes of things to come, maybe....(laws of other countries)
|
||
+ India has a fee schedule for BBS operators, e.g., they have
|
||
to pay $50,000 a year to operate a bulletin board! (This
|
||
sounds like the urban legend about the FCC planning a modem
|
||
tax, but maybe it's true.)
|
||
- "The Forum for Rights to Electronic Expression (FREE) has
|
||
been formed in India as a body dedicated to extending
|
||
fundamental rights to the electronic domain....FREE owes
|
||
its creation to an attack on Indian datacom by the Indian
|
||
government, in the form of exorbitant licence fees (a
|
||
minimum Rs. 1.5 million = US$50,000 each year for a BBS,
|
||
much higher for e-mail)." [amehta@doe.ernet.in (Dr. Arun
|
||
Mehta), forwarded by Phil Agre, comp.org.cpsr.talk, 1994-
|
||
08-31]
|
||
- for more info: ftp.eff.org
|
||
/pub/EFF/Policy/World/India/FREE
|
||
17.14.4. Cyberspace will need better protection
|
||
- to ensure spoofing and counterfeiting is reduced (recall
|
||
Habitat's problems with people figuring out the loopholes)
|
||
|
||
18. Loose Ends and Miscellaneous Topics
|
||
|
||
18.1. copyright
|
||
THE CYPHERNOMICON: Cypherpunks FAQ and More, Version 0.666,
|
||
1994-09-10, Copyright Timothy C. May. All rights reserved.
|
||
See the detailed disclaimer. Use short sections under "fair
|
||
use" provisions, with appropriate credit, but don't put your
|
||
name on my words.
|
||
|
||
18.2. SUMMARY: Loose Ends and Miscellaneous Topics
|
||
18.2.1. Main Points
|
||
18.2.2. Connections to Other Sections
|
||
18.2.3. Where to Find Additional Information
|
||
18.2.4. Miscellaneous Comments
|
||
- I hate to have a section like this, but there are just some
|
||
things that don't seem to fit neatly elsewhere
|
||
- hopefully you found this topics with your editor search
|
||
tools
|
||
|
||
18.3. Quantum Cryptography
|
||
18.3.1. "What is quantum cryptography?"
|
||
+ Two main flavors:
|
||
+ secure channels exploiting the Uncertainty Principle
|
||
+ Brassard, Bennett, fiber optic lines, short distances,
|
||
detects tapping
|
||
+ Quantum cryptography
|
||
- bits can be exchanged-albeit at fairly low
|
||
efficiencies-over a channel
|
||
- with detection of taps, via the change of
|
||
polarizations
|
||
+ Stephen Wiesner wrote a 1970 paper, half a decade
|
||
before the P-K work, which outlined this-not
|
||
published until much later
|
||
- speculate that the NSA knew about this and
|
||
quashed the publication
|
||
+ factoring of numbers using a strange Many World
|
||
interpretation
|
||
- Shor
|
||
+ hearkens to my spoof about Russians
|
||
- I never knew I hit so close to the mark!
|
||
18.3.2. "What about _quantum cryptography_?"
|
||
+ Exploiting Uncertainty Principle to make untappable
|
||
communication lines. (More precisely, tapped lines give
|
||
indication of having been tapped.)
|
||
- Bennett and Brassard
|
||
- faint flashes of light in a fiber optic cable used;
|
||
polarized photons
|
||
- Alice and Bob go through a protocol that involves them
|
||
picking Linear or Circular Polarization (LP or CP); can't
|
||
be simultaneously measured...
|
||
-
|
||
- Not likely to be important for a long time.
|
||
- An additional tool, or crypto primitive building block.
|
||
|
||
18.4. Chaotic Cryptography
|
||
18.4.1. the oscillator scheme was broken at Crypto '94
|
||
|
||
18.5. Neural Nets and AI in Crypto
|
||
18.5.1. "What about neural nets and AI in crypto?"
|
||
- Of limited use, at least in breaking modern ciphers. Marvin
|
||
Minsky once said that if you don't understand how to solve
|
||
a problem, adding randomness usually doesn't help.
|
||
- The shape of the solution space is very spiky, very poorly-
|
||
suited to hill-climbing or divide-and-conquer methods
|
||
+ Neural nets are not likely to do well with modern ciphers
|
||
(e.g., RSA, IDEA, DES, etc.), mainly because of the shape
|
||
of the solution space. Instead of the "rolling hills and
|
||
valleys" that neural nets (and related methods, such as
|
||
genetic algorithms, simulated annealing, etc.) do well in,
|
||
the solution space for modern ciphers offers very little in
|
||
the way of "learning" opportunities: you either have the
|
||
solution (the key), or you don't.
|
||
|
||
Think of a needle standing up from a flat plain...a NN or
|
||
any other hill-climber could wander for years and never
|
||
find it. Well-designed modern ciphers like RSA and IDEA
|
||
appear to admit no analysis based on "nonrandom"
|
||
properties. If anybody has found shortcuts to factoring the
|
||
modulus in RSA, for example, they haven't let on.
|
||
|
||
I suspect there are uses in peripheral aspects, such as
|
||
guessing passwords (when people have not picked high-
|
||
entropy passwords, but have instead used familiar names).
|
||
Or in traffic analysis. Those who munch on lots of traffic
|
||
may well be using neural nets, custom signal processing,
|
||
etc. to "prepare" the captured traffic for further
|
||
analysis. A safe bet, in fact.
|
||
|
||
But the move in modern cryptology is definitely away from
|
||
using anything with "structure" that can be learned. Put
|
||
another way, neural nets and such work well in structured
|
||
environments, where there's something to _learn), but not
|
||
in the high-entropy, seemingly random world of encrypted
|
||
data.
|
||
+ AI may be useful in other areas
|
||
- protocol generation
|
||
- SIGINT
|
||
18.5.2. Evolutionary or Genetic Programming
|
||
- a la Holland, Koza
|
||
- RNGs
|
||
|
||
18.6. Miscellaneous Advanced Crypto Ideas
|
||
18.6.1. "Why have provably "NP-complete" problems not found uses in
|
||
crypto?"
|
||
- One of the great Unresolved Mysteries! Or the Holy Grail,
|
||
if you will.
|
||
- The issue is why have provably hard (or NP-complete, to be
|
||
more accurate) problems not been used? (Factoring is not
|
||
known to NP-complete...experts can correct my phrasing here
|
||
if I'm misstating things.)
|
||
- It would be nice if a provably hard problem, such as the
|
||
domino tiling problem, or 3SAT, or other such things out of
|
||
Garey and Johnson's book on NP-Completeness could be used.
|
||
This would increase confidence in ciphers still further.
|
||
18.6.2. "Can cellular automata, like Conway's "Game of Life," be used
|
||
for cryptography?"
|
||
- Stephen Wolfram proposed use of cellular automata for
|
||
crytography some years back; his collection of essays on
|
||
cellular automata contains at least one such mention. Many
|
||
people suspected that 1D CAs were no stronger than linear
|
||
feedback shift registers (LFSRs), and I recally hearing a
|
||
couple of years ago that someone proved 1D CAs (and maybe
|
||
all CAs?) are equivalent to LFSRs, which have been used in
|
||
crypto for many years.
|
||
- Wolfram's book is "Theory and Applications of Cellular
|
||
Automata," 1986, World Scientific. Several papers on using
|
||
CAs for random sequence generation. P. Bardell showed
|
||
in1990 that CAs produce the outputs of LFSRs.) Wolfram also
|
||
has a paper, "Cryptography with cellular automata," in
|
||
Proc. CRYPTO 85.
|
||
- Intuitively, the idea of a CA looks attractive for "one-way
|
||
functions," for the reasons mentioned. But what's the
|
||
"trapdoor" that gives the key holder a shortcut to reverse
|
||
the process? (Public key crypto needs a trapdoor 1-way
|
||
funtion that is easy to reverse if one has the right
|
||
information).
|
||
|
||
18.7. Viruses and Crypto
|
||
18.7.1. "What's the connection between Cypherpunks and viruses?"
|
||
- Like, dewd, it's so kool.
|
||
- Beavis 'n Butthead use PGP (actually, Eric Hughes proposed
|
||
at one point that we suggest a crypto tie-in to the
|
||
writers)
|
||
- There's only peripheral connection.
|
||
- Viruses can be spread with anonymous remailers, but digital
|
||
signatures can be used to safeguard software. Signed
|
||
software, no mods allowed.
|
||
18.7.2. "What about the "encryption viruses," like KOH?"
|
||
- (A little far afield, but the issue does come up.)
|
||
- Somebody asked about this on sci.crypt and Vesselin
|
||
Bontchev said: "This topic has been debated to death in
|
||
alt.security.pgp, when somebody posted KOH, without even a
|
||
warning that it is a virus.....Both viruses indeed use the
|
||
IDEA cipher - the same that is used both by SecureDevice
|
||
and SecureDrive. However, the viruses pose some significant
|
||
threats to the integrity of your data, exactly because of
|
||
their viral replication means.....Also, if you aquire it by
|
||
viral means, you do not get the doumentation and one
|
||
utility, both of which are essential for the proper usage
|
||
of the product - thus proving one more time that its viral
|
||
capabilities are unnecessary and harmful. Also, the virus
|
||
does not come in source, which means that it could have
|
||
some hidden backdoors or simply security flaws, and you
|
||
have no way to check this or to fix them. At last, in some
|
||
cases the virus could destroy valuable information during
|
||
its replication process."
|
||
- "In short - don't use them. You will gain nothing over
|
||
using
|
||
stand-alone encryption programs, and you'll expose your
|
||
data's
|
||
integrity to significant risks. Those viruses are
|
||
completely useless
|
||
and even harmful; they have been created with the only
|
||
reason to
|
||
condone the illicit activities of the virus writers, by
|
||
claiming that
|
||
computer viruses can be "useful"." [Vesselin Bontchev,
|
||
sci.crypt, 1994-08-31]
|
||
18.7.3. "What about viruses? Are there any ties to crypto and
|
||
Cypherpunks themes?"
|
||
- No direct link that any of us see clearly. Occasionally a
|
||
virus fan sees the "punks" name and thinks we're involved
|
||
in writing viruses. (Actually, a few folks on the list have
|
||
virus expertise.)
|
||
- Crypto may protect against viruses, by having code signed.
|
||
And the reliance on self-responsibility and self-protection
|
||
is in contrast to the legal approach, which tends not to
|
||
work too well for virus protection (by the covert nature of
|
||
many viruses).
|
||
18.7.4. "What interests do Cypherpunks have in viruses?"
|
||
- Not much, though the topic comes up periodically.
|
||
- Some overlap in the communities involved.
|
||
- And there are some virus methods which use forms of
|
||
encryption.
|
||
- Also, digital signatures on code can be used to ensure that
|
||
code has not been modified since being released by the
|
||
original author.
|
||
|
||
18.8. Making Money in Crypto
|
||
18.8.1. "How can I make money in crypto?"
|
||
- crypto experts are hired by software companies
|
||
+ start up companies
|
||
- a tough road
|
||
- not clear that even Phil Zimmermann has made money
|
||
- and even RSADSI is facing a challenge (hasn't gone
|
||
public, not a cash cow, etc.)
|
||
- There may be an explosive growth--the phase change I often
|
||
talk about--and many opportunities will emerge. But, having
|
||
said this, I still don't see obvious opportunities right
|
||
now. And starting a company based on hope and ideology,
|
||
rather than supplying a real market or pushing real
|
||
technology (market pull vs. technology push argument) seem
|
||
misguided.
|
||
|
||
18.9. The Net
|
||
18.9.1. Limitations of the current net
|
||
- interoperability
|
||
+ subsidized, not pay as you go
|
||
- makes spamming inevitable, doesn't allocate resources to
|
||
those who want them the most
|
||
- this will require digicash in a better form than most
|
||
users now have access to
|
||
- sysadmins get worried
|
||
- encryption sometimes banned
|
||
- common carrier status not clear
|
||
- general cruftiness of Net ("imminent death of Usenet
|
||
predicted")
|
||
|
||
18.10. Duress Switches, Dead Man Switches
|
||
18.10.1. "What about "duress" codes for additional security?"
|
||
- Where a harmless decrytion can be done, or an alarm sent.
|
||
+ Examples
|
||
- sending alarm, like an under the counter alarm button
|
||
- decrypting a bank card number for a lesser-value account
|
||
- two sets of books (not strictly a "duress" code, unless
|
||
you view the IRS as causing duress)
|
||
- alarms to associates, as in cells
|
||
- " Having a separate authentication mechanism that is used
|
||
under duress is a very good idea that some existing systems
|
||
already
|
||
employ.... From a systems point of view, it is hard to
|
||
figure out exactly how the system should respond when it
|
||
recognizes a duress authentication....The safe inside the
|
||
ATM machines used by BayBanks (Boston Mass) can be opened
|
||
with two combinations. One combination sends an alarm to
|
||
the bank via a separate phone line (not the one used to
|
||
perform the ATM transaction). The alarm phone line is also
|
||
connected to a conventional panic switch." [Bob Baldwin,
|
||
Duress Passwords/PINs/Combinations, 1993-11-18]
|
||
18.10.2. Duress switches, dead man switches, etc.
|
||
+ "Digital flash paper," can be triggered to erase files,
|
||
etc.
|
||
- (BATF and DEA raiders may have sophisticated means of
|
||
disabling computers)
|
||
+ Duress codes..."erase my files," ways of not giving esrowed
|
||
information unless proper code is given, etc.
|
||
+ "Don't release if I am under indictment"
|
||
- interesting issues about secret indictments, about
|
||
publicity of such cases, access to court records by
|
||
offshore computers, etc.
|
||
18.10.3. Personal security for disks, dead man switches
|
||
+ I have heard that some BBS operators install dead man
|
||
switches near the doors to rooms containing their
|
||
systems...entering the room without flipping the switch
|
||
causes some action to be taken
|
||
- erasing a disk, dumping a RAM disk (a dangerous way to
|
||
store data, given power failures, soft errors, restarts,
|
||
etc.)
|
||
|
||
18.11. Can Encryption be Detected?
|
||
18.11.1. "Can messages be scanned and checked for encryption?"
|
||
- If the encryption produces _markers_ or other indications,
|
||
then of course. "BEGIN PGP" is a pretty clear beacon. (Such
|
||
markers assists in decryption by the recipient, but are not
|
||
essential. "Stealth" versions of PGP and other encryption
|
||
programs--such as S-Tools for DOS--don't have such
|
||
markers.)
|
||
- If the encryption produces "random-looking" stuff, then
|
||
entropy measures and other statistical tests may or may not
|
||
be able detect such messages reliably. Depends on what non-
|
||
encrypted messages look like, and how the algorithm works.
|
||
+ Steganography:
|
||
- making messages look like normal ones
|
||
- tucking th ebits in with other random-like bits, such as
|
||
in the low-order bits of images or sound files
|
||
- The practical concern depends on one's local political
|
||
environment. In many countries, mere suspicion of using
|
||
crypto could put one in real danger.
|
||
|
||
18.12. Personal Digital Assistants, Newtons, etc.
|
||
18.12.1. "Are there cryptographic uses for things like Newtons?"
|
||
- Probably. Eventually. Digital wallets, portable key
|
||
holders, local agents for access, etc.
|
||
+ Meanwhile, a few encryption programs exist. Here's one:
|
||
- -> nCrypt, the strong cryptography application for
|
||
Newton:
|
||
-> ftp.sumex-aim.stanford.edu/info-mac/nwt/utils/n-crypt-
|
||
lite.hqx
|
||
|
||
18.13. Physical Security
|
||
18.13.1. "Can fiber optical cables be tapped?"
|
||
+ Yes. Light can escape from the fiber in bends, and "near-
|
||
field" tapping is theoretically possible, at least under
|
||
lab conditions. Active measures for puncturing cable
|
||
shields and tapping fibers are also possible.
|
||
- "The Fed's want a cost effective F/O tap. My company was
|
||
approached to develop such a system, can be done but not
|
||
cheap like copper wire tapping." [
|
||
domonkos@access.digex.net (andy domonkos),
|
||
comp.org.eff.talk, 1994-06-29]
|
||
- Los Alamos technology? 1990?
|
||
|
||
18.14. Attacking Governments
|
||
18.14.1. "termites" (rumors, psy-ops) that can undermine governments,
|
||
followed by "torpedoes" (direct attack)
|
||
18.14.2. WASTE (War Against Strong, Tamper-resistant Encryption).
|
||
|
||
18.15. Cypherpunks List Issues
|
||
18.15.1. too much noise on the list?
|
||
- "Of all the lists I'm subscribed to, this is the only one
|
||
that I read
|
||
*every* article in. Even the "noise" articles. Humans
|
||
being what
|
||
they are, the noise is needed to help decide the direction
|
||
of the
|
||
group. Besides, for those of us who are just starting on
|
||
our journey
|
||
through crypto-underworld need the noise to help
|
||
familiarize
|
||
ourselves with how crypto works. I've learned more from
|
||
the informal
|
||
ramblings than I've gathered out of all the formal and/or
|
||
mathematical
|
||
postings to date." [Patrick E. Hykkonen, 5-25-93]
|
||
|
||
18.16. Tamper-Resistant Modules
|
||
18.16.1. TRMs--claims that "Picbuster" processor can be locally
|
||
overwritten with focussed or directed UV (OTP)
|
||
18.16.2. tamper-resistant modules have some downsides as well
|
||
- cash registers for ensuring compliance with all relevant
|
||
sales tax, value-added tax (VAT), and rationing rules; a
|
||
tamper-resistant module cash register could be the
|
||
enforcement mechanism for a national security state.
|
||
- "observers"
|
||
|
||
18.17. Deeper Connections
|
||
18.17.1. In several places I've referred to "deep connections" between
|
||
things like crypto, money, game theory, evolutionary
|
||
ecologies, human motivations, and the nature of law. By this
|
||
I mean that there are deeper, unifying principles. Principles
|
||
involving locality, identity, and disclosure of knowledge. A
|
||
good example: the deep fairness of "cut-and-choose" protocols-
|
||
-I've seen mention of this in game theory tesxts, but not
|
||
much discussion of other, similar protocols.
|
||
18.17.2. For example, below the level of number theory and algorithms
|
||
in cryptology lies a level dealing with "identity," "proof,"
|
||
"collusion," and other such core concepts, concepts that can
|
||
almost be dealt with independent of the acual algorithms
|
||
(though the concrete realization of public key methods took
|
||
this out of the abstract realm of philosophy and made it
|
||
important to analyze). And these abstract concepts are linked
|
||
to other fields, such as economics, human psychology, law,
|
||
and evolutionary game theory (the study of evolved strategies
|
||
in multi-agent systems, e.g., human beings interacting and
|
||
trading with each other).
|
||
18.17.3. I believe there are important questions about why things work
|
||
the way they do at this level. To be concrete, why do threats
|
||
of physical coercion create market distortions and what
|
||
effects does this have? Or, what is the nature of emergent
|
||
behavior in reputation-based systems? (The combinatiion of
|
||
crypto and economics is a fertile area, barely touched upon
|
||
by the academic cryptology community.) Why is locality is
|
||
important, and what does this mean for digital cash? Why does
|
||
regulation often produce _more_ crime?
|
||
18.17.4. Crypto and the related ideas of reputation, identity, and
|
||
webs of trust has introduced a new angle into economic
|
||
matters. I suspect there are a couple of Nobel Prizes in
|
||
Economics for those who integrate these important concepts.
|
||
|
||
18.18. Loose End Loose Ends
|
||
18.18.1. What the core issues are...a tough thing to analyze
|
||
- untraceablility as a basic construct has major implications
|
||
+ can often ask what the implications would be if, say:
|
||
- invisibility existed
|
||
- untraceability existed
|
||
- By "tough to analyze" I mean that things are often
|
||
coflated, mixed together. Is it the "reputations" that
|
||
matter, or the "anonymity"? The "untraceability" or the
|
||
"digital money"?
|
||
18.18.2. Price signalling in posts...for further information
|
||
+ When an article is posted, and there is more complete
|
||
information available elsewhere by ftp, gopher, mosaic,
|
||
etc., then how is this to to be signalled without actually
|
||
advertising prominently?
|
||
- why not a code, like the "Geek code" so many people put
|
||
in their sigs? The code could be parsed by a reader and
|
||
used to automatically fetch the information, pay for it,
|
||
etc. (Agents that can be built in to newsreaders.)
|
||
18.18.3. "What should Cypherpunks support for "cable" or "set-top box"
|
||
standards?
|
||
- Caveats: My opinions, offered only to help frame the
|
||
debate. And many of us reject the idea of government-
|
||
mandated "standards," so my phrasing here is not meant to
|
||
imply support of such standards.
|
||
+ Major alternatives:
|
||
+ Set-top box, with t.v. as core of access to "information
|
||
superhighway."
|
||
+ Problems:
|
||
- limited number of channels, even if "500 channels"
|
||
- makes t.v. the focus, loses some other capabilities
|
||
- few consumers will have television sets with the
|
||
resolution capabilities that even current computer
|
||
monitors have (there are reasons for this: size of
|
||
monitors (related to viewing distance), NTSC
|
||
constraints, age of televisions, etc.)
|
||
+ Switched-packet cable, as in ATM or even SONET
|
||
(Synchronous Optical Network) access
|
||
+ Advantages:
|
||
- Television is just one more switched-packet
|
||
transmission, not using up the bandwidth
|
||
+ Radical Proposal: Complete deregulation
|
||
+ let cable suppliers--especially of optical fibers,
|
||
which are small and unobtrusive--lay fibers to any home
|
||
they can negotiate access to
|
||
- e.g., by piggybacking on telephone lines, electrical
|
||
cables, etc. (to remove the objection about unsightly
|
||
new poles or cables being strung...should not be an
|
||
issue with fiber optics)
|
||
- let the market decide...let customers decide
|
||
+ In my view, government standards are a terrible idea here.
|
||
Sure, NTSC was an effective standard, but it likely would
|
||
have emerged without government involvement. Ditto for
|
||
Ethernet and a zillion other standards. No need for
|
||
government involvement.
|
||
- Of course, when industry groups meet to discuss
|
||
standards, one hopes that antitrust laws will not be
|
||
invoked.
|
||
18.18.4. minor point: the importance of "But does it scale?" is often
|
||
exaggerated
|
||
- in many cases, it's much more important to simply get
|
||
something deployed than it is to worry in advance about how
|
||
it will break if too many people use it (e.g., MacDonald's
|
||
worrying in 1955 about scalabilty of their business).
|
||
- Remailer networks, for example, may not scale especially
|
||
well in their current form...but who cares? Getting them
|
||
used will allow further refinement.
|
||
|
||
19. Appendices
|
||
|
||
19.1. copyright
|
||
THE CYPHERNOMICON: Cypherpunks FAQ and More, Version 0.666,
|
||
1994-09-10, Copyright Timothy C. May. All rights reserved.
|
||
See the detailed disclaimer. Use short sections under "fair
|
||
use" provisions, with appropriate credit, but don't put your
|
||
name on my words.
|
||
|
||
19.2. SUMMARY: Appendices
|
||
19.2.1. Main Points
|
||
19.2.2. Connections to Other Sections
|
||
19.2.3. Where to Find Additional Information
|
||
19.2.4. Miscellaneous Comments
|
||
- This is still under construction
|
||
- Disorganized!!!
|
||
- URLs need to be checked
|
||
|
||
19.3. Appendix -- Sites, Addresses, URL/Web Sites, Etc.
|
||
19.3.1. be sure to get soda address straight!!! [use clones]
|
||
- I received mine from soda.csua.berkeley.edu
|
||
the menus are: /pub/cypherpunks/pgp/pgp26
|
||
|
||
19.3.2. How to use this section
|
||
+ comment on URLs being only a snapshot...
|
||
- use reply to Sherry Mayo here
|
||
19.3.3. General Crypto and Cypherpunks Sites
|
||
- sci.crypt archive: anon ftp to ftp.wimsey.bc.ca:/pub/crypto
|
||
[Mark Henderson]
|
||
+ ftp://soda.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/Home.html [has
|
||
probably been changed to soda.csua.edu site]
|
||
- ftp://ftp.u.washington.edu/public/phantom/cpunk/README.ht
|
||
ml
|
||
- ftp://furmint.nectar.cs.cmu.edu/security/cypheressay/what-
|
||
is-cypherpunk.html [Vincent Cate, 1994-07-03]
|
||
- ftp://wiretap.spies.com/Gov/World/usa.con
|
||
- http://www.quadralay.com/www/Crypt/Crypt.html
|
||
- http://cs.indiana.edu/ripem/dir.html
|
||
- misc. article on crypto:
|
||
http://www.quadralay.com/www/Crypt/Crypt.html
|
||
- ftp.wimsey.bc.ca:/pub/crypto has REDOC III, Loki91, SHS and
|
||
HAVAL (Mark Henderson, markh@vanbc.wimsey.com, 4-17-94,
|
||
sci.crypt>
|
||
+ Some misc. ftp sites to check:
|
||
- soda.berkeley.edu
|
||
- ftp.informatik.uni-hamburg.de
|
||
- ripem.msu.edu
|
||
- garbo.uwasa.fi
|
||
- wimsey.bc.ca
|
||
- ghost.dsi.unimi.it
|
||
- http://rsa.com
|
||
- PC Expo disk package to ftp.wimsey.bc.ca [Arsen Ray
|
||
Arachelian, 1994-07-05]
|
||
+ PC Expo disk
|
||
- ftp.wimsey.bc.ca
|
||
/pub/crypto/software/dist/US_or_Canada_only_XXXXXXXX/pcxp
|
||
o/pcxpo.zip
|
||
- "The FTP site ripem.msu.edu has a bunch of crypto stuff."
|
||
[Mark Riordan, 1994-07-08]
|
||
+ URL for "Applied Cryptography"-related files
|
||
- http://www.openmarket.com/info/cryptography/applied_crypt
|
||
ography.html
|
||
19.3.4. PGP Information and Sites
|
||
+ http://www.mantis.co.uk/pgp/pgp.html
|
||
- information on where to find PGP
|
||
+ pgpinfo@mantis.co.uk
|
||
- send any mail to this site and receive a list back of PGP
|
||
sites
|
||
- PGP info: ftp.netcom.com, in /pub/gbe and in /pub/qwerty
|
||
- more PGP:
|
||
ftp:csn.org//mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp
|
||
<Michael Paul Johnson, mpj@csn.org, Colorado Catacombs, 4-8-
|
||
94>
|
||
- For non-U.S. sources of PGP: send blank mail to
|
||
pgpinfo@mantis.co.uk
|
||
+ Sherry Mayo, a crypto researcher in Australia, is also
|
||
making versions available:
|
||
- "PGP2.6ui is available (I hope!) on my experimental WWW
|
||
server, aim your browser at
|
||
http://rschp2.anu.edu.au:8080/crypt.html I am new to
|
||
this WWW thing so let me know if you have any probs
|
||
downloading. Available on the server is:
|
||
PGP2.6ui source for unix machines
|
||
Executable for the PC version of PGP 2.6ui
|
||
Executable for MacPGP 2.3" [Sherry Mayo,
|
||
talk.politics.crypto, 1994-09-06]
|
||
19.3.5. Key Servers
|
||
+ pgp-public-keys@demon.co.uk
|
||
- HELP in the subject line for more information about how
|
||
to use
|
||
- pgp-public-keys@jpunix.com
|
||
+ pgp-public-keys@pgp.iastate.edu
|
||
- ``help'' as the subject, to get a list of keyservers
|
||
[Michael Graff <explorer@iastate.edu>, alt.security.pgp,
|
||
1994-07-04]
|
||
19.3.6. Remailer Sites
|
||
- To show active remailers: finger remailer@soda.berkeley.edu
|
||
19.3.7. Mail-to-Usenet gateways:
|
||
+ group.name@paris.ics.uci.edu
|
||
- group.name@cs.dal.ca
|
||
- group.name@ug.cs.dal.ca
|
||
- <compiled by Matthew J. Ghio, 4-18-94>
|
||
19.3.8. Government Information
|
||
+ California Legislative Information
|
||
- "You are invited to browse the new edition of my list of
|
||
Internet and direct dial sources of California government
|
||
information at URL:
|
||
www.cpsr.org/cpsr/states/california/cal_gov_info_FAQ.html
|
||
" [Chris Mays, comp.org.cpsr.talk, 1994-07-01]
|
||
|
||
+ NSA Information
|
||
- Can get on NSA/NCSC/NIST mailing list by sending to:
|
||
- csrc.nist.gov:/pub/nistpubs
|
||
19.3.9. Clipper Info
|
||
+ http://www.mantis.co.uk/~mathew/
|
||
- some good Clipper articles and testimony
|
||
19.3.10. Other
|
||
+ ftp://furmint.nectar.cs.cmu.edu/security/README.html#taxes
|
||
- Vincent Cate
|
||
- http://www.acns.nwu.edu/surfpunk/
|
||
+ Export Laws
|
||
- "EFF Board member and Cygnus Support co-founder John
|
||
Gilmore has set up a World Wide Web page on cryptography
|
||
export issues, including information on how to apply for
|
||
export clearance, exchages with Commerce Dept. on export
|
||
licensing, legal documents on networking issues in
|
||
relation to export of technology and crypto, and more.
|
||
The URL is: http://www.cygnus.com/~gnu/export.html"
|
||
[Stanton McCandlish, mech@eff.org, 1994-04-21]
|
||
+ Large integer math libraries
|
||
- ripem.msu.edu <Mark Riordan, mrr@scss3.cl.msu.edu, 4-8-
|
||
94, sci.crypt>
|
||
- ftp:csn.org//mpj <Michael Paul Johnson, 4-8-94,
|
||
sci.crypt>
|
||
+ Phrack
|
||
- archived at ftp.netsys.com
|
||
+ Bruce Sterling's comments at CFP
|
||
+ Bruce Sterling's remarks delivered at the "Computers,
|
||
Freedom and Privacy IV"
|
||
- conference , Mar. 26 1994 in Chicago, are now online at
|
||
EFF:
|
||
- ftp://ftp.eff.org/pub/Publications/Bruce_Sterling/cfp_9
|
||
4_sterling.speech
|
||
- http://www.eff.org/pub/Publications/Bruce_Sterling/cfp_
|
||
94_sterling.speech
|
||
- gopher://gopher.eff.org/11/Publications/Bruce_Sterling/
|
||
cfp_94_sterling.speech
|
||
- gopher.eff.org, 1/Publications/Bruce_Sterling,
|
||
cfp_94_sterling.speech
|
||
- (source: Stanton McCandlish * mech@eff.org, 3-31-94)
|
||
19.3.11. Crypto papers
|
||
- ftp.cs.uow.edu.au
|
||
pub/papers
|
||
- (quantum, other, Siberry, etc.)
|
||
19.3.12. CPSR URL
|
||
- CPSR URL: http://www.cpsr.org/home
|
||
|
||
19.4. Appendix -- Glossary
|
||
19.4.1. **Comments**
|
||
- Release Note: I regret that I haven't had time to add many
|
||
new entries here. There are a lot of specialized terms, and
|
||
I probably could have doubled the number of entries here.
|
||
- Much more work is needed here. In fact, I debated at one
|
||
point making the FAQ instead into a kind of "Encycopedia
|
||
Cypherpunkia," with a mix of short and long articles on
|
||
each of hundreds of topics. Such an organization would
|
||
suffer the disadvantages found in nearly all
|
||
lexicographically-organized works: confusion of the
|
||
concepts.
|
||
- Many of the these entries were compiled for a long handout
|
||
at the first Cypherpunks meeting, September, 1992. Errors
|
||
are obviously present. I'll try to keep correcting them
|
||
when I can.
|
||
- Schneier's "Applied Cryptography" is of course an excellent
|
||
place to browse for terms, special uses, etc.
|
||
19.4.2. agoric systems -- open, free market systems in which
|
||
voluntary transactions are central.
|
||
19.4.3. Alice and Bob -- crypographic protocols are often made
|
||
clearer by considering parties A and B, or Alice and Bob,
|
||
performing some protocol. Eve the eavesdropper, Paul the
|
||
prover, and Vic the verifier are other common stand-in names.
|
||
19.4.4. ANDOS -- all or nothing disclosure of secrets.
|
||
19.4.5. anonymous credential -- a credential which asserts some right
|
||
or privelege or fact without revealing the identity of the
|
||
holder. This is unlike CA driver's licenses.
|
||
19.4.6. assymmetric cipher -- same as public key cryptosystem.
|
||
19.4.7. authentication -- the process of verifying an identity or
|
||
credential, to ensure you are who you said you were.
|
||
19.4.8. biometric security -- a type of authentication using
|
||
fingerprints, retinal scans, palm prints, or other
|
||
physical/biological signatures of an individual.
|
||
19.4.9. bit commitment -- e.g., tossing a coin and then committing to
|
||
the value without being able to change the outcome. The blob
|
||
is a cryptographic primitive for this.
|
||
19.4.10. BlackNet -- an experimental scheme devised by T. May to
|
||
underscore the nature of anonymous information markets. "Any
|
||
and all" secrets can be offered for sale via anonymous
|
||
mailers and message pools. The experiment was leaked via
|
||
remailer to the Cypherpunks list (not by May) and thence to
|
||
several dozen Usenet groups by Detweiler. The authorities are
|
||
said to be investigating it.
|
||
19.4.11. blinding, blinded signatures -- A signature that the signer
|
||
does not remember having made. A blind signature is always a
|
||
cooperative protocol and the receiver of the signature
|
||
provides the signer with the blinding information.
|
||
19.4.12. blob -- the crypto equivalent of a locked box. A
|
||
cryptographic primitive for bit commitment, with the
|
||
properties that a blobs can represent a 0 or a 1, that others
|
||
cannot tell be looking whether it's a 0 or a 1, that the
|
||
creator of the blob can "open" the blob to reveal the
|
||
contents, and that no blob can be both a 1 and a 0. An
|
||
example of this is a flipped coin covered by a hand.
|
||
19.4.13. BnD --
|
||
19.4.14. Capstone --
|
||
19.4.15. channel -- the path over which messages are transmitted.
|
||
Channels may be secure or insecure, and may have
|
||
eavesdroppers (or enemies, or disrupters, etc.) who alter
|
||
messages, insert and delete messages, etc. Cryptography is
|
||
the means by which communications over insecure channels are
|
||
protected.
|
||
19.4.16. chosen plaintext attack -- an attack where the cryptanalyst
|
||
gets to choose the plaintext to be enciphered, e.g., when
|
||
possession of an enciphering machine or algorithm is in the
|
||
possession of the cryptanalyst.
|
||
19.4.17. cipher -- a secret form of writing, using substitution or
|
||
transposition of characters or symbols. (From Arabic "sifr,"
|
||
meaning "nothing.")
|
||
19.4.18. ciphertext -- the plaintext after it has been encrypted.
|
||
19.4.19. Clipper -- the infamous Clipper chip
|
||
19.4.20. code -- a restricted cryptosystem where words or letters of a
|
||
message are replaced by other words chosen from a codebook.
|
||
Not part of modern cryptology, but still useful.
|
||
19.4.21. coin flippping -- an important crypto primitive, or protocol,
|
||
in which the equivalent of flipping a fair coin is possible.
|
||
Implemented with blobs.
|
||
19.4.22. collusion -- wherein several participants cooperate to deduce
|
||
the identity of a sender or receiver, or to break a cipher.
|
||
Most cryptosystems are sensitive to some forms of collusion.
|
||
Much of the work on implementing DC Nets, for example,
|
||
involves ensuring that colluders cannot isolate message
|
||
senders and thereby trace origins and destinations of mail.
|
||
19.4.23. COMINT --
|
||
19.4.24. computationally secure -- where a cipher cannot be broken
|
||
with available computer resources, but in theory can be
|
||
broken with enough computer resources. Contrast with
|
||
unconditionally secure.
|
||
19.4.25. countermeasure -- something you do to thwart an attacker
|
||
19.4.26. credential -- facts or assertions about some entity. For
|
||
example, credit ratings, passports, reputations, tax status,
|
||
insurance records, etc. Under the current system, these
|
||
credentials are increasingly being cross-linked. Blind
|
||
signatures may be used to create anonymous credentials.
|
||
19.4.27. credential clearinghouse -- banks, credit agencies,
|
||
insurance companies, police departments, etc., that correlate
|
||
records and decide the status of records.
|
||
19.4.28. cryptanalysis -- methods for attacking and breaking ciphers
|
||
and related cryptographic systems. Ciphers may be broken,
|
||
traffic may be analyzed, and passwords may be cracked.
|
||
Computers are of course essential.
|
||
19.4.29. crypto anarchy -- the economic and political system after the
|
||
deployment of encryption, untraceable e-mail, digital
|
||
pseudonyms, cryptographic voting, and digital cash. A pun on
|
||
"crypto," meaning "hidden," and as when Gore Vidal called
|
||
William F. Buckley a "crypto fascist."
|
||
19.4.30. cryptography -- another name for cryptology.
|
||
19.4.31. cryptology -- the science and study of writing, sending,
|
||
receiving, and deciphering secret messages. Includes
|
||
authentication, digital signatures, the hiding of messages
|
||
(steganography), cryptanalysis, and several other fields.
|
||
19.4.32. cyberspace -- the electronic domain, the Nets, and computer-
|
||
generated spaces. Some say it is the "consensual reality"
|
||
described in "Neuromancer." Others say it is the phone
|
||
system. Others have work to do.
|
||
19.4.33. DC protocol, or DC-Net -- the dining cryptographers protocol.
|
||
DC-Nets use multiple participants communicating with the DC
|
||
protocol.
|
||
19.4.34. DES -- the Data Encryption Standard, proposed in 1977 by the
|
||
National Bureau of Standards (now NIST), with assistance from
|
||
the National Security Agency. Based on the "Lucifer" cipher
|
||
developed by Horst Feistel at IBM, DES is a secret key
|
||
cryptosystem that cycles 64-bit blocks of data through
|
||
multiple permutations with a 56-bit key controlling the
|
||
routing. "Diffusion" and "confusion" are combined to form a
|
||
cipher that has not yet been cryptanalyzed (see "DES,
|
||
Security of"). DES is in use for interbank transfers, as a
|
||
cipher inside of several RSA-based systems, and is available
|
||
for PCs.
|
||
19.4.35. DES, Security of -- many have speculated that the NSA placed
|
||
a trapdoor (or backdoor) in DES to allow it to read DES-
|
||
encrypted messages. This has not been proved. It is known
|
||
that the original Lucifer algorithm used a 128-bit key and
|
||
that this key length was shortened to 64 bits (56 bits plus 8
|
||
parity bits), ths making exhaustive search much easier (so
|
||
far as is known, brute-force search has not been done, though
|
||
it should be feasible today). Shamir and Bihan have used a
|
||
technique called "differential cryptanalysis" to reduce the
|
||
exhaustive search needed for chosen plaintext attacks (but
|
||
with no import for ordinary DES).
|
||
19.4.36. differential cryptanalysis -- the Shamir-Biham technique for
|
||
cryptanalyzing DES. With a chosen plaintext attack, they've
|
||
reduced the number of DES keys that must be tried from about
|
||
2^56 to about 2^47 or less. Note, however, that rarely can an
|
||
attacker mount a chosen plaintext attack on DES systems.
|
||
19.4.37. digital cash, digital money -- Protocols for transferring
|
||
value, monetary or otherwise, electronically. Digital cash
|
||
usually refers to systems that are anonymous. Digital money
|
||
systems can be used to implement any quantity that is
|
||
conserved, such as points, mass, dollars, etc. There are
|
||
many variations of digital money systems, ranging from VISA
|
||
numbers to blinded signed digital coins. A topic too large
|
||
for a single glossary entry.
|
||
19.4.38. digital pseudonym -- basically, a "crypto identity." A way
|
||
for individuals to set up accounts with various organizations
|
||
without revealing more information than they wish. Users may
|
||
have several digital pseudonyms, some used only once, some
|
||
used over the course of many years. Ideally, the pseudonyms
|
||
can be linked only at the will of the holder. In the simplest
|
||
form, a public key can serve as a digital pseudonym and need
|
||
not be linked to a physical identity.
|
||
19.4.39. digital signature -- Analogous to a written signature on a
|
||
document. A modification to a message that only the signer
|
||
can make but that everyone can recognize. Can be used
|
||
legally to contract at a distance.
|
||
19.4.40. digital timestamping -- one function of a digital notary
|
||
public, in which some message (a song, screenplay, lab
|
||
notebook, contract, etc.) is stamped with a time that cannot
|
||
(easily) be forged.
|
||
19.4.41. dining cryptographers protocol (aka DC protocol, DC nets) --
|
||
the untraceable message sending system invented by David
|
||
Chaum. Named after the "dining philosophers" problem in
|
||
computer science, participants form circuits and pass
|
||
messages in such a way that the origin cannot be deduced,
|
||
barring collusion. At the simplest level, two participants
|
||
share a key between them. One of them sends some actual
|
||
message by bitwise exclusive-ORing the message with the key,
|
||
while the other one just sends the key itself. The actual
|
||
message from this pair of participants is obtained by XORing
|
||
the two outputs. However, since nobody but the pair knows the
|
||
original key, the actual message cannot be traced to either
|
||
one of the participants.
|
||
19.4.42. discrete logarithm problem -- given integers a, n, and x,
|
||
find some integer m such that a^m mod n = x, if m exists.
|
||
Modular exponentiation, the a^m mod n part, is
|
||
straightforward (and special purpose chips are available),
|
||
but the inverse problem is believed to be very hard, in
|
||
general. Thus it is conjectured that modular exponentiation
|
||
is a one-way function.
|
||
19.4.43. DSS, Digital Signature Standard -- the latest NIST (National
|
||
Institute of Standards and Technology, successor to NBS)
|
||
standard for digital signatures. Based on the El Gamal
|
||
cipher, some consider it weak and poor substitute for RSA-
|
||
based signature schemes.
|
||
19.4.44. eavesdropping, or passive wiretapping -- intercepting
|
||
messages without detection. Radio waves may be intercepted,
|
||
phone lines may be tapped, and computers may have RF
|
||
emissions detected. Even fiber optic lines can be tapped.
|
||
19.4.45. Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES) -- current name for the
|
||
key escrow system known variously as Clipper, Capstone,
|
||
Skipjack, etc.
|
||
19.4.46. factoring -- Some large numbers are difficult to factor. It
|
||
is conjectured that there are no feasible--i.e."easy," less
|
||
than exponential in size of number-- factoring methods. It is
|
||
also an open problem whether RSA may be broken more easily
|
||
than by factoring the modulus (e.g., the public key might
|
||
reveal information which simplifies the problem).
|
||
Interestingly, though factoring is believed to be "hard", it
|
||
is not known to be in the class of NP-hard problems.
|
||
Professor Janek invented a factoring device, but he is
|
||
believed to be fictional.
|
||
19.4.47. HUMINT --
|
||
19.4.48. information-theoretic security -- "unbreakable" security, in
|
||
which no amount of cryptanalysis can break a cipher or
|
||
system. One time pads are an example (providing the pads are
|
||
not lost nor stolen nor used more than once, of course). Same
|
||
as unconditionally secure.
|
||
19.4.49. key -- a piece of information needed to encipher or decipher
|
||
a message. Keys may be stolen, bought, lost, etc., just as
|
||
with physical keys.
|
||
19.4.50. key exchange, or key distribution -- the process of sharing a
|
||
key with some other party, in the case of symmetric ciphers,
|
||
or of distributing a public key in an asymmetric cipher. A
|
||
major issue is that the keys be exchanged reliably and
|
||
without compromise. Diffie and Hellman devised one such
|
||
scheme, based on the discrete logarithm problem.
|
||
19.4.51. known-plaintext attack -- a cryptanalysis of a cipher where
|
||
plaintext-ciphertext pairs are known. This attack searches
|
||
for an unknown key. Contrast with the chosen plaintext
|
||
attack, where the cryptanalyst can also choose the plaintext
|
||
to be enciphered.
|
||
19.4.52. listening posts -- the NSA and other intelligence agencies
|
||
maintain sites for the interception of radio, telephone, and
|
||
satellite communications. And so on. Many sites have been
|
||
identified (cf. Bamford), and many more sites are suspected.
|
||
19.4.53. mail, untraceable -- a system for sending and receiving mail
|
||
without traceability or observability. Receiving mail
|
||
anonymously can be done with broadcast of the mail in
|
||
encrypted form. Only the intended recipient (whose identity,
|
||
or true name, may be unknown to the sender) may able to
|
||
decipher the message. Sending mail anonymously apparently
|
||
requires mixes or use of the dining cryptographers (DC)
|
||
protocol.
|
||
19.4.54. Message Pool
|
||
19.4.55. minimum disclosure proofs -- another name for zero knowledge
|
||
proofs, favored by Chaum.
|
||
19.4.56. mixes -- David Chaum's term for a box which performs the
|
||
function of mixing, or decorrelating, incoming and outgoing
|
||
electronic mail messages. The box also strips off the outer
|
||
envelope (i.e., decrypts with its private key) and remails
|
||
the message to the address on the inner envelope. Tamper-
|
||
resistant modules may be used to prevent cheating and forced
|
||
disclosure of the mapping between incoming and outgoing mail.
|
||
A sequence of many remailings effectively makes tracing
|
||
sending and receiving impossible. Contrast this with the
|
||
software version, the DC protocol. The "remailers" developed
|
||
by Cypherpunks are an approximation of a Chaumian mix.
|
||
19.4.57. modular exponentiation -- raising an integer to the power of
|
||
another integer, modulo some integer. For integers a, n, and
|
||
m, a^m mod n. For example, 5^3 mod 100 = 25. Modular
|
||
exponentiation can be done fairly quickly with a sequence of
|
||
bit shifts and adds, and special purpose chips have been
|
||
designed. See also discrete logarithm.
|
||
19.4.58. National Security Agency (NSA) -- the largest intelligence
|
||
agency, responsible for making and breaking ciphers, for
|
||
intercepting communications, and for ensuring the security of
|
||
U.S. computers. Headquartered in Fort Meade, Maryland, with
|
||
many listening posts around the world. The NSA funds
|
||
cryptographic research and advises other agencies about
|
||
cryptographic matters. The NSA once obviously had the world's
|
||
leading cryptologists, but this may no longer be the case.
|
||
19.4.59. negative credential -- a credential that you possess that you
|
||
don't want any one else to know, for example, a bankruptcy
|
||
filing. A formal version of a negative reputation.
|
||
19.4.60. NP-complete -- a large class of difficult problems. "NP"
|
||
stands for nondeterministic polynomial time, a class of
|
||
problems thought in general not to have feasible algorithms
|
||
for their solution. A problem is "complete" if any other
|
||
NP problem may be reduced to that problem. Many important
|
||
combinatorial and algebraic problems are NP-complete: the
|
||
travelling salesman problem, the Hamiltonian cycle problem,
|
||
the graph isomorphism problem, the word problem, and on and
|
||
on.
|
||
19.4.61. oblivious transfer -- a cryptographic primitive that involves
|
||
the probablistic transmission of bits. The sender does not
|
||
know if the bits were received.
|
||
19.4.62. one-time pad -- a string of randomly-selected bits or symbols
|
||
which is combined with a plaintext message to produce the
|
||
ciphertext. This combination may be shifting letters some
|
||
amount, bitwise exclusive-ORed, etc.). The recipient, who
|
||
also has a copy of the one time pad, can easily recover the
|
||
plaintext. Provided the pad is only used once and then
|
||
destroyed, and is not available to an eavesdropper, the
|
||
system is perfectly secure, i.e., it is information-
|
||
theoretically secure. Key distribution (the pad) is
|
||
obviously a practical concern, but consider CD-ROM's.
|
||
19.4.63. one-way function -- a function which is easy to compute in
|
||
one direction but hard to find any inverse for, e.g. modular
|
||
exponentiation, where the inverse problem is known as the
|
||
discrete logarithm problem. Compare the special case of trap
|
||
door one-way functions. An example of a one-way operation
|
||
is multiplication: it is easy to multiply two prime numbers
|
||
of 100 digits to produce a 200-digit number, but hard to
|
||
factor that 200-digit number.
|
||
19.4.64. P ?=? NP -- Certainly the most important unsolved problem
|
||
in complexity theory. If P = NP, then cryptography as we know
|
||
it today does not exist. If P = NP, all NP problems are
|
||
"easy."
|
||
19.4.65. padding -- sending extra messages to confuse eavesdroppers
|
||
and to defeat traffic analysis. Also adding random bits to
|
||
a message to be enciphered.
|
||
19.4.66. PGP
|
||
19.4.67. plaintext -- also called cleartext, the text that is to be
|
||
enciphered.
|
||
19.4.68. Pool
|
||
19.4.69. Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) -- Phillip Zimmerman's
|
||
implementation of RSA, recently upgraded to version 2.0, with
|
||
more robust components and several new features. RSA Data
|
||
Security has threatened PZ so he no longer works on it.
|
||
Version 2.0 was written by a consortium of non-U.S. hackers.
|
||
19.4.70. prime numbers -- integers with no factors other than
|
||
themselves and 1. The number of primes is unbounded. About
|
||
1% of the 100 decimal digit numbers are prime. Since there
|
||
are about 10^70 particles in the universe, there are about
|
||
10^23 100 digit primes for each and every particle in the
|
||
universe!
|
||
19.4.71. probabalistic encryption -- a scheme by Goldwasser, Micali,
|
||
and Blum that allows multiple ciphertexts for the same
|
||
plaintext, i.e., any given plaintext may have many
|
||
ciphertexts if the ciphering is repeated. This protects
|
||
against certain types of known ciphertext attacks on RSA.
|
||
19.4.72. proofs of identity -- proving who you are, either your true
|
||
name, or your digital identity. Generally, possession of the
|
||
right key is sufficient proof (guard your key!). Some work
|
||
has been done on "is-a-person" credentialling agencies, using
|
||
the so-called Fiat-Shamir protocol...think of this as a way
|
||
to issue unforgeable digital passports. Physical proof of
|
||
identity may be done with biometric security methods. Zero
|
||
knowledge proofs of identity reveal nothing beyond the fact
|
||
that the identity is as claimed. This has obvious uses for
|
||
computer access, passwords, etc.
|
||
19.4.73. protocol -- a formal procedure for solving some problem.
|
||
Modern cryptology is mostly about the study of protocols for
|
||
many problems, such as coin-flipping, bit commitment (blobs),
|
||
zero knowledge proofs, dining cryptographers, and so on.
|
||
19.4.74. public key -- the key distributed publicly to potential
|
||
message-senders. It may be published in a phonebook-like
|
||
directory or otherwise sent. A major concern is the validity
|
||
of this public key to guard against spoofing or
|
||
impersonation.
|
||
19.4.75. public key cryptosystem -- the modern breakthrough in
|
||
cryptology, designed by Diffie and Hellman, with
|
||
contributions from several others. Uses trap door one-way
|
||
functions so that encryption may be done by anyone with
|
||
access to the "public key" but decryption may be done only by
|
||
the holder of the "private key." Encompasses public key
|
||
encryption, digital signatures, digital cash, and many other
|
||
protocols and applications.
|
||
19.4.76. public key encryption -- the use of modern cryptologic
|
||
methods to provided message security and authentication. The
|
||
RSA algorithm is the most widely used form of public key
|
||
encryption, although other systems exist. A public key may be
|
||
freely published, e.g., in phonebook-like directories, while
|
||
the corresponding private key is closely guarded.
|
||
19.4.77. public key patents -- M.I.T. and Stanford, due to the work
|
||
of Rivest, Shamir, Adleman, Diffie, Hellman, and Merkle,
|
||
formed Public Key Partners to license the various public key,
|
||
digital signature, and RSA patents. These patents, granted in
|
||
the early 1980s, expire in the between 1998 and 2002. PKP has
|
||
licensed RSA Data Security Inc., of Redwood City, CA, which
|
||
handles the sales, etc.
|
||
19.4.78. quantum cryptography -- a system based on quantum-mechanical
|
||
principles. Eavesdroppers alter the quantum state of the
|
||
system and so are detected. Developed by Brassard and
|
||
Bennett, only small laboratory demonstrations have been made.
|
||
19.4.79. remailers -- software versions of Chaum's "mixes," for the
|
||
sending of untraceable mail. Various features are needed to
|
||
do this: randomized order of resending, encryption at each
|
||
stage (picked in advance by the sender, knowing the chain of
|
||
remailers), padding of message sizes. The first remailer was
|
||
written by E. Hughes in perl, and about a dozen or so are
|
||
active now, with varying feature sets.
|
||
19.4.80. reputations -- the trail of positive and negative
|
||
associations and judgments that some entity accrues. Credit
|
||
ratings, academic credentials, and trustworthiness are all
|
||
examples. A digital pseudonym will accrue these reputation
|
||
credentials based on actions, opinions of others, etc. In
|
||
crypto anarchy, reputations and agoric systems will be of
|
||
paramount importance. There are many fascinating issues of
|
||
how reputation-based systems work, how credentials can be
|
||
bought and sold, and so forth.
|
||
19.4.81. RSA -- the main public key encryption algorithm, developed by
|
||
Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Kenneth Adleman. It exploits the
|
||
difficulty of factoring large numbers to create a private key
|
||
and public key. First invented in 1978, it remains the core
|
||
of modern public key systems. It is usually much slower than
|
||
DES, but special-purpose modular exponentiation chips will
|
||
likely speed it up. A popular scheme for speed is to use RSA
|
||
to transmit session keys and then a high-speed cipher like
|
||
DES for the actual message text.
|
||
- Description -- Let p and q be large primes, typically with
|
||
more than 100 digits. Let n = pq and find some e such that
|
||
e is relatively prime to (p - 1)(q - 1). The set of numbers
|
||
p, q, and e is the private key for RSA. The set of numbers
|
||
n and e forms the public key (recall that knowing n is not
|
||
sufficient to easily find p and q...the factoring problem).
|
||
A message M is encrypted by computing M^e mod n. The owner
|
||
of the private key can decrypt the encrypted message by
|
||
exploiting number theory results, as follows. An integer d
|
||
is computed such that ed =1 (mod (p - 1)(q - 1)). Euler
|
||
proved a theorem that M^(ed) = M mod n and so M^(ed) mod n
|
||
= M. This means that in some sense the integers e and d are
|
||
"inverses" of each other. [If this is unclear, please see
|
||
one of the many texts and articles on public key
|
||
encryption.]
|
||
19.4.82. secret key cryptosystem -- A system which uses the same key
|
||
to encrypt and decrypt traffic at each end of a communication
|
||
link. Also called a symmetric or one-key system. Contrast
|
||
with public key cryptosystem.
|
||
19.4.83. SIGINT --
|
||
19.4.84. smart cards -- a computer chip embedded in credit card. They
|
||
can hold cash, credentials, cryptographic keys, etc. Usually
|
||
these are built with some degree of tamper-resistance. Smart
|
||
cards may perform part of a crypto transaction, or all of it.
|
||
Performing part of it may mean checking the computations of a
|
||
more powerful computer, e.g., one in an ATM.
|
||
19.4.85. spoofing, or masquerading -- posing as another user. Used for
|
||
stealing passwords, modifying files, and stealing cash.
|
||
Digital signatures and other authentication methods are
|
||
useful to prevent this. Public keys must be validated and
|
||
protected to ensure that others don't subsititute their own
|
||
public keys which users may then unwittingly use.
|
||
19.4.86. steganography -- a part of cryptology dealing with hiding
|
||
messages and obscuring who is sending and receiving messages.
|
||
Message traffic is often padded to reduce the signals that
|
||
would otherwise come from a sudden beginning of messages.
|
||
"Covered writing."
|
||
19.4.87. symmetric cipher -- same as private key cryptosystem.
|
||
19.4.88. tamper-responding modules, tamper-resistant modules (TRMs) --
|
||
sealed boxes or modules which are hard to open, requiring
|
||
extensive probing and usually leaving ample evidence that the
|
||
tampering has occurred. Various protective techniques are
|
||
used, such as special metal or oxide layers on chips, armored
|
||
coatings, embedded optical fibers, and other measures to
|
||
thwart analysis. Popularly called "tamper-proof boxes." Uses
|
||
include: smart cards, nuclear weapon initiators,
|
||
cryptographic key holders, ATMs, etc.
|
||
19.4.89. tampering, or active wiretapping -- intefering with messages
|
||
and possibly modifying them. This may compromise data
|
||
security, help to break ciphers, etc. See also spoofing.
|
||
19.4.90. Tessera
|
||
19.4.91. token -- some representation, such as ID cards, subway
|
||
tokens, money, etc., that indicates possession of some
|
||
property or value.
|
||
19.4.92. traffic analysis -- determining who is sending or receiving
|
||
messages by analyzing packets, frequency of packets, etc. A
|
||
part of steganography. Usually handled with traffic padding.
|
||
19.4.93. traffic analysis -- identifying characteristics of a message
|
||
(such as sender, or destination) by watching traffic.
|
||
Remailers and encryption help to foil traffic analysys.
|
||
19.4.94. transmission rules -- the protocols for determining who can
|
||
send messages in a DC protocol, and when. These rules are
|
||
needed to prevent collision and deliberate jamming of the
|
||
channels.
|
||
19.4.95. trap messages -- dummy messages in DC Nets which are used to
|
||
catch jammers and disrupters. The messages contain no private
|
||
information and are published in a blob beforehand so that
|
||
the trap message can later be opened to reveal the disrupter.
|
||
(There are many strategies to explore here.)
|
||
19.4.96. trap-door -- In cryptography, a piece of secret information
|
||
that allows the holder of a private key to invert a normally
|
||
hard to invert function.
|
||
19.4.97. trap-door one way functions -- functions which are easy to
|
||
compute in both the forward and reverse direction but for
|
||
which the disclosure of an algorithm to compute the function
|
||
in the forward direction does not provide information on how
|
||
to compute the function in the reverse direction. More simply
|
||
put, trap-door one way functions are one way for all but the
|
||
holder of the secret information. The RSA algorithm is the
|
||
best-known example of such a function.
|
||
19.4.98. unconditional security -- same as information-theoretic
|
||
security, that is, unbreakable except by loss or theft of the
|
||
key.
|
||
19.4.99. unconditionally secure -- where no amount of intercepted
|
||
ciphertext is enough to allow the cipher to be broken, as
|
||
with the use of a one-time pad cipher. Contrast with
|
||
computationally secure.
|
||
19.4.100. URLs
|
||
19.4.101. voting, cryptographic -- Various schemes have been devised
|
||
for anonymous, untraceable voting. Voting schemes should have
|
||
several properties: privacy of the vote, security of the vote
|
||
(no multiple votes), robustness against disruption by jammers
|
||
or disrupters, verifiability (voter has confidence in the
|
||
results), and efficiency.
|
||
19.4.102. Whistleblowers
|
||
19.4.103. zero knowledge proofs -- proofs in which no knowledge of the
|
||
actual proof is conveyed. Peggy the Prover demonstrates to
|
||
Sid the Skeptic that she is indeed in possession of some
|
||
piece of knowledge without actually revealing any of that
|
||
knowledge. This is useful for access to computers, because
|
||
eavesdroppers or dishonest sysops cannot steal the knowledge
|
||
given. Also called minimum disclosure proofs. Useful for
|
||
proving possession of some property, or credential, such as
|
||
age or voting status, without revealing personal information.
|
||
|
||
19.5. Appendix -- Summary of Crypto Versions
|
||
19.5.1. DOS and Windows
|
||
- SecureDevice
|
||
+ SecureDrive
|
||
- "Secdrv13d is the latest version. There was an unupdated
|
||
.exe file in the package that had to be fixed. From the
|
||
readme file: If you found this file inside FPART13D.ZIP,
|
||
this is an update and bug fix for the FPART utility of
|
||
SecureDrive Release 1.3d,
|
||
- Edgar Swank involved?
|
||
+ SecureDevice
|
||
- Major Versions:
|
||
- Functions:
|
||
- Principal Authors:
|
||
- Major Platforms:
|
||
+ Where to Find:
|
||
- ftp://ftp.csn.org/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/
|
||
secdrv/secdev.arj
|
||
See ftp://ftp.csn.org/mpj/README.MPJ for the ???????
|
||
- Strengths:
|
||
- Weaknesses:
|
||
+ Notes:
|
||
- By the way, I'm not the only one who gets SecureDrive
|
||
and SecureDevice confused. Watch out for this.
|
||
+ SFS
|
||
- "A MS-DOS-based package for hard disk encryption. It is
|
||
implemented as a device driver and encrypts a whole
|
||
partition (i.e., not a file or a directory). It uses the
|
||
MDC/SHA cipher. ... It is available from Grabo
|
||
(garbo.uwasa.fi:/pc/crypt/sfs110.zip, I think), and also
|
||
from our ftp site: ftp.informatik.uni-
|
||
hamburg.de:/pub/virus/crypt/disk/sfs110.zip I would
|
||
recommend the Garbo site, because ours is a bit slow."
|
||
[Vesselin Bontchev, alt.security.pgp, 1994-09-05]
|
||
- Compared to SecureDrive, users report it to be faster,
|
||
better-featured, has a Windows interface, is a device
|
||
driver, and is robust. The disadvantages are that it
|
||
currently does not ship with source code and uses a more
|
||
obscure cipher.
|
||
- "SFS (Secure FileSystem) is a set of programs which
|
||
create and manage a number of encrypted disk volumes, and
|
||
runs under both DOS and Windows. Each volume appears as
|
||
a normal DOS drive, but all data stored on it is encryped
|
||
at the individual-sector level....SFS 1.1 is a
|
||
maintenance release which fixes a few minor problems in
|
||
1.0, and adds a number of features suggested by users.
|
||
More details on changes are given in in the README file."
|
||
[Peter Gutmann, sci.crypt, 1994-08-25]
|
||
- "from garbo.uwasa.fi and all its mirror sites worldwide
|
||
as /pc/crypt/sfs110.zip."
|
||
+ WinCrypt.
|
||
- "WinCrypt is pretty good IF you keep your encrypted text
|
||
to less than the length of your password, AND IF you
|
||
generate your password randomly, AND IF you only use each
|
||
password ONCE. :-)" [Michael Paul Johnson, sci.crypt,
|
||
1994-07-08]
|
||
+ Win PGP
|
||
+ there seem to be two identically-named programs:
|
||
- WinPGP, by Christopher w. Geib
|
||
+ WinPGP, by Timothy M. Janke and Geoffrey C. Grabow
|
||
- ftp WinPGP 1.0 from
|
||
oak.oakland.edu//pub/msdos/windows3/WinPGP10.ZIP
|
||
- Until this is clarified...
|
||
+ PGPShell
|
||
- "PGPShell v3.2 has been released and is available at
|
||
these sites: (U.S.)
|
||
oak.oakland.edu:/pub/msdos/security/pgpshe32.zip
|
||
(Euro)
|
||
ftp.demon.co.uk:/simtel20/msdos/security/pgpshe32.zip
|
||
[still@rintintin.Colorado.EDU (Johannes Kepler), 1994-07-
|
||
07]
|
||
+ PGS
|
||
- ftp.informatik.uni-
|
||
hamburg.de:/pub/virus/crypt/pgp/shells/pgs099b.zip
|
||
- "I just uploaded the bug fix of PGS (v0.99b) on some FTP-
|
||
sites:
|
||
wuarchive.wustl.edu:/pub/msdos_uploads/pgs/pgs099b.zip
|
||
rzsun2.informatik.uni-hamburg.de:/pub/virus/crypt/pgp/...
|
||
(Just uploaded it, should be on in a few days)
|
||
oak.oakland.edu:/SimTel/msdos/security/pgs099b.zip (Just
|
||
uploaded it, should be on in a few days)
|
||
|
||
[Eelco Cramer <crame001@hio.tem.nhl.nl>, 1994-06-27]
|
||
+ DOS disk encryption utilities
|
||
+ Several free or nearly free utilities are available:
|
||
- ftp.informatik.uni-hamburg.de:/pub/virus/crypt/disk/
|
||
[Vesselin Vladimirov Bontchev, as of 1994-08]
|
||
+ Norton's "Diskreet" is weak and essentially useless
|
||
- uses DES in weak (ECB) mode...is probably the "snake
|
||
oil" that Zimmermann writes about in his docs. SFS docs
|
||
say it is even worse than that.
|
||
+ PGS
|
||
- "PGS v0.99c is out there!
|
||
|
||
This new version of PGS supports 8 bytes keyid's.
|
||
This version will be able to run in a OS/2 DOS box.
|
||
|
||
PGS v0.99c is available on the following site:
|
||
wuarchive.wustl.edu:/pub/msdos_uploads/pgs/pgs099c.zip"
|
||
[ER CRAMER <crame001@hio.tem.nhl.nl>, 1994-07-08]
|
||
|
||
+ Program:
|
||
- Major Versions:
|
||
- Functions:
|
||
- Principal Authors:
|
||
- Major Platforms:
|
||
- Where to Find:
|
||
- Strengths:
|
||
- Weaknesses:
|
||
- Notes:
|
||
19.5.2. OS/2
|
||
19.5.3. Amiga
|
||
+ Program: PGPAmiga, Amiga PGP
|
||
+ Major Versions: 2.3a.4, PGP 2.6
|
||
- "The Amiga equivalent of PGP 2.6ui is called PGP
|
||
2.3a.3" [unknown commenter]
|
||
- Functions:
|
||
- Principal Authors:
|
||
- Major Platforms:
|
||
- Where to Find:
|
||
- Strengths:
|
||
- Weaknesses:
|
||
- Notes: Situation is confusing. 2.3a.3 is not equivalent
|
||
to PGP 2.6ui.
|
||
19.5.4. Unix
|
||
- NeXTStep
|
||
- Sun 4.3
|
||
- Solaris
|
||
- HP
|
||
- SGI
|
||
+ swIPe
|
||
- Metzger: It was John Ioannidis' swIPe package, and it was
|
||
not merely announced
|
||
but released. Phil has done a similar package for KA9Q
|
||
and was one of
|
||
19.5.5. SFS ?
|
||
- "A MS-DOS-based package for hard disk encryption. It is
|
||
implemented as a device driver and encrypts a whole
|
||
partition (i.e., not a file or a directory). It uses the
|
||
MDC/SHA cipher. ... It is available from Grabo
|
||
(garbo.uwasa.fi:/pc/crypt/sfs110.zip, I think), and also
|
||
from our ftp site: ftp.informatik.uni-
|
||
hamburg.de:/pub/virus/crypt/disk/sfs110.zip I would
|
||
recommend the Garbo site, because ours is a bit slow."
|
||
[Vesselin Bontchev, alt.security.pgp, 1994-09-05]
|
||
19.5.6. Macintosh
|
||
+ more on MacPGP
|
||
- From: phinely@uhunix.uhcc.Hawaii.Edu (Peter Hinely)
|
||
Subject: Re: MacPGP 2.6ui doesn't actually work
|
||
Message-ID: <CsI3wr.I3B@news.Hawaii.Edu>
|
||
Sender: news@news.Hawaii.Edu
|
||
Organization: University of Hawaii
|
||
References: <m0qJqLD-001JKsC@sunforest.mantis.co.uk>
|
||
Date: Wed, 6 Jul 1994 04:17:15 GMT
|
||
Lines: 9
|
||
|
||
In article <m0qJqLD-001JKsC@sunforest.mantis.co.uk>
|
||
mathew@stallman.mantis.co.uk (mathew at home) writes:
|
||
>Well, I downloaded the rumoured MacPGP 2.6ui, but sadly
|
||
it bombs out
|
||
>immediately with an address error when I try to run it.
|
||
|
||
MacPGP 2.6ui works on my Quadra 605.
|
||
The MacBinary process cannot handle pathnames >63
|
||
characters, but as long
|
||
an you encrypt files on the desktop, it's not too much of
|
||
a problem.
|
||
- From: warlord@MIT.EDU (Derek Atkins)
|
||
Newsgroups: alt.security.pgp
|
||
Subject: Re: When will there be a bug fix for MacPGP?
|
||
Followup-To: alt.security.pgp
|
||
Date: 6 Jul 1994 10:19:13 GMT
|
||
Organization: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
|
||
Lines: 19
|
||
Message-ID: <WARLORD.94Jul6061917@toxicwaste.mit.edu>
|
||
References: <AWILSON-020794082446@ts7-57.upenn.edu>
|
||
NNTP-Posting-Host: toxicwaste.media.mit.edu
|
||
In-reply-to: AWILSON@DRUNIVAC.DREW.EDU's message of 2 Jul
|
||
1994 12:25:14 GMT
|
||
|
||
In article <AWILSON-020794082446@ts7-57.upenn.edu>
|
||
AWILSON@DRUNIVAC.DREW.EDU (AL WILSON) writes:
|
||
|
||
When will there be a bug fix for MacPGP (1.1.1)? I am
|
||
not complaining, I
|
||
know that the software is free. I just want to start
|
||
utilizing it for
|
||
communications at the earliest possible time.
|
||
|
||
There are still a number of outstanding bugs that need to
|
||
be
|
||
fixed, but the hope is to make a bugfix release in the
|
||
near
|
||
future. I don't know when that is going to be, but
|
||
hopefully
|
||
it will be Real Soon Now (TM).
|
||
- Date: Wed, 6 Jul 1994 10:42:08 -0700
|
||
From: tcmay (Timothy C. May)
|
||
To: tcmay
|
||
Subject: (fwd) Re: What is the difference between 2.6 &
|
||
2.6ui?
|
||
Newsgroups: alt.security.pgp
|
||
Organization: NETCOM On-line Communication Services (408
|
||
261-4700 guest)
|
||
Status: O
|
||
|
||
Xref: netcom.com alt.security.pgp:16979
|
||
Path: netcom.com!netcomsv!decwrl!lll-
|
||
winken.llnl.gov!sol.ctr.columbia.edu!howland.reston.ans.n
|
||
et!pipex!lyra.csx.cam.ac.uk!iwj10
|
||
From: iwj10@cus.cam.ac.uk (Ian Jackson)
|
||
Newsgroups: alt.security.pgp
|
||
Subject: Re: What is the difference between 2.6 & 2.6ui?
|
||
Date: Wed, 6 Jul 1994 10:14:24 GMT
|
||
Organization: Linux Unlimited
|
||
Lines: 55
|
||
Message-ID:
|
||
<1994Jul6.101424.9203.chiark.ijackson@nyx.cs.du.edu>
|
||
References: <CsE3CC.Gqz@crash.cts.com>
|
||
<RATINOX.94Jul3221136@delphi.ccs.neu.edu>
|
||
NNTP-Posting-Host: bootes.cus.cam.ac.uk
|
||
Summary: Use 2.6ui :-).
|
||
Originator: iwj10@bootes.cus.cam.ac.uk
|
||
|
||
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
|
||
|
||
In article <RATINOX.94Jul3221136@delphi.ccs.neu.edu>,
|
||
Stainless Steel Rat <ratinox@ccs.neu.edu> wrote:
|
||
>Ed Dantes <edantes@crash.cts.com> writes [quoting
|
||
normalised - iwj]:
|
||
>> subject line says it all.
|
||
>
|
||
>PGP 2.6 is distributed from MIT and is legally available
|
||
to US and Canadian
|
||
>residents. It uses the RSAREF library. It has code that
|
||
will prevent
|
||
>interoperation with earlier versions of PGP.
|
||
>
|
||
>PGP 2.6ui is a modified version of PGP 2.3a which
|
||
functions almost
|
||
>identically to MIT PGP 2.6, without the "cripple code"
|
||
of MIT PGP 2.6. It
|
||
>is legally available outside the US and Canada only.
|
||
|
||
This is false. PGP 2.6ui is available to US and Canadian
|
||
residents.
|
||
It is definitely legal for such people to download PGP
|
||
2.6ui and study
|
||
it.
|
||
|
||
However, RSADSI claim that *using* PGP 2.6ui in the US
|
||
and Canada
|
||
violates their patents on the RSA algorithm and on public
|
||
key
|
||
cryptography in general. Other people (like myself)
|
||
believe that
|
||
these patents wouldn't stand up if tested in court, and
|
||
that in any
|
||
case the damages recoverable would be zero.
|
||
|
||
You might also like to know that the output formats
|
||
generated by 2.6ui
|
||
and MIT-2.6 are identical, so that if you choose to use
|
||
2.6ui in North
|
||
America noone will be able to tell the difference anyway.
|
||
|
||
Unfortunately these patent problems have caused many
|
||
North American
|
||
FTP sites to stop carrying 2.3a and 2.6ui, for fear of
|
||
committing
|
||
contributory infringement.
|
||
|
||
If you would like to examine PGP 2.3a or 2.6ui, they are
|
||
available on
|
||
many FTP sites. Try
|
||
black.ox.ac.uk:/src/security
|
||
ftp.demon.co.uk:/pub/pgp
|
||
ftp.dsi.unimi.it:/pub/security/crypt/PGP
|
||
ftp.funet.fi:/pub/crypt
|
||
for starters. Look out for the regular postings here in
|
||
alt.security.pgp for other sites.
|
||
|
||
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
|
||
Version: 2.6
|
||
|
||
iQCVAgUBLhqD48MWjroj9a3bAQH9VgQAqOvCVXqJLhnFvsKfr82M5808h
|
||
6GKY5RW
|
||
SZ1/YLmshlDEMgeab4pSLSz+lDvsox2KFxQkP7O3oWYnswXcdr4FdLBu/
|
||
TXU+IQw
|
||
E4r/jY/IXSupP97Lxj9BB73TkJIHVmrqgoPQG2Nszj60cbE/LsiGs5uMn
|
||
CSESypH
|
||
c0Y8FnR64gc=
|
||
=Pejo
|
||
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
|
||
--
|
||
Ian Jackson, at home <ijackson@nyx.cs.du.edu> or
|
||
<iwj10@cus.cam.ac.uk>
|
||
+44 223 575512 Escoerea on IRC.
|
||
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/iwj10/
|
||
2 Lexington Close, Cambridge, CB4 3LS, England. Urgent:
|
||
<iwj@cam-orl.co.uk>
|
||
|
||
--
|
||
.........................................................
|
||
.................
|
||
Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption,
|
||
digital money,
|
||
tcmay@netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital
|
||
pseudonyms, zero
|
||
408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations,
|
||
information markets,
|
||
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of
|
||
governments.
|
||
Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe
|
||
available.
|
||
"National borders are just speed bumps on the information
|
||
superhighway."
|
||
|
||
+ CurveEncrypt, for Mac
|
||
- "Curve Encrypt 1.1, IDEA encryption for the Macintosh is
|
||
now available.....Curve Encrypt is a freeware drag-and-
|
||
drop encryption application for the Macintosh. It uses
|
||
IDEA cipher-feedback mode with a 255 character pass
|
||
phrase, encrypts both the data and resource forks of
|
||
files, and will encrypt the contents of a folder or
|
||
volume in a single operation. Source code is provided,
|
||
natch. CE is System 7 only....(Note that this program has
|
||
nothing whatsoever to do with elliptic curve
|
||
encryption methods, just so nobody gets confused...)" [
|
||
"W. Kinney" <kinney@bogart.Colorado.EDU>, 1994-07-08]
|
||
- "Ftp Sites:
|
||
|
||
ripem.msu.edu:pub/crypt/other/curve-encrypt-idea-for-mac/
|
||
This is an export controlled ftp site: read
|
||
pub/crypt/GETTING_ACCESS for
|
||
information.
|
||
|
||
ftp.csn.org:/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/curve_e
|
||
ncrypt/
|
||
csn.org is also export-controlled: read /mpj/README for
|
||
the characters
|
||
to replace ???????." [ "W. Kinney"
|
||
<kinney@bogart.Colorado.EDU>, 1994-07-08]
|
||
+ RIPEM on Macintosh
|
||
- Carl Ellison says "I've only used RIPEM on AOL -- but it
|
||
should be the same....I run on a Mac, generating the
|
||
armored file, and then use AOL's "paste from file" option
|
||
in the File menu to include the encrypted file in the
|
||
body of my message.....In the other direction, I have to
|
||
use Select All and Copy to get it out of AOL mail, Paste
|
||
to get it into an editor. From there I can file it and
|
||
give that file to PGP or RIPEM.....BBEDIT on the Mac has
|
||
good support for RIPEM. I wish I knew how to write
|
||
BBEDIT extensions for Mac PGP as well." [C.E., 1994-07-
|
||
06]
|
||
+ URL for Stego (Macintosh)
|
||
- http://www.nitv.net/~mech/Romana/stego.html
|
||
19.5.7. Newton
|
||
19.5.8. Atari
|
||
19.5.9. VMS
|
||
19.5.10. IBM VM/etc.
|
||
19.5.11. Miscellaneous
|
||
19.5.12. File-splitting utilities
|
||
+ Several exist.
|
||
- XSPLIT
|
||
- cryptosplit, Ray Cromwell
|
||
- shade
|
||
|
||
19.6. Appendix -- References
|
||
19.6.1. the importance of libraries
|
||
- "Use a library. That's a place with lots of paper
|
||
periodicals and paper books. Library materials not online,
|
||
mostly, but it is still where most of the world's encoded
|
||
knowledge is stored. If you don't like paper, tough.
|
||
That's the way the world is right now." [Eric Hughes, 1994-
|
||
04-07]
|
||
19.6.2. Books
|
||
- Bamford, James, "The Puzzle Palace," 1982. The seminal
|
||
reference on the NSA.
|
||
- N. Koblitz, "A course in number theory and cryptography",
|
||
QA3.G7NO.114. Very technical, with an emphasis on elliptic
|
||
functions.
|
||
+ D. Welsh, "Codes and Cryptography", Oxford Science
|
||
Publications, 1988, Eric Hughes especially
|
||
recommends this.
|
||
- Z103.W461988
|
||
- D.E. Denning, "Cryptography and Data Security", 1982,
|
||
Addison-Wesley, 1982, QA76.9.A25D46. A classic, if a bit
|
||
dated, introduction by the woman who later became the chief
|
||
supporter of Clipper.
|
||
+ G. Brassard, "Modern Cryptology: a tutorial", Lecture Notes
|
||
in Computer
|
||
- Science 325, Springer 1988, QA76.L4V.325 A slim little
|
||
book that's a gem. Sections by David Chaum.
|
||
- Vinge, V., "True Names," 1981. A novel about digital
|
||
pseudonyms and cyberspace.
|
||
- Card, Orson Scott, "Ender's Game," 1985-6. Novel about kids
|
||
who adopt digital pseudonyms for political debate.
|
||
- G.J. Simmons,"Contemporary Cryptology", IEEE Press, 1992,
|
||
QA76.9.A25C6678. A collection of articles by well-known
|
||
experts. Surprisingly, no discussion of digital money. Gus
|
||
Simmons designed "Permissive Action Links" for nukes, at
|
||
Sandia.
|
||
19.6.3. sci.crypt
|
||
- archived at ripem.msu.edu and rpub.cl.msu.edu
|
||
-
|
||
+ The cryptography anon ftp archive at
|
||
wimsey.bc.ca:/pub/crypto
|
||
- has been moved to ftp.wimsey.bc.ca
|
||
19.6.4. cryptography-faq
|
||
- in about 10 parts, put out by Crypt Cabal (several
|
||
Cypherpunks on it)
|
||
- rtfm.mit.edu, in /pub/usenet/news.answers/cryptography-
|
||
faq/part[xx]
|
||
+ posted every 21 days to sci.crypt, talk.politics.crypto,
|
||
- sci.answers, news.answers
|
||
19.6.5. RSA FAQ
|
||
- Paul Fahn, RSA Laboratories
|
||
- anonymous FTP to rsa.com:/pub/faq
|
||
- rtfm.mit.edu, /pub/usenet/news.answers/cryptography-faq/rsa
|
||
19.6.6. Computers, Freedom and Privacy Conference
|
||
- next Computers, Freedom and Privacy Conference will be
|
||
March 1995, San Francisco
|
||
19.6.7. Various computer security papers, publications, and programs
|
||
can be found at cert.org.
|
||
- anonymous ftp to it and look in /pub. /pub/info even has
|
||
the NSA "Orange Book." (Not a secret, obviously. Anyone can
|
||
get on the NSA/NCSC's mailing list and get a huge pile of
|
||
documents sent to them, with new ones arriving every
|
||
several weeks.)
|
||
- or try ftp.win.tue.nl /pub/security
|
||
19.6.8. Clipper information by Internet
|
||
- ftp.cpsr.org
|
||
- ftp.eff.org
|
||
|
||
19.7. Glossary Items
|
||
19.7.1. message pools --
|
||
19.7.2. pools -- see "message pools."
|
||
19.7.3. cover traffic --
|
||
19.7.4. padding -- see "message padding."
|
||
19.7.5. message padding --
|
||
19.7.6. latency --
|
||
19.7.7. BlackNet -- an experiment in information markets, using
|
||
anonymous message pools for exchange of instructions and
|
||
items. Tim May's experiment in guerilla ontology.
|
||
19.7.8. ILF -- Information Liberation Front. Distributes copyrighted
|
||
material via remailers, anonymously. Another experiment in
|
||
guerilla ontology.
|
||
19.7.9. digital mix --
|
||
19.7.10. FinCEN -- Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.
|
||
19.7.11. true name -- one's actual, physical name. Taken from Vernor
|
||
Vinge's novel of the same name.
|
||
19.7.12. mix --
|
||
19.7.13. TEMPEST --
|
||
19.7.14. OTP --
|
||
19.7.15. Vernam cipher --
|
||
19.7.16. detweiler -- verb, to rant and rave about tentacles that are
|
||
destroying one's sanity through crypto anarchist thought
|
||
control. Named after L. Detweiler. "He's just detweilering."
|
||
19.7.17. remailer --
|
||
19.7.18. Stego --
|
||
19.7.19. incipits -- message indicators or tags (relates to stego)
|
||
19.7.20. duress code -- a second key which can decrypt a message to
|
||
something harmless. Could be useful for bank cards, as well
|
||
as for avoiding incrimination. A form of security through
|
||
obscurity, and not widely used.
|
||
|
||
19.8. A comment on software versions, ftp sites, instructions, etc.
|
||
19.8.1. I regret that I can't be complete in all versions, platforms
|
||
supported, sites for obtaining, instructions,
|
||
incompatibilities, etc. Frankly, I'm drowning in reports of
|
||
new versions, questions about use, etc. Most of these
|
||
versions I have no direct knowledge of, have no experience
|
||
with, and no appreciation of subtle incompatibilites
|
||
involved.
|
||
19.8.2. There are others who have concentrated on providing up-to-
|
||
date reports on what is available. Some of them are"
|
||
- site
|
||
19.8.3. Reading sci.crypt, alt.security.pgp, and related groups for a
|
||
few weeks and looking for programs of interest to one's own
|
||
situation should give the most recent and current results.
|
||
Things are moving quickly, so if one is interested in
|
||
"AmigaPGP," for example, then the right place to look for the
|
||
latest versions is in the groups just mentioned, or in groups
|
||
and ftp sites specific to the Amiga. (Be careful that
|
||
sabotaged or spoofed versions are not used, as in all crypto.
|
||
"Joe's AmigaPGP" might need a closer look.)
|
||
|
||
20. README
|
||
|
||
20.1. copyright
|
||
THE CYPHERNOMICON: Cypherpunks FAQ and More, Version 0.666,
|
||
1994-09-10, Copyright Timothy C. May. All rights reserved.
|
||
See the detailed disclaimer. Use short sections under "fair
|
||
use" provisions, with appropriate credit, but don't put your
|
||
name on my words.
|
||
|
||
20.2. README--BRIEF VERSION
|
||
20.2.1. Copyright Timothy C. May. All rights reserved. For what it's
|
||
worth.
|
||
20.2.2. Apologies in advance for the mix of styles (outline, bullet,
|
||
text, essays), for fragments and incomplete sections. This
|
||
FAQ is already much too long and detailed, and writing
|
||
suitable connective material, introductions, summaries, etc.
|
||
is not in the cards anytime soon. Go with the flow, use your
|
||
text searching tools, and deal with it.
|
||
20.2.3. Substantive corrections welcome, quibbles less welcome, and
|
||
ideological debate even less welcome. Corrections to outdated
|
||
information, especially on pointers to information, will be
|
||
most appreciated.
|
||
|
||
20.3. Copyright Comments
|
||
20.3.1. It may seem illogical for a Cypherpunk to assert some kind of
|
||
copyright. Perhaps. But my main concern is the ease with
|
||
which people can relabel documents as their own, sometimes
|
||
after only adding a few words here and there.
|
||
20.3.2. Yes, I used the words of others in places, to make points
|
||
better than I felt my own words would, to save time, and to
|
||
give readers a different voice speaking on issues. I have
|
||
credited quotes with a "[Joe Foobar, place, date]
|
||
attribution, usually at the end of the quote. If a place is
|
||
not listed, it is the Cypherpunks list itself. The author and
|
||
date should be sufficient to (someday) retrieve the source
|
||
text. By the way, I used quotes as they seemed appropriate,
|
||
and make no claims that the quoted points are necessarily
|
||
original to the author--who may have remembered them from
|
||
somewhere else--or that the date listed is the origination
|
||
date for the point. I have something like 80 megabytes of
|
||
Cypherpunks posts, so I couldn't do an archaeological dig for
|
||
the earliest mention of an idea.
|
||
20.3.3. People can quote this FAQ under the "fair use" provisions,
|
||
e.g., a paragraph or two, with credits. Anything more than a
|
||
few paragraphs constitutes copyright infringement, as I
|
||
understand it.
|
||
20.3.4. Should I give up the maintaining of this FAQ and/or should
|
||
others get involved, then the normal co-authorship and
|
||
inheritance arrangements will be possible.
|
||
20.3.5. The Web. WWW and Mosaic offer amazing new opportunities for
|
||
on-line documents. It is in fact likely that this FAQ will be
|
||
available as a Web document. My concern, however, is that the
|
||
integrity and authorship be maintained. Thus, splitting the
|
||
document in a hundred or more little pieces, with no
|
||
authorship attached, would not be cool. Also, I intend to
|
||
maintain this document with my powerful outlining tools
|
||
(Symantec's "MORE," on a Macintosh) and thus anyone who
|
||
"freezes" the document and uses it as a base for links,
|
||
pointers, etc., will be left behind as mods are made.
|
||
|
||
20.4. A Few Words on the Style
|
||
20.4.1. Some sections are in outline form
|
||
- like this
|
||
- with fragments of ideas and points
|
||
- with incomplete sentences
|
||
- and with lists of points that are obviously only starting
|
||
points for more complete analyses
|
||
20.4.2. Other sections are written in more complete essay form, as
|
||
reasonably self-contained analyses of some point or topic.
|
||
Like this. Some of these essays were taken directly out of
|
||
posts I did for the list, or for sci.crypt, and no
|
||
attribution H (since I wrote the stuff...quotes from others
|
||
are credited).
|
||
20.4.3. The styles may clash, but I just don't have the hundreds of
|
||
hours to go through and "regularize" everything to a
|
||
consistent style. The outline style allows additional points,
|
||
wrinkles, rebuttals, and elaborations to be grafted on easily
|
||
(if not always elegantly). I hope most readers can understand
|
||
this and learn to deal with it.
|
||
20.4.4. Of course, there are places where the points made are just
|
||
too fragmentary, too outlinish, for people to make sense of.
|
||
I've tried to clean these up as much as I can, but there will
|
||
always be some places where an idea seemed clear to me at the
|
||
time (maybe not) but which is not presented clearly to
|
||
others. I'll keep trying to iron these kinks out in future
|
||
versions.
|
||
20.4.5. Comment on style
|
||
- In many cases I merged two or more chunks of ideas into one
|
||
section, resulting in many cases in mismatching writing
|
||
styles, tenses, etc. I apologize, but I just don't have the
|
||
many dozens of hours it might take to go through and
|
||
"regularize" things, to write more graceful transition
|
||
paragraphs, etc. I felt it was more important to get the
|
||
ideas and idea fragments out than to polish the writing.
|
||
(Essays written from scratch, and in order, are generally
|
||
more graceful than are concatenations of ideas, facts,
|
||
pointers, and the like.)
|
||
- Readers should also not assume that a "fleshed-out"
|
||
section, made up of relatively complete paragraphs, is any
|
||
more important than a section that is still mostly made up
|
||
of short one-liners.
|
||
- References to Crypto Journals, Books. Nearly every section
|
||
in this document _could have_ one or more references to
|
||
articles and papers in the Crypto Proceedings, in
|
||
Schneier's book, or whatever. Sorry, but I can't do this.
|
||
Maybe someday--when true hypertext arrives and is readily
|
||
usable (don't send me e-mail about HTML, or Xanadu, etc.)
|
||
this kind of cross-referencing will be done. Footnotes
|
||
would work today, but are distracting in on-line documents.
|
||
And too much work, given that this is not meant to be a
|
||
scholarly thesis.
|
||
- I also have resisted the impulse to included quotes or
|
||
sections from other FAQs, notably the sci.crypt and rsadsi
|
||
FAQs. No point in copying their stuff, even with
|
||
appropriate credit. Readers should already have these docs,
|
||
of course.
|
||
20.4.6. quibbling
|
||
- Any time you say something to 500-700 people, expect to
|
||
have a bunch of quibbles. People will take issue with
|
||
phrasings, with choices of definitions, with facts, etc.
|
||
Correctness is important, but sometimes the quibbling sets
|
||
off a chain reaction of corrections, countercorrections,
|
||
rebuttals, and "I would have put it differently"s. It's all
|
||
a bit overwhelming at times. My hope for this FAQ is that
|
||
serious errors are (of course) corrected, but that the List
|
||
not get bogged down in endless quibbling about such minor
|
||
issues as style and phrasing.
|
||
|
||
20.5. How to Find Information
|
||
20.5.1. This FAQ is very long, which makes finding specific questions
|
||
problematic. Such is life--shorter FAQ are of course easier
|
||
to navigate, but may not address important issues.
|
||
20.5.2. A full version of this FAQ is available, as well as chapter-
|
||
by-chapter versions (to reduce the downloading efforts for
|
||
some people). Search tools within text editors are one way to
|
||
find topics. Future versions of this FAQ may be paginated and
|
||
then indexed (but maybe not).
|
||
20.5.3. I advise using search tools in editors and word processors to
|
||
find sections of interest. This is likely faster anyway than
|
||
consulting an index generated by me (which I haven't
|
||
generated, and probably never will).
|
||
|
||
20.6. My Views
|
||
20.6.1. This FAQ, or whatever one calls it, is more than just a
|
||
simple listing of frequently asked questions and the lowest-
|
||
common-denominator answers. This should be clear just by the
|
||
size alone. I make no apologies for writing the document I
|
||
wanted to write. Others are free to write the FAQ they would
|
||
prefer to read. You're getting what you paid for.
|
||
20.6.2. My views are rather strong in some areas. I've tried to
|
||
present some dissenting arguments in cases where I think
|
||
Cypherpunks are really somewhat divided, such as in remailer
|
||
strategies and the like. In cases where I think there's no
|
||
credible dissent, such as in the wisdom of Clipper, I've made
|
||
no attempt to be fair. My libertarian, even anarchist, views
|
||
surely come through. Either deal with it, or don't read the
|
||
document. I have to be honest about this.
|
||
|
||
20.7. More detailed disclaimer
|
||
20.7.1. This detailed disclaimer is probably not good in most courts
|
||
in the U.S., contracts having been thrown out if favor of
|
||
nominalism, but here it is anyway. At least nobody can claim
|
||
they were misled into thinking I was giving them warranteed,
|
||
guaranteed advice.
|
||
20.7.2. Timothy C. May hereby disclaims all warranties relating to
|
||
this document, whether express or implied, including without
|
||
limitation any implied warranties of merchantability or
|
||
fitness for a particular purpose. Tim May will not be liable
|
||
for any special, incidental, consequential, indirect or
|
||
similar damages due to loss of business, indictment for any
|
||
crime, imprisonment, torture, or any other reason, even if
|
||
Tim May or an agent of his has been advised of the
|
||
possibility of such damages. In no event shall Tim May be
|
||
liable for any damages, regardless of the form of the claim.
|
||
The person reading or using the document bears all risk as to
|
||
the quality and suitability of the document. Legality of
|
||
reading or possessing this document in a jurisdiction is not
|
||
the responsibility of Tim May.
|
||
20.7.3. The points expressed may or may not represent the views of
|
||
Tim May, and certainly may not represent the views of other
|
||
Cypherpunks. Certain ideas are explored which, if
|
||
implemented, would be illegal to various extents in most
|
||
countries in the world. Think of these explorations of ideas
|
||
as just that.
|
||
|
||
20.8. I've decided to release this before the RSA patents run out...
|