aljaz/mailing-list-archive-generator
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/aljazceru/mailing-list-archive-generator.git synced 2025-12-17 06:24:22 +01:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

Add thread indexes

Browse Source
This commit is contained in:
Thomas Busby
2018-06-20 21:05:46 +02:00
parent d76969c836
commit 30c8415c46
999 changed files with 287233 additions and 78 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

7
_config.yml
View File

@@ -12,10 +12,13 @@ tagarray: []
collections:
years:
permalink: /:collection/:path/
permalink: /archive/:path/
output: true
months:
permalink: /archive/:path/
output: true
emails:
permalink: /years/:path/
permalink: /archive/:path/
output: true
social:

51
_emails/1992/02/ee4f48790b0b67f5a81916a65e53d6db4e431405f1287833b50b9630a07694d6.md
View File

@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-04 - Secure IRC
## Header Data
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)<br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: ee4f48790b0b67f5a81916a65e53d6db4e431405f1287833b50b9630a07694d6<br>
Message ID: \<7w969B2w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com\><br>
Reply To: \<9309010251.AA03303@netcom5.netcom.com\><br>
UTC Datetime: Tue, 31 Feb 92 17:19:10<br>
Raw Date: Tue, 31 Aug 93 17:19:10 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
From: Arthur Abraham <a2@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Fri, 16 Oct 92 18:04:53 PDT
To: hh@soda.berkeley.edu
Subject: Re: Game items...
Message-ID: <199210170104.AA06520@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
re RU-486: has recently been proven to make a nifty "morning-after" pill (is
this abortion? only if you believe in the sanctity of blastula) and a study
in (I believe) S. CA. is beginning on effectiveness in brain tumors... seems
as if this drug has possible wide theropeutic (aw, who can spell?) uses
beyond directly sex-lined situations. And RU-P5 is due out 2Q93.
-a2.
```
## Thread
+ [Return to January 1992](/years/1992/02/)
+ [Return to February 1992](/years/1992/02/)
+ 1992-10-01 (Thu, 1 Oct 92 17:43:51 -0400) - [Secure IRC](/years/1992/02/ee4f48790b0b67f5a81916a65e53d6db4e431405f1287833b50b9630a07694d6/) - _postmastuh@dawkmastuh.guv_
+ 1992-10-04 (Sun, 4 Oct 92 19:06:41 -0700) - [Secure IRC](/years/1992/02/ee4f48790b0b67f5a81916a65e53d6db4e431405f1287833b50b9630a07694d6/) - _Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\>_
+ 1992-10-04 (Sun, 4 Oct 92 19:06:41 -0700) - Secure IRC - _Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\>_
+ 1992-10-04 (Sun, 4 Oct 92 19:06:41 -0700) - [Secure IRC](/years/1992/02/ee4f48790b0b67f5a81916a65e53d6db4e431405f1287833b50b9630a07694d6/) - _Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\>_
+ 1992-10-04 (Sun, 4 Oct 92 19:06:41 -0700) - [Secure IRC](/years/1992/02/ee4f48790b0b67f5a81916a65e53d6db4e431405f1287833b50b9630a07694d6/) - _Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\>_

75
_emails/1992/09/114d62fabc9ea292aa291c6e0f0a85d514e73fe329f645d92916e8012e9d4a2e.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-09-23 - KPFA interview went well
## Header Data
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)<br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 114d62fabc9ea292aa291c6e0f0a85d514e73fe329f645d92916e8012e9d4a2e<br>
Message ID: \<9209232007.AA03117@netcom.com\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-09-23 20:25:19 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Wed, 23 Sep 92 13:25:19 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 23 Sep 92 13:25:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: KPFA interview went well
Message-ID: <9209232007.AA03117@netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
This is my first test of this list...hope it works...and a brief
opinion on the KPFA (etc.) interview with our own John Gilmore,
representing the EFF, Jim Bidzos, of RSA Data Security, and Jim
Kellstrom (sp?) of the FBI.
I made a tape of it and can bring it to the 10/10/92 crypto meeting.
John did an excellent job of raising the constitutional issues, while
the FBI guy basically said "Trust us." Jim Bidzos of RSA Data Security
didn't say much, as the thrust of the discussion was more on
wiretapping and the proposed Digital Telephony bill, with not much of
substance said about RSA and public key cryptography.
I waited on the 1-800-464-5732 line to ask about the status of use of
encryption, especially with RSA and RSA-like systems, but the show ran
out of time before I could get on.
This series seems timely. Every Wednesday at noon on KPFA. Check your
local listings and the announcement list John sent out a few days ago.
--Tim
--
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay@netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | RSA MailSafe Public Key: by arrangement
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [September 1992](/years/1992/09)
+ 1992-09-23 (Wed, 23 Sep 92 13:25:19 PDT) - KPFA interview went well - _tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)_
+ 1992-09-24 (Thu, 24 Sep 92 10:28:07 PDT) - [Re: KPFA interview went well](/years/1992/09/484d54b869575b86e1f5f4cbe21959684137e0c875004ff63c502b11f717fb7a) - _pozar@kumr.lns.com (Tim Pozar)_
+ 1992-09-24 (Thu, 24 Sep 92 11:13:21 PDT) - [The aural Tim Pozar](/years/1992/09/17a09f8ed3e4c3e98e902c889e53518adfcf481d9d8ac1c147fbf572113bebf2) - _Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\>_
+ 1992-09-24 (Thu, 24 Sep 92 16:42:21 PDT) - [Re: The aural Tim Pozar](/years/1992/09/90aa886e6ed977b1d1f23bb41ecef6ad549dd017bc141b6bdefb8b0b42e038f2) - _pozar@kumr.lns.com (Tim Pozar)_

54
_emails/1992/09/17a09f8ed3e4c3e98e902c889e53518adfcf481d9d8ac1c147fbf572113bebf2.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-09-24 - The aural Tim Pozar
## Header Data
From: Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 17a09f8ed3e4c3e98e902c889e53518adfcf481d9d8ac1c147fbf572113bebf2<br>
Message ID: \<9209241811.AA23823@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
Reply To: \<m0mXwxx-00029lC@kumr.lns.com\><br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-09-24 18:13:21 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Thu, 24 Sep 92 11:13:21 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 24 Sep 92 11:13:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The aural Tim Pozar
In-Reply-To: <m0mXwxx-00029lC@kumr.lns.com>
Message-ID: <9209241811.AA23823@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Tim Pozar writes:
>I am also the technical consultant to the show, so your mail will not be
>falling on deft ears...
Just for the record, Tim's _are_ deft, but they are _not_ deaf.
Eric
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [September 1992](/years/1992/09)
+ 1992-09-23 (Wed, 23 Sep 92 13:25:19 PDT) - [KPFA interview went well](/years/1992/09/114d62fabc9ea292aa291c6e0f0a85d514e73fe329f645d92916e8012e9d4a2e) - _tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)_
+ 1992-09-24 (Thu, 24 Sep 92 10:28:07 PDT) - [Re: KPFA interview went well](/years/1992/09/484d54b869575b86e1f5f4cbe21959684137e0c875004ff63c502b11f717fb7a) - _pozar@kumr.lns.com (Tim Pozar)_
+ 1992-09-24 (Thu, 24 Sep 92 11:13:21 PDT) - The aural Tim Pozar - _Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\>_
+ 1992-09-24 (Thu, 24 Sep 92 16:42:21 PDT) - [Re: The aural Tim Pozar](/years/1992/09/90aa886e6ed977b1d1f23bb41ecef6ad549dd017bc141b6bdefb8b0b42e038f2) - _pozar@kumr.lns.com (Tim Pozar)_

197
_emails/1992/09/276aeba05fb25fa848ecbc81e28d6955ccf33532c4d011a74c023ef15ce2c9bc.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-09-25 - secretions
## Header Data
From: Judith Milhon \<stjude@well.sf.ca.us\><br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 276aeba05fb25fa848ecbc81e28d6955ccf33532c4d011a74c023ef15ce2c9bc<br>
Message ID: \<199209251001.AA16909@well.sf.ca.us\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-09-25 10:02:38 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Fri, 25 Sep 92 03:02:38 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: Judith Milhon <stjude@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Fri, 25 Sep 92 03:02:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: secretions
Message-ID: <199209251001.AA16909@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
"The alternative to mutual trust, which is indeed a risky gamble, is the
security of the police state."
-- Alan Watts
This text may be published in MONDO2000 as my regular column, Irresponsible
Journalism. Eric Hughes suggested the coda with the toad address, adding
that it would be amusing to have it almost completely blotted by magic
marker, as if inadequately censored.
I don't want to be the venom in this toad. <I'd like to be one of the
jewels
it wears in its head -- I can't quote that precisely, but it's something
like, "the venomous toad, which yet in its head wears a precious
jewel"...>
the idea is to draw in other useful minds. we can assume the WRONG PEOPLE
already know the address.
lady ada won't apologize for the gonzo wrapping for the ideas; she is
concerned only that they be correct and clearly stated. clarifications,
expansions, corrections are welcome. also abuse and threats, for that
matter... any feedback, please feed me...
THE CYPHERPUNK MOVEMENT
by St. Jude
I don't face-to-face all that much. And I don't like clubs. I was in the
Black Hole for a reason: The Screamin' Memes were in town for one night
only -- Thursday, of course. Thursday's the night, now that the weekend
has annexed Fri. and Mon. I was lurking in the back, hoping not to see
anybody, when the Jones brothers staked me out. Damn. They are deep into
the street drugs. Keeping up with the Joneses is nigh impossible; their
most trivial chitchat is an exercise in decryption. Eddy -- or maybe he
was being Ellis that night -- was implying something about somebody when my
right foot detonated down to its steel toe. I looked up -- way up -- to a
face that wasn't there at all. Just a dome of black cloth, with goggles.
Three-eyed goggles. Ah: a Chador. I'd heard of that. I screamed: "You
stomped my foot FLAT!"
"Sorry." "Are you okay?" "Oh maaaang." Many overlapping voices, all
of them synthesized, blurted from above. Out of two tiny speakers hanging
like earrings off a basketweave headband like a cop's belt. The head
bowed, bringing it almost within biting range.
"Gah. Ow. Ooo." Pretending to be demented with pain, I lurched deep
into the Chador. But I was cool: I was rootling in there for clues. Ha!
Male pheromones. Hardish male torso. I was jostling this lumpy equipment
hanging off him, trying to get a good feel of it without alerting him. Nuh
uh: _I_ meant electronics... what did _you_ think? Okay: I had some data
to work with. Male with gadgets. Quelle surprise.
"What the hell have you got on your feet? HORSESHOES?"
A voice like rushing water: "Kothurni." The Chador shifted a
little...
and under his full black skirts I saw them: big weighted club-foot boots
with concealed lifts, to disguise the wearer's height. Wicked.
The pain and the espionage cleared my head. I was ready to deal.
"So you're protecting your meat identity, right?"
The Chador seemed to teeter a little. It goggled down at me as if I
were a smear on a slide. Its third-eye goggle was a lens. Check. Out of
the ambient murk loomed another Chador. Exactly the same height. Right.
"How come you guys are in full drag?"
"We're here for a... uh... party." The voice from the other Chador was
a flanged saxophone, but I could swear it had a Texas accent.
"Rubbish. You're having a cell meeting, right? "
The near Chador, the one I had groped, seemed to teeter again. What
sounded like a tape player on fast-forward came faintly from its interior.
An earphone?
The saxophone honked: "If I said I even understood what you meant, what
kind of a chump would that make me?"
"I could hazard a guess. I think you're cryptoanarchists -- what I'd
call cypherpunks!"
My Chador cracked up. I could tell. The farther one seemed to stiffen;
I think it was giving me a hate stare. Hard to manage behind the whole 9
yards o' cloth.
"Is that clever or what? I'm onto you like psilocybe on cowshit, dudes.
You want to take over the world. Haha hahaha haaaaa."
Both of them rocked back a little. I went in after them. "You want to
talk encryption schemes? Let's talk cryptic. Tales from the cryp'ed. But
make it fast: The Memes are comin' on." Oh, I was bluffing. I don't know
much about cryptography. I was just 'tuding them from tech envy. Damn:
Chadors. And me without the first widget.
From the far guy came a cello, very suave: "The world has already been
taken over. You may have noticed this. We're just trying to get some of
it back." And the accent was -- Dutch?
Bob's yr uncle. Gotcha. I hadn't been certain. Maybe chadors were now
trendy club gear -- what do I know? "Hey -- that cello's another guy? How
many you PACKIN' in there?"
Out of my Chador a sawtooth rasped: "Variable. People are ringing in
and out."
"You're on line?"
"This is a bridge. International." Sawtooth again.
The cello resumed, an annoyed cello: "We don't believe in takeovers.
In fact, we are working to make things UNTAKEOVERABLE."
A theremin quivered, "And to make the world safe for anarchy. _We want
the air-waves, baby_." It snickered across many frequencies.
The Tejana saxophone chuckled, (and an eerie treat that was, too):
"Problem is, how to guarantee privacy for pseudonyms. So you can have a
pseudonymous economy."
A toad croaked: "So, full-RSA encrypted EVERYTHING. No back doors.
Secure digital money. Swiss bank accounts for the millions."
The theremin: "A global monetary system that makes governments obsolete.
Down come the governments. Goodbye the feds." It sang, whoopingly: "BYE
BYE, LAWWww." Horrible broad-band snickering.
The toad croaked: "Er... yes. Real freedom of speech, too.
Libertech!"
The Dutch cello was all business: "Okay, what does it take? You need
real-time protocols to prove you own your pseudonym. And your pseudonyms
have online reputations, via people you've done biz with -- like a
distributed credit rating system. With maybe designated angels -- Fair
Witnesses."
I was charmed. "And you wear the chador when you face-to-face somebody
who knows your handle!"
The theremin wheeped: "Actually, unmasking your real identity could be
the ultimate collateral -- your killable, _torturable_ body. Even without
kids, you've got a hostage to fortune -- your own meat."
I was reeling. "Oh yas yas. As Dylan said: 'They asked me for some
collateral/ and I pulled down my pants'."
Orchestral chuckles rained down on me. Was I an international hit?
But at that exact moment The Memes hit the stage. The crowd did a 9.1
Richter lurch and the other Chador pitched onto my LEFT toe, maybe denting
the steel.
"AAIEEeeee. That's great COVERT GEAR you got there, guys. You couldn't
sneak up on Helen Keller in a HAILSTORM." I was trying to spin down. "And
dudes -- this is not the neighborhood for flashing the hardware. Getting
rolled by winos is pretty LOW TECH."
A spike-knuckled glove slithered out of the farther guy, clutching what
looked, in the near-dark, like an electric razor. "_Gonna menace 'em with
a clean shave_?"
The sax: "Stunner. Bottom of the line. But." A hot line of pure
energy cracked across its little trodes. Of course.
Rushing water: "See ya." And they did a fade into the smoke.
The Screamin' Memes were worthless. To hell with clubs. To hell with
lots o' things, maybe. I am now sensing my roots, mahn; dey who are my
bredren. Nerds.
Nerds as mainstreamed by the grainy but still fetching Robt Redford in
Sneakers... Nerds who will have their revenge at last, by making the
online realer than our current regrettable reality... No, I'm not quite
delusional. I've heard the cypherpunks are already distributing their
encrypted email software, which is quick and slick. I might even join the
revolution, which is, heh, already in progress.
Yeah. Why not? Give me libertech or give me... _DES_?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------
St. Jude, aka Lady Ada Lovelace, wrote "The Spook in the Machine" for MONDO
#1, describing the enforcement of DES, the Data Encryption Scam with the
handy backdoor. She can be reached online as stjude@well.sf.ca.us. Note:
a definitely false rumor is now circulating that the revolutionists can be
contacted via cypherpunks@toad.com.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
feed me?
>jude<
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [September 1992](/years/1992/09)
+ 1992-09-25 (Fri, 25 Sep 92 03:02:38 PDT) - secretions - _Judith Milhon \<stjude@well.sf.ca.us\>_

149
_emails/1992/09/2fe5a28bc8c23820dc93de1603b58c1ac84c93a16bc852a9b51eb3faed1aa231.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-09-25 - the hopping remailer is done
## Header Data
From: Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 2fe5a28bc8c23820dc93de1603b58c1ac84c93a16bc852a9b51eb3faed1aa231<br>
Message ID: \<9209251835.AA00599@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-09-25 18:37:12 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Fri, 25 Sep 92 11:37:12 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Fri, 25 Sep 92 11:37:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: the hopping remailer is done
Message-ID: <9209251835.AA00599@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
The hopping remailer is finished. I wrote it this morning.
The change to make a hopping remailer is very easy. Here's the new
perl script:
--------- cut here ---------
while (<>) {
last if /^$/ ;
$subject = $_ if /^Subject:/ ;
if (/^Request-Remailing-To:/) {
chop ;
s/^.*:// ;
$addressee = $_ ;
}
}
#open( OUTPUT, ">foo" ) || die "Cannot open 'foo'." ;
open( OUTPUT, "| /usr/lib/sendmail " . $addressee ) ;
select( OUTPUT ) ;
print "To:" . $addressee . "\n" ;
print "From: nobody\n" ;
print $subject ;
print "Remailed-By: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>\n" ;
#
# check to see if there are header lines in the body to collapse
# into the full header.
#
if ( $_ = <> ) {
if (/^##$/) {
# do nothing if the pasting token appears
# the rest of the body will be directly appended
# this allows for extra header lines to be added
} else {
# normal line
print "\n" ;
print $_ ;
}
} else {
# empty body
exit ;
}
while (<>) {
} continue {
print ;
}
--------- cut here ---------
Short explanation. The 'print "\n" ;' line was moved inside the new
if statement. The if statement reads a line of the body and stops the
script if there is no body. The line read is tested to see if it
contains the two characters "##" alone on the line. "##" is the ANSI
C token pasting operator. If there is no pasting, a blank line is
printed to mark the end of the header and the first line of the body
is printed. If there is pasting, then the conditional does nothing,
which has the effect that the body is appended directly onto the end
of the header, allowing you to add more header lines after the header
is rewritten.
Here is a sample message that I sent myself after the new script was
installed:
--------- cut here ---------
To: hughes
Subject: multiple hops
Request-Remailing-To: hughes
##
X-Hop: 1
Request-Remailing-To: hughes
##
X-Hop: 2
Request-Remailing-To: hughes
##
X-Hop: 3
This is a test message of multiple hops.
Eric
--------- cut here ---------
I received four pieces of mail after sending this to myself. The
first was the actual letter, which is still delivering normally and
not being filtered. The next two were the first and second
remailings; they had X-Hop: 1 and 2. The last message was the final
one, had X-Hop: 3 in its header and was delivered normally.
At each stage, the header got rewritten and a new
Request-Remailing-To: line inserted. When that mail got delivered, it
was again rewritten, with a new remailing request. This process is
extensible up to the 50K or so practical limitatation on mail size.
Note that this system is not at all secure by itself. But if each
message body were encrypted first, and the message first decrypted
before the header re-write took place, the routing instructions as a
whole would be hidden from prying eyes.
That's the next project.
Eric
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [September 1992](/years/1992/09)
+ 1992-09-25 (Fri, 25 Sep 92 11:37:12 PDT) - the hopping remailer is done - _Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\>_

56
_emails/1992/09/31baaacc209deb13a95a3cb83d8cdc149943000deccc15c41b37ee3219550d01.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-09-25 - Pointing out the obvious....
## Header Data
From: Mark Pesce \<osendai@well.sf.ca.us\><br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 31baaacc209deb13a95a3cb83d8cdc149943000deccc15c41b37ee3219550d01<br>
Message ID: \<199209252326.AA19540@well.sf.ca.us\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-09-25 23:27:24 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Fri, 25 Sep 92 16:27:24 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: Mark Pesce <osendai@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Fri, 25 Sep 92 16:27:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Pointing out the obvious....
Message-ID: <199209252326.AA19540@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Hey, Kidz....
I don't mean to point out the obvious, but when you mention a certain
scheme for secure transfer (3 initials, you guess), or a certain organization
dedicated to keeping it from the public (3 initals, you guess again),
THEY READ IT.
OK? Did I make my point?
If not, we're going to unsubscribe from this list like a bat out of hell.
Over,
OS Corp.
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [September 1992](/years/1992/09)
+ 1992-09-25 (Fri, 25 Sep 92 16:27:24 PDT) - Pointing out the obvious.... - _Mark Pesce \<osendai@well.sf.ca.us\>_

63
_emails/1992/09/484d54b869575b86e1f5f4cbe21959684137e0c875004ff63c502b11f717fb7a.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-09-24 - Re: KPFA interview went well
## Header Data
From: pozar@kumr.lns.com (Tim Pozar)<br>
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)<br>
Message Hash: 484d54b869575b86e1f5f4cbe21959684137e0c875004ff63c502b11f717fb7a<br>
Message ID: \<m0mXwxx-00029lC@kumr.lns.com\><br>
Reply To: \<9209232007.AA03117@netcom.com\><br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-09-24 17:28:07 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Thu, 24 Sep 92 10:28:07 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: pozar@kumr.lns.com (Tim Pozar)
Date: Thu, 24 Sep 92 10:28:07 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: KPFA interview went well
In-Reply-To: <9209232007.AA03117@netcom.com>
Message-ID: <m0mXwxx-00029lC@kumr.lns.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Timothy C. May wrote:
> This is my first test of this list...hope it works...and a brief
> opinion on the KPFA (etc.) interview with our own John Gilmore,
> representing the EFF, Jim Bidzos, of RSA Data Security, and Jim
> Kellstrom (sp?) of the FBI.
> [...]
Thanks for your input. If anyone else wants to feed back to the
program, they can send me email and I will pass it along to the producers.
I am also the technical consultant to the show, so your mail will not be
falling on deft ears...
Tim
--
Internet: pozar@kumr.lns.com FidoNet: Tim Pozar @ 1:125/555
UUCP: ...!uunet!kumr.lns.com!pozar
Snail: Tim Pozar / KKSF / 77 Maiden Lane / San Francisco CA 94108 / USA
Voice: +1 415 788 2022
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [September 1992](/years/1992/09)
+ 1992-09-23 (Wed, 23 Sep 92 13:25:19 PDT) - [KPFA interview went well](/years/1992/09/114d62fabc9ea292aa291c6e0f0a85d514e73fe329f645d92916e8012e9d4a2e) - _tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)_
+ 1992-09-24 (Thu, 24 Sep 92 10:28:07 PDT) - Re: KPFA interview went well - _pozar@kumr.lns.com (Tim Pozar)_
+ 1992-09-24 (Thu, 24 Sep 92 11:13:21 PDT) - [The aural Tim Pozar](/years/1992/09/17a09f8ed3e4c3e98e902c889e53518adfcf481d9d8ac1c147fbf572113bebf2) - _Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\>_
+ 1992-09-24 (Thu, 24 Sep 92 16:42:21 PDT) - [Re: The aural Tim Pozar](/years/1992/09/90aa886e6ed977b1d1f23bb41ecef6ad549dd017bc141b6bdefb8b0b42e038f2) - _pozar@kumr.lns.com (Tim Pozar)_

179
_emails/1992/09/63838c4c1c21215f4440e8cd823b5208586a474466b0784d8d9ce6cc851237ee.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-09-29 - SEIZING THE MEDIA- A NETWOR
## Header Data
From: "Fen Labalme" \<fen@genmagic.com\><br>
To: "Cypher Punks" \<cypherpunks@toad.com\><br>
Message Hash: 63838c4c1c21215f4440e8cd823b5208586a474466b0784d8d9ce6cc851237ee<br>
Message ID: \<9209290409.AA25631@relay2.UU.NET\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-09-29 04:01:24 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Mon, 28 Sep 92 21:01:24 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: "Fen Labalme" <fen@genmagic.com>
Date: Mon, 28 Sep 92 21:01:24 PDT
To: "Cypher Punks" <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: SEIZING THE MEDIA- A NETWOR
Message-ID: <9209290409.AA25631@relay2.UU.NET>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Mail*Link( Remote SEIZING THE MEDIA: A NETWORKER CONGRESS
from PeaceNet ACTIV-L:
Date: Sat, 26 Sep 1992 23:33:10 CDT
Sender: Activists Mailing List <ACTIV-L%MIZZOU1.BITNET@pucc.Princeton.EDU>
From: "(Rich Winkel)" <rich@pencil.cs.missouri.edu>
Subject: PAX: SEIZING THE MEDIA: A NETWORKER CONGRESS
To: Multiple recipients of ACTIV-L <ACTIV-L%MIZZOU1.BITNET@pucc.Princeton.EDU>
/** gen.media: 141.0 **/
** Topic: SEIZING THE MEDIA: NETWORKER CONGR **
** Written 6:39 pm Sep 25, 1992 by openmedia in cdp:gen.media **
SEIZING THE MEDIA: A NETWORKER CONGRESS
A weekend of activity to discuss, self-educate,
and put into practice the creation of subversive media.
1:30pm Saturday 24 October to 6pm Sunday 25 October 1992
Media and resource exchange; slides, fax, posters,
pamphlets, computer files, ideas, proposals, tactics
Practical action on billboard improvement and removal;
Big Art and postering
E-mail and fax facility to receive material
to be discussed and implemented during the weekend
Documentation to all participants
Materials supplied: photocopier reproduction/enlargement
and the streets of Oxford
Bloomin Arts, Princes Street, Cowley Road, Oxford, OX4, U.K.
If you can't make it in person, you can take part
in the Seizing the Media Congress by post, fax, E-mail.
Send documents, comments, proposals, art, ideas, and posters.
Post to: BM Jed, London WC1N 3XX, United Kingdom
Fax to: (011 441) 0865 72 4317
E-Mail to: Eastoxcomcen@GN.APC.ORG
Accommodation and other information are available from Friday night
onwards. To make arrangements or get more information, get in
touch with Oxfin between 1-4pm Mondays to Fridays at: (0865) 240545
>From the United States: 011 41865 240 545
Background:
SEIZING THE MEDIA is the title of pamphlet written by the
Immediast Underground and first released in Amsterdam ,
New York City, and Seattle in early 1992. The 26 pamphlet
combines theory, graphics, research and proposals that examine:
* Information control
* Propaganda and advertising
* CIA
* Mind control
* Immediast counter-offensives
* tactics, subversive networking, public empowerment
* multi-media
* Public production libraries
* the liberation of public space
...Just when Jesse Helms thought he made the world safe from
poetic terrorism, along come the Immediasts, a cadre of media
hackers who are fed up with the ecology of coercion that
surrounds them. Their booklet SEIZING THE MEDIA proposes an
all-out artistic assault on coercive communication, cultural
monologue, and media control. They want all media insurgents
to take back the airwaves with pirate radio, cable access TV,
altering ads and billboards, and otherwise hacking the
datasphere to break the spell of State/corporate media control.
. . . from Gareth Branwyns STREET NOISE, Issue 7 of Mondo 2000
SEIZING THE MEDIA Version 1.1 is available for $3 from
Open Media PO Box 2726 Westfield New Jersey 07091 USA
THE IMMEDIAST UNDERGROUND is a centerless network of artists,
writiers, hackers, culture jammers, pirate broadcasters, and
posterists who connect with one another through information
systems, mail art, networker congresses, and the underground
press, and who communicate with the public through actions
against all forms of coercive communication, space
infringement, and media control.
For more info contact:
Immediast U. PO Box 2726 Westfield New Jersey 07091 USA
DECENTRALIZED WORLD-WIDE NETWORKER CONGRESSES
Since the beginning of the year, members of alternative
info-nets, artists, insurgents, and cultural workers have
been holding networker congresses, transnational engagements
in cultural production, dialogue, collaborations, open
exchange, subversive brainstorming, and collective
disruptions of dominant culture.
THE NETWORKER, A NEW PERCEPTION
In societies where information is money and media is power,
public access is as controlled as the corporate states grip
on communication law, censorship, commerce, covert action
and surveillance. In this context, uninhibited public
communication, expression, and cultural production are acts
of freedom, sovereignty, and defiance. Rooted in the drive to
connect and exchange with others, Networker Congress engage
in culture and media as the battleground for greater openness
and freedom.
MORE INFORMATION about NETWORKER CONGRESSES contact:
H.R. Fricker
Buro fur kunsterische Umtriebe
CH 9043 Trogen Switzerland
Retrofuturism
PO Box 2278
Iowa City, Iowa 52244
Face of the Congress
FaGaGaGa
Po Box 1382
Youngstown, Ohio 44501
Peter Kaufman
Bergenwissenstrasse 11
CH-8123 EbmatigenDecentralized Networker Congresses
Switzerland
Decentralized Networker Congresses
Netshaker
PO Box 978
Hanover, New Hampshire 03766
** End of text from cdp:gen.media **
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [September 1992](/years/1992/09)
+ 1992-09-29 (Mon, 28 Sep 92 21:01:24 PDT) - SEIZING THE MEDIA- A NETWOR - _"Fen Labalme" \<fen@genmagic.com\>_

270
_emails/1992/09/6dcabcb0ac94c59c64f95177c1a985dfc027584f9a22e2aed8114ee95c861c01.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,270 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-09-24 - Returned mail: Unable to deliver mail
## Header Data
From: Mailer-Daemon@atdt.org (Mail Delivery Subsystem)<br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 6dcabcb0ac94c59c64f95177c1a985dfc027584f9a22e2aed8114ee95c861c01<br>
Message ID: \<9209242349.AB06629@atdt.org\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-09-24 23:49:37 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Thu, 24 Sep 92 16:49:37 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: Mailer-Daemon@atdt.org (Mail Delivery Subsystem)
Date: Thu, 24 Sep 92 16:49:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Returned mail: Unable to deliver mail
Message-ID: <9209242349.AB06629@atdt.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
----- Transcript of session follows -----
554 cypherpunks@toad.com... Recipient names must be specified
----- Unsent message follows -----
Return-Path: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Received: by atdt.org (5.61+++/JLK-atdt)
id AA06629; Thu, 24 Sep 92 19:49:05 -0400
Date: Thu, 24 Sep 92 19:49:05 -0400
From: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message-Id: <9209242349.AA06629@atdt.org>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Information Brokers
____________________________________________________________________________
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD
August 13 1992
HUGE TRADE IN PERSONAL FILES
By MALCOLM BROWN
Westpac, National Australia Bank, NRMA Insurance Ltd, Custom Credit
and
Citicorp are some of the big names in a damning report by the ICAC
Assistant Commissioner, Mr Adrian Roden, QC, on the unauthorised
release of
confidential government information.
Mr Roden found that there was a multi-million-dollar trade in such
information which involved public servants, including police, and
private
inquiry agents.
""Information, from a variety of State and Commonwealth government
sources
and the private sector has been freely and regularly sold and
exchanged for
many years," he said. "NSW public officials have been heavily
involved."
Mr Roden heard 446 witnesses in public and private hearings over 168
days
before compiling his 1,300-page report.
Even so, he said, it was necessary to be selective; thousands of
private
and commercial inquiry agents had not examined.
Mr Roden found that more than 250 people had participated in the
illicit
trade or had contributed to it.
OOf these, 155 had engaged in corrupt conduct. A further 101 had
engaged in
conduct which allowed, encouraged or caused the occurrence of corrupt
conduct.
Many are NSW and Commonwealth public servants who sold information
collected by the agencies where they work, including the Roads and
Traffic
Authority (RTA), police force, Telecom and Sydney County Council.
The Attorney-General, Mr Hannaford, announced that the Director of
Public
Prosecutions had set up a task force to consider laying charges
against
more than 100 people named in the report.
HHe said many of the public servants named could expect to lose their
jobs
and that the heads of all the government departments involved had been
told
to examine the report and take action against those involved.
The Assistant Police Commissioner, Mr Col Cole, confirmed yesterday
that
five police officers had been suspended and announced that three task
forces had been set up and computer security upgraded.
Mr Hannaford foreshadowed the introduction of privacy legislation to
make
the unauthorised use of confidential information a criminal offence.
The major banks said that they could not condone what their staff had
done
but said the staff had believed that they were acting in the best
interests
of their employers and the community.
None of the banks was planning to sack staff found to be corrupt
although
several said the staff had been counselled or "educated".
MMr Roden said the trade involved banks, insurance companies and other
financial institutions which had provided "a ready market".
The link was provided by private and commercial inquiry agents. With
some
banks, codes had been used to conceal the nature of the transactions.
"As they have gone about their corrupt trade, commercial interest has
prevailed over commercial ethics, greed ha~ prevailed over public
duty;
laws and regulations designed to protect confidentiality have been
ignored," Mr Roden said.
"Frequently the client, generally an insurance company, bank or other
financial institution, ordered the information from the agent with a
full
appreciation of how it was to be obtained.
""The evidence disclosed that in the collection and recovery
departments of
a number of those institutions, it has long been standard practice to
use
confidential government information . . . as a means of locating
debtors."
Some finance and insurance companies had directed agents to keep all
references to the trade off invoices and reports.
"Some even directed that the agents falsely state the source of the
information in their reports," Mr Roden said.
"Some solicitors in private practice have sought and purchased
confidential
government information in circumstances in which they must have known
that
it could not have been properly obtained."
Mr Kevin Rindfleish, an unlicensed private inquiry agent, had sold
Department of Motor Transport/Roads and Traffic Authority and social
security information "on a large scale". His principal client had been
the
ANZ Bank.
AA private investigator, Mr Terence John Hancock, and his company, All
Cities Investigations Pty Ltd, had sold confidential government
information
to the National Australia Bank and Westpac on a regular basis.
Two employees of the NAB had used prior contacts to provide the bank
with
access to RTA, social security, Australia Post and immigration
information.
Between them, the employees also provided silent numbers and
information on
electricity consumers.
The Advance Bank had "over a period of years" obtained information
improperly released from the RTA, the Department of Social Security
and the
Department of Immigration. The practice was "known and approved at
least to
senior management level".
New Zealand Insurance and Manufacturers Mutual had bought confidential
government information from private investigators.
NRMA Insurance Ltd and the Government Insurance Office were "found to
have
participated as freely in the illicit trade in confidential government
information as their more commercially orientated competitors".
"Evidence relating to NRMA Insurance Ltd established not only that it
purchased confidential government information through private
investigators, but also that investigators were required to obtain
relevant
government information by unauthorised means if they were to retain
the
company's work."
EEsanda Finance Corporation Ltd had bought confidential information
over at
least 23 years. Custom Credit Corporation Ltd which had engaged in the
illicit trade over "many years", had maintained false records to
conceal
how it obtained information.
Alston de Zilwa, former underwriter and operations manager of Citicorp
Ltd
and later, Toyota Finance Australia Limited's credit operations
manager,
had established for each of the two companies a system for obtaining
confidential information.
The companies would seek information directly from employees of the
DMA and
RTA and pay a private inquiry agent, Mr Kevin Robinson, who would
"launder"
it, then invoice the companies for the corresponding sum.
Mr Roden said that hundreds of thousands of dollars had changed hands
in
the trade uncovered. One agent had estimated that he had paid $40,000
to
$50,000 a year for Social Security information alone.
Another had said he received $100,000 over two years for government
information.
YYet another had, according to records, charged a bank $186,000 for
"inquiry
services" over a period of 18 months.
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [September 1992](/years/1992/09)
+ 1992-09-24 (Thu, 24 Sep 92 16:49:37 PDT) - Returned mail: Unable to deliver mail - _Mailer-Daemon@atdt.org (Mail Delivery Subsystem)_

258
_emails/1992/09/736e7c10f33ebf5915a11376d9bb00bd63e298a9770ccbe3072397ca30e5526a.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,258 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-09-24 - No Subject
## Header Data
From: Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 736e7c10f33ebf5915a11376d9bb00bd63e298a9770ccbe3072397ca30e5526a<br>
Message ID: \<9209241809.AA23637@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-09-24 18:10:30 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Thu, 24 Sep 92 11:10:30 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 24 Sep 92 11:10:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9209241809.AA23637@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
How to Make an Automated Remailer in Your Copious Spare Time with Easy
to Find and Inexpensive Software Tools You May Have Lying Around.
<reprinted from Popular Cryptography, September 1992. Used with permission>
The basic remailer illustrates how to hook in automated software
processing into the Unix mail system. Here are the basic elements.
1. .forward
2. slocal and .maildelivery
3. remail.perl
4. /usr/lib/sendmail
--------------------------------------------
1. .forward
Unix mail provides a way to have accounts on many different machines
but to receive all your mail in one place. That facility is the
.forward file, which resides in the home directory. The file is one
line long and contains the email address to which the mail will be
forwarded.
But the .forward file has another mode of operation. If the string
begins with the pipe character '|', the mail will be piped through the
program listed. Enclose the string with double quotes if you need
spaces included. Here is my .forward file:
"| /usr/local/lib/mh/slocal -user hughes"
Thus all my mail gets processed by the slocal program, described next.
I don't know where the man page for .forward is. Perhaps someone
could provide a reference.
---------
2. slocal and .maildelivery
The software system MH contains a bunch of useful tools for handling
mail, only one of which we need. For details on MH, do 'man mh'.
MH has a nice little mail hook processor called slocal. Its docs can
be found by 'man mhook'. slocal can conditionally perform operations
on mail messages and consider them either delivered or not. It allows
multiple operations on individual mail messages.
slocal reads the file .maildelivery when it starts up for
instructions. Here is my .maildelivery file:
#
# field pattern action/ string
# result (quote included spaces)
#
Request-Remailing-To "" pipe R "perl remail.perl"
Request-Remailing-To "" file R archive.remailer
The various pieces of the .maildelivery file are fully documented in
the man page. I'll just explain what mine does. Each line describes
one operation to be performed on each incoming mail message. Fields
are separated by whitespace, so if you need to include spaces, use
quotes.
The first field, labelled field, is the mail header field to look for.
slocal can selectively process on any header line. If the header line
does not exist, then the mail does not match this line and no
operation is performed. If the header line does exist, processing
continues.
The second field, pattern, is a text string to match with the contents
of that header line, i.e. with everything after the colon. In my
case, I put the empty string in, which matches everything. You need
the pair of quotes to have a placeholder for the field contents.
The next field, action, tells what to do with the message. 'pipe'
sends the message to the standard input of the named program. 'file'
appends the message to an archive or log file. A useful pipe command
for testing is "tee foo", which makes a copy of the message in file
foo, but does not append, so that you get an exact copy of what slocal
is going to pass to your pipe. This allows testing of the pipe
program without sending yourself mail all the time.
The next field, result, tells what to do with the message after
processing. I am currently using R for Regardless to indicate that
this action should always be performed no matter what. The code R
indicates that the mail should be considered not delivered after
processing; thus slocal writes the mail back into my local spool and I
see it as normal. Later, after I'm sick of looking at all the
forwarded mail, I'll change this code to A, meaning if the processing
succeeds, then the mail is considered delivered. The archive file
will always remain R.
The last field, string, is the parameter to the action. It is a file
name or program. Use quotes to include spaces. The name of my mail
processor is "perl remail.perl", which is to run the perl script
remail.perl on the mail.
The .maildelivery file is also the place to put encryption hooks to
automatically decrypt the bodies of messages. More on that in a
future version.
---------
3. remail.perl
Perl is a wonderful language for doing all sorts of useful work like
processing mail headers. Do 'man perl' for details, or get the
O'Reilly book and really learn how to use it.
The perl script, in summary, strips off the mail headers, saving the
Subject: line, rewrites a new header, and appends the body of the
previous message. Here is the script:
--------- cut here ---------
while (<>) {
last if /^$/ ;
$subject = $_ if /^Subject:/ ;
if (/^Request-Remailing-To:/) {
chop ;
s/^.*:// ;
$addressee = $_ ;
}
}
#open( OUTPUT, ">foo" ) || die "Cannot open 'foo'." ;
open( OUTPUT, "| /usr/lib/sendmail " . $addressee ) ;
select( OUTPUT ) ;
print "To:" . $addressee . "\n" ;
print "From: nobody\n" ;
print $subject ;
print "Remailed-By: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>\n" ;
print "\n" ;
while (<>) {
} continue {
print ;
}
--------- cut here ---------
Here is a summary of the operation. To really understand this, you'll
have to learn perl.
The while loop processes standard input. 'last' terminates the loop
as soon as a blank line is seen. A blank line separates the header
from the body. The subject line, if seen, sets the subject variable
to the whole subject line. The Request- header line has its final
newline removed, the contents up to the colon substituted into
nonexistence, and saves the rest in the addressee variable.
Next the pipe to sendmail is opened and its output is selected so that
all print commands will go to the pipe. There is a comment for a
different output channel to the file foo which can be commented in for
testing.
Next the remailed header is constructed out of print statements.
Lastly the rest of the standard input is passed through unmodified to
the output channel. The while loop terminates when there is no more
input.
---------
4. sendmail
sendmail is the backend mailer; it expects complete mail messages and
does not usually generate any line itself except for the first "From"
(with no colon) line. Any header you construct will thus get passed
through mostly unmodified. Hence you can put in any "From:" line you
want and any other header info, such as my "Remailed-By:" line.
sendmail expects the name of the addressee on its command line,
otherwise it puts an "Apparently-To:" line in the header.
Any mail processor which remails should probably go through sendmail,
although it would also be possible to talk to an SMTP port directly,
were you so motivated. MH also has some remailing programs; see 'man
mhook'.
---------
A few words for tinkerers.
-- You can always send mail to yourself. Especially after you've done
one kind of mail processing and want to pass the mail through the
filters again.
-- When getting started, create an empty .maildelivery file first and
then get your .forward file working. Test it by sending messages to
yourself. If you're not getting them, they are going into the bit
bucket. All your other mail will as well, in this case, so if you
can't afford to lose mail, do it right the first time or work on a
spare account.
-- Any mail slocal does not process will get delivered as normal.
Running a remailer will not interfere with your other work.
-- Remember to use quote marks.
-- You don't need to be a sysadmin to run this kind of remailer.
There is nothing, however, to prevent a sysadmin from running this
sofware under an alias. The sysadmin is also a 'trusted user' to
sendmail and can get rid of pesky "From"-no-colon lines.
-- Perl has a random function which could be used to automatically
choose various "From:" lines from a database. Remember to include
yeltsy@kremvax.rus.
-- postnews or inews could be substituted for sendmail. Different
header lines would have to be created. Such a service could run in
parallel with a remailer. You too can now repost to alt.sex.bondage!
Enjoy. And watch for interesting improvements like encryption.
Eric
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [September 1992](/years/1992/09)
+ 1992-09-24 (Thu, 24 Sep 92 11:10:30 PDT) - No Subject - _Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\>_

62
_emails/1992/09/90aa886e6ed977b1d1f23bb41ecef6ad549dd017bc141b6bdefb8b0b42e038f2.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-09-24 - Re: The aural Tim Pozar
## Header Data
From: pozar@kumr.lns.com (Tim Pozar)<br>
To: hughes@soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)<br>
Message Hash: 90aa886e6ed977b1d1f23bb41ecef6ad549dd017bc141b6bdefb8b0b42e038f2<br>
Message ID: \<m0mY2oA-00029tC@kumr.lns.com\><br>
Reply To: \<9209241811.AA23823@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-09-24 23:42:21 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Thu, 24 Sep 92 16:42:21 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: pozar@kumr.lns.com (Tim Pozar)
Date: Thu, 24 Sep 92 16:42:21 PDT
To: hughes@soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Subject: Re: The aural Tim Pozar
In-Reply-To: <9209241811.AA23823@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <m0mY2oA-00029tC@kumr.lns.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Eric Hughes wrote:
> Tim Pozar writes:
>
> >I am also the technical consultant to the show, so your mail will not be
> >falling on deft ears...
>
> Just for the record, Tim's _are_ deft, but they are _not_ deaf.
Thanks... :-)
Tim
--
Internet: pozar@kumr.lns.com FidoNet: Tim Pozar @ 1:125/555
UUCP: ...!uunet!kumr.lns.com!pozar
Snail: Tim Pozar / KKSF / 77 Maiden Lane / San Francisco CA 94108 / USA
Voice: +1 415 788 2022
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [September 1992](/years/1992/09)
+ 1992-09-23 (Wed, 23 Sep 92 13:25:19 PDT) - [KPFA interview went well](/years/1992/09/114d62fabc9ea292aa291c6e0f0a85d514e73fe329f645d92916e8012e9d4a2e) - _tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)_
+ 1992-09-24 (Thu, 24 Sep 92 10:28:07 PDT) - [Re: KPFA interview went well](/years/1992/09/484d54b869575b86e1f5f4cbe21959684137e0c875004ff63c502b11f717fb7a) - _pozar@kumr.lns.com (Tim Pozar)_
+ 1992-09-24 (Thu, 24 Sep 92 11:13:21 PDT) - [The aural Tim Pozar](/years/1992/09/17a09f8ed3e4c3e98e902c889e53518adfcf481d9d8ac1c147fbf572113bebf2) - _Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\>_
+ 1992-09-24 (Thu, 24 Sep 92 16:42:21 PDT) - Re: The aural Tim Pozar - _pozar@kumr.lns.com (Tim Pozar)_

51
_emails/1992/09/b4b554a32aff1742f72a2dd539e78d65c7adb945500134a33e2174f795a7e928.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-09-24 - Fake Mail
## Header Data
From: cliff_stoll@harvard.edu<br>
To: hughes@soda.berkeley.edu<br>
Message Hash: b4b554a32aff1742f72a2dd539e78d65c7adb945500134a33e2174f795a7e928<br>
Message ID: \<9209240552.AA04259@atdt.org\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-09-24 05:53:12 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Wed, 23 Sep 92 22:53:12 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: cliff_stoll@harvard.edu
Date: Wed, 23 Sep 92 22:53:12 PDT
To: hughes@soda.berkeley.edu
Subject: Fake Mail
Message-ID: <9209240552.AA04259@atdt.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Pssst!
I have a nice fake mail program that interfaces with emacs.
I'll send it along to anyone who wants it.
PS: Have you seen my latest chocolate chip cookie recipe?
Too bad about Martha. Maybe people like me are wed
to science...and great cookies.
ADFGVX
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [September 1992](/years/1992/09)
+ 1992-09-24 (Wed, 23 Sep 92 22:53:12 PDT) - Fake Mail - _cliff_stoll@harvard.edu_

582
_emails/1992/09/b5e24ee5d6a00a60a5cdd485ad3b67fa4016296e3d5df8faa2c6181e88494b20.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,582 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-09-21 - Long but good: Hammill on encryption
## Header Data
From: whitakerNeternity.demon.co.uk.demon.co.uk ("Russell E. Whitaker")<br>
To: _N/A_<br>
Message Hash: b5e24ee5d6a00a60a5cdd485ad3b67fa4016296e3d5df8faa2c6181e88494b20<br>
Message ID: \<717081867snx@eternity.demon.co.uk.demon.co.uk\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-09-21 13:24:27 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Mon, 21 Sep 1992 13:24:27 +0000<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: whitakerNeternity.demon.co.uk.demon.co.uk ("Russell E. Whitaker")
Date: Mon, 21 Sep 1992 13:24:27 +0000
Subject: Long but good: Hammill on encryption
Message-ID: <717081867snx@eternity.demon.co.uk.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
The following is the text of a *very* interesting speech
given in 1987 by mathematician Chuck Hammill. The Soviet
Union is mentioned; while this may be a little dated, there's
always China... and Cuba... and a few other places...
Enjoy,
Russell
FROM CROSSBOWS TO CRYPTOGRAPHY: THWARTING THE STATE VIA
TECHNOLOGY
Given at the Future of Freedom Conference, November 1987
You know, technology--and particularly computer
technology--has often gotten a bad rap in Libertarian cir-
cles. We tend to think of Orwell's 1984, or Terry Gilliam's
Brazil, or the proximity detectors keeping East Berlin's
slave/citizens on their own side of the border, or the so-
phisticated bugging devices Nixon used to harass those on
his "enemies list." Or, we recognize that for the price of
a ticket on the Concorde we can fly at twice the speed of
sound, but only if we first walk thru a magnetometer run by
a government policeman, and permit him to paw thru our be-
longings if it beeps.
But I think that mind-set is a mistake. Before there
were cattle prods, governments tortured their prisoners with
clubs and rubber hoses. Before there were lasers for
eavesdropping, governments used binoculars and lip-readers.
Though government certainly uses technology to oppress, the
evil lies not in the tools but in the wielder of the tools.
In fact, technology represents one of the most promis-
ing avenues available for re-capturing our freedoms from
those who have stolen them. By its very nature, it favors
the bright (who can put it to use) over the dull (who can-
not). It favors the adaptable (who are quick to see the
merit of the new( over the sluggish (who cling to time-
tested ways). And what two better words are there to de-
scribe government bureaucracy than "dull" and "sluggish"?
One of the clearest, classic triumphs of technology
over tyranny I see is the invention of the man-portable
crossbow. With it, an untrained peasant could now reliably
and lethally engage a target out to fifty meters--even if
that target were a mounted, chain-mailed knight. (Unlike
the longbow, which, admittedly was more powerful, and could
get off more shots per unit time, the crossbow required no
formal training to utilize. Whereas the longbow required
elaborate visual, tactile and kinesthetic coordination to
achieve any degree of accuracy, the wielder of a crossbow
could simply put the weapon to his shoulder, sight along the
arrow itself, and be reasonably assured of hitting his tar-
get.)
Moreover, since just about the only mounted knights
likely to visit your average peasant would be government
soldiers and tax collectors, the utility of the device was
plain: With it, the common rabble could defend themselves
not only against one another, but against their governmental
masters. It was the medieval equivalent of the armor-
piercing bullet, and, consequently, kings and priests (the
medieval equivalent of a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Crossbows) threatened death and excommunication, respec-
tively, for its unlawful possession.
Looking at later developments, we see how technology
like the firearm--particularly the repeating rifle and the
handgun, later followed by the Gatling gun and more advanced
machine guns--radically altered the balance of interpersonal
and inter-group power. Not without reason was the Colt .45
called "the equalizer." A frail dance-hall hostess with one
in her possession was now fully able to protect herself
against the brawniest roughneck in any saloon. Advertise-
ments for the period also reflect the merchandising of the
repeating cartridge rifle by declaring that "a man on
horseback, armed with one of these rifles, simply cannot be
captured." And, as long as his captors were relying upon
flintlocks or single-shot rifles, the quote is doubtless a
true one.
Updating now to the present, the public-key cipher
(with a personal computer to run it) represents an equiv-
alent quantum leap--in a defensive weapon. Not only can
such a technique be used to protect sensitive data in one's
own possession, but it can also permit two strangers to ex-
change information over an insecure communications
channel--a wiretapped phone line, for example, or
skywriting, for that matter)--without ever having previously
met to exchange cipher keys. With a thousand-dollar com-
puter, you can create a cipher that a multi-megabuck CRAY
X-MP can't crack in a year. Within a few years, it should
be economically feasible to similarly encrypt voice communi-
cations; soon after that, full-color digitized video images.
Technology will not only have made wiretapping obsolete, it
will have totally demolished government's control over in-
formation transfer.
I'd like to take just a moment to sketch the mathemat-
ics which makes this principle possible. This algorithm is
called the RSA algorithm, after Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman
who jointly created it. Its security derives from the fact
that, if a very large number is the product of two very
large primes, then it is extremely difficult to obtain the
two prime factors from analysis of their product. "Ex-
tremely" in the sense that if primes p and q have 100
digits apiece, then their 200-digit product cannot in gen-
eral be factored in less than 100 years by the most powerful
computer now in existence.
The "public" part of the key consists of (1) the prod-
uct pq of the two large primes p and q, and (2) one fac-
tor, call it x , of the product xy where xy = {(p-1) *
(q-1) + 1}. The "private" part of the key consists of the
other factor y.
Each block of the text to be encrypted is first turned
into an integer--either by using ASCII, or even a simple
A=01, B=02, C=03, ... , Z=26 representation. This integer
is then raised to the power x (modulo pq) and the resulting
integer is then sent as the encrypted message. The receiver
decrypts by taking this integer to the (secret) power y
(modulo pq). It can be shown that this process will always
yield the original number started with.
What makes this a groundbreaking development, and why
it is called "public-key" cryptography," is that I can
openly publish the product pq and the number x , while
keeping secret the number y --so that anyone can send me
an encrypted message, namely
x
a (mod pq) ,
but only I can recover the original message a , by taking
what they send, raising it to the power y and taking the
result (mod pq). The risky step (meeting to exchange cipher
keys) has been eliminated. So people who may not even trust
each other enough to want to meet, may still reliably ex-
change encrypted messages--each party having selected and
disseminated his own pq and his x , while maintaining
the secrecy of his own y.
Another benefit of this scheme is the notion of a "dig-
ital signature," to enable one to authenticate the source of
a given message. Normally, if I want to send you a message,
I raise my plaintext a to your x and take the result (mod
your pq) and send that.
However, if in my message, I take the plaintext a and
raise it to my (secret) power y , take the result (mod my
pq), then raise that result to your x (mod your pq) and
send this, then even after you have normally "decrypted" the
message, it will still look like garbage. However, if you
then raise it to my public power x , and take the result
(mod my public pq ), so you will not only recover the ori-
ginal plaintext message, but you will know that no one but I
could have sent it to you (since no one else knows my secret
y).
And these are the very concerns by the way that are to-
day tormenting the Soviet Union about the whole question of
personal computers. On the one hand, they recognize that
American schoolchildren are right now growing up with com-
puters as commonplace as sliderules used to be--more so, in
fact, because there are things computers can do which will
interest (and instruct) 3- and 4-year-olds. And it is pre-
cisely these students who one generation hence will be going
head-to-head against their Soviet counterparts. For the
Soviets to hold back might be a suicidal as continuing to
teach swordsmanship while your adversaries are learning
ballistics. On the other hand, whatever else a personal
computer may be, it is also an exquisitely efficient copying
machine--a floppy disk will hold upwards of 50,000 words of
text, and can be copied in a couple of minutes. If this
weren't threatening enough, the computer that performs the
copy can also encrypt the data in a fashion that is all but
unbreakable. Remember that in Soviet society publicly ac-
cessible Xerox machines are unknown. (The relatively few
copying machines in existence are controlled more inten-
sively than machine guns are in the United States.)
Now the "conservative" position is that we should not
sell these computers to the Soviets, because they could use
them in weapons systems. The "liberal" position is that we
should sell them, in the interests of mutual trade and
cooperation--and anyway, if we don't make the sale, there
will certainly be some other nation willing to.
For my part, I'm ready to suggest that the Libertarian
position should be to give them to the Soviets for free, and
if necessary, make them take them . . . and if that doesn't
work load up an SR-71 Blackbird and air drop them over
Moscow in the middle of the night. Paid for by private sub-
scription, of course, not taxation . . . I confess that this
is not a position that has gained much support among members
of the conventional left-right political spectrum, but, af-
ter all, in the words of one of Illuminatus's characters, we
are political non-Euclideans: The shortest distance to a
particular goal may not look anything like what most people
would consider a "straight line." Taking a long enough
world-view, it is arguable that breaking the Soviet govern-
ment monopoly on information transfer could better lead to
the enfeeblement and, indeed, to the ultimate dissolution of
the Soviet empire than would the production of another dozen
missiles aimed at Moscow.
But there's the rub: A "long enough" world view does
suggest that the evil, the oppressive, the coercive and the
simply stupid will "get what they deserve," but what's not
immediately clear is how the rest of us can escape being
killed, enslaved, or pauperized in the process.
When the liberals and other collectivists began to at-
tack freedom, they possessed a reasonably stable, healthy,
functioning economy, and almost unlimited time to proceed to
hamstring and dismantle it. A policy of political
gradualism was at least conceivable. But now, we have
patchwork crazy-quilt economy held together by baling wire
and spit. The state not only taxes us to "feed the poor"
while also inducing farmers to slaughter milk cows and drive
up food prices--it then simultaneously turns around and sub-
sidizes research into agricultural chemicals designed to in-
crease yields of milk from the cows left alive. Or witness
the fact that a decline in the price of oil is considered as
potentially frightening as a comparable increase a few years
ago. When the price went up, we were told, the economy
risked collapse for for want of energy. The price increase
was called the "moral equivalent of war" and the Feds swung
into action. For the first time in American history, the
speed at which you drive your car to work in the morning be-
came an issue of Federal concern. Now, when the price of
oil drops, again we risk problems, this time because Ameri-
can oil companies and Third World basket-case nations who
sell oil may not be able to ever pay their debts to our
grossly over-extended banks. The suggested panacea is that
government should now re-raise the oil prices that OPEC has
lowered, via a new oil tax. Since the government is seeking
to raise oil prices to about the same extent as OPEC did,
what can we call this except the "moral equivalent of civil
war--the government against its own people?"
And, classically, in international trade, can you imag-
ine any entity in the world except a government going to
court claiming that a vendor was selling it goods too
cheaply and demanding not only that that naughty vendor be
compelled by the court to raise its prices, but also that it
be punished for the act of lowering them in the first place?
So while the statists could afford to take a couple of
hundred years to trash our economy and our liberties--we
certainly cannot count on having an equivalent period of
stability in which to reclaim them. I contend that there
exists almost a "black hole" effect in the evolution of
nation-states just as in the evolution of stars. Once free-
dom contracts beyond a certain minimum extent, the state
warps the fabric of the political continuum about itself to
the degree that subsequent re-emergence of freedom becomes
all but impossible. A good illustration of this can be seen
in the area of so-called "welfare" payments. When those who
sup at the public trough outnumber (and thus outvote) those
whose taxes must replenish the trough, then what possible
choice has a democracy but to perpetuate and expand the tak-
ing from the few for the unearned benefit of the many? Go
down to the nearest "welfare" office, find just two people
on the dole . . . and recognize that between them they form
a voting bloc that can forever outvote you on the question
of who owns your life--and the fruits of your life's labor.
So essentially those who love liberty need an "edge" of
some sort if we're ultimately going to prevail. We obvi-
ously can't use the altruists' "other-directedness" of
"work, slave, suffer, sacrifice, so that next generation of
a billion random strangers can live in a better world."
Recognize that, however immoral such an appeal might be, it
is nonetheless an extremely powerful one in today's culture.
If you can convince people to work energetically for a
"cause," caring only enough for their personal welfare so as
to remain alive enough and healthy enough to continue
working--then you have a truly massive reservoir of energy
to draw from. Equally clearly, this is just the sort of ap-
peal which tautologically cannot be utilized for egoistic or
libertarian goals. If I were to stand up before you tonight
and say something like, "Listen, follow me as I enunciate my
noble "cause," contribute your money to support the "cause,"
give up your free time to work for the "cause," strive
selflessly to bring it about, and then (after you and your
children are dead) maybe your children's children will actu-
ally live under egoism"--you'd all think I'd gone mad. And
of course you'd be right. Because the point I'm trying to
make is that libertarianism and/or egoism will be spread if,
when, and as, individual libertarians and/or egoists find it
profitable and/or enjoyable to do so. And probably only
then.
While I certainly do not disparage the concept of poli-
tical action, I don't believe that it is the only, nor even
necessarily the most cost-effective path toward increasing
freedom in our time. Consider that, for a fraction of the
investment in time, money and effort I might expend in try-
ing to convince the state to abolish wiretapping and all
forms of censorship--I can teach every libertarian who's in-
terested how to use cryptography to abolish them
unilaterally.
There is a maxim--a proverb--generally attributed to
the Eskimoes, which very likely most Libertarians have al-
ready heard. And while you likely would not quarrel with
the saying, you might well feel that you've heard it often
enough already, and that it has nothing further to teach us,
and moreover, that maybe you're even tired of hearing it. I
shall therefore repeat it now:
If you give a man a fish, the saying runs, you feed him
for a day. But if you teach a man how to fish, you feed him
for a lifetime.
Your exposure to the quote was probably in some sort of
a "workfare" vs. "welfare" context; namely, that if you
genuinely wish to help someone in need, you should teach him
how to earn his sustenance, not simply how to beg for it.
And of course this is true, if only because the next time he
is hungry, there might not be anybody around willing or even
able to give him a fish, whereas with the information on how
to fish, he is completely self sufficient.
But I submit that this exhausts only the first order
content of the quote, and if there were nothing further to
glean from it, I would have wasted your time by citing it
again. After all, it seems to have almost a crypto-altruist
slant, as though to imply that we should structure our ac-
tivities so as to maximize the benefits to such hungry
beggars as we may encounter.
But consider:
Suppose this Eskimo doesn't know how to fish, but he
does know how to hunt walruses. You, on the other hand,
have often gone hungry while traveling thru walrus country
because you had no idea how to catch the damn things, and
they ate most of the fish you could catch. And now suppose
the two of you decide to exchange information, bartering
fishing knowledge for hunting knowledge. Well, the first
thing to observe is that a transaction of this type
categorically and unambiguously refutes the Marxist premise
that every trade must have a "winner" and a "loser;" the
idea that if one person gains, it must necessarily be at the
"expense" of another person who loses. Clearly, under this
scenario, such is not the case. Each party has gained some-
thing he did not have before, and neither has been dimin-
ished in any way. When it comes to exchange of information
(rather than material objects) life is no longer a zero-sum
game. This is an extremely powerful notion. The "law of
diminishing returns," the "first and second laws of
thermodynamics"--all those "laws" which constrain our possi-
bilities in other contexts--no longer bind us! Now that's
anarchy!
Or consider another possibility: Suppose this hungry
Eskimo never learned to fish because the ruler of his
nation-state had decreed fishing illegal. Because fish
contain dangerous tiny bones, and sometimes sharp spines, he
tells us, the state has decreed that their consumption--and
even their possession--are too hazardous to the people's
health to be permitted . . . even by knowledgeable, willing
adults. Perhaps it is because citizens' bodies are thought
to be government property, and therefore it is the function
of the state to punish those who improperly care for govern-
ment property. Or perhaps it is because the state gener-
ously extends to competent adults the "benefits" it provides
to children and to the mentally ill: namely, a full-time,
all-pervasive supervisory conservatorship--so that they need
not trouble themselves with making choices about behavior
thought physically risky or morally "naughty." But, in any
case, you stare stupefied, while your Eskimo informant re-
lates how this law is taken so seriously that a friend of
his was recently imprisoned for years for the crime of "pos-
session of nine ounces of trout with intent to distribute."
Now you may conclude that a society so grotesquely
oppressive as to enforce a law of this type is simply an
affront to the dignity of all human beings. You may go far-
ther and decide to commit some portion of your discretion-
ary, recreational time specifically to the task of thwarting
this tyrant's goal. (Your rationale may be "altruistic" in
the sense of wanting to liberate the oppressed, or
"egoistic" in the sense of proving you can outsmart the
oppressor--or very likely some combination of these or per-
haps even other motives.)
But, since you have zero desire to become a martyr to
your "cause," you're not about to mount a military campaign,
or even try to run a boatload of fish through the blockade.
However, it is here that technology--and in particular in-
formation technology--can multiply your efficacy literally a
hundredfold. I say "literally," because for a fraction of
the effort (and virtually none of the risk) attendant to
smuggling in a hundred fish, you can quite readily produce a
hundred Xerox copies of fishing instructions. (If the tar-
geted government, like present-day America, at least permits
open discussion of topics whose implementation is re-
stricted, then that should suffice. But, if the government
attempts to suppress the flow of information as well, then
you will have to take a little more effort and perhaps write
your fishing manual on a floppy disk encrypted according to
your mythical Eskimo's public-key parameters. But as far as
increasing real-world access to fish you have made genuine
nonzero headway--which may continue to snowball as others
re-disseminate the information you have provided. And you
have not had to waste any of your time trying to convert id-
eological adversaries, or even trying to win over the unde-
cided. Recall Harry Browne's dictum from "Freedom in an
Unfree World" that the success of any endeavor is in general
inversely proportional to the number of people whose persua-
sion is necessary to its fulfilment.
If you look at history, you cannot deny that it has
been dramatically shaped by men with names like Washington,
Lincoln, . . . Nixon . . . Marcos . . . Duvalier . . .
Khadaffi . . . and their ilk. But it has also been shaped
by people with names like Edison, Curie, Marconi, Tesla and
Wozniak. And this latter shaping has been at least as per-
vasive, and not nearly so bloody.
And that's where I'm trying to take The LiberTech
Project. Rather than beseeching the state to please not en-
slave, plunder or constrain us, I propose a libertarian net-
work spreading the technologies by which we may seize
freedom for ourselves.
But here we must be a bit careful. While it is not (at
present) illegal to encrypt information when government
wants to spy on you, there is no guarantee of what the fu-
ture may hold. There have been bills introduced, for exam-
ple, which would have made it a crime to wear body armor
when government wants to shoot you. That is, if you were to
commit certain crimes while wearing a Kevlar vest, then that
fact would constitute a separate federal crime of its own.
This law to my knowledge has not passed . . . yet . . . but
it does indicate how government thinks.
Other technological applications, however, do indeed
pose legal risks. We recognize, for example, that anyone
who helped a pre-Civil War slave escape on the "underground
railroad" was making a clearly illegal use of technology--as
the sovereign government of the United States of America at
that time found the buying and selling of human beings quite
as acceptable as the buying and selling of cattle. Simi-
larly, during Prohibition, anyone who used his bathtub to
ferment yeast and sugar into the illegal psychoactive drug,
alcohol--the controlled substance, wine--was using technol-
ogy in a way that could get him shot dead by federal agents
for his "crime"--unfortunately not to be restored to life
when Congress reversed itself and re-permitted use of this
drug.
So . . . to quote a former President, un-indicted co-
conspirator and pardoned felon . . . "Let me make one thing
perfectly clear:" The LiberTech Project does not advocate,
participate in, or conspire in the violation of any law--no
matter how oppressive, unconstitutional or simply stupid
such law may be. It does engage in description (for educa-
tional and informational purposes only) of technological
processes, and some of these processes (like flying a plane
or manufacturing a firearm) may well require appropriate li-
censing to perform legally. Fortunately, no license is
needed for the distribution or receipt of information it-
self.
So, the next time you look at the political scene and
despair, thinking, "Well, if 51% of the nation and 51% of
this State, and 51% of this city have to turn Libertarian
before I'll be free, then somebody might as well cut my
goddamn throat now, and put me out of my misery"--recognize
that such is not the case. There exist ways to make your-
self free.
If you wish to explore such techniques via the Project,
you are welcome to give me your name and address--or a fake
name and mail drop, for that matter--and you'll go on the
mailing list for my erratically-published newsletter. Any
friends or acquaintances whom you think would be interested
are welcome as well. I'm not even asking for stamped self-
addressed envelopes, since my printer can handle mailing la-
bels and actual postage costs are down in the noise compared
with the other efforts in getting an issue out. If you
should have an idea to share, or even a useful product to
plug, I'll be glad to have you write it up for publication.
Even if you want to be the proverbial "free rider" and just
benefit from what others contribute--you're still welcome:
Everything will be public domain; feel free to copy it or
give it away (or sell it, for that matter, 'cause if you can
get money for it while I'm taking full-page ads trying to
give it away, you're certainly entitled to your capitalist
profit . . .) Anyway, every application of these principles
should make the world just a little freer, and I'm certainly
willing to underwrite that, at least for the forseeable fu-
ture.
I will leave you with one final thought: If you don't
learn how to beat your plowshares into swords before they
outlaw swords, then you sure as HELL ought to learn before
they outlaw plowshares too.
--Chuck Hammill
THE LIBERTECH PROJECT
3194 Queensbury Drive
Los Angeles, California
90064
310-836-4157
[The above LiberTech address was updated June 1992, with the
permission of Chuck Hammill, by:
Russell Earl Whitaker whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk
Communications Editor 71750.2413@compuserve.com
EXTROPY: The Journal of Transhumanist Thought AMIX: RWHITAKER
Board member, Extropy Institute (ExI)
[.sig revised 11 September 1992 /// Send mail to eternity node]
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.0
mQCNAiqwg10AAAEEAMVNMI766ljeuW01xqXKYYV5lmDPvb+6dCQK3m1iBQdan0no
pm35j1DIRp3UJZogAe5eimsQg1TALDhTq310OZs9+L6B/HxeX3+4BadIDad4g+xI
lvaFY1Ut/hMdZNkw0tzNZOdUPiO4jYIyirReAUiMCm6jXzkTRITj7/vxxWtPAAUR
tDNSdXNzZWxsIEUuIFdoaXRha2VyIDx3aGl0YWtlckBldGVybml0eS5kZW1vbi5j
by51az4=
=LOCL
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
That's it from here.
Over.
Ono-Sendai Corporation
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [September 1992](/years/1992/09)
+ 1992-09-21 (Mon, 21 Sep 1992 13:24:27 +0000) - Long but good: Hammill on encryption - _whitakerNeternity.demon.co.uk.demon.co.uk ("Russell E. Whitaker")_

47
_emails/1992/09/bd1e6c9886e9a2f9780afa9c3aa25f128a88366fc2ee4796813ce0a27f66ca77.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-09-25 - through mr. crypto
## Header Data
From: nobody@soda.berkeley.edu<br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: bd1e6c9886e9a2f9780afa9c3aa25f128a88366fc2ee4796813ce0a27f66ca77<br>
Message ID: \<9209250231.AA10851@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-09-25 02:32:44 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Thu, 24 Sep 92 19:32:44 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: nobody@soda.berkeley.edu
Date: Thu, 24 Sep 92 19:32:44 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: through mr. crypto
Message-ID: <9209250231.AA10851@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
** I am also the technical consultant to the show, so your mail will not be
** falling on deft ears...
Awwww.... it wasn't that badly engineered.
sho3t
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [September 1992](/years/1992/09)
+ 1992-09-25 (Thu, 24 Sep 92 19:32:44 PDT) - through mr. crypto - _nobody@soda.berkeley.edu_

62
_emails/1992/09/bdccb11e37262b96d2fae5d7defb5b431acc6fb83513bf85f49373e0ee6376b5.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-09-24 - New! Eric's Cheap Remailing Service. Free!
## Header Data
From: nobody@soda.berkeley.edu<br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: bdccb11e37262b96d2fae5d7defb5b431acc6fb83513bf85f49373e0ee6376b5<br>
Message ID: \<9209240027.AA27179@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-09-24 00:28:41 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Wed, 23 Sep 92 17:28:41 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: nobody@soda.berkeley.edu
Date: Wed, 23 Sep 92 17:28:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: New! Eric's Cheap Remailing Service. Free!
Message-ID: <9209240027.AA27179@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Pssst.
You don't know where you heard this. There's a new service available,
and it's free.
If you send mail to
hughes@soda.berkeley.edu
with a header line of the form
Request-Remailing-To: <addressee>
then the software will strip off all the header lines (except the
Subject: line) and remail it to the addressee of your choice.
But there's this rumor that he's saving all the message that pass
through. Damn.
Mr. Crypto
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [September 1992](/years/1992/09)
+ 1992-09-24 (Wed, 23 Sep 92 17:28:41 PDT) - New! Eric's Cheap Remailing Service. Free! - _nobody@soda.berkeley.edu_

95
_emails/1992/09/cf16d07098fa4977f67d9fbeb8ff6eec1d0a578559b800f719727d00fd753581.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-09-22 - Radio program on wiretaps and encryption: Wednesday at noon
## Header Data
From: gnu<br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: cf16d07098fa4977f67d9fbeb8ff6eec1d0a578559b800f719727d00fd753581<br>
Message ID: \<9209221917.AA02319@toad.com\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-09-22 19:17:43 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Tue, 22 Sep 92 12:17:43 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: gnu
Date: Tue, 22 Sep 92 12:17:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Radio program on wiretaps and encryption: Wednesday at noon
Message-ID: <9209221917.AA02319@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.privacy,alt.activism
Subject: Radio program on wiretaps and encryption: Wednesday at noon
Message-Id: <35449@hoptoad.uucp>
Date: 22 Sep 92 19:15:19 GMT
The Telecommunications Radio Project at KPFA is producing a series of
thirteen hour-long radio programs on issues in communications. The
first program is on the FBI's `Digital Telephony' e-z-wiretap proposal
and the politics of encryption.
The first half-hour will be an introduction and a panel discussion,
featuring Jim Bidzos of RSA Data Security; Jim Kalstrom, head of
investigative technology for the FBI; and me, representing the
Electronic Frontier Foundation. You can phone in questions and comments
in the second half of the show. The call-in number is:
+1 800 464 5732
This program will be broadcast live on Wed, September 23, at noon, on
these California stations:
KPFA Berkeley
KPFK Los Angeles
KHSU Arcata
These other stations will be picking up the broadcast,
and probably transmitting it at a later time. Phone the station to find
out when it's scheduled.
KMUD Redway, California KCBL Sacramento, California
KPBS San Diego, California WMNF Tampa, Florida
KSUI Iowa City, Iowa KSAI Minneapolis, Minnesota
KSMU Springfield, Missouri WCPN Cleveland, Ohio
WYSO Yellow Springs, Ohio WBAI New York, New York
WXXI Rochester, New York WEOS Geneva, New York
KRCL Salt Lake City, Utah KPBX Spokane, Washington
KUOW Seattle, Washington
If you are not with in reach of a station that is broadcasting the
Communications Revolution, please call your local station and pitch it
to the program director. Have them call the Telecommincations Radio
Project at KPFA, at +1 510 848 6767 x263 or x264.
Future shows (Wednesdays at noon) will cover isses like how the concept
of libraries is changing; what information is availible to (and held
back from) the public; and electronic democracy where the voters can
feed back directly to goverment agencies or change the outcome of an
election via computer networks.
Please tune in, and phone in good questions. See you in the airwaves!
--
John Gilmore gnu@toad.com -- gnu@cygnus.com -- gnu@eff.org
"It isn't given to us to know those rare moments when people
are wide open and the lightest touch can wither or heal."
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [September 1992](/years/1992/09)
+ 1992-09-22 (Tue, 22 Sep 92 12:17:43 PDT) - Radio program on wiretaps and encryption: Wednesday at noon - _gnu_

50
_emails/1992/09/dea8962389f95a613d81ddd1ee911ba94d52c9ffa1af91c5f3e2b33da1145de1.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-09-26 - Hints
## Header Data
From: not_root@nowhere.com<br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: dea8962389f95a613d81ddd1ee911ba94d52c9ffa1af91c5f3e2b33da1145de1<br>
Message ID: \<9209260027.AA08573@atdt.org\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-09-26 00:27:32 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Fri, 25 Sep 92 17:27:32 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: not_root@nowhere.com
Date: Fri, 25 Sep 92 17:27:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Hints
Message-ID: <9209260027.AA08573@atdt.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Most internet traffic is archived (and later Grep'd) anyway.
If you're really that worried about it, then we should have
been speaking in Aramaic all this time, or using encrypted
e-mail (and I'm sure traffic which mentions the characters
"crypt" draws attention as well, and most of the msgs on this
mailing list have already violated that one.) I'm interested
to see the PGP addition to the re-mailer.
-- Concerned, yet not overly unrealistic about it.
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [September 1992](/years/1992/09)
+ 1992-09-26 (Fri, 25 Sep 92 17:27:32 PDT) - Hints - _not_root@nowhere.com_

44
_emails/1992/09/edabc89a8f270cafcb5d558d067e5198da549c2b69c3664e175a4606e39f0898.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-09-24 - Interesting post to alt.cyberpunk.tech
## Header Data
From: Mark Pesce \<osendai@well.sf.ca.us\><br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: edabc89a8f270cafcb5d558d067e5198da549c2b69c3664e175a4606e39f0898<br>
Message ID: \<199209240744.AA20447@well.sf.ca.us\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-09-24 07:45:30 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Thu, 24 Sep 92 00:45:30 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: Mark Pesce <osendai@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Thu, 24 Sep 92 00:45:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Interesting post to alt.cyberpunk.tech
Message-ID: <199209240744.AA20447@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Thought ya'll might be interested in this....
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [September 1992](/years/1992/09)
+ 1992-09-24 (Thu, 24 Sep 92 00:45:30 PDT) - Interesting post to alt.cyberpunk.tech - _Mark Pesce \<osendai@well.sf.ca.us\>_

91
_emails/1992/09/fdf9c19e77ec3f1a9bbc6bc19266d565b89d19dbd0ad369f5a2e800af3fc9558.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-09-22 - No Subject
## Header Data
From: Eric Hughes \<hughesNsoda.berkeley.edu\><br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: fdf9c19e77ec3f1a9bbc6bc19266d565b89d19dbd0ad369f5a2e800af3fc9558<br>
Message ID: \<9209220543.AA25094@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-09-22 05:47:51 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Mon, 21 Sep 92 22:47:51 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: Eric Hughes <hughesNsoda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Mon, 21 Sep 92 22:47:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9209220543.AA25094@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Welcome to the cypherpunks mailing list.
We have a real mailing list now, and not just a mail alias on my
account. Thanks to John Gilmore for space on hoptoad and Hugh Daniel
for setting things up.
Mail to the list members at
cypherpunks@toad.com
Request additions or deletions, talk to the list maintainer (me, Eric
Hughes) at
cypherpunks-request@toad.com
Tell your friends about the list and have them join if they wish, and
have them do the same, but please do not post the list address yet.
We'd like to have a core group working before we advertise to avoid
diffusion of interest at the outset.
----------------------
ANNOUNCEMENT
Second Meeting -- October 10, 1992
The second meeting will be held at the new Cygnus offices. Exact
address and directions to follow.
We do not have an exact agenda yet, but one should be arriving in the
next few days. Please mark you calendars now and start telling your
friends.
For this meeting and until further announced, we are using a
transitive trust system for invitations. Invite anybody you want and
let them invite anybody they want and so on.
The crypto-anarchy game we tried out at the first meeting was as good
a success as we could have hoped for from an untested idea. The game
seems useful and fun enough to warrant continued play and play
testing, so we'll be playing again at this and future meetings.
We observed several interesting emergent behaviors in the first
session, including resellers and reputation behaviors. We'll play a
two hour session this time and discuss it afterwards.
Eric
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [September 1992](/years/1992/09)
+ 1992-09-22 (Mon, 21 Sep 92 22:47:51 PDT) - No Subject - _Eric Hughes \<hughesNsoda.berkeley.edu\>_

79
_emails/1992/10/0162570b9d666ee011a10386b278f1a79e9e438ad0c6f94161324578b3c0974c.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-30 - Subscribe
## Header Data
From: edgar@spectrx.Saigon.COM (Edgar W. Swank)<br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 0162570b9d666ee011a10386b278f1a79e9e438ad0c6f94161324578b3c0974c<br>
Message ID: \<iykFTB5w165w@spectrx.saigon.com\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-30 19:02:40 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Fri, 30 Oct 92 12:02:40 PPE<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: edgar@spectrx.Saigon.COM (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Fri, 30 Oct 92 12:02:40 PPE
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Subscribe
Message-ID: <iykFTB5w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
I got this address off Extropians. Sorry if there's a separate
"request" address I should be using, but I don't know what it is.
Please add me to your mailing list.
Please use one of these addresses:
Internet: edgar@spectrx.saigon.com
UUCP: szebra!spectrx!edgar
The address in the network header may not work.
I'm familiar with how PGP 2.0 works, including some bugs. I'm trying
to start a low-cost public key registry, which can verify public
keys independent of the network.
Here is my signed 512-bit public key:
-----Type bits/keyID Date User ID
-----pub 512/4F0C47 1992/09/26 Edgar W. Swank <edgar@spectrx.saigon.com>
-----sig! 67F70B 1992/10/14 Philip R. Zimmermann
<prz@sage.cgd.ucar.edu>
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.02
mQBNAirEvxwAAAECAMUkLHrx6JH45BMd4bxZDNQO3HrLmhZSvsHJzLH9+90BTbuX
3Kvo0pSLCh98m2Abu/LtoHDggJOKxRGee+5PDEcABRG0KUVkZ2FyIFcuIFN3YW5r
IDxlZGdhckBzcGVjdHJ4LnNhaWdvbi5jb20+iQCVAgUQKtu1h+J13g7/Z/cLAQFg
nAQAjRlKmmSvDMZUWKM2BQFmpqHBiaCg7OLKEFng9pZGx2qzYHCZOL+a9A0exN9P
RAtV6bEm9+F8VoOEpVyF346XJwwE1e/13IETHFi7Jd9fbjsw8voQFqz69X2p8xoE
LxYtqSlwfOQ3S7JOyyx4/p04fG/JZuRJicVaUIRlDKHJPJ0=
=tsbS
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005 Silicon Valley, Ca
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-30 (Fri, 30 Oct 92 12:02:40 PPE) - Subscribe - _edgar@spectrx.Saigon.COM (Edgar W. Swank)_

47
_emails/1992/10/019cdf477893905cbdcbdba0dcfe5805886c1a979a064b38f898dc8d87e9e89d.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-17 - Re: Game items...
## Header Data
From: Arthur Abraham \<a2@well.sf.ca.us\><br>
To: hh@soda.berkeley.edu<br>
Message Hash: 019cdf477893905cbdcbdba0dcfe5805886c1a979a064b38f898dc8d87e9e89d<br>
Message ID: \<199210170104.AA06520@well.sf.ca.us\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-17 01:04:53 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Fri, 16 Oct 92 18:04:53 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: Arthur Abraham <a2@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Fri, 16 Oct 92 18:04:53 PDT
To: hh@soda.berkeley.edu
Subject: Re: Game items...
Message-ID: <199210170104.AA06520@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
re RU-486: has recently been proven to make a nifty "morning-after" pill (is
this abortion? only if you believe in the sanctity of blastula) and a study
in (I believe) S. CA. is beginning on effectiveness in brain tumors... seems
as if this drug has possible wide theropeutic (aw, who can spell?) uses
beyond directly sex-lined situations. And RU-P5 is due out 2Q93.
-a2.
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-17 (Fri, 16 Oct 92 18:04:53 PDT) - Re: Game items... - _Arthur Abraham \<a2@well.sf.ca.us\>_

55
_emails/1992/10/01dd3338e31b454f5ddf16d8d379d36e6690381811c64d219d0f07c6a96a902b.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-19 - one time pads.
## Header Data
From: Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 01dd3338e31b454f5ddf16d8d379d36e6690381811c64d219d0f07c6a96a902b<br>
Message ID: \<9210191548.AA01490@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
Reply To: \<9210190136.1.13588@cup.portal.com\><br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-19 15:48:48 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Mon, 19 Oct 92 08:48:48 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Mon, 19 Oct 92 08:48:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: one time pads.
In-Reply-To: <9210190136.1.13588@cup.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9210191548.AA01490@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Keith's CD-for-a-pad idea is a variant of a book code. In a book
code, parts of the key are in various standard books, often the bible.
Advantages: easier key distribution.
Disadvantages: key material is public. Should an internal spy learn
the few bits of addressing information (which CD, where), the cipher
is compromised.
Eric
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-19 (Mon, 19 Oct 92 02:21:17 PDT) - [one time pads.](/years/1992/10/ed656b95f52bf63782f7b835e6ae14c1bd892422ed6422815953acd9285309f7) - _hkhenson@cup.portal.com_
+ 1992-10-19 (Mon, 19 Oct 92 08:48:48 PDT) - one time pads. - _Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\>_
+ 1992-10-20 (Mon, 19 Oct 92 17:09:14 PDT) - [one time pads.](/years/1992/10/aa4ce8970b83924042b4db610a7bd986514f98bf7dffd14a05363fce934e7c9c) - _pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)_

45
_emails/1992/10/01dddd6d92298c29d33c6a80d463aafff03a2ab4ad339017eeac7855d5d198f5.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-16 - Re: Who uses ethernet (Mr Squirrel?)
## Header Data
From: George A. Gleason \<gg@well.sf.ca.us\><br>
To: shipley@tfs.COM<br>
Message Hash: 01dddd6d92298c29d33c6a80d463aafff03a2ab4ad339017eeac7855d5d198f5<br>
Message ID: \<199210160927.AA11421@well.sf.ca.us\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-16 09:28:15 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Fri, 16 Oct 92 02:28:15 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: George A. Gleason <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Fri, 16 Oct 92 02:28:15 PDT
To: shipley@tfs.COM
Subject: Re: Who uses ethernet (Mr Squirrel?)
Message-ID: <199210160927.AA11421@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Tom, if you're interested in ISDN, my organisation (Integrated Signal) will
probably be in a position to hook you up early next year. We're 90% certain
to be putting in a network very close to your neighborhood.
-gg
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-16 (Fri, 16 Oct 92 02:28:15 PDT) - Re: Who uses ethernet (Mr Squirrel?) - _George A. Gleason \<gg@well.sf.ca.us\>_

182
_emails/1992/10/027aedd907cd2259e85e2d6a68d28423eb507129b907c2ae6cff84c4d4d1fe90.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-13 - New remailer...
## Header Data
From: Hal \<74076.1041@CompuServe.COM\><br>
To: CYPHERPUNKS \<CYPHERPUNKS@TOAD.COM\><br>
Message Hash: 027aedd907cd2259e85e2d6a68d28423eb507129b907c2ae6cff84c4d4d1fe90<br>
Message ID: \<921013203148_74076.1041_DHJ21-1@CompuServe.COM\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-13 20:37:43 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Tue, 13 Oct 92 13:37:43 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Tue, 13 Oct 92 13:37:43 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@TOAD.COM>
Subject: New remailer...
Message-ID: <921013203148_74076.1041_DHJ21-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
I have been experimenting with Eric's remailing software on
the Sun 4 I use at work. This is what I've found.
First, Eric's descriptions of how all the different software
components work together have been very helpful. The software
has gone through three revisions as Eric added new features, so
I implemented them in that order - first the basic remailer,
then adding the "##" and "::" support for header management.
(I had to get perl and slocal before I could get started.
Luckily my system already uses sendmail.)
Basically, I was able to put the parts together the way Eric
described and have it work. I was able to send messages and
have them remailed. I even did some tests bouncing mail between
my remailer and Eric's.
Then I tried adding a new feature to the remailer - automatic
message decryption using PGP. It's not really very secure since
anyone with root privileges at my site can see my pass phrase,
but my site is pretty isolated (a 2400 baud modem is the only link
to the outside world). For this I had to add one line to Eric's
model .maildelivery file to invoke my PGP filter, and had to write
about a five line shell script to run PGP in a useful way. I
am still tuning this a little bit but I can send the exact scripts
out when people are ready for them.
One nice thing about this is that, with my remailer plus Eric's,
and with the decryption option, you can now send anonymous messages
for which no one person can tell that you did it. What you would
do is to send the message first through Eric's remailer, so I
don't know where it came from, then through my remailer, but with
the message encrypted so that Eric can't tell where it's going after
it leaves me. If more people will run remailers then we'll have
much more security.
I will now tell you how to use it, in case you want to experiment.
But remember that all messages are going across an intermittently-
polled 2400 baud modem, so don't expect fast turnaround and please
don't send a large volume of messages. Also, please don't pass
information about this remailer beyond this list, for now.
The remailer is at hal@ghs.com. The basic remailing operation is
as Eric has described: either put "Request-Remailing-To: <dest>" in
the header of the message, or put, as the first two lines of the
body of your message:
::
Request-Remailing-To: <dest>
And follow these two lines with a blank line, then the message to
be forwarded.
Decryption is just a little complicated. The thing to remember is
that you want to do more than just have me decrypt the message. You
want me to then remail the message after decryption. This means
that you should prepare a message with remailing instructions as
above, then encrypt the whole thing, including the "::" and
"Request-Remailing-To:" lines. Encrypt using PGP with the public
key I show below, and use the -a flag for Ascii output.
This will create a PGP output file, typically with the extension .asc.
The first line will be:
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Now, you can send this message to me, but you have to do one more
thing. You have to mark it as an encrypted message, by putting the
line "Encrypted: PGP" in the header. If you can't put stuff into
the headers of messages, then use Eric's "::" feature and add the
following two lines, then a blank line, before "-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----":
::
Encrypted: PGP
Don't forget the blank line after these two.
Now, this message can be sent to my remailer. It will be decrypted
and then remailed to whomever you requested.
I know this sounds complicated, so let me break it down into steps:
1. Create the message.
2. Add "::" and "Request-Remailing-To: <dest>" and a blank line to the
top.
3. Encrypt the whole file using PGP and the public key below.
4. Add "::" and "Encrypted: PGP" and a blank line to the top of
the encrypted file.
5. Send it to hal@ghs.com.
That's not so bad, is it?
Now, if you're really adventurous, here's how to do the double-remailing
process I described above, the one which keeps any one remailer from
knowing who's talking to whom.
1. Create the message.
2. Add "::" and "Request-Remailing-To: <dest>" and a blank line to the
top.
3. Encrypt the whole file using PGP and the public key below.
4. Add "::" and "Request-Remailing-To: hal@ghs.com", then a blank line,
then "##" then "Encrypted: PGP", then a blank line, to the top of
the encrypted file.
5. Send it to hughes@soda.berkeley.edu
The only complicated step is step 4, where you put in the remailing
request to go from Eric's system to mine, and use the "##" line so
that the outgoing message has "Encrypted: PGP" in the header.
If you want real security, encrypt the message using your friend's
public key after step 1 and send that. Then nobody will even know
what you're saying, let alone who you're talking to.
As promised, here's the public key for my remailer:
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.01
mQBNAirY9EoAAAEB/iuDBqpeJ8gsNQwJNRYWBxH7uP95ApQ92CDhCmuSEJ0Tta0l
oCrC+8Br+D7Nfotb7hJlI0A1CYGAlmCsRO8VEmkABRO0H1JlbWFpbGluZyBTZXJ2
aWNlIDxoYWxAZ2hzLmNvbT6JAJUCBRAq2ISQqBMDr1ghTDcBARYlBADCjkCkIDvA
7QFtpYUlYjz/2U+/oDuMZBDlmAw8BCg3sdJG7hnxPE4yVgKoH/ozsb23pbFTPB8H
WNEjqTqixNybOKSKH9T8iCaRDA8+bS6xPN4YlWKD/Wg2EiyuOjD3v/vWgiZXzMR5
hpe0CYVJ6bM++hptXu+JxqDReJIot5FFbQ==
=p8FS
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Hal
74076.1041@compuserve.com
P.S. Coming soon: anonymous return addresses!
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-13 (Tue, 13 Oct 92 13:37:43 PDT) - New remailer... - _Hal \<74076.1041@CompuServe.COM\>_

53
_emails/1992/10/028104239841ce7ed12abdf25e98b3f8d6f6ed3ca45ae4c095e115cb184c3b35.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-31 - Re: remove from mailing list
## Header Data
From: Andrew Purshottam \<andy@autodesk.com\><br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 028104239841ce7ed12abdf25e98b3f8d6f6ed3ca45ae4c095e115cb184c3b35<br>
Message ID: \<9210302349.AA01575@meefun.YP.acad\><br>
Reply To: \<9210242237.aa22143@src4src.linet.org\><br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-31 00:50:53 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Fri, 30 Oct 92 17:50:53 PPE<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: Andrew Purshottam <andy@autodesk.com>
Date: Fri, 30 Oct 92 17:50:53 PPE
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: remove from mailing list
In-Reply-To: <9210242237.aa22143@src4src.linet.org>
Message-ID: <9210302349.AA01575@meefun.YP.acad>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Are you Jethroes still using berkeley mail? Get a real mail user
agent, like MH, and you can write a pattern that collects all the mail
sent to a given address into a mail folder, effectively making your
own digest.
Andy
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-25 (Sat, 24 Oct 92 21:11:19 PDT) - [remove from mailing list](/years/1992/10/9bfdbcec27940a27cd9e7024fe2b938174899c51cbfa7016369746042e754a55) - _joeb@arden.linet.org_
+ 1992-10-31 (Fri, 30 Oct 92 17:50:53 PPE) - Re: remove from mailing list - _Andrew Purshottam \<andy@autodesk.com\>_

48
_emails/1992/10/033ae3ee73aaa2679f7aa880c4601e687ba98804670907595faf860d3d0c2981.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-12 - Next meeting: Nov. 21
## Header Data
From: Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 033ae3ee73aaa2679f7aa880c4601e687ba98804670907595faf860d3d0c2981<br>
Message ID: \<9210121527.AA23015@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-12 15:20:43 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Mon, 12 Oct 92 08:20:43 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Mon, 12 Oct 92 08:20:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Next meeting: Nov. 21
Message-ID: <9210121527.AA23015@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
The next physical cypherpunks meeting was decided on Saturday at
that meeting. It will be Saturday, November 21, starting at noon at
the Cygnus Support offices in Mountain View. I am announcing the date
now so that you can put it on your calendar.
Eric
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-12 (Mon, 12 Oct 92 08:20:43 PDT) - Next meeting: Nov. 21 - _Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\>_

60
_emails/1992/10/041ccd8442454608e3dec5534526a715161e63caf6d81ac5e2f5ea068bf6c330.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-21 - TEMPEST, Eavesdropping
## Header Data
From: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)<br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 041ccd8442454608e3dec5534526a715161e63caf6d81ac5e2f5ea068bf6c330<br>
Message ID: \<9210211934.AA09886@newsu.shearson.com\><br>
Reply To: \<9210211711.AA11833@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-21 21:07:37 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Wed, 21 Oct 92 14:07:37 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Wed, 21 Oct 92 14:07:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: TEMPEST, Eavesdropping
In-Reply-To: <9210211711.AA11833@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9210211934.AA09886@newsu.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
>From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
>>Their chief concern doesn't seem to be folks like us, but rather
>>concerns about vans parking outside high tech and defense contractors
>>and slurping up what they can [...]
>When banks start signing with private keys, then we get an even more
>interesting monitoring problem.
Consider that the international clearing and settlement systems for
interbank transactions process several TRILLION a day in electronic
transactions, and then consider what diverting just a tiny little bit
of that to yourself would be worth. Security in banks is ALREADY
crucial.
Perry
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-21 (Wed, 21 Oct 92 10:11:42 PDT) - [TEMPEST, Eavesdropping](/years/1992/10/4d3c0b68b446f11f664d02d6696ac26026c7e92e0e14c93cbc6235b7eb4495c3) - _Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\>_
+ 1992-10-21 (Wed, 21 Oct 92 14:07:37 PDT) - TEMPEST, Eavesdropping - _pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)_

88
_emails/1992/10/07ae1782d78a668866ed682f440cba74ebbd27148657ab8bcb66f1a7d5c36516.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-09 - New feature of the remailer
## Header Data
From: Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 07ae1782d78a668866ed682f440cba74ebbd27148657ab8bcb66f1a7d5c36516<br>
Message ID: \<9210090703.AA26448@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-09 06:56:11 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Thu, 8 Oct 92 23:56:11 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 8 Oct 92 23:56:11 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: New feature of the remailer
Message-ID: <9210090703.AA26448@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
New! Just finished. Fidonet support. Dumb mailer support. Incoming
header line pasting.
Here's what's going on. There are a lot of mailers, the Fidonet
gateway in particular, which don't allow you to put arbitrary header
lines in your outgoing messages. Previously people using these
systems couldn't use the remailer because they couldn't put the
necessary "Request-Remailing-To:" in the header.
Now they can. Instead of putting header lines into actual header, I
now support a syntax which allows header lines to be _added_ to the
header on incoming mail. These extended header lines are in the body
of the message proper, but a filter on incoming mail effectively
adds them to the header.
This allows anybody who can send me mail with a reasonably unmangled
body to use any feature of the remailer that should ever get written.
Example:
------- cut here -------
To: hughes@soda.berkeley.edu
From: Secret_Squirrel@treehouse.com
Subject: Mrs. Tree's secret recipe for pinole
::
Request-Remailing-To: Crusader_Rabbit@rocky.moosylvania.org
I just paid $2600 for this recipe [etc. etc.]
[...]
------- cut here -------
If "::" is on the first body line all by itself, whatever lines follow
up to the first blank line will be appended to the header when it is
scanned for special instruction lines.
This new feature is completely modular. It doesn't (seem to) break
any of the other existing features. I'll post the source with an
explanation tomorrow.
In the meantime, try it out.
Eric
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-09 (Thu, 8 Oct 92 23:56:11 PDT) - New feature of the remailer - _Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\>_
+ 1992-10-09 (Fri, 9 Oct 92 00:14:13 PDT) - [Re: New feature of the remailer](/years/1992/10/469abb614c7863da4b08c8492ddedd9268dc6c9ee9e116c72675887290677963) - _Peter Shipley \<shipley@tfs.COM\>_

218
_emails/1992/10/098ca600122482f9530453b1ebec0212ca1c89ee459be44f395c8b1c1a939bde.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,218 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-28 - Threat to our privacy
## Header Data
From: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)<br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 098ca600122482f9530453b1ebec0212ca1c89ee459be44f395c8b1c1a939bde<br>
Message ID: \<9210272346.AA11735@newsu.shearson.com\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-28 00:23:08 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Tue, 27 Oct 92 17:23:08 PPE<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Tue, 27 Oct 92 17:23:08 PPE
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Threat to our privacy
Message-ID: <9210272346.AA11735@newsu.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
For Cypherpunks: A copy of mail I just sent to...
libernet@dartmouth.edu, extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu,
prz@sage.cgd.ucar.edu, mike@eff.org, mkapor@eff.org
[This is being sent out to a wide audiance. If you receive this, its
because
My friends, its rare of me to try to encourage panic. Occassionally,
however, by panicing early we can avert a disaster later on.
Risks, an internet mailing list, reported about a week ago on a
proposal by Dr. Dorothy Denning, one of the most prominent people in
the field of cryptography, that copies of all private encryption keys
associated with public key cryptographic systems be held, effectively
by the government, to permit them to read people's encrypted messages
to each other. Naturally, such invasions of privacy will only be
permitted "when a warrant is produced". It has been suggested that
this idea might be taken up by several government agencies for
"review".
Many have noted that the dawning of cheap and effective cryptographic
systems could spell the end of the ability of governments to invade
people's privacy. Unfortunately, it appears that the government and
its cronies have also realized this, and intend to take preemptive
action. Our notion of civil rights has decayed so far that it is now
considered a citizen's duty to not merely be quiet while he is
enslaved but to actively cooperate with his own enslavement. Not
merely must we put up with the indignity of the government being
granted the right to read our papers and communications to each other,
not merely has the FBI attempted to get legislation passed to make
phone companies give them easier access to tap phone lines under color
of "maintaining the current capability in the presense of new
technology", but now it is suggested that we ordinary citizens must
personally cooperate to make it easier for them to read our
communications. We will be branded criminals if we fail to cooperate,
presuming that ideas like this are enacted.
It is crucial that the fiends proposing this be convinced that
resistance will be too high to implement their plan. It is crucial
that before they can even propose legislation that the threat here be
brought to the attention of the news media. If the currently proposed
FBI legislation were passed, a dictatorial government would have all
the tools it would need to tap all the phones in the country -- the
only thing restraining that behavior would be a system of warrants
that could disappear with a mere change in attitude. If Denning's more
serious and sinister idea were proposed for future enactment as
legislation (this has not yet been proposed), it would become
impossible for individuals to take any action to protect their own
communications privacy from a dictatorial regime, even ignoring the
question of abuses that could occur right now. I'm convinced that the
only thing that prevented the FBI bill from passing this year was the
fact that media attention was brought to bear. Its important that this
new proposal be exposed to similar sunshine. Far be it for me to
suggest restraint of free speech, but I would like to see people
think of making such suggestions as having the social acceptability of
calling a black person "nigger".
Here, for reference, is a copy of an article Dr. Denning just posted
to sci.crypt on usenet.
I encourage people, rather than discussing this matter on libernet or
extropians, to discuss this on sci.crypt where the topic is just
breaking.
Perry Metzger
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Article 6275 of sci.crypt:
Path: shearson.com!uunet!uunet!think.com!sdd.hp.com!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!darwin.sura.net!guvax.acc.georgetown.edu!denning
From: denning@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: A Trial Balloon on Registered Keys
Message-ID: <1992Oct27.143737.1574@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu>
Date: 27 Oct 92 14:37:37 -0500
Distribution: world
Organization: Georgetown University
Lines: 94
The posting about the proposal I made at the NCSC for key registration
is essentially correct. Let me add to it the following:
1. The government is not taking any action to curb crypto and is
unlikely to take any such action in the near future. No proposal has
been made and no government agency that I am aware of has plans to
make such a proposal. The closest we've had to a proposal was a "Sense
of Congress" resolution in Senate Bill 266 over a year ago. This
would not have mandated anything, but said it was the sense of
Congress that service providers should provide accesss to the
plaintext of encrypted communications under a court order. It got a lot of
opposition and was withdrawn. Thus, don't panic folks -- this was just me
making a suggestion. I didn't realize I had that much clout to cause
such a stir and call to arms! I expect that the next step will be government
sponsored discussions about crypto policy, probably sponsored by NIST,
at the recommendation of the Computer System Security Advisory Board
headed by Willis Ware. That will provide a forum to work through these
issues.
2. The reason I made the proposal is because I am concerned that we
may be facing a major crisis in law enforcement. I expect many of
you will say "that's wonderful" but I don't see it that way.
Electronic surveillance has been an essential tool in preventing
serious crimes such as terrorist attacks and destabilizing organized crime.
The economic benefits alone are estimated to be in the billions. This
issue is not about snooping on innocent citizens but about doing what
we can do prevent major crimes that could seriously disrupt other
liberties. The problem is likely to get even worse if criminals know
they use the telecommunications systems without any chance of getting
caught.
3. My proposal was to register your private key with a trustee,
different from the government. The key would be encrypted under some
other public key so the trustee couldn't decrypt it. I have suggested
it be the key of the DOJ, but it could be another independent trustee.
I believe this would provide acceptably good protection since someone
would need to get a court order and then the cooperation of 3 agencies
to get at your communications: the telecommunications provider (to get
the bit stream), the first trustee (to get the encrypted key), and
the second to decrypt it. Experience with the telecom providers has
been that they are very fussy about court orders -- you have to get
the semicolons right!
You can get even more security by using Silvio Micali's "fair
public-key cryptosystem" approach. Called "fair" because it is
designed to strike a balance between the needs of the Government and
those of the citizens. With his approach, you would break your key
up into 5 parts and give it to different trustees. All 5 parts
are needed to reassemble it, but it is possible to veryify the parts
individually and as a whole without putting them together --
ingenious! He presented this at CRYPTO '92.
4. Someone suggested that law enforcement routinely taps without
court order. This is an ungrounded claim for which I have never
seen any evidence. Regardless, their ability to do this is
disappearing with the new digital based technologies. They need the
help of the service providers, who in turn ask for court orders.
Court orders are not all that easy to get as law enforcers have to
document why other approaches have failed etc.
5. Many people have noted that you could not enforce key
registration. They may be right, but I am not throwing in the towel
yet. Let's take phones, which is what law enforcers are most
interested in. Products are emerging that you can attach to your
phone and that will do DES encryption. Criminals and everyone
else are most likely to use commercial products -- easiest to
get and cheapest. The products could be designed so key registration
would essentially be part of the sales process.
There can be social benefit to government regulation even when
regulation is not 100% successful. None of our laws prevent the
acts they outlaw. But this does not mean we should get rid of
all laws.
6. Some people have said we should not give up our privacy to the
government. But the constitution does not give us absolute privacy.
We are protected from unreasonable searches and seizures, but not
reasonable ones in response to "probable cause" of crime. In all
areas of our lives, the government can invade our privacy if they
have good reason to believe we are engaged in major criminal activity.
They can break into our homes, our safes, and so on. Do we really
want a society where electronic communications cannot ever be broken
when there is good reason to believe some major threat against society
is being planned?
Thank you for your comments and for encouraging those on the other
news groups to move over to sci.crypt. I'll try to keep up with
this newsgroup and respond to other comments if appropriate, but
I honestly can't track them all.
Dorothy Denning
denning@cs.georgetown.edu (posting from guvax)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-28 (Tue, 27 Oct 92 17:23:08 PPE) - Threat to our privacy - _pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)_

73
_emails/1992/10/0bfa1d7d1f80cbd3ce39cc23172cc4e724e96af15fbdaf8df16e75cb89f68a9c.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-23 - Re: Keystone
## Header Data
From: gnu@cygnus.com<br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 0bfa1d7d1f80cbd3ce39cc23172cc4e724e96af15fbdaf8df16e75cb89f68a9c<br>
Message ID: \<9210230728.AA25822@cygnus.com\><br>
Reply To: \<9210230622.AA26831@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-23 07:28:19 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Fri, 23 Oct 92 00:28:19 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: gnu@cygnus.com
Date: Fri, 23 Oct 92 00:28:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Keystone
In-Reply-To: <9210230622.AA26831@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9210230728.AA25822@cygnus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
> "A provider of communications services cannot be held liable for the
> consequences of encrypted communications that pass though its system."
Far too simple. Suppose the provider is a BBS operator who *knows* what
their users are passing through the system? Suppose the provider has
keys to the encrypted communications? Suppose those keys are only to be
used under duress (e.g. under a court order)? Suppose the provider
is a parent and the user is their teenage daughter? Suppose the
encryption is easily breakable?
The principle you are looking for is that if the service provider has
no *control* over the content, then they should have no *liability*
for it either. The courts are gradually making that happen. But
control relates directly to the specific facts of the particular case --
not whether encryption is in use.
The case law on liability for content is gradually being made. So
far, no particularly horrible precedents have been set (I don't think
there are precedents yet in the arrest-the-record-store-owner-for-rap-
records-the-cops-don't-like issue). In a good decision, Compuserve
was let off the hook for a message sent by someone who Compuserve even
paid to moderate a corner of their service -- because Compuserve
didn't control the content of that corner.
I realize that this group has a tendency toward extremism, but let's
temper that with a bit of wisdom, too.
John
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-22 (Thu, 22 Oct 92 11:19:49 PDT) - [re: Keystone](/years/1992/10/90acf83b11143d2b8c4c4029e49ae5df05278a74166799409280e6de432e0a6a) - _Tom.Jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (Tom Jennings)_
+ 1992-10-23 (Thu, 22 Oct 92 23:22:28 PDT) - [Keystone](/years/1992/10/dbefe9ce00cd47ed9ef4144315bc660edb3c2704e4ded25c391ab61617053e53) - _Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\>_
+ 1992-10-23 (Fri, 23 Oct 92 00:28:19 PDT) - Re: Keystone - _gnu@cygnus.com_
+ 1992-10-23 (Fri, 23 Oct 92 10:27:18 PDT) - [Keystone](/years/1992/10/7eafa220d02ff7674103b943a51cc62015c3bc371211bcd6d8b3a9f5e836b8a1) - _Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\>_

74
_emails/1992/10/0dc2cf15ce93cba1ee63387f52280c165516ebf5779bfeb873d6e38425e5e49a.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-22 - temporary request
## Header Data
From: DELTORTO@AppleLink.Apple.COM (Imaja, David Del Torto,PAS)<br>
To: CYPHERPUNKS@TOAD.COM<br>
Message Hash: 0dc2cf15ce93cba1ee63387f52280c165516ebf5779bfeb873d6e38425e5e49a<br>
Message ID: \<719795393.8323950@AppleLink.Apple.COM\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-22 23:28:44 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Thu, 22 Oct 92 16:28:44 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: DELTORTO@AppleLink.Apple.COM (Imaja, David Del Torto,PAS)
Date: Thu, 22 Oct 92 16:28:44 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@TOAD.COM
Subject: temporary request
Message-ID: <719795393.8323950@AppleLink.Apple.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Greetings CypherFolk,
I, one of your newest members, am on vacation in Europe (right now I'm in
Holland enjoying the "coffee" shops) and am temporarily restricted to using
AppleLink as my gateway to Internet. Because it costs $0.50 to $0.80 per piece
of email, I asked Eric to _temporarily_ remove me from the general alias until
I return to the US in December, saving me major bucks. When I get back, I'll
announce that you can send me mail at "ddt@well.sf.ca.us". I enjoyed the
repartee I sampled and look forward to joining in as I learn more.
Offer of the Week:
If anyone needs me to physically pick up a PGP key from someone here in Europe,
I have a train pass good for another month (maybe longer if I can alter it
again) and will consider any request that will take me to interesting locations
and connect me with interesting folks.
Further Request:
If any of you send any interesting stuff to the group alias (e.g. Russ
Whitaker's article on "computer cryptography" from the Economist) and think it
might be of general interest to someone learning about the whole encryption
process (i.e. me), please cc me at "deltorto@applelink.apple.com" anytime. This
would be appreciated. I also encourage anyone who has helpful learning material
to forward it to me so I can get up to speed. I am working on an interesting
project I would like to share with the right people, but I am not prepared to
discuss it in public.
Does anyone have a copy of PGP 2.0 that runs on a Macintosh? If you email it to
me, I will cover any costs you incur. Coolness.
Until we all meet in person,
dave
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-22 (Thu, 22 Oct 92 16:28:44 PDT) - temporary request - _DELTORTO@AppleLink.Apple.COM (Imaja, David Del Torto,PAS)_

61
_emails/1992/10/0eec0ebc8ca754a17d7524fa51a07b6557113dffeb3bd13e9f3da940001c47f9.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-24 - Multiple messages + entropy
## Header Data
From: Hal \<74076.1041@CompuServe.COM\><br>
To: \<cypherpunks@toad.com\><br>
Message Hash: 0eec0ebc8ca754a17d7524fa51a07b6557113dffeb3bd13e9f3da940001c47f9<br>
Message ID: \<921024155350_74076.1041_DHJ67-1@CompuServe.COM\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-24 16:02:41 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Sat, 24 Oct 92 09:02:41 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Sat, 24 Oct 92 09:02:41 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Multiple messages + entropy
Message-ID: <921024155350_74076.1041_DHJ67-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
The Internet PEM (Privacy Enhanced Mail) standard uses the
concept which Dean Tribble mentioned of multiple encryption
(using each recipient's public key) of a single session key
which encrypts the message. PGP's data structures do not
currently provide for this but could be extended pretty easily
to allow it.
On the entropy measure - I thought entropy was how many bits
of information you get per character. Encrypted binary text
would be pretty close to 8 bits per character. The RFC1113
Ascii encoding used by PGP reduces this to 6 bits per character
(e.g. a character set with 64 printable characters) neglecting
line separators and message beginnings and endings. So there
should be a little less than 6 bits per character for encrypted,
Ascii-encoded messages.
Hal
74076.1041@compuserve.com
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-24 (Sat, 24 Oct 92 09:02:41 PDT) - Multiple messages + entropy - _Hal \<74076.1041@CompuServe.COM\>_
+ 1992-10-26 (Mon, 26 Oct 92 09:53:38 PPE) - [entropy](/years/1992/10/372c96cffd382696c685f18f23b0868ec033ccb4cd1e33b39fcededb8cc5f91d) - _Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\>_

49
_emails/1992/10/0f6bbccf741960b8c34c3990dace27fba9fb2d8092b51b0f79b3ac8353ccbdc5.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-28 - Messages in the Least Significant Bits
## Header Data
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)<br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 0f6bbccf741960b8c34c3990dace27fba9fb2d8092b51b0f79b3ac8353ccbdc5<br>
Message ID: \<9210280303.AA21744@netcom2.netcom.com\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-28 03:06:05 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Tue, 27 Oct 92 20:06:05 PPE<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 27 Oct 92 20:06:05 PPE
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Messages in the Least Significant Bits
Message-ID: <9210280303.AA21744@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Cypherpunks,
Here's a message I just posted to another mailing list. It has rather
strict policies against cross-posting, so I've edited out the headers
and the initial chunk of text I quoted. That should make me kosher.
(This topic also came up in some e-mail with George Gleason.)
Forwarded message:
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-28 (Tue, 27 Oct 92 20:06:05 PPE) - Messages in the Least Significant Bits - _tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)_

59
_emails/1992/10/0fc82407e8fa8a6ef671268b6a7f0783f2980e9ede01ea33ac59ac5e564b0027.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-27 - list status
## Header Data
From: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)<br>
To: hughes@soda.berkeley.edu<br>
Message Hash: 0fc82407e8fa8a6ef671268b6a7f0783f2980e9ede01ea33ac59ac5e564b0027<br>
Message ID: \<9210271954.AA07709@newsu.shearson.com\><br>
Reply To: \<9210271856.AA03357@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-27 20:24:00 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Tue, 27 Oct 92 13:24:00 PPE<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Tue, 27 Oct 92 13:24:00 PPE
To: hughes@soda.berkeley.edu
Subject: list status
In-Reply-To: <9210271856.AA03357@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9210271954.AA07709@newsu.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
>From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
>Breakdown of the list by top-level domain:
>U.S. domains:
> 42 com
> 42 edu
> 1 gov
> 1 mil
> 10 org
> 6 us
Hmm... Wonder who Mr. .gov and Mr. .mil are...
(1/2 :-)
Perry
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-27 (Tue, 27 Oct 92 11:57:12 PPE) - [list status](/years/1992/10/77250e97ac7c83428c993340774581a44c7395bc5a6b955b6a3bfd78ec75ec7c) - _Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\>_
+ 1992-10-27 (Tue, 27 Oct 92 13:24:00 PPE) - list status - _pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)_

67
_emails/1992/10/12951b10c85d64c94a33420c3f2b983a727031d9401a623cc5c0b8940927614e.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-21 - Put me on your mailing list!
## Header Data
From: "Campbell James A" \<UJACAMPBE@memstvx1.memst.edu\><br>
To: "cypherpunks" \<cypherpunks@toad.com\><br>
Message Hash: 12951b10c85d64c94a33420c3f2b983a727031d9401a623cc5c0b8940927614e<br>
Message ID: \<9210212129.AA27437@toad.com\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-21 21:29:41 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Wed, 21 Oct 92 14:29:41 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: "Campbell James A" <UJACAMPBE@memstvx1.memst.edu>
Date: Wed, 21 Oct 92 14:29:41 PDT
To: "cypherpunks" <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Put me on your mailing list!
Message-ID: <9210212129.AA27437@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Hey, I'd like to be on the mailing list for CYPHERPUNKS. My address is:
ujacampbe@memstvx1.memst.edu
If you need this too, here's my PGP 2.0 public key:
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.0
mQCNAirkL4AAAAEEANAomYnlPXopnms9RtU0ln9CiLJljssOeflC9A+QIDujXhPT
yApbL6VPqSUSoFF/e72xTJixyrwBQhw5lAvfvQPEiGIFQQYxviF+Qg/+6/JVvLCj
vnGVFl9kKTEYVeONxBNGiaXuSE0VMQLx47iP9AU+wYw62aXmTNtW1BUtX5BHAAUR
tDBKYW1lcyBBLiBDYW1wYmVsbCA8dWphY2FtcGJlQG1lbXN0dngxLm1lbXN0LmVk
dT4=
=0rCj
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Thanks!
James A. Campbell
Memphis State University
Memphis, Tennessee
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-21 (Wed, 21 Oct 92 14:29:41 PDT) - Put me on your mailing list! - _"Campbell James A" \<UJACAMPBE@memstvx1.memst.edu\>_

70
_emails/1992/10/12bc0f85f9a646add4c5603e08fe8e538363c6c8b9aa6e63490461eea74314a6.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-16 - Re: one time pads
## Header Data
From: Peter Shipley \<shipley@tfs.COM\><br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 12bc0f85f9a646add4c5603e08fe8e538363c6c8b9aa6e63490461eea74314a6<br>
Message ID: \<9210160103.AA06271@edev0.TFS\><br>
Reply To: \<9210160007.AA18430@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-16 01:03:41 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Thu, 15 Oct 92 18:03:41 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: Peter Shipley <shipley@tfs.COM>
Date: Thu, 15 Oct 92 18:03:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: one time pads
In-Reply-To: <9210160007.AA18430@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9210160103.AA06271@edev0.TFS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
>
>Physical security is not a big issue for RSA (in the pgp implementation)
>because the secret key ring is itself encrypted. The problem is not so much
>physical-intrusion-to-get-the-key as it is physical intrusion aimed at
>modifying software.
To add my two cents, I once had some sensitive files solen from me.
the cracker had modified the crypt command to record passwords
and current directory (since crypt only works on stdin and stdout).
In a matter of a few days they have my crypt password and enough infomation
from my file to raise some real hell.
Note that they did not bother with breaking the crypt or guessing the password
they just rigged the system binaries.
-Pete
PS: this happend a year ago, and last month a copy of the files
appeared on some systems owned by the Bay Area Air Quality Management
District in SF (baaqmd).
PPS: I *know* that crypt is insecure but I had tared/compressed it and des
was not avalible on the systems I was working on.
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-15 (Thu, 15 Oct 92 02:23:21 PDT) - [Re: one time pads](/years/1992/10/5d5b98b544ddca1167fefcf884fb753cc1d761f014b8e779949d089d9d8109ee) - _George A. Gleason \<gg@well.sf.ca.us\>_
+ 1992-10-16 (Thu, 15 Oct 92 17:08:10 PDT) - [Re: one time pads](/years/1992/10/6d1555d9ba7e7f5df99b0b1e6d959204e559a393d247f7263b6320400b221fe9) - _Eric Hollander \<hh@soda.berkeley.edu\>_
+ 1992-10-16 (Thu, 15 Oct 92 18:03:41 PDT) - Re: one time pads - _Peter Shipley \<shipley@tfs.COM\>_

63
_emails/1992/10/13448cebdb0e3f6fa278cb853f0f0e9221952f53a09470ce78415ecc4fe7835a.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-14 - re: Matching Text, Headders and Signatures with Crypto Hashes
## Header Data
From: Tom.Jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (Tom Jennings)<br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 13448cebdb0e3f6fa278cb853f0f0e9221952f53a09470ce78415ecc4fe7835a<br>
Message ID: \<2936.2ADBB282@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-14 05:45:57 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Tue, 13 Oct 92 22:45:57 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: Tom.Jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (Tom Jennings)
Date: Tue, 13 Oct 92 22:45:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: re: Matching Text, Headders and Signatures with Crypto Hashes
Message-ID: <2936.2ADBB282@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
U> From: hugh@domingo.teracons.com (Hugh Daniel)
U> For example in NetNews I proposed changing the
U> MessageId: headder such that part of the gobldyguk on the
U> left side of the atsign was a crypto hash of the body of
U> the message and some of the important sending host
U> generated headders. With this system of MessageId:'s
U> anyone who corrupts a message (intentionaly or otherwise)
U> creates a bogus message, as the next machine that gets the
U> message can see that the message does not match it
U> MessageId: line.
There's a FidoNet mailer (Dutchie) that uses MD4 to generate message
IDs in exactly this way... They did some cheat, to allow certain
filters (CR/LF vs LF, etc) to work.
* Origin: World Power Systems / FidoNews / San Francisco CA (1:125/111)
--
Tom Jennings - via FidoNet node 1:125/555
UUCP: ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!111!Tom.Jennings
INTERNET: Tom.Jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-14 (Tue, 13 Oct 92 22:45:57 PDT) - re: Matching Text, Headders and Signatures with Crypto Hashes - _Tom.Jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (Tom Jennings)_

118
_emails/1992/10/13c718fd6a00a709360fa83486aabdfc938ad255783a4024fb7ca1487cbac0e9.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-05 - Meeting Sat. Oct. 10, noon, Mt. View
## Header Data
From: Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 13c718fd6a00a709360fa83486aabdfc938ad255783a4024fb7ca1487cbac0e9<br>
Message ID: \<9210050830.AA03692@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-05 08:23:23 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Mon, 5 Oct 92 01:23:23 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Mon, 5 Oct 92 01:23:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Meeting Sat. Oct. 10, noon, Mt. View
Message-ID: <9210050830.AA03692@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
ANNOUNCEMENT
============
Second Meeting
Saturday, October 10, 1992
12:00 noon - 6:00 p.m.
Cygnus Support offices
1937 Landings Drive
Mountain View
The second meeting of the cypherpunks will be Saturday at noon. John
Gilmore has graciously provided us with a meeting space at the new
Cygnus Support offices. These offices are so new, in fact, that
Cygnus will not have moved in yet. This meeting will be
bring-your-own-pillow (or chair), since it will be held in largely
empty space. Directions are at the end of the message.
Attendance is transitive trust, arbitrarily deep. Invite whoever you
want, and let them do so also, and so on. Invite them also to join
the mailing list. Do not, however, just post the announcement. Time
for that will come.
I'd like everyone who plans on attending the meeting to send me,
hughes@soda.berkeley.edu, a message telling me so. I'd like to get a
rough head count before Saturday for game planning.
We are starting at noon because of popular demand. Eat beforehand or
bring a burrito or something. It will be fine to eat during the first
segment; it won't be any more disruptive than the game is.
Bring your PGP public key for in-person key distribution, preferably
on diskette. We'll need a portable PC or three to do key
distribution; if you have one you can bring, post to the list and tell
people.
We realized after the first meeting that a strict schedule was
nonsense. This meeting has a very informal schedule.
Schedule
--------
Starting at noon, we're going to play session two of the
crypto-anarchy game, in which players try to conduct business under
the watchful eyes of others. We want to play for two hours and then
have discuss experiences afterward for about an hour. Some of the
improvements over last time will be flatter denominations of money,
wider distribution of commodities, more watchers (governmental and
otherwise), and perhaps some pre-printed forms.
We'll take a break to regroup for about ten or twenty minutes.
For the second half we'll talk about the security of remailers. I'll
lead the discussion. We'll be designing protocols and analyzing
attacks and defenses. I've done this with DigiCash for electronic
money protocols, and remailers are much easier, but still probably
more than an afternoon's discussion. We'll do this until six or so,
when people will have to start leaving.
Everyone who wants to will go out for dinner. I don't know the
restaurants down there; perhaps someone could suggest one?
Directions
----------
It's at 1937 Landings Drive, Mt. View. 101 to Amphitheatre Parkway
(the bay side of Rengstorff Ave), go right at the first light,
pass a right turn, and just before the road crests a tiny hill,
turn right into the Landings complex. We're in Building H.
--
Eric
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-05 (Mon, 5 Oct 92 01:23:23 PDT) - Meeting Sat. Oct. 10, noon, Mt. View - _Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\>_

70
_emails/1992/10/150cc9075146bf18554193b2b52dfc56cd0a54da12fbd6bf8d9fcb1e1b285478.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-31 - re: Why I Don't Use PGP
## Header Data
From: Tom.Jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (Tom Jennings)<br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 150cc9075146bf18554193b2b52dfc56cd0a54da12fbd6bf8d9fcb1e1b285478<br>
Message ID: \<3394.2AF2012B@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-31 03:46:23 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Fri, 30 Oct 92 20:46:23 PPE<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: Tom.Jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (Tom Jennings)
Date: Fri, 30 Oct 92 20:46:23 PPE
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: re: Why I Don't Use PGP
Message-ID: <3394.2AF2012B@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
U> From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
U> 10. Because I use a Mac and the Mac version is not out yet.
I'll ask in the FidoNet PUBLIC_KEYS echo about Smackintoshes.
U> 9. Because the Mac version may NEVER be out.
... prolly cuz noone can figger out how to make a lot of money from
it!
U> 4. Because I'm not yet convinced it is needed.
Ayup. My feelings exackly. This is starting to sound just like my gun
arguments... I don't need one on the street, but someday I may, no?
U> 3. Because ideally our mailers should handle this in a
U> push-button way
Some do already...
--- ReadMail
* Origin: tomj@fidosw.fidonet.org / World Power Systems (1:125/111)
--
Tom Jennings - via FidoNet node 1:125/555
UUCP: ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!111!Tom.Jennings
INTERNET: Tom.Jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-31 (Fri, 30 Oct 92 20:46:23 PPE) - re: Why I Don't Use PGP - _Tom.Jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (Tom Jennings)_

63
_emails/1992/10/156252f47fbad0cd66b933fed873c3264c37a1109b19f5dad86089525996d53c.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-20 - Mac Version PGP
## Header Data
From: No_Such_Address@atdt.org<br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 156252f47fbad0cd66b933fed873c3264c37a1109b19f5dad86089525996d53c<br>
Message ID: \<9210201806.AA07990@atdt.org\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-20 18:06:12 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Tue, 20 Oct 92 11:06:12 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: No_Such_Address@atdt.org
Date: Tue, 20 Oct 92 11:06:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mac Version PGP
Message-ID: <9210201806.AA07990@atdt.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
No one has been able to get me the source-code to PGP, and when
I ftp'd it from wherever, it came ZIP'd in a format that my
unzipper doesn't recognize. (Maybe I've been ZIP superceded).
Anyway, it hasn't been very convenient to get a hold of it for me.
But, it should be fairly straight forward to throw it into
THINK C. THINK C supports a console with command-line. You
would not necessarily have to Mac-ify it (although it would
certainly make it more aesthetically pleasing); so porting
to the Mac is not a dead-end port. THINK C should be
able to compile and execute PGP as-is.
As soon as I can get the source, I'll put my words into action.
(re: Macifying it: It's simple enough to slap together an
interface on top of something like PGP; that's one, maybe two
dialog boxes with a bunch of radio buttons and check boxes
and a routine to parse it all and hand the info over in a way
PGP expects. BFD. So, criticisms I've heard about
it being a hassle and a pointless exercise to port PGP to the
Mac are without merit, as far as I'm concerned.)
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-20 (Tue, 20 Oct 92 11:06:12 PDT) - Mac Version PGP - _No_Such_Address@atdt.org_

95
_emails/1992/10/15812353cae00b92b6950171b0944602902caba39821204d31a8223d50e1bff6.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-26 - Registering Keys...
## Header Data
From: Hal \<74076.1041@CompuServe.COM\><br>
To: CYPHERPUNKS \<CYPHERPUNKS@TOAD.COM\><br>
Message Hash: 15812353cae00b92b6950171b0944602902caba39821204d31a8223d50e1bff6<br>
Message ID: \<921026155917_74076.1041_DHJ88-1@CompuServe.COM\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-26 16:23:21 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Mon, 26 Oct 92 09:23:21 PPE<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Mon, 26 Oct 92 09:23:21 PPE
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@TOAD.COM>
Subject: Registering Keys...
Message-ID: <921026155917_74076.1041_DHJ88-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
This proposal to register keys was also mentioned in the July, 1992
Communications of the ACM, in an article by Ron Rivest, one of the
creators of the RSA algorithm. He was mostly criticizing the proposed
government Digital Signature Standard, stating that he thought that
the NSA was purposely trying to get "weak" cryptography installed as
the standard. Then he goes on to say,
"Are there technical alternatives that would satisfy all parties?
Perhaps. It is certainly the case that the formulation of the problem
to be solved has never been made explicit for the cryptographic
community to work on. I suspect that a solution based on 'escrowed
secret keys' might be workable, wherein each user is legally required
to depost his or her secret key with a trusted third party, such as
the user's bank. Cryptographic hardware and software would only
operate with public keys that were certified to having their corres-
ponding secret keys appropriately escrowed. A federal agency could
then obtain the secret key, or its use, with an appropriate warrant.
Once their secret keys were escrowed, multinational corporations could
even operate across borders with a high degree of authentication and
privacy (except perhaps from court-ordered wiretaps). Cryptographic
hardware and software manufactured in the U.S. would not operate
abroad without public keys suitably certified as having their secret
counterparts escrowed in the U.S. In an extension of this approach,
users can escrow their secret keys with several trusted third parties
in a 'secret-sharing' manner, so that no single third party can com-
promise the user's key. While this approach may have its own difficulties,
it does illustrate that weak cryptography is not the only technical
approach available. There may be much better techniques for achieving
a compromise between a number of conflicting national concerns."
At the time that I read this, I thought it was largely a rhetorical
device, making the point that if the government wants to infringe on
people's privacy, it should come out in the open and do so, rather
than skulking about. (Like saying, "if the government _really_ wants
to stop sexual immorality it would have to put a TV camera in every
bedroom".) And of course (I thought) this kind of proposal would never
be taken seriously. I'm shocked that Denning is now advocating it openly.
This proposal makes it illegal for people to communicate so secretly
that the government can't find out what they are saying. It could
apply to postal mail as well as email - it would be illegal to send
a message via post which the government couldn't interpret. If this
is really the government's purpose, then it should also require that all
private conversations be recorded, and the resulting tapes be "escrowed"
similarly in case the government needed to find out what was said,
for which it would have to get a court order.
As Tim suggested, this is probably a "trial balloon" being floated to
see what the reaction is. Let's see that it gets shot down.
Hal
74076.1041@compuserve.com
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-26 (Mon, 26 Oct 92 09:23:21 PPE) - Registering Keys... - _Hal \<74076.1041@CompuServe.COM\>_
+ 1992-10-26 (Mon, 26 Oct 92 10:08:45 PPE) - [Registering Keys...](/years/1992/10/2354d012d9195764785cc4d5b1fb9b3a566d8c08b2f3caadb23470bad07047e3) - _pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)_

46
_emails/1992/10/1948a7ffa411c9042feb2752a23ce12790792008ce818a44ddb4efb02b7a3321.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-25 - pgp
## Header Data
From: David Cabana (MTH) \<drcc@ultrix.csc.usf.edu.\><br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 1948a7ffa411c9042feb2752a23ce12790792008ce818a44ddb4efb02b7a3321<br>
Message ID: \<9210250037.AA19290@ultrix.csc.usf.edu.\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-25 00:43:41 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Sat, 24 Oct 92 17:43:41 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: David Cabana (MTH) <drcc@ultrix.csc.usf.edu.>
Date: Sat, 24 Oct 92 17:43:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: pgp
Message-ID: <9210250037.AA19290@ultrix.csc.usf.edu.>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Where in the U.S. can I ftp a copy of PGP? I tried Kauri.vuw.ac.nz,
but their README asked that I not transfer files. I would like to
respect their wishes...
Thanks,
drc
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-25 (Sat, 24 Oct 92 17:43:41 PDT) - pgp - _David Cabana (MTH) \<drcc@ultrix.csc.usf.edu.\>_

114
_emails/1992/10/1afebd35d2386ecbd3e928fbe8238aa1ae87a785db7db042acce1e283ed3cd16.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-13 - Re: one time pads
## Header Data
From: George A. Gleason \<gg@well.sf.ca.us\><br>
To: hughes@soda.berkeley.edu<br>
Message Hash: 1afebd35d2386ecbd3e928fbe8238aa1ae87a785db7db042acce1e283ed3cd16<br>
Message ID: \<199210130821.AA03658@well.sf.ca.us\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-13 08:14:58 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Tue, 13 Oct 92 01:14:58 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: George A. Gleason <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Tue, 13 Oct 92 01:14:58 PDT
To: hughes@soda.berkeley.edu
Subject: Re: one time pads
Message-ID: <199210130821.AA03658@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Good hard critique, Eric! Now if I might try to salvage my position...
"One time pads are very (much more) expensive on a per-link basis than
public key systems..."
Yes, of course. However I don't envision OTPs as a standard for bulk
encryption on large networks. Rather, for person-to-person communication in
small networks. Examples: a group of civil rights attorneys suing the
Federal govt., an international environmental organisation's main offices in
the capital cities of a small number of countries, etc. Cases where the
adversary is one or more powerful governments, and the number of links
required is relatively small. Given the nature of the relationships between
these kinds of networks and their adversaries, the expense would seem to be
justified; in any case, the **incremental** cost of for instance a set of
30MB cartridges as compared to a few floppy discs, is an minor fraction of
the cost of the airline tickets and other expenses for trusted couriers.
(oops: "a minor fraction...")
Your discussion of bandwidth can be met with a similar counter-arguement.
First of all, I would reject the use of UPS or (God help us) the *Post
Office* as a courier, particularly where one or more governments may be the
adversaries against whom protection is needed.
So your reference to those carriers is not relevant to the main point of my
case. I'm assuming that key materials are transported by trusted courier
and are guarded by same until they reach their intended recipient. Okay,
that *really* drives up the cost, doesn't it...? Not if the key materials
"hitch hike" on an existing travel plan: attorney A flies out to city B to
visit attorney B... and happens to carry key material onboard in his/her
shoulder bag. No added cost except for the storage devices, and that is not
significant.
Re mathematical breakthroughs in factoring etc, you say, "we don't know when
that will happen, and we don't know which will happen." Exactly my point.
*We* don't know. But the NSA and so on, most certainly do know, and they
won't be telling. If the breakthrough comes, then the period between that
point and the point when it is publicised, will be one of false security.
Was it Kahn who said nothing is more dangerous than a bad cipher? My point
here comes down to nothing more or less than the principle of caution in the
face of an unknown.
(Discussion of relative cost of brute force solutions, and the question of
hard problems and scale.) I agree that my intuition about these things may
be highly flawed. However this doesn't invalidate my point about the
possibility of basic breakthroughs happening behind closed doors. Now in a
way I'll admit that my arguement here sort of comes down to a black box.
However, again I would assert that there are cases where the almost
irrational caution is worthwhile.
You say in concluding, "Perfect security is not worth the cost in time,
effort, or dollars when the marginal cost of perfection is less (do you mean
more?) than perfection." You cite examples of international banking
systems.
I would cite examples of political movements which have been sabotaged and
destroyed by government covert action. One need not look far to run into
COINTELPRO and the more recent French govt action of blowing up a Greenpeace
vessel. Where your adversaries are the intelligence agencies of world
powers, and where lives are at stake, I would say the cost of perfect
security is justified. Now of course, the French terrorist bombing, the
destruction of Black nationalist and student organising groups in the US,
and other examples, may not (probably would not) have been prevented
altogether by adoption of perfect communications security. Che Guevara
after all used OTPs, and it was radio direction finding and traffic analysis
(rather than cryptanalysis) which ultimately led to his murder by US-backed
mercenaries.
If we are promoting a tendency which is inherently political, it implicitly
recognises governments as its adversaries. Our choices of cryptographic
systems should reflect a wide range of applications and not exclude some
a-priori on grounds of cost or convenience.
-George (gg@well.sf.ca.us)
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-13 (Tue, 13 Oct 92 01:14:58 PDT) - Re: one time pads - _George A. Gleason \<gg@well.sf.ca.us\>_
+ 1992-10-13 (Tue, 13 Oct 92 08:51:51 PDT) - [one time pads](/years/1992/10/59880107a8682ff630340193de22e9bf74179cc0b1399b38c188fa4c661518f3) - _Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\>_

84
_emails/1992/10/1be047fb00ed9b8e7e62a36076bd875e747fc5da248ab50cd0ef9aff7be79589.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-13 - Re: Mr. Squirrel
## Header Data
From: Hal \<74076.1041@CompuServe.COM\><br>
To: CYPHERPUNKS \<CYPHERPUNKS@TOAD.COM\><br>
Message Hash: 1be047fb00ed9b8e7e62a36076bd875e747fc5da248ab50cd0ef9aff7be79589<br>
Message ID: \<921013154244_74076.1041_DHJ92-2@CompuServe.COM\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-13 15:55:18 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Tue, 13 Oct 92 08:55:18 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Tue, 13 Oct 92 08:55:18 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@TOAD.COM>
Subject: Re: Mr. Squirrel
Message-ID: <921013154244_74076.1041_DHJ92-2@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
||ugh Daniel raises some questions about using public keys to
verify pseudonyms:
> Hal is somewhat right, anyone can use 'Secret Squirrel' and anyone
> can use any public key they want also.
But, once person A creates public key X, nobody else can sign messages
using X. So if all messages from A are signed under X, we can know
that they are all from the same person, even if they are sent anonymously
or under a pseudonym.
> So, in a many-to-one scope (as
> in a maillist) where the sender can not use the one-on-one signed
> signiture method how do we have proff of who the sender really is?
You can use signatures even in a many-to-one scope. Messages from
a particular person could be signed and the signature appended to
the message. Then anyone who has the public key can check to see
who the message came from. The process is a little unwieldy now
in PGP because you have to separate the signature and message into
separate files and run PGP on the signature file. This should be
streamlined.
> [Good points about keeping track of key-pseudonym pairs]
> But all this needs to be done automaticly by the mailers and
> interfaces, else the system will be mis-used and folks will tire of
> the extra work that gets them little advantage.
Absolutely. The most crying need now, IMO, is to better integrate the
cryptographic tools into mail readers and senders, so that it's not
such a pain to use these things. People should be able to give a single
command or press a button to decrypt an incoming message or encrypt an
outgoing one. Only then will these features be used by average people.
There was a message posted on alt.security.pgp describing how to
use PGP with the Emacs mail reading program. I'd like to see more
messages telling how to use it with other systems.
Hal
74076.1041@compuserve.com
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-13 (Tue, 13 Oct 92 08:55:18 PDT) - Re: Mr. Squirrel - _Hal \<74076.1041@CompuServe.COM\>_
+ 1992-10-13 (Tue, 13 Oct 92 10:04:24 PDT) - [Re: Mr. Squirrel](/years/1992/10/fe748ec0459677318d9e9d5d0611919b35b8f6e096b4d2ede12008c07f006f28) - _nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)_
+ 1992-10-13 (Tue, 13 Oct 92 11:49:36 PDT) - [Mr. Squirrel](/years/1992/10/4449d8423a3d4ccea75be61a5bd0f1ff0f12e8a37191013726ee2d9bfc0c5fb6) - _Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\>_

55
_emails/1992/10/1cb41753bf65e002a001ebdff3469ba8c095aa151ce1f7a7b8fc22e578c215bd.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-18 - Re: one time pads
## Header Data
From: George A. Gleason \<gg@well.sf.ca.us\><br>
To: hughes@soda.berkeley.edu<br>
Message Hash: 1cb41753bf65e002a001ebdff3469ba8c095aa151ce1f7a7b8fc22e578c215bd<br>
Message ID: \<199210180820.AA24894@well.sf.ca.us\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-18 08:21:11 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Sun, 18 Oct 92 01:21:11 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: George A. Gleason <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Sun, 18 Oct 92 01:21:11 PDT
To: hughes@soda.berkeley.edu
Subject: Re: one time pads
Message-ID: <199210180820.AA24894@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Sigh... well, I guess I can see if the people I know who are interested,
would do it as a freebie...
Funny thing is, when I first looked into crypto for dissident purposes, back
in 1981 or so, I was interested in a PKS implementation, but someone else in
my circle persuaded me that OTPs would be preferable in some cases. Now
here we are with a PKS and I'm still making noises about OTPs.
Guess the debate is closed for the moment... congratulations, y'all, for
good arguements in a good tone.
Now the well is about to close for the night, so I gotta scoot.
Be back soon...
-gg
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-18 (Sun, 18 Oct 92 01:21:11 PDT) - Re: one time pads - _George A. Gleason \<gg@well.sf.ca.us\>_

217
_emails/1992/10/1ce894a4595e4385435ca9bc1f3f60cac623e7cf191fa1f6b08f23122cd86ff0.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-09 - The technical explanation of "::" incoming header pasting
## Header Data
From: Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 1ce894a4595e4385435ca9bc1f3f60cac623e7cf191fa1f6b08f23122cd86ff0<br>
Message ID: \<9210091650.AA12173@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-09 16:43:05 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Fri, 9 Oct 92 09:43:05 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Fri, 9 Oct 92 09:43:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The technical explanation of "::" incoming header pasting
Message-ID: <9210091650.AA12173@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
There's a new feature in the remailing software.
Some people can't add arbitrary header fields because of mailer or
gateway restrictions. This restricts them from using the remailer. I
have added a facility to allow new header fields to be pasted onto the
end of a header when the mail arrives. This effectively happens
before processing by the remailer software. These new fields exist
during transit in the message body, where they remain untouched. Only
after the message is delivered to my account does this operator
take effect.
Syntax: If the first line of the body is the two characters "::", then
the following lines are appended to the header, up to the next blank
line.
Here's how it works.
First of all, here's my new .maildelivery file:
------- cut here -------
#
# field pattern action/ string
# result (quote included spaces)
#
Request-Remailing-To "" pipe R "perl remailer/remail.perl"
Request-Remailing-To "" file R remailer/archive
* "" pipe R "/usr/local/lib/mh/rcvtty -biff"
* "" pipe ? "perl remailer/incoming.header.perl"
------- cut here -------
Comments are indicated by #. The Request-Remailing-To lines have been
there. The second of the makes an archive for debugging purposes. It
will go eventually. The third field, "*", indicates all fields, it
runs 'rcvtty' on my mail; this replaces the function of biff, since
mail is getting piped to slocal now, disabling biff.
The last line is the important one. It says "If the mail hasn't been
delivered by now, run the incoming header rewrite script on it. If
that doesn't work, continue trying to deliver it."
Now here's the trick. slocal has no way of taking the output of the
rewrite and continuing to process it. (It should. It would make this
whole job easy.) So in order to continue processing, you need to
redeliver the mail. You could invoke sendmail and mail it back to
yourself, but that would mangle the existing header. So the thing to
do is to recursively invoke slocal from within the perl script.
Here's the perl script to do all this:
------- cut here -------
# First read in the whole header.
# We check for the Second-Pass: line to detect infinite loops.
while (<>) {
last if /^$/ ;
exit 1 if /^Second-Pass:/ ;
$header .= $_ ;
}
# We have just read the last line in the header.
# Now we check to see if there is a pasting operator.
if ( ( $_ = <> ) && /^::$/ ) {
while (<>) {
last if /^$/ ;
$header .= $_ ;
}
} else {
# There is either an empty body or no pasting operator
# Thus exit with a return code of 1 to indicate that
# the mail has not been delivered.
exit 1 ;
}
# There was a header pasting operator.
# So we open 'slocal' as a pipe, effectively redelivering the mail
# back to ourselves.
#open( OUTPUT, ">foo" ) ;
open( OUTPUT, "| /usr/local/lib/mh/slocal -user hughes" ) ;
select( OUTPUT ) ;
# print a "From " line to satisfy slocal
@weekdays = ( "Sun","Mon","Tue","Wed","Thu","Fri", "Sat" ) ;
@months = ( "Jan","Feb","Mar","Apr","May",
"Jun","Jul","Aug","Sep","Oct","Nov","Dec" ) ;
($sec,$min,$hour,$mday,$mon,$year,$wday,$yday,$isdst) = localtime ;
printf "From hughes %s %s ", @weekdays[ $wday ], @months[ $mon ] ;
printf "%2d %02d:%02d:%02d 19%d\n", $mday, $hour, $min, $sec, $year ;
# Now just print out the message
print $header ;
print "Second-Pass:\n" ;
print "\n" ;
while (<>) {
} continue {
print ;
}
------- cut here -------
Here's how the perl script works.
The first loop reads lines from the existing header. When it sees a
blank line (regexp /^$/) it terminates the loop. If it sees a field
"Second-Pass", it knows it has filtered this message before and exits
with a return code indicating that the mail has not been delivered.
The variable $header is appended with the current header line.
$header contains the whole header when the loop terminates.
Properly speaking, the Second-Pass test is not necessary to detect
infinite loops. Since the pasting operator gets removed during the
rewrite, the script won't return an exit status of 0 more times than
the pasting operator appears. But should something get screwed up,
such as a different module adding pasting commands (how? I don't know),
the Second-Pass test should prevent infinite recursion.
The next statement reads another line from the input file. This line
is the first line of the message body. If this line is the pasting
operator, then header lines are accumulated in $header as before until
a blank line. The difference is that these header lines are being
read from the body of the message. If there is no pasting operator,
the script exits undelivered.
At this point we now have to redeliver the message back to ourselves.
We first open slocal as the output pipe.
The next section is a kludge. It turns out that slocal strips off the
out-of-band "From " (no colon) line that the mail delivery system
uses. In other words, the message which slocal pipes into its pipes
is not identical to the message it itself received. This means that
slocal cannot be directly recursed. What this section does is to
create a "From " line to make slocal happy. It calls localtime() and
then formats those numbers into the proper form.
It turns out that slocal will deliver this mail without the "From "
line, even to /usr/spool/mail, but it doesn't do so properly. On my
system, in added some delimiters which I think I've tracked down to
the 'mtstailor' file, namely mmdelivery1 and mmdelivery2. Since these
are not null on my system, there's some garbage added which screws up
separation of the spool file into messages. Adding a "From " line
fixes that. This misbehavior may not be so surprising, considering
that slocal was "meant" to be invoked only in a .forward file.
Now we print the variable $header which contains the whole header,
including newlines. Using a single string removes the need for an
array. We added the Second-Pass line and a blank line for the end of
the header. The final loop prints out the rest of the message body.
There is another way to proceed to get the same functionality. One
could write a filter to translate the first occurrence only of
\n\n::\n into \n. We could then pass the message through this filter
before slocal saw it. And for now, that would do the same thing.
But suppose we want more that one rewrite rule active? Then you would
only be able to apply each rewrite rule exactly once in fixed order.
You want to be able to rewrite a message and then apply all the
rewrite rules again.
At least one other rewrite rule is planned: automatic decryption.
Since decrypting a message will completely change the body, and since
some of the header fields may need to be hidden, you have to be able
to decrypt the body and then paste on header lines. But since you
need to indicate an encrypted body by a header line (well, not really,
but it's more reliable), and since some people can't add these header
lines, you need to paste lines before encryption as well.
Thus the rewrite rules need to be applied asyncronously and hence I'm
using a fairly complex slocal scheme to do a simple filter.
Eventually I hope to write an equivalent to slocal which knows about
message rewrites and simple filters, but that's for later.
Eric
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-09 (Fri, 9 Oct 92 09:43:05 PDT) - The technical explanation of "::" incoming header pasting - _Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\>_

74
_emails/1992/10/1eea0ede39035ff4b7e883851446a69768d6e4f5d546d0a5b37182f47cce4f4e.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-14 - Integrated privacy...
## Header Data
From: Tom.Jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (Tom Jennings)<br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 1eea0ede39035ff4b7e883851446a69768d6e4f5d546d0a5b37182f47cce4f4e<br>
Message ID: \<2931.2ADB225F@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-14 02:52:16 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Tue, 13 Oct 92 19:52:16 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: Tom.Jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (Tom Jennings)
Date: Tue, 13 Oct 92 19:52:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Integrated privacy...
Message-ID: <2931.2ADB225F@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
U> Absolutely. The most crying need now, IMO, is to better
U> integrate the cryptographic tools into mail readers and
U> senders, so that it's not such a pain to use these things.
U> People should be able to give a single command or press a
U> button to decrypt an incoming message or encrypt an
U> outgoing one.
I just completed (well, it's in "beta") a mail-reader package for
MSDOS and FidoNet. It does "rm" type stuff, and has PGP integrated
reawonably well. Single character commands to decrypt, encrypt, sign,
or encrypt/sign. It furnishes the distributed PGP.EXE program with
it's imput (deriving it from the message itself). It'll extract keys
from messages, and all that.
It's MSDOS and .MSG-type FidoNet message base oriented, but it does
all it's work in pure ASCII (FidoNet .MSG files are mixed binary and
text). It is intentionally "RFC-822 like", and will become fully
RFC-822 "soon".
I was reasonably careful regarding de-cyphered plaintext laying about
on disk, etc. It's available via Wazoo filerequest as magicname RM.
(That's probably as obscure to you as FTP is to FidoNet.)
It will be released as "copyleft" with all sources. Binaries only
this week til I get it shaken down.
* Origin: World Power Systems / FidoNews / San Francisco CA (1:125/111)
--
Tom Jennings - via FidoNet node 1:125/555
UUCP: ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!111!Tom.Jennings
INTERNET: Tom.Jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-14 (Tue, 13 Oct 92 19:52:16 PDT) - Integrated privacy... - _Tom.Jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (Tom Jennings)_

62
_emails/1992/10/200d440b3ce47cfce824973681a175c86df247d92d5e7dc292012ab8bc88656a.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-23 - Diffie-Hellman
## Header Data
From: "Scott Collins" \<scott_collins@genmagic.com\><br>
To: "Cypher Punks" \<cypherpunks@toad.com\><br>
Message Hash: 200d440b3ce47cfce824973681a175c86df247d92d5e7dc292012ab8bc88656a<br>
Message ID: \<9210230706.AA04122@relay2.UU.NET\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-23 07:06:14 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Fri, 23 Oct 92 00:06:14 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: "Scott Collins" <scott_collins@genmagic.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Oct 92 00:06:14 PDT
To: "Cypher Punks" <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Diffie-Hellman
Message-ID: <9210230706.AA04122@relay2.UU.NET>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Subject: Diffie-Hellman
>Since there's no perceived value and since all the software would
>require license from RSADSI, it won't happen that way.
It was not my understanding that RSA held any patents, copyrights or other controls
over Diffie-Hellman key exchange. The 'big-number' math required is not
difficult and is fully documented in Knuth's "The Art of Computer Programming",
vol2: Seminumerical Algorithms; section 4.3: Multiple Precision Arithmetic.
Also note that this multiple precision code is available in the PGP source in
the file mpilib.c.
The exchanged key could easily be a DES (or other fast symmetric cypher) key --
and usually is. Unless you want to perform an authenticated key exchange with
Diffie-Hellman as described in "Authentication and Authenticated Key Exchanges" [Diffie,
Van Oorschot and Wiener in "Designs, Codes and Cryptography", 2, 107-125 (1992)]
using certificates signed with the RSA algorithm, then RSA doesn't have to enter
the picture at all.
Is my understanding of RSAs controls incorrect?
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-23 (Fri, 23 Oct 92 00:06:14 PDT) - Diffie-Hellman - _"Scott Collins" \<scott_collins@genmagic.com\>_

58
_emails/1992/10/20afd4cea4d9e2d57280c5afce0c3f16abf843ef65658c20b5cd90f7b78a1070.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-08 - Subscriptions, etc.
## Header Data
From: Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 20afd4cea4d9e2d57280c5afce0c3f16abf843ef65658c20b5cd90f7b78a1070<br>
Message ID: \<9210081604.AA15870@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
Reply To: \<9210081541.AA03134@toad.com\><br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-08 15:57:23 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Thu, 8 Oct 92 08:57:23 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 8 Oct 92 08:57:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Subscriptions, etc.
In-Reply-To: <9210081541.AA03134@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9210081604.AA15870@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Yow! I'm a hypocrite!
Now _I_ forgot to look at the reply line. Damn.
Diligence, diligence.
--------------------------------------------
In other news, the list membership is up to 60 people and one local
newsgroup gateway. I have five more to add, some of whose addresses I
have to find out.
Eric
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-08 (Thu, 8 Oct 92 07:04:56 PDT) - [Subscribe](/years/1992/10/454afdeccfcfc12faec4a1c95227823ccd2317215802fba5cb077de5bba38b1f) - _whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk (Russell E. Whitaker)_
+ 1992-10-08 (Thu, 8 Oct 92 08:41:35 PDT) - [Subscribe](/years/1992/10/4dda48fae2f6e862d1a35aa019c82ecee26503b544f80ca323cc75f6238d3c42) - _hughes (Eric Hughes)_
+ 1992-10-08 (Thu, 8 Oct 92 08:57:23 PDT) - Subscriptions, etc. - _Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\>_

46
_emails/1992/10/21eb2845724e8c20b4bad621a09e57464c0ff3888812380cbecbb2b49bae4fbb.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-10 - random
## Header Data
From: Eric Hollander \<hh@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 21eb2845724e8c20b4bad621a09e57464c0ff3888812380cbecbb2b49bae4fbb<br>
Message ID: \<9210102041.AA04891@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-10 20:33:53 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Sat, 10 Oct 92 13:33:53 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: Eric Hollander <hh@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sat, 10 Oct 92 13:33:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: random
Message-ID: <9210102041.AA04891@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
So when are we going to start alt.crypt, where we just post a lot of
uuencode'ed random data?
e
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-10 (Sat, 10 Oct 92 13:33:53 PDT) - random - _Eric Hollander \<hh@soda.berkeley.edu\>_

51
_emails/1992/10/228284a4836f0d9252ddf094ef2c55dbc324950fbbc2b9e7af6b1106cd26051b.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-23 - Eavesdropping on a printer's signature
## Header Data
From: nobody@soda.berkeley.edu<br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 228284a4836f0d9252ddf094ef2c55dbc324950fbbc2b9e7af6b1106cd26051b<br>
Message ID: \<9210230609.AA26646@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-23 06:10:13 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Thu, 22 Oct 92 23:10:13 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: nobody@soda.berkeley.edu
Date: Thu, 22 Oct 92 23:10:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Eavesdropping on a printer's signature
Message-ID: <9210230609.AA26646@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
While doing a summer (1980?) co-op with Raytheon Submarine Signal
division in Newport RI, a milk-truck-sized van pulled up out front
and opened a sliding side door. Inside was a line printer
that was busy printing out the same text that an internal (in the
middle of the building, perhaps 150 feet away) line-printer was
printing. There were mistakes, but it was readable.
My guess is that with all the electromechanical pulses the printer
was emanating this was pretty easy. Probably harder to do with a
laser printer...
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-23 (Thu, 22 Oct 92 23:10:13 PDT) - Eavesdropping on a printer's signature - _nobody@soda.berkeley.edu_

65
_emails/1992/10/2354d012d9195764785cc4d5b1fb9b3a566d8c08b2f3caadb23470bad07047e3.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-26 - Registering Keys...
## Header Data
From: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)<br>
To: 74076.1041@compuserve.com<br>
Message Hash: 2354d012d9195764785cc4d5b1fb9b3a566d8c08b2f3caadb23470bad07047e3<br>
Message ID: \<9210261643.AA16936@newsu.shearson.com\><br>
Reply To: \<921026155917_74076.1041_DHJ88-1@CompuServe.COM\><br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-26 17:08:45 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Mon, 26 Oct 92 10:08:45 PPE<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Mon, 26 Oct 92 10:08:45 PPE
To: 74076.1041@compuserve.com
Subject: Registering Keys...
In-Reply-To: <921026155917_74076.1041_DHJ88-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9210261643.AA16936@newsu.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
>From: Hal <74076.1041@compuserve.com>
>This proposal makes it illegal for people to communicate so secretly
>that the government can't find out what they are saying. It could
>apply to postal mail as well as email - it would be illegal to send
>a message via post which the government couldn't interpret. If this
>is really the government's purpose, then it should also require that all
>private conversations be recorded, and the resulting tapes be "escrowed"
>similarly in case the government needed to find out what was said,
>for which it would have to get a court order.
>As Tim suggested, this is probably a "trial balloon" being floated to
>see what the reaction is. Let's see that it gets shot down.
I find it repugnant that we've gone all the way over to the notion
that people must actively cooperate with their own enslavement. We'd
better start getting organized flames against this idea mobilized.
Denning is on the net -- anyone care to start flaming on sci.crypt?
Its likely the place that will get the most response in the general
community.
Perry
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-26 (Mon, 26 Oct 92 09:23:21 PPE) - [Registering Keys...](/years/1992/10/15812353cae00b92b6950171b0944602902caba39821204d31a8223d50e1bff6) - _Hal \<74076.1041@CompuServe.COM\>_
+ 1992-10-26 (Mon, 26 Oct 92 10:08:45 PPE) - Registering Keys... - _pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)_

58
_emails/1992/10/235c7c3e14ca0abdb4ef75a7cbe79f081cb2aae7eb5ca8ebfcc604717216bfc1.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-26 - Re: Alpha Particles and One Time Pads
## Header Data
From: marc@kg6kf.ampr.org (Marc de Groot - KG6KF)<br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 235c7c3e14ca0abdb4ef75a7cbe79f081cb2aae7eb5ca8ebfcc604717216bfc1<br>
Message ID: \<9210261024.AA11069@kg6kf.ampr.org\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-26 10:44:55 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Mon, 26 Oct 92 03:44:55 PPE<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: marc@kg6kf.ampr.org (Marc de Groot - KG6KF)
Date: Mon, 26 Oct 92 03:44:55 PPE
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Alpha Particles and One Time Pads
Message-ID: <9210261024.AA11069@kg6kf.ampr.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Tim May sez:
Here's a posting I just sent to sci.crypt, dealing with using alpha
particle sources as noise sources for generating one-time pads.
Tim,
Why not use a back-biased germanium diode, or other noisy semiconductor
junction? Seriously, the NRC has allowed the smoke detector people to
spread those little radioactive chunks of Americium for too long.
John Walker of AutoDesk actually built an IBM-PC card that generated
random numbers from a radioactive source.
All the best,
^M
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-26 (Mon, 26 Oct 92 03:44:55 PPE) - Re: Alpha Particles and One Time Pads - _marc@kg6kf.ampr.org (Marc de Groot - KG6KF)_
+ 1992-10-26 (Mon, 26 Oct 92 12:13:42 PPE) - [Re: Alpha Particles and One Time Pads](/years/1992/10/96f4cccc3f7dcec3807398d9e17c2ea77516a4daa35cb38c9570bec1fea0481d) - _Peter Shipley \<shipley@tfs.COM\>_

62
_emails/1992/10/23def49fd60616a55ca036b06643363d86f2e3d62e1b1ead38adbf49d8495208.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-16 - Re: Game items...
## Header Data
From: Eric Hollander \<hh@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
To: Tom.Jennings@f111.n125.z1.fidonet.org (Tom Jennings)<br>
Message Hash: 23def49fd60616a55ca036b06643363d86f2e3d62e1b1ead38adbf49d8495208<br>
Message ID: \<9210160013.AA19109@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
Reply To: \<2962.2ADD350B@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG\><br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-16 00:23:16 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Thu, 15 Oct 92 17:23:16 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: Eric Hollander <hh@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 15 Oct 92 17:23:16 PDT
To: Tom.Jennings@f111.n125.z1.fidonet.org (Tom Jennings)
Subject: Re: Game items...
In-Reply-To: <2962.2ADD350B@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>
Message-ID: <9210160013.AA19109@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
>-- Access to genuine information on RU-48 (?) the so-called abortion
>pill. Turns out it does some cool stuff re: breast cancer and even
>morning-after abortion.
RU 486 (no, it's not Intel's pharmaceuticals division).
This is actually a really good example of something that could be the
subject of the game. Medical researchers need it because it has the
potential to save lives. However, synthesis and import of it into the
United States is banned, no matter what quantities are needed or what use it
is needed for. It is an interesting and powerful substance and we should be
doing research on it, but instead we are letting a small minority of people
with no medical knowledge dictate the policy of our entire nation. Oh
well. I hope to have European citizenship someday (especially if Geroge
wins).
e
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-15 (Thu, 15 Oct 92 02:10:13 PDT) - [re: Game items...](/years/1992/10/ce279b19b49d07d1574d291311a0733a6c7c3f25ba24f44c9ebe81f8b10d6b36) - _Tom.Jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (Tom Jennings)_
+ 1992-10-16 (Thu, 15 Oct 92 17:23:16 PDT) - Re: Game items... - _Eric Hollander \<hh@soda.berkeley.edu\>_

59
_emails/1992/10/2414b4e9749952e702f40e3ab08b5c8c4f13ba6c41f4fd2ddcc01ba85e3079c8.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-22 - Re: Keystone
## Header Data
From: sdw@meaddata.com (Stephen Williams)<br>
To: gnu@cygnus.com<br>
Message Hash: 2414b4e9749952e702f40e3ab08b5c8c4f13ba6c41f4fd2ddcc01ba85e3079c8<br>
Message ID: \<9210221600.AA21898@bugatti.meaddata.com\><br>
Reply To: \<9210220637.AA20200@cygnus.com\><br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-22 17:09:30 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Thu, 22 Oct 92 10:09:30 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: sdw@meaddata.com (Stephen Williams)
Date: Thu, 22 Oct 92 10:09:30 PDT
To: gnu@cygnus.com
Subject: Re: Keystone
In-Reply-To: <9210220637.AA20200@cygnus.com>
Message-ID: <9210221600.AA21898@bugatti.meaddata.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
..
> real advantage, since you can get free source for just about program,
> while "free" PC programs means free binaries. If anyone knows of a
> reasonably popular PC terminal emulator for which source code is
> freely available and distributable, let us know.
PC Kermit, of course. The best vt100 emulator around, last I used them
heavily.
>
sdw
--
Stephen D. Williams Local Internet Gateway Co.; SDW Systems 513 496-5223APager
LIG dev./sales Internet: sdw@world.std.com CIS 76244.210@compuserve.com
OO R&D Source Dist. By Horse: 10028 Village Tree Ct., Miamisburg, OH 45342
GNU Support ICBM: 39 34N 85 15W I love it when a plan comes together
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-22 (Wed, 21 Oct 92 22:35:21 PDT) - [Keystone](/years/1992/10/4b028509a502332d7eb20d667f19c0822f161f636956254fb21a228f7050899b) - _Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\>_
+ 1992-10-22 (Wed, 21 Oct 92 23:35:44 PDT) - [Re: Keystone](/years/1992/10/fb6cd513252375d40032e5c92dc6f0e2a944525554d20788331d097d9233143d) - _gnu@cygnus.com_
+ 1992-10-22 (Thu, 22 Oct 92 10:09:30 PDT) - Re: Keystone - _sdw@meaddata.com (Stephen Williams)_

52
_emails/1992/10/26b81383c805929e3c002c3f7836848983275fee0cf94a079d7717bfd346d887.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-27 - Re: A Trial Balloon to Ban Encryption?
## Header Data
From: gnu<br>
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May), cypherpunks<br>
Message Hash: 26b81383c805929e3c002c3f7836848983275fee0cf94a079d7717bfd346d887<br>
Message ID: \<9210270908.AA00325@toad.com\><br>
Reply To: \<9210261819.AA07688@netcom2.netcom.com\><br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-27 09:08:56 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Tue, 27 Oct 92 02:08:56 PPE<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: gnu
Date: Tue, 27 Oct 92 02:08:56 PPE
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May), cypherpunks
Subject: Re: A Trial Balloon to Ban Encryption?
In-Reply-To: <9210261819.AA07688@netcom2.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9210270908.AA00325@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
> I think it was John Gilmore who said: "If encryption is outlawed, only
> outlaws will have encryption."
Maybe. But I like John Perry Barlow's formulation better:
"You can have my encryption algorithm when you pry my cold dead fingers
from its private key."
John
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-26 (Mon, 26 Oct 92 11:22:35 PPE) - [(fwd) A Trial Balloon to Ban Encryption?](/years/1992/10/38fbbe375ba50d24f74e7a2036b91a85401f68ccf280d843e3d6930e6634d353) - _tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)_
+ 1992-10-27 (Tue, 27 Oct 92 02:08:56 PPE) - Re: A Trial Balloon to Ban Encryption? - _gnu_

68
_emails/1992/10/275154781ea5f331380a67d875964b36eacfaa5b6310d2811f94b1db35be8356.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-22 - "Cypherpunks write code"
## Header Data
From: whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk (Russell E. Whitaker)<br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 275154781ea5f331380a67d875964b36eacfaa5b6310d2811f94b1db35be8356<br>
Message ID: \<2580@eternity.demon.co.uk\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-22 07:00:52 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Thu, 22 Oct 92 00:00:52 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk (Russell E. Whitaker)
Date: Thu, 22 Oct 92 00:00:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: "Cypherpunks write code"
Message-ID: <2580@eternity.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Eric Hughes writes:
>
> Cypherpunks write code.
>
> This will mean someone who knows Procomm, Crosstalk, Qmodem, Telix,
> etc. for the PC, someone who knows the various Mac, Amiga, Atari, and
> other machines. This will mean someone to write nice pretty visual
> interfaces for PGP to put all the PGP options on menus where they are
> all visible. This will mean people to think about BBS/terminal
> protocols. This will mean lots of individual contributions, no single
> of which need be large, but whose sum will be.
>
> Eric
>
Count me in on the Procomm scripting. I *may* do something for Telix,
too.
Who knows? I may sell the scripts/interfaces on AMiX. ;-)
Russell Earl Whitaker whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk
Communications Editor 71750.2413@compuserve.com
EXTROPY: The Journal of Transhumanist Thought AMiX: RWHITAKER
Board member, Extropy Institute (ExI)
================ PGP 2.0 public key available =======================
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-22 (Thu, 22 Oct 92 00:00:52 PDT) - "Cypherpunks write code" - _whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk (Russell E. Whitaker)_

81
_emails/1992/10/27708d1bd342959acd3e40d9fa98d462c357f0b098de7f57772db854d4934a7f.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-20 - More private PGP...?
## Header Data
From: Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 27708d1bd342959acd3e40d9fa98d462c357f0b098de7f57772db854d4934a7f<br>
Message ID: \<9210201533.AA07309@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
Reply To: \<9210200622.AA10349@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-20 15:33:46 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Tue, 20 Oct 92 08:33:46 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 20 Oct 92 08:33:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: More private PGP...?
In-Reply-To: <9210200622.AA10349@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9210201533.AA07309@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
>One of the things I've noticed about PGP is that it makes it pretty
>obvious that you're sending an encrypted message. [...] Sending
>encrypted messages may call unwelcome attention to yourself.
First, let me get on record as saying that Hal's "innocent mode" is a
good idea that should be implemented.
But it's not really a good long-term solution from a social point of
view. Encrypted traffic should become the norm, not the exception.
Flagging that you're sending encrypted traffic should be encouraged.
When questioned about this, people should respond in shocked tones
"What do mean? Aren't you encrypting _your_ email?" and then proceed
to suppress gentle laughter at them when they say no.
When it's cool to encrypt, only the uncool will be plain.
So, then, more peer pressure! Consider someone asking you about your
encrypted mail to be an opportunity to start a conversation about
their position on personal privacy. When your sysadmin asks why your
mail can't be read, tell him you are defending your privacy and ask if
there is any problem with that. Then, when the sysadmin puts in a
filter for PGP traffic, use innocent mode.
>Another thing that I think is kind of bad about PGP in the context
>of avoiding traffic analysis is that it puts the key ID of the
>destination person in the header.
Absolutely. Ditto for signatures. Both should be able to be
selectively removed. In any case, it should be possible to have
nothing appear on the outer envelope.
Another feature for PGP would be automatic message padding. To
properly do a mix you need to quantize the message lengths. If PGP
were to automatically pad with random data, it would save a lot of
integration work for the mix. PGP already has a random number
generator, after all.
Eric
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-20 (Mon, 19 Oct 92 23:22:30 PDT) - [More private PGP...?](/years/1992/10/28d6b7fffe6975bc2644d84e8b632806749253c90050aafafcf27218d336ff2f) - _nobody@soda.berkeley.edu_
+ 1992-10-20 (Tue, 20 Oct 92 08:33:46 PDT) - More private PGP...? - _Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\>_

105
_emails/1992/10/28d6b7fffe6975bc2644d84e8b632806749253c90050aafafcf27218d336ff2f.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-20 - More private PGP...?
## Header Data
From: nobody@soda.berkeley.edu<br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 28d6b7fffe6975bc2644d84e8b632806749253c90050aafafcf27218d336ff2f<br>
Message ID: \<9210200622.AA10349@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-20 06:22:30 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Mon, 19 Oct 92 23:22:30 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: nobody@soda.berkeley.edu
Date: Mon, 19 Oct 92 23:22:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: More private PGP...?
Message-ID: <9210200622.AA10349@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
One of the things I've noticed about PGP is that it makes it pretty
obvious that you're sending an encrypted message. The big
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
at the start pretty much gives that away.
In most cases, this is fine, but sometimes it may not be desirable
to make it this obvious. Sending encrypted messages may call
unwelcome attention to yourself. Also, some people are experimenting
with packet radio on the amateur bands, and it's not legal to send
encrypted messages there.
What I think would be nice would be an "innocent" mode for PGP
in which it created files which looked like something else. For
example, what if your encrypted output file looked like:
begin 666 testpat.gif
MI\44:#G4D>QQXR!-M,Z20O1K&5D<U"C;V<J#-I@:ANT,A+>0, 5-4F.X<%MT
M2:V94,K;XE@B?]%IHF+_<VT=U! 3Q;;M-K<QT.N"?%IJTNU!%(KF7K]2^B6+
M;&TTGTULW(4%:F@\&MB^ ^Y5Y\#2A6^*86F-Y"^%J$>WGI%(]#=F]/[LV+&!
M,NH0(!3B35CW#!-Z7"B_L'=-C 8DLB-(J R"3?EE9<.>QE4Y?T$66IA7B@W?
end
This will be recognizable, if you've seen many, as a uuencoded file,
a common encoding for non-ascii files. The header line suggests
that it is a graphics file. Tons of these types of files are sent
across email networks every day. Sending your encrypted messages
in this form would give you a lower profile.
Still, if someone goes to the effort to uudecode your message,
and examines the resulting file, it will be obvious that it's not
a GIF file because it lacks the proper headers. Instead, with
the current PGP implementation it will be obvious that it is in
fact a PGP file, because the header format matches the PGP spec.
Again, I think it would be better if PGP in this mode were able to
produce a file without headers which will give away what it is. Even
better would be the ability to mimic headers of some other types
of files, such as the .ZIP, .ZOO, or Unix "compress" format which are
often used in binary files people mail around.
Another thing that I think is kind of bad about PGP in the context
of avoiding traffic analysis is that it puts the key ID of the
destination person in the header. There was some discussion during
development of a mode in which no key ID information would be in the
header; the only way you'd have of knowing if the message was for
you was to try decrypting it. (There is a checksum which is used
internally to tell if the decryption was done with the right key.)
This way you could broadcast messages to some group, and no one could
know which person in the group you were sending to.
These "anonymous destination" messages could be encoded with a key
ID of zeros, and the PGP software could easily be modified to let
the user try a decryption on such a message, reporting success or
failure.
How useful do these kinds of features seem to people? Would they
really be helpful or is this just paranoia?
Hal
74076.1041@compuserve.com
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-20 (Mon, 19 Oct 92 23:22:30 PDT) - More private PGP...? - _nobody@soda.berkeley.edu_
+ 1992-10-20 (Tue, 20 Oct 92 08:33:46 PDT) - [More private PGP...?](/years/1992/10/27708d1bd342959acd3e40d9fa98d462c357f0b098de7f57772db854d4934a7f) - _Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\>_

61
_emails/1992/10/298d86c630be7b06958a77a0e2a93e61224cded16c21ee64acb6bc0f39e9ecfd.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-23 - BBS E-mail policy Now see if this number is in one of the following ranges:
## Header Data
From: tribble@xanadu.com (E. Dean Tribble)<br>
To: uunet!soda.berkeley.edu!hughes@uunet.UU.NET<br>
Message Hash: 298d86c630be7b06958a77a0e2a93e61224cded16c21ee64acb6bc0f39e9ecfd<br>
Message ID: \<9210231641.AA11868@xanadu.xanadu.com\><br>
Reply To: \<9210230601.AA26160@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-23 21:42:19 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Fri, 23 Oct 92 14:42:19 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: tribble@xanadu.com (E. Dean Tribble)
Date: Fri, 23 Oct 92 14:42:19 PDT
To: uunet!soda.berkeley.edu!hughes@uunet.UU.NET
Subject: BBS E-mail policy Now see if this number is in one of the following ranges:
In-Reply-To: <9210230601.AA26160@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9210231641.AA11868@xanadu.xanadu.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
[1.5 .. 2.5] encrypted text
[3 .. 6] regular text
[7 .. 8] line noise
This is a very simple measure. There are other measures to look for
the deviation from an expected distribution, which give much more
accurate distinctions. One can very easily separate languages from
each other just by looking at such measures.
Where does uuencoded [compressed] binary lie? I would suspect it lies
right around where encrypted text is. Presumably straight encrypted
text is statistically random [7..8], but that when you8 encrypt to
just the ascii subset is when you lose the entropy.
dean
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-22 (Thu, 22 Oct 92 09:25:56 PDT) - [BBS E-mail policy](/years/1992/10/8a24672636a42d5225524b26c5cc78e1b0ba1b62a4c1e1fe1825463951a6b9e0) - _omega@spica.bu.edu (The Omega)_
+ 1992-10-23 (Thu, 22 Oct 92 23:02:09 PDT) - [BBS E-mail policy](/years/1992/10/bc5b354247141e46df2c768591ee1dffd7fbc017a03b959da779cf82e2521133) - _Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\>_
+ 1992-10-23 (Fri, 23 Oct 92 14:42:19 PDT) - BBS E-mail policy Now see if this number is in one of the following ranges: - _tribble@xanadu.com (E. Dean Tribble)_
+ 1992-10-24 (Fri, 23 Oct 92 23:20:44 PDT) - [entropy measures](/years/1992/10/3c38d48ebe6788447fca198f92d44a9ffa68121b79032804da9a7944dc97d602) - _Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\>_
+ 1992-10-26 (Sun, 25 Oct 92 21:41:19 PPE) - [Re: entropy measures](/years/1992/10/b71072e5de22f0ee2513a7bc057b82b39ad7284a70bf4913906340f5c39b27b3) - _Eric Hollander \<hh@soda.berkeley.edu\>_

54
_emails/1992/10/2be473d52a0362296b2fa5db0c5b7368828c3e322b7e2ac29c00d371d3c17539.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-20 - Home security...
## Header Data
From: mark@coombs.anu.edu.au (Mark)<br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 2be473d52a0362296b2fa5db0c5b7368828c3e322b7e2ac29c00d371d3c17539<br>
Message ID: \<9210200918.AA18129@coombs.anu.edu.au\><br>
Reply To: \<199210200855.AA27037@well.sf.ca.us\><br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-20 09:19:05 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Tue, 20 Oct 92 02:19:05 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: mark@coombs.anu.edu.au (Mark)
Date: Tue, 20 Oct 92 02:19:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Home security...
In-Reply-To: <199210200855.AA27037@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9210200918.AA18129@coombs.anu.edu.au>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
>This general area is part of a larger topic called TEMPEST. Anyone else
>interested in pursuing this angle...?
What's the best sources for faraday cages and TEMPEST etc? And does anyone
out there implement anything of this type of security at home to protect
against monitoring? The cost of such an exercise would be rather prohibitive
to say the least.
Just curious..
Mark
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-20 (Tue, 20 Oct 92 01:56:22 PDT) - [Re: one time pads.](/years/1992/10/f521aad835f2995f4c759db006e61372149cd4cb840a397f387ad8a0a9dca1cb) - _George A. Gleason \<gg@well.sf.ca.us\>_
+ 1992-10-20 (Tue, 20 Oct 92 02:19:05 PDT) - Home security... - _mark@coombs.anu.edu.au (Mark)_

62
_emails/1992/10/2d63e88350175c0c0fbf601fc8fa86677404a48be269affc97ed929f354f72e5.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-25 - re: multiple message destinations
## Header Data
From: Tom.Jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (Tom Jennings)<br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 2d63e88350175c0c0fbf601fc8fa86677404a48be269affc97ed929f354f72e5<br>
Message ID: \<3266.2AEAF026@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-25 19:08:31 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Sun, 25 Oct 92 12:08:31 PPE<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: Tom.Jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (Tom Jennings)
Date: Sun, 25 Oct 92 12:08:31 PPE
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: re: multiple message destinations
Message-ID: <3266.2AEAF026@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
U> 1) [...] Or send it yourself.
As a paranoid person myself (I use the two phrases "sufficiently
paranoid" (me, and most of us in here are sufficiently paranoid -- to
at least consider the issues) and "insufficiently paranoid" -- people
who conduct business over cordless or cellular voice, etc -- these
paren'd subtexts are getting out of hand -- as a paranoid person
myself I would only trust sending them myself.
It's really a "code" issue -- given a list of addressees, will the
miserable program you're using do the work for you.
--- ReadMail
* Origin: World Power Systems / FidoNews / San Francisco CA (1:125/111)
--
Tom Jennings - via FidoNet node 1:125/555
UUCP: ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!111!Tom.Jennings
INTERNET: Tom.Jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-25 (Sun, 25 Oct 92 12:08:31 PPE) - re: multiple message destinations - _Tom.Jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (Tom Jennings)_

62
_emails/1992/10/2d70f4bb92f4ef328aae493b3882459b8bb67b24261f1bb28f4a91e316c8e243.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-07 - re: introducers
## Header Data
From: Tom.Jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (Tom Jennings)<br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 2d70f4bb92f4ef328aae493b3882459b8bb67b24261f1bb28f4a91e316c8e243<br>
Message ID: \<2715.2AD37337@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-07 23:46:07 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Wed, 7 Oct 92 16:46:07 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: Tom.Jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (Tom Jennings)
Date: Wed, 7 Oct 92 16:46:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: re: introducers
Message-ID: <2715.2AD37337@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
U> Detection of tampering is plenty good enough, I think, for
U> a _network_ policy of key distribution. For most people,
U> it will work fine.
I guess I had to come at this from the backside. You are right.
Accepting keys over the network will provide reasonably well-sealed
envelopes. It won't provide notarized, hand-delivered security, but
that's not what's needed *usually*.
U> For personal use, for people I know, I'm going to rely on
U> personally
U> exchanged keys.
Exactly.
* Origin: World Power Systems / FidoNews (1:125/111)
--
Tom Jennings - via FidoNet node 1:125/555
UUCP: ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!111!Tom.Jennings
INTERNET: Tom.Jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-07 (Wed, 7 Oct 92 16:46:07 PDT) - re: introducers - _Tom.Jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (Tom Jennings)_

74
_emails/1992/10/2f6d5e1afd06d6ab7efd62ee0ef4f4e446d648d9648b1a1bcdca947107a33d2f.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-14 - Game items...
## Header Data
From: Hal \<74076.1041@CompuServe.COM\><br>
To: CYPHERPUNKS \<CYPHERPUNKS@TOAD.COM\><br>
Message Hash: 2f6d5e1afd06d6ab7efd62ee0ef4f4e446d648d9648b1a1bcdca947107a33d2f<br>
Message ID: \<921014151922_74076.1041_DHJ62-1@CompuServe.COM\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-14 15:27:57 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Wed, 14 Oct 92 08:27:57 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Wed, 14 Oct 92 08:27:57 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@TOAD.COM>
Subject: Game items...
Message-ID: <921014151922_74076.1041_DHJ62-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
I'm trying to think in terms of things which were illegal but
which have good moral connotations today.
Crosses and other Christian symbols were supposedly outlawed
during the Roman empire (leading to the adoption of the fish
as a symbol of Christianity). Posing as early Christians smuggling
crosses ought to make the right-wingers happy!
Abolitionists had to smuggle runaway slaves out of the South
on the so-called "underground railroad". Perhaps cryptography
would have helped them coordinate their efforts.
Much of the support in the U.S. for freedom and privacy comes from
our revolutionary heritage. I'm embarrassed at how little I can
recall of what things were restricted in those pre-revolutionary
days. I recall the Stamp Act and a few other laws, and I imagine
that seditious materials were restricted. Perhaps the game players
could be early revolutionaries trading items forbidden under British
rule.
Hal Finney - 74076.1041@Compuserve.Com
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
mQCNAiqsNkwAAAEEAMKWM52m5EWi0ocK4u1cC2PPyHT6tavk9PC3TB5XBYDegf3d
sldRpnjJj1r+aO08FFO+QLEI9wtBqvf1PPP5iLX7sD2uIVlJH14MPtyVtjm9ZKb8
JMtCW74045BgtHBC9yQ3V7vXNV5jM6dE2ocnH4AI/pBFrGLJPKgTA69YIUw3AAUR
tCZIYWwgRmlubmV5IDw3NDA3Ni4xMDQxQGNvbXB1c2VydmUuY29tPokAlQIFECqu
M1Tidd4O/2f3CwEByrUD/3uoV2y+Fuicrrd2oDawgOw9Ejcx6E+Ty9PVPqKvflLs
0zYyGfeFVSgBbTSDP3X91N3F68nydl9J9VA6QRCGelHM1cZRukCJ0AYbKYfpwUN0
xjEGHsDrd2gT5iWlB3vBZvi+6Ybs4rSq+gyZzVm1/+oRrMen32fz2r0CLgUtHok2
=fF6Z
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-14 (Wed, 14 Oct 92 08:27:57 PDT) - Game items... - _Hal \<74076.1041@CompuServe.COM\>_

104
_emails/1992/10/2ff29505951a381077a03c5daef44ec830ba5b90cf48eb6abe31bc094aeaee28.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-21 - Keystone
## Header Data
From: Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 2ff29505951a381077a03c5daef44ec830ba5b90cf48eb6abe31bc094aeaee28<br>
Message ID: \<9210211643.AA11195@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
Reply To: \<9210201753.AA009kv@fnordbox.UUCP\><br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-21 16:43:25 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Wed, 21 Oct 92 09:43:25 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Wed, 21 Oct 92 09:43:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Keystone
In-Reply-To: <9210201753.AA009kv@fnordbox.UUCP>
Message-ID: <9210211643.AA11195@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Eric:
>:I would be hesitant to implement a system that _only_ required a user
>:to generate a key pair.
Loyd:
>I take the opposite view -- I dare *not* supply such a system.
[...]
>But many users do not have the interest/time/ability to set up PGP on their
>home system. For them, I want to provide the best possible privacy given the
>ease with which anyone who can find their local LMOS can tap (voice or data)
>a line...
Where is the key pair generated? It must be on the BBS since your
user may not have PGP running. The private key isn't private! The
work to do public key encryption in the first place is hardly valuable
if the owner of the private key doesn't hold it.
If you just want inter-BBS privacy, why not set up each BBS with a PGP
key pair, and use that for transfering messages? There's not much
difference in security. A monitoring sysop would be able to read all
the traffic originating on that board in either system. The
difference is that such a monitoring sysop would not be able to read
replies. Why? Because the private keys are kept on the originating
board.
But it sounds as though you're trying to prevent against external
monitoring and that you trust your sysops. In this case there is no
advantage to issuing keys to individuals; it's just not worth the
effort.
Loyd:
>I don't have my user's terminal program -- I *do* have the bbs software.
This is the unfortunate fact of the situation, I acknowledge. But do
you know what terminal programs are in the most common use? I suspect
most of this stuff could be done with script programming in the
various terminal packages.
Do you know, in aggregate, how many users of each terminal program you
have? You can poll your users to find out. You'll need this data to
allocate your effort.
And you've got lots of people willing to help, even if they can't
because they are working on other projects. Everyone on this list,
for example. Let me repeat, for those of you who did not previously
know you were willing to help. Everyone on this list should be
willing to help Loyd write scripts for his users to use PGP.
Cypherpunks write code.
This will mean someone who knows Procomm, Crosstalk, Qmodem, Telix,
etc. for the PC, someone who knows the various Mac, Amiga, Atari, and
other machines. This will mean someone to write nice pretty visual
interfaces for PGP to put all the PGP options on menus where they are
all visible. This will mean people to think about BBS/terminal
protocols. This will mean lots of individual contributions, no single
of which need be large, but whose sum will be.
Eric
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-20 (Tue, 20 Oct 92 14:43:30 PDT) - [Re: Keystone](/years/1992/10/503c3b8d260c9d277fec543d1511e53afe6d139974194bbc24df6f7f32462d72) - _fnordbox!loydb@cs.utexas.edu (Loyd Blankenship)_
+ 1992-10-21 (Wed, 21 Oct 92 09:43:25 PDT) - Keystone - _Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\>_

72
_emails/1992/10/30f312069f952f339e3cbab3214d8960f76615d1d3a492b081fc86cbba3080d9.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-31 - re: Why I Don't Use PGP...
## Header Data
From: Tom.Jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (Tom Jennings)<br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 30f312069f952f339e3cbab3214d8960f76615d1d3a492b081fc86cbba3080d9<br>
Message ID: \<3400.2AF2EC7B@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-31 20:31:32 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Sat, 31 Oct 92 13:31:32 PPE<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: Tom.Jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (Tom Jennings)
Date: Sat, 31 Oct 92 13:31:32 PPE
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: re: Why I Don't Use PGP...
Message-ID: <3400.2AF2EC7B@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
U> From: 74076.1041@CompuServe.COM (Hal)
U> The best way to integrate PGP into other software is a
U> tough
U> question. There are so many different ways in which
U> people read and send mail.
U> don't know which programs can do this. A lot of Unix
U> programs can, like VI and EMACS, but I don't know about
U> PC's or other home machines. PGP has a filter mode which
Not to brag, but my offline-reader (DOS version of a 'read news'
program), as well as at least one other I know of, does a pretty good
job of this. It handles the decrypted plaintext reasonably securely
too. It does the decryption locally. (You have to manage your own
keyrings externally, though of course keys embedded in messages are
handled OK.)
Solutions are out there.
--- ReadMail
* Origin: tomj@fidosw.fidonet.org / World Power Systems (1:125/111)
--
Tom Jennings - via FidoNet node 1:125/555
UUCP: ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!111!Tom.Jennings
INTERNET: Tom.Jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-31 (Sat, 31 Oct 92 13:31:32 PPE) - re: Why I Don't Use PGP... - _Tom.Jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (Tom Jennings)_
+ 1992-10-31 (Sat, 31 Oct 92 13:45:38 PPE) - [re: Why I Don't Use PGP...](/years/1992/10/f487615e36c2f4deaf5a01fa4e159c3bf63ecc93a3423ead808d29f2a0350da3) - _tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)_

53
_emails/1992/10/310aa141e3533fdd3670d2879114cb218dcb9d99e646a6311ff8bbfa97206b48.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-10 - re: Better directions to the meeting on Saturday at noon
## Header Data
From: Tom.Jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (Tom Jennings)<br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 310aa141e3533fdd3670d2879114cb218dcb9d99e646a6311ff8bbfa97206b48<br>
Message ID: \<2889.2AD73B41@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-10 20:15:11 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Sat, 10 Oct 92 13:15:11 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: Tom.Jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (Tom Jennings)
Date: Sat, 10 Oct 92 13:15:11 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: re: Better directions to the meeting on Saturday at noon
Message-ID: <2889.2AD73B41@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Things are not good here. I have to stay and deal with my best friend
Deke who seems to be going nuts. (It's not a new story, but it heated
up last night.) Now, at 1pm, I've gotta stay here another hour or so,
and be back by 630, so I guess I'm gonna have to miss another. I'll
see you all elsewhen (to borrow a Hugh-ism).
* Origin: World Power Systems / FidoNews / San Francisco CA (1:125/111)
--
Tom Jennings - via FidoNet node 1:125/555
UUCP: ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!111!Tom.Jennings
INTERNET: Tom.Jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-10 (Sat, 10 Oct 92 13:15:11 PDT) - re: Better directions to the meeting on Saturday at noon - _Tom.Jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (Tom Jennings)_

52
_emails/1992/10/3128a7c4ccd184baf0476e40998c112d09c1af9fe04ab6f4bd40b1b8d7a5207a.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-26 - Re: Registering Keys with Big Brother
## Header Data
From: efrem@spitha.informix.com (Efrem Lipkin)<br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 3128a7c4ccd184baf0476e40998c112d09c1af9fe04ab6f4bd40b1b8d7a5207a<br>
Message ID: \<9210261016.AA15135@spitha.informix.com\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-26 10:52:20 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Mon, 26 Oct 92 03:52:20 PPE<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: efrem@spitha.informix.com (Efrem Lipkin)
Date: Mon, 26 Oct 92 03:52:20 PPE
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Registering Keys with Big Brother
Message-ID: <9210261016.AA15135@spitha.informix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
It seems that registration would defeat the advantage
of a public key system, but it would not prevent private
encrypted messages from being hidden from casual traffic
analysis or even notice by public key wrapping.
This would make registration rather useless against a
conspiracy and thus hard to justify in the face of commercial
and constitutional opposition.
--efrem
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-26 (Mon, 26 Oct 92 03:52:20 PPE) - Re: Registering Keys with Big Brother - _efrem@spitha.informix.com (Efrem Lipkin)_
+ 1992-10-26 (Mon, 26 Oct 92 09:40:33 PPE) - [Registering Keys with Big Brother](/years/1992/10/c42d2d0187951763f35a791c544b34c096c6e0d58664eb4dc74d2729d6257648) - _Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\>_

55
_emails/1992/10/325a35fb9d7b76f703a824d2a599c2fc66875ad4fc6d75213b20337b577a174e.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-20 - Re: More private PGP...?
## Header Data
From: George A. Gleason \<gg@well.sf.ca.us\><br>
To: nobody@soda.berkeley.edu<br>
Message Hash: 325a35fb9d7b76f703a824d2a599c2fc66875ad4fc6d75213b20337b577a174e<br>
Message ID: \<199210200915.AA27714@well.sf.ca.us\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-20 09:16:09 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Tue, 20 Oct 92 02:16:09 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: George A. Gleason <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Tue, 20 Oct 92 02:16:09 PDT
To: nobody@soda.berkeley.edu
Subject: Re: More private PGP...?
Message-ID: <199210200915.AA27714@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Hal, I think those would be vry useful. Now of course, we don't want to
advocate that radio users in the United States do anything like sending
ciphertext over the airwaves, but we might want to develop something that we
can ship to the Gusanos who want to take Cuba back for the Mafia, or maybe
in a better vein, something that the Tien-an-men kids can use when
overthrowing the Commies in China.
Good ideas about message headers. Since the source code for PGP is widely
available, it would seem a straightforward matter to alter the program to
include the new features.
What I'd really like also is a Mac version....
-gg
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-20 (Tue, 20 Oct 92 02:16:09 PDT) - Re: More private PGP...? - _George A. Gleason \<gg@well.sf.ca.us\>_

50
_emails/1992/10/34602500d479303d1a7a304cabde762a9624b8b46feca41333e5d7a3bc26d4f9.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-25 - pgp key distribution
## Header Data
From: shawnb \<shawnb@ecst.csuchico.edu\><br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 34602500d479303d1a7a304cabde762a9624b8b46feca41333e5d7a3bc26d4f9<br>
Message ID: \<9210250333.AA11925@toad.com\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-25 03:33:12 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Sat, 24 Oct 92 20:33:12 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: shawnb <shawnb@ecst.csuchico.edu>
Date: Sat, 24 Oct 92 20:33:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: pgp key distribution
Message-ID: <9210250333.AA11925@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
I'm pretty new to this mailing list, so something along these lines may
have already been proposed, but I was considering the possibility of
putting together a list of pgp public keys for distribution through this
list. My own collection of keys is pretty small, and I would pernally
like to expand this, but I think this would provide a great service to the
group as well. Let me know what you all think.
Shawn
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-25 (Sat, 24 Oct 92 20:33:12 PDT) - pgp key distribution - _shawnb \<shawnb@ecst.csuchico.edu\>_
+ 1992-10-25 (Sat, 24 Oct 92 20:54:34 PDT) - [Re: pgp key distribution](/years/1992/10/8848ce1351a4a5cbb0fed3d61c2af59d18118d66c467fc4a93e9b9b4c9f36503) - _Peter Shipley \<shipley@tfs.COM\>_

58
_emails/1992/10/35579c9de2cb0cbf5765897a6665b3bccfcfd2b6b524607768adfb798bcdd72a.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-11 - [gg@well.sf.ca.us: Re: +-=*^]
## Header Data
From: d9mj@crux2.cit.cornell.edu<br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 35579c9de2cb0cbf5765897a6665b3bccfcfd2b6b524607768adfb798bcdd72a<br>
Message ID: \<9210110102.AA21921@crux1.cit.cornell.edu\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-11 00:55:26 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Sat, 10 Oct 92 17:55:26 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: d9mj@crux2.cit.cornell.edu
Date: Sat, 10 Oct 92 17:55:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: [gg@well.sf.ca.us: Re: +-=*^]
Message-ID: <9210110102.AA21921@crux1.cit.cornell.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Look at what my mailer did to your header. Is this a result of your
perl script or my screwed router?
Date: Sat, 10 Oct 1992 05:06:40 -0400
Illegal-Object: Syntax error in From: address found on router.mail.cornell.edu:
From: George A.Gleason <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
^ ^-illegal period in phrase
\-phrases containing '.' must be quoted
X-Ph: V3.12@router.mail.cornell.edu
>From: <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
To: Secret_Squirrel@treehouse.com, shipley@tfs.COM
Subject: Re: +-=*^
Cc: cypherpunks@toad.com
[message deleted]
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-11 (Sat, 10 Oct 92 17:55:26 PDT) - [gg@well.sf.ca.us: Re: +-=*^] - _d9mj@crux2.cit.cornell.edu_
+ 1992-10-11 (Sun, 11 Oct 92 11:52:09 PDT) - [[gg@well.sf.ca.us: Re: +-=*^]](/years/1992/10/7fbcfff145a8eea8bdd67a992755fc3e470eb037dc849602e09bc070154828ff) - _Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\>_

59
_emails/1992/10/372c96cffd382696c685f18f23b0868ec033ccb4cd1e33b39fcededb8cc5f91d.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-26 - entropy
## Header Data
From: Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 372c96cffd382696c685f18f23b0868ec033ccb4cd1e33b39fcededb8cc5f91d<br>
Message ID: \<9210261653.AA13072@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
Reply To: \<921024155350_74076.1041_DHJ67-1@CompuServe.COM\><br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-26 16:53:38 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Mon, 26 Oct 92 09:53:38 PPE<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Mon, 26 Oct 92 09:53:38 PPE
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: entropy
In-Reply-To: <921024155350_74076.1041_DHJ67-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9210261653.AA13072@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Hal:
>Ascii encoding used by PGP reduces this to 6 bits per character
>(e.g. a character set with 64 printable characters) neglecting
>line separators and message beginnings and endings. So there
>should be a little less than 6 bits per character for encrypted,
>Ascii-encoded messages.
Hal is, of course, right. I was getting myself confused between
entropy lost in the encoding and the entropy of the encoding. The
channel uses up two bits of entropy per character in the encoding.
What's left is six bits.
As punishment for getting this so egregiously wrong, I'm going to post
some C code for measuring entropy so that you all can play with it.
Eric
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-24 (Sat, 24 Oct 92 09:02:41 PDT) - [Multiple messages + entropy](/years/1992/10/0eec0ebc8ca754a17d7524fa51a07b6557113dffeb3bd13e9f3da940001c47f9) - _Hal \<74076.1041@CompuServe.COM\>_
+ 1992-10-26 (Mon, 26 Oct 92 09:53:38 PPE) - entropy - _Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\>_

194
_emails/1992/10/3843b9127a4b6cfaa8d420adae4a43519a8821bfa7898172b6f162b3bdaca046.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-14 - Some (Pseudo)Random Thoughts
## Header Data
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)<br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 3843b9127a4b6cfaa8d420adae4a43519a8821bfa7898172b6f162b3bdaca046<br>
Message ID: \<9210141805.AA04539@netcom2.netcom.com\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-14 18:06:29 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Wed, 14 Oct 92 11:06:29 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 14 Oct 92 11:06:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Some (Pseudo)Random Thoughts
Message-ID: <9210141805.AA04539@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Some thoughts on the recent meetings and what we're doing:
1. The importance of trading physical goods in the Crypto Anarchy
Game.
This, in my view, has been given undue and misleading importance.
Physical goods are inherently easy to trace through remailers (via
sniffers, radioactive tracers, weight of packages, and many other
physical cues), are hard to store physically (imagine getting 100
parcels for later remailing), and, most importantly, have none of the
"envelope within envelope within...." protection accorded to the bits
of a cryptographic remailing, or DC-Net, system! The elegance of
cryptographic protocols is lost with physical goods.
Furthermore, physical delivery of any good, whether drugs, stolen
missile components, antiquities and art items, whatever, is
fundamentally a hard problem to solve...smugglers and thieves have
been dealing this since the beginning of time. Stings can be easily
arranged, delivery is not anonymous (one merely watches who takes
delivery, or who opens a train station locker, etc....this is all SOP
for narcs and counterespionage types), and a raid on a remailing
entity will result in confiscation of the physical goods and (likely)
prosecution of those caught holding the stuff. (Raiding a bit
remailing entity produces only random-appearing bits...granted, the
authorities may well outlaw bit remailing, or use the RICO and
conspiracy/sedition laws to prosecute, but that's another topic.)
Our recent emphasis on physical goods, and all the ideas pouring in on
what other kinds of "contraband" besides drugs can be used, is
misleading. None of the richness of the cryptographic world is
faithfully preserved. I urge we get back to our roots and deal only
with things that can be expressed purely in bit form.
2. The "colonization of cyberspace" does not mean there is no
interaction with the physical world, of course. But that interaction
can be mediated with money made by converting information or digital
money into physical money. Several methods for this conversion path
can be considered:
-Alice sells information in the cyberspace domain for the equivalent
of, say, $30,000. She converts this to "real" dollars by using an
escrow entity which hold both sides of the transaction until it's
completed. They then mail the information to the purchaser and send an
ordinary check "for services rendered" to Alice for $30K. She reports
it on her taxes, probably as a "consulting fee" (for which essentially
no government supervision currently exists, nor is likely to....), and
the conversion has taken place. (Note: there are still elements of
trust involved, notably involving the escrow agent, but trust works
pretty well for many things, especially when reputations are at
stake. Understanding how real businesses depend on reputations is a
missing part of modern cryptology analyses of transactions...the
protocol analyzers and number theorists almost never take into account
how reputations work in the real world, But I digress.)
-Alice and Bob trade information such that Bob gets the information
worth about $30K, as above, and Alice gets another piece of
information she can use in the "real world" that is worth about $30K.
This might be stock tips, or, better, information she can turn around
and sell in the "open market" of a service like AMIX! There are lots
of wrinkles, inefficiencies, etc., to be worked out.
-And then there is digital money. You all know about this, or should.
David Chaum, DigiCash, blinded notes, credentials, etc. The handout
for the first meeting had a glossary of terms. (IMHO, we should be
spending more of our time at our meeting discussing this, and less in
playing more interations of the Game.)
The fascinating novel "Snow Crash," by Neil Stephenson, makes a
mistake in having Hiro Protagonist a very wealthy man in the Metaverse
(Stephenson's term for the virtual reality cyberspace) but a very poor
man in the Real World. Information _is_ money. Information is liquid,
flows across borders, and is generally convertible into real money.
(One simple conversion strategy, alluded to above, is for Alice to
sell her information for, say, $500K, and then to receive a
"consulting contract," perhaps called a "retainer," of $50K a year for
the next 20 years. Her retainer is fully legal, is perhaps handled
through cut-outs who specialize in this kind of thing, and is a
low-risk way to "launder" money from cyberspace into the real world. I
have a lot more to say on these schemes, perhaps later.)
3. Are we emphasizing "The Game" too much?
If the goal is to produce a paper-based game, similar to "Monopoly" or
fantasy role-playing games, then I suppose more practice is needed.
But I'm not sure how worthwhile it is to try to design such a game.
(Those who wish to should do so, then commercialize it, and become the
Avalon Hill of crypto games!)
If the goal is educational, for newly interested folks, then I also
question how much more effort should be put into it. The ideas of
anonymous remailers, of digital money, etc., are, I think, gotten
across in the first 60 minutes of the game, especially if some of the
formalism is first explained (as it was at the first game, where
digital mixes, tamper-resistand modules for implementing mixes, the
"Dining Cryptographers Protocol," and digital money had all been
freshly covered, so participants were putting the theory to test).
I found the first game was instructive, the second much less so (and
_not_ because of the focus on drug selling...that was a relatively
minor issue). My impression is that many of the newcomers--and they
should jump in here with their own reactions (too bad we don't have
hypertext links!)--didn't really know how remailing mixes work, how
digital psueodnyms can protect privacy in transactions, and how the
"Game" was intended to exercise these concepts.
4. We need to talk about the charter or purpose of the "Cypherpunks"
or "Cryptology Amateurs for Social Irresponsibility" (CASI--Eric
Hughes's term) group.
-Is it mostly educational?
-Is it a lobbying group, as are EFF, CPSR, and the like?
-Is it to produce remailers, digital money, and other programming?
-Is it subversive?
Now clearly we can't say it's subversive (any bets on who's gatewaying
these messages to Other Listeners?). But we also don't want to skew
things toward "YALG" (Yet Another Lobbying Group), nor do we want to
be a spoon-feeding educational group for people with a casual (and
transient) interest in crypto stuff.
5. There have have been several messages so far about worries about
the legal implications of these topics, about how some
corporate-affiliated subscribers will desubscribe "real fast" if
certain discussion trends continue, and so on. Now we can't please
everybody, but maybe we ought to talk about this sensitive issue soon,
and _in person_.
Since it relates to our charter, Point 4 above, I recommend we do this
at our next meeting. I'd favor that over another iteration of the
Game.
In conclusion, we are in at the beginning of Something Big. While I'm
somewhat skeptical about the claims for things like nanotech, I see
this whole cyberspace/cryptology/digital money/transnationalism ball of
wax being _much_ easier to implement. Networks are multiplying beyond
any hope of government control, bandwidths are skyrocketing, CPUs are
putting awesome power on our desktops, PGP is generating incredible
interest, and social trends are making the time right for crypto
anarchy.
I look forward to hearing your views.
--
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay@netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | PGP 2.0 and MailSafe keys by arrangement.
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-14 (Wed, 14 Oct 92 11:06:29 PDT) - Some (Pseudo)Random Thoughts - _tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)_

150
_emails/1992/10/38fbbe375ba50d24f74e7a2036b91a85401f68ccf280d843e3d6930e6634d353.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-26 - (fwd) A Trial Balloon to Ban Encryption?
## Header Data
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)<br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 38fbbe375ba50d24f74e7a2036b91a85401f68ccf280d843e3d6930e6634d353<br>
Message ID: \<9210261819.AA07688@netcom2.netcom.com\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-26 18:22:35 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Mon, 26 Oct 92 11:22:35 PPE<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Mon, 26 Oct 92 11:22:35 PPE
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: (fwd) A Trial Balloon to Ban Encryption?
Message-ID: <9210261819.AA07688@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Fellow Cypherpunks,
I have rewritten my posting on Denning's proposal and posted it to
sci.crypt, for wider discussion. I'm surprised the sci.crypt folks had
not already the significance. You might want to consider debating the
issue there, rather than on this list, as your words will then be
heard by more folks and could mobilize an effort against proposal like
this one of Denning's.
Cryptically your,
--Tim
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Path: netcom.com!tcmay
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: A Trial Balloon to Ban Encryption?
Message-ID: <1992Oct26.180813.7002@netcom.com>
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest)
X-Newsreader: Tin 1.1 PL5
Date: Mon, 26 Oct 1992 18:08:13 GMT
Is there a trial balloon being floated to effectively ban encryption?
Noted and influential influential crypto advisor Dorothy Denning has
apparently floated the idea of _public key registration_ in a paper or
talk at the 15th Computer Security Conference in Baltimore, held
recently. Discussion of this is in comp.risks ("RISKS"), so far, but
certainly belongs in this group.
I posted a summary of this position to a private mailing list devoted
to crypto issues and got a huge response of concerned folks. I don't
understand why this is not a hot topic on sci.crypt, so I'll post
something right now.
Here's my understanding of her proposal:
* Anyone using public key cryptography would be required to register
the private key with the appropriate authorities, for example, the
Justice Department.
* To head off the obvious concerns about the government routinely
reading e-mail, financial dealings, etc., this registered key would be
stored at an independent agency after first being encrypted with the
_public key_ of Justice. (That is, the independent key storage agency
would have an unusable key, so _they_ couldn't use it themselves.)
* To obtain a usable form of the private key, Justice would have to
get a valid court order, go to the independent storage agency, present
the order, pick up the key, open it with their own _private key_, and
proceed to open mail, read communications, etc.
This is ostensibly the procedure now used for wiretaps.
But the effect on encryption would be chilling:
-would greatly complicate the rapid changing of keys
-would probably be a way to get "unlicensed" crypto programs off the
market (e.g., don't think about using PGP 2.0, as the key registration
authorities would either insist on another algorithm, or would send
the "registration application" to, for example, RSA Data Security for
legal action)
-would undoubtedly require a "fee" (like a driver's license)
-would interfere with the use of digital pseudonyms, anonymous nets (a
la Chaum's "DC Net" proposal, which some of us are exploring now), and
digital money
-would establish the precedent that private communications are not
legal, that copies of all private communications must be placed in
escrow with the government
Registering keys is no different than, for example, requiring a permit
for every public utterance or for registering typewriters, modems,
computers, fax machines, and copiers. Or banning the use of sealed
envelopes for mail. In Phil Zimmerman's great words, it would be like
requiring all mail to be sent on postcards.
My suspicion, which Prof. Denning will presumably comment on if she's
reading this, is that the government folks have come to understand the
profound implications of modern crypto and are looking for approaches
to head off the coming sea changes. Granted, there are serious
national security threats in using modern crypto methods, but there
are in any of the new technologies, such as those listed above.
Besides, does anyone think all keys will be registered? Hiding bits is
a relatively easy thing to do.
This key registration proposal is more odious than the "backdoors in
telecom equipment" proposal discussed here recently.
Can we remain silent as our liberties are taken away?
I think it was John Gilmore who said: "If encryption is outlawed, only
outlaws will have encryption."
--
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay@netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | PGP 2.0 and MailSafe keys by arrangement.
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-26 (Mon, 26 Oct 92 11:22:35 PPE) - (fwd) A Trial Balloon to Ban Encryption? - _tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)_
+ 1992-10-27 (Tue, 27 Oct 92 02:08:56 PPE) - [Re: A Trial Balloon to Ban Encryption?](/years/1992/10/26b81383c805929e3c002c3f7836848983275fee0cf94a079d7717bfd346d887) - _gnu_

74
_emails/1992/10/39a4d88ae35f5601244d259d0f691e6b2c8ec39aab73c9c220c99654fea8fa60.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-09 - re: +-=*^
## Header Data
From: Tom.Jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (Tom Jennings)<br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 39a4d88ae35f5601244d259d0f691e6b2c8ec39aab73c9c220c99654fea8fa60<br>
Message ID: \<2747.2AD5CD4D@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-09 18:13:54 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Fri, 9 Oct 92 11:13:54 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: Tom.Jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (Tom Jennings)
Date: Fri, 9 Oct 92 11:13:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: re: +-=*^
Message-ID: <2747.2AD5CD4D@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
U> re: problem with key distribution; right, OK, I hadn't
U> thought that there might be a security problem with
U> casually giving someone your key without them being able
U> to authenticate that it came from you. Good point.
But as Eric pointed out, and I realized later, the underlying social
structure will allow detection of bum keys (presuming the scammed
person or someone s/he knows notices, etc, and so on, a wholew world
resides here...)
U> Here's my public key. If you feel it is not secure
U> enough, we can always use the cone of silence:
U>
U> -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
U> Version: 2.0
U>
U>
U> 23l1t34u
U> -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Now I feel very unsecure, because the above is all I got. It ain't no
public key...
PS: Too much anonymity? I have to reply in hte mailing list to this
person cuz it's a faked From... (trust me)
* Origin: World Power Systems / FidoNews / San Francisco CA (1:125/111)
--
Tom Jennings - via FidoNet node 1:125/555
UUCP: ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!111!Tom.Jennings
INTERNET: Tom.Jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-09 (Fri, 9 Oct 92 11:13:54 PDT) - re: +-=*^ - _Tom.Jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (Tom Jennings)_

66
_emails/1992/10/3c38d48ebe6788447fca198f92d44a9ffa68121b79032804da9a7944dc97d602.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-24 - entropy measures
## Header Data
From: Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 3c38d48ebe6788447fca198f92d44a9ffa68121b79032804da9a7944dc97d602<br>
Message ID: \<9210240620.AA08036@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
Reply To: \<9210231641.AA11868@xanadu.xanadu.com\><br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-24 06:20:44 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Fri, 23 Oct 92 23:20:44 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Fri, 23 Oct 92 23:20:44 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: entropy measures
In-Reply-To: <9210231641.AA11868@xanadu.xanadu.com>
Message-ID: <9210240620.AA08036@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Dean:
>Where does uuencoded [compressed] binary lie? I would suspect it lies
>right around where encrypted text is.
Right.
>Presumably straight encrypted
>text is statistically random [7..8], but that when you encrypt to
>just the ascii subset is when you lose the entropy.
Exactly.
uuencoding will have a slightly lower single-character entropy than
the ASCII armor PGP uses because just about every line begins with the
letter 'M'. This will skew the distribution slightly. But a better
way of distinguishing uuencoding and ascii armor is to see that in
falls in the same entropy class, and then just looking at the
alphabetic subsets used.
Eric
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-22 (Thu, 22 Oct 92 09:25:56 PDT) - [BBS E-mail policy](/years/1992/10/8a24672636a42d5225524b26c5cc78e1b0ba1b62a4c1e1fe1825463951a6b9e0) - _omega@spica.bu.edu (The Omega)_
+ 1992-10-23 (Thu, 22 Oct 92 23:02:09 PDT) - [BBS E-mail policy](/years/1992/10/bc5b354247141e46df2c768591ee1dffd7fbc017a03b959da779cf82e2521133) - _Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\>_
+ 1992-10-23 (Fri, 23 Oct 92 14:42:19 PDT) - [BBS E-mail policy Now see if this number is in one of the following ranges:](/years/1992/10/298d86c630be7b06958a77a0e2a93e61224cded16c21ee64acb6bc0f39e9ecfd) - _tribble@xanadu.com (E. Dean Tribble)_
+ 1992-10-24 (Fri, 23 Oct 92 23:20:44 PDT) - entropy measures - _Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\>_
+ 1992-10-26 (Sun, 25 Oct 92 21:41:19 PPE) - [Re: entropy measures](/years/1992/10/b71072e5de22f0ee2513a7bc057b82b39ad7284a70bf4913906340f5c39b27b3) - _Eric Hollander \<hh@soda.berkeley.edu\>_

110
_emails/1992/10/3e1735e0a8e172c942c2f35d934ddf647ef5c97007e6978b2e39a8506dc6808b.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-17 - Keystone
## Header Data
From: Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 3e1735e0a8e172c942c2f35d934ddf647ef5c97007e6978b2e39a8506dc6808b<br>
Message ID: \<9210172209.AA29900@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
Reply To: \<9210170556.AA009js@fnordbox.UUCP\><br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-17 22:10:14 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Sat, 17 Oct 92 15:10:14 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sat, 17 Oct 92 15:10:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Keystone
In-Reply-To: <9210170556.AA009js@fnordbox.UUCP>
Message-ID: <9210172209.AA29900@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
First, let me congratulate Loyd and the others involved with Keystone
for working towards the creation of a local distribution mechanism for
keys.
Every city in the U.S. needs something like this. If it's not
happening in your area, start it. Start by getting PGP and making your
own key. Then exchange keys with people you know.
We have members of the list in many parts of the U.S., Canada, and
Europe. There's plenty of work to do. Look around. If no one else
is doing this, you should.
>Ideally, you would be able to send RSA-encrypted email from any bbs
>on any of the local nets to any other bbs -- even if all you know is
>the destination address. We're going to do this by attempting to make
>the bbs PGP-friendly. All the user has to do is generate a key pair.
There are, roughly speaking, two kinds of privacy; one is provided,
and one is defended. Provided privacy is unstable, since the person
using the privacy does not create it. Defended privacy is stable,
because those who want privacy create it themselves to the level at
which they want it. Both systems do provide privacy, no mistake.
I would be hesitant to implement a system that _only_ required a user
to generate a key pair. This, for the users, is too much provided
privacy. It will not teach the users how privacy really works, nor
will it give them any good idea how their privacy is being maintained.
Defended privacy does not need to be difficult. I would spend effort,
instead of modifying BBS software, to make it easier for users to
handle encrypted email with their own terminal programs.
Now, any privacy is better than none. I don't really know if it is
easier to modify your BBS or your modem program. But all other things
being equal, make it easier for users to maintain their own privacy.
>[...] a master keyring that will be regularly distributed via a
>trusted system to other nodes in town.
Again, trusted systems can turn into provided privacy. If there is a
distributed solution you can think up, use it.
>The first [weak link, line security] is almost insurmountable --
>unless the user takes the time to d/l a complete copy of PGP and the
>Austin Keystone Keyring and encrypt the mail on their home system.
This should not be such an onerous task. It might be now, but that
can change. Finding ways for users to manage keys, to get keys, and
to look up keys are all interesting and useful problems to solve.
Every user should encrypt outgoing mail on the home system before it
leaves and decrypt incoming mail on the home system after it arrives.
If this is not easy, it should be made easy.
Not every user need have the complete directory on their own system.
They merely need a way to communicate with those that they want to.
This probably means a directory service, where people can download
keys for the people they want to communicate with. Moving around a
complete directory does not scale well.
As far as BBS support, if I want to respond to someone and I don't
have the corresponding key, I should be able to initiate a zmodem
transfer of that key relatively easily, for instance without leaving
the discussion area to go to a download area.
Eric
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-17 (Sat, 17 Oct 92 07:16:32 PDT) - [Intro & Keystone](/years/1992/10/bfb3ed37d92a8d3b2b0087d4c8b9ae40db038981b9f15d89ec0bcbd2e2e7ed6d) - _fnordbox!loydb@cs.utexas.edu (Loyd Blankenship)_
+ 1992-10-17 (Sat, 17 Oct 92 15:10:14 PDT) - Keystone - _Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\>_

79
_emails/1992/10/3fd0e544238de7181d76d863b77743d4ae1d3dc88e4eaee330999abcb62314cc.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-06 - re: Nuts & Acorns
## Header Data
From: Tom.Jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (Tom Jennings)<br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 3fd0e544238de7181d76d863b77743d4ae1d3dc88e4eaee330999abcb62314cc<br>
Message ID: \<2654.2AD20C59@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-06 22:11:44 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Tue, 6 Oct 92 15:11:44 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: Tom.Jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (Tom Jennings)
Date: Tue, 6 Oct 92 15:11:44 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: re: Nuts & Acorns
Message-ID: <2654.2AD20C59@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
> To: Tom Jennings
tj>>
I am considering becoming and "introducer" for parts of FidoNet. I
can't seem to get past the problems of how to assign reliability to
public keys I receive over an unsecured email channel to begin with.
No other method is practical.
<<
>>??
Huh? I don't understand what you're pointing out. If I send you my
public key -- even if I cc: dockmaster -- what does it matter that the
NSA knows my public key (unoless they want to send me msgs, too)?
<<
Not my worry. What I meant was, how do I know htat the keyfile I
received from "John Smith @ net address" really is his, and not some
faker. Short of physically getting key disks from someone face to
face (flatly im-possible here), I don't know.
The assurance of course is the social system: if someone sends me a
message and keyfile, "here's my file, my name is Eric Hughes", and I
distribute it...
I can think of no way to prevent this, other than let a social system
detect and repair -- "HEY THATS NOT ME!!!" form the 'real' you would
raise a flag... and an audit trail at the introducers site
(dangerous...!) might help.
Anyhoo, that's what I meant.
--- RM version 0.-1 (watch out)
--
Tom Jennings - via FidoNet node 1:125/555
UUCP: ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!111!Tom.Jennings
INTERNET: Tom.Jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-06 (Tue, 6 Oct 92 15:11:44 PDT) - re: Nuts & Acorns - _Tom.Jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (Tom Jennings)_
+ 1992-10-06 (Tue, 6 Oct 92 15:59:23 PDT) - [Nuts & Acorns](/years/1992/10/b106cdc1eb583bff16fa9268f26e98be158ce990a6bbf7894c7c2074f047ea51) - _pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)_
+ 1992-10-07 (Tue, 6 Oct 92 17:44:27 PDT) - [Nuts & Acorns](/years/1992/10/f15e5fceb881331d0abfe3e479ccbe1aaa0955f01737edfcbcb97a68f27288e8) - _tribble@xanadu.com_

60
_emails/1992/10/40122c10b02d8f98f7843b615af9824d0e08ae642020e324118791616e8d211a.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-27 - Re: Registering Keys with Big Brother
## Header Data
From: gnu@cygnus.com<br>
To: Arthur Abraham \<a2@well.sf.ca.us\><br>
Message Hash: 40122c10b02d8f98f7843b615af9824d0e08ae642020e324118791616e8d211a<br>
Message ID: \<9210270724.AA29964@cygnus.com\><br>
Reply To: \<199210270553.AA26809@well.sf.ca.us\><br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-27 07:24:43 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Tue, 27 Oct 92 00:24:43 PPE<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: gnu@cygnus.com
Date: Tue, 27 Oct 92 00:24:43 PPE
To: Arthur Abraham <a2@well.sf.ca.us>
Subject: Re: Registering Keys with Big Brother
In-Reply-To: <199210270553.AA26809@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9210270724.AA29964@cygnus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Arthur Abrahams incisively notes:
> Seems to me that there would be a certain amount of trouble with people
> registering one private key but communicating with another they had
> forgotten to register. Bad situation for my large sibling 'cause he
> wouldn't realize this until after the court order etc. A good solution
> would be BIG fines for mis-encryption and sampling of messages...
There is no need for sampling of messages. You don't understand the
theory of power. Simply make the penalty for encryption without registry,
larger than the penalty for any other crime. Then no crime can be hidden
behind it. It's like getting Al Capone for income tax evasion; if you
investigate someone and they are enforcing privacy on their communications,
you can put them in jail for life for that, and can stop worrying about the
original suspected offense.
John
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-27 (Mon, 26 Oct 92 22:54:33 PPE) - [Re: Registering Keys with Big Brother](/years/1992/10/dcf9d115e0ad4b617fdbf127754c16f4c569db245e2713554ab65a2db0302f9c) - _Arthur Abraham \<a2@well.sf.ca.us\>_
+ 1992-10-27 (Tue, 27 Oct 92 00:24:43 PPE) - Re: Registering Keys with Big Brother - _gnu@cygnus.com_

156
_emails/1992/10/428592ad0b9a398c4644a4e59509ecf89710f218eef38258f438441f9b907320.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-09 - re: Subscribe
## Header Data
From: Tom.Jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (Tom Jennings)<br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 428592ad0b9a398c4644a4e59509ecf89710f218eef38258f438441f9b907320<br>
Message ID: \<2733.2AD49634@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-09 01:48:59 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Thu, 8 Oct 92 18:48:59 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: Tom.Jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (Tom Jennings)
Date: Thu, 8 Oct 92 18:48:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: re: Subscribe
Message-ID: <2733.2AD49634@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
My public key.
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.0
mQBNAirHIV8AAAECAOE6hyvBZUslVOgi12u6d7/6yMIXX4aKIRcfV3wa/ysHl+ul
d4agC1YW+YimYeA+/bXOBxH/Y/KRzT/tLvUlcRcABRG0MVRvbSBKZW5uaW5ncyA8
dG9takBmaWRvc3cuZmlkb25ldC5vcmcsIDE6MTI1LzExMT4=
=dADc
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
My public key ring, signed with my secret key:
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Version: 2.0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=irCz
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
* Origin: World Power Systems / FidoNews (1:125/111)
--
Tom Jennings - via FidoNet node 1:125/555
UUCP: ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!111!Tom.Jennings
INTERNET: Tom.Jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-09 (Thu, 8 Oct 92 18:48:59 PDT) - re: Subscribe - _Tom.Jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (Tom Jennings)_

53
_emails/1992/10/4449d8423a3d4ccea75be61a5bd0f1ff0f12e8a37191013726ee2d9bfc0c5fb6.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-13 - Mr. Squirrel
## Header Data
From: Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 4449d8423a3d4ccea75be61a5bd0f1ff0f12e8a37191013726ee2d9bfc0c5fb6<br>
Message ID: \<9210131856.AA29470@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
Reply To: \<9210131710.AA20497@bsu-cs.bsu.edu\><br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-13 18:49:36 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Tue, 13 Oct 92 11:49:36 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 13 Oct 92 11:49:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mr. Squirrel
In-Reply-To: <9210131710.AA20497@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Message-ID: <9210131856.AA29470@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
A signature on a message is dependent on the contents of the message;
it is not a free floating bit of information. You can't copy a
signature, therefore, without copying the message or find another
message that hashes to the same value. This is the design criterion
behind one-way functions--that you can't (feasibly) find a message
that hashes to a given value.
Eric
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-13 (Tue, 13 Oct 92 08:55:18 PDT) - [Re: Mr. Squirrel](/years/1992/10/1be047fb00ed9b8e7e62a36076bd875e747fc5da248ab50cd0ef9aff7be79589) - _Hal \<74076.1041@CompuServe.COM\>_
+ 1992-10-13 (Tue, 13 Oct 92 10:04:24 PDT) - [Re: Mr. Squirrel](/years/1992/10/fe748ec0459677318d9e9d5d0611919b35b8f6e096b4d2ede12008c07f006f28) - _nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)_
+ 1992-10-13 (Tue, 13 Oct 92 11:49:36 PDT) - Mr. Squirrel - _Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\>_

66
_emails/1992/10/454afdeccfcfc12faec4a1c95227823ccd2317215802fba5cb077de5bba38b1f.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-08 - Subscribe
## Header Data
From: whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk (Russell E. Whitaker)<br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 454afdeccfcfc12faec4a1c95227823ccd2317215802fba5cb077de5bba38b1f<br>
Message ID: \<1480@eternity.demon.co.uk\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-08 14:04:56 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Thu, 8 Oct 92 07:04:56 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk (Russell E. Whitaker)
Date: Thu, 8 Oct 92 07:04:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Subscribe
Message-ID: <1480@eternity.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
SUBSCRIBE
To human overseer: Please subscribe me to the cypherpunks list...
Thanks,
Russell Earl Whitaker whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk
Communications Editor 71750.2413@compuserve.com
EXTROPY: The Journal of Transhumanist Thought AMiX: RWHITAKER
Board member, Extropy Institute (ExI)
[.sig revised 1 October 1992 /// Send mail to eternity node]
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.0
mQCNAiqwg10AAAEEAMVNMI766ljeuW01xqXKYYV5lmDPvb+6dCQK3m1iBQdan0no
pm35j1DIRp3UJZogAe5eimsQg1TALDhTq310OZs9+L6B/HxeX3+4BadIDad4g+xI
lvaFY1Ut/hMdZNkw0tzNZOdUPiO4jYIyirReAUiMCm6jXzkTRITj7/vxxWtPAAUR
tDNSdXNzZWxsIEUuIFdoaXRha2VyIDx3aGl0YWtlckBldGVybml0eS5kZW1vbi5j
by51az4=
=LOCL
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-08 (Thu, 8 Oct 92 07:04:56 PDT) - Subscribe - _whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk (Russell E. Whitaker)_
+ 1992-10-08 (Thu, 8 Oct 92 08:41:35 PDT) - [Subscribe](/years/1992/10/4dda48fae2f6e862d1a35aa019c82ecee26503b544f80ca323cc75f6238d3c42) - _hughes (Eric Hughes)_
+ 1992-10-08 (Thu, 8 Oct 92 08:57:23 PDT) - [Subscriptions, etc.](/years/1992/10/20afd4cea4d9e2d57280c5afce0c3f16abf843ef65658c20b5cd90f7b78a1070) - _Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\>_

102
_emails/1992/10/45cba9314df0b5d366aa10e328f5e1583af274d04a9344baf485eb69ffc88689.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-10 - Better directions to the meeting on Saturday at noon
## Header Data
From: gnu@cygnus.com<br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 45cba9314df0b5d366aa10e328f5e1583af274d04a9344baf485eb69ffc88689<br>
Message ID: \<9210100950.AA28200@cygnus.com\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-10 09:43:25 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Sat, 10 Oct 92 02:43:25 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: gnu@cygnus.com
Date: Sat, 10 Oct 92 02:43:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Better directions to the meeting on Saturday at noon
Message-ID: <9210100950.AA28200@cygnus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Someone asked for better directions, and the original ones were
pretty skimpy anyway. Here's a better try.
Cygnus Support
1937 Landings Drive
Mt. View, CA 94043
There's no phone service there yet.
Take US 101 toward Mt. View. From San Francisco, it's about a
40-minute drive. Get off at the Rengstorff Ave/Amphitheatre Parkway
exit. If you were heading south on 101, you curve around to the
right, cross over the freeway, and get to a stoplight. If you were
heading north on 101, you just come right off the exit to the
stoplight. The light is the intersection of Amphitheatre and
Charleston Rd. Take a right on Charleston; there's a right-turn-only
lane.
Follow Charleston for a short distance. You'll pass the
Metaphor/Kaleida buildings on the right. At a clump of palm trees and
a "Landmark Deli" sign, you can take a right into Landings Drive; this
gets you into the complex from the north. Or you can go slightly
further along Charleston and take the next right, into a driveway with
a big "Landmark" sign in the middle. No matter which way you got into
the complex, follow around it until you are on the side that faces the
freeway. There's a clock tower that rises out of one of the
buildings, to the right (south) of the deli. Enter through the doors
immediately under the clock tower. They'll be open between noon and
1PM at least. (See below if you're late.)
Once inside, take the stairs up, immediately to your right. At the top
of the stairs, turn right past the treetops, and we'll be in 1937 on
your left.
If you are late and the door under the clock tower is locked, you can
go to the deli (which will be around a building and left, as you face
the door), cut between the buildings to the right of the deli, and
into the back lawns between the complex and the farm behind it. Walk
around the buildings until you see a satellite dish in the lawn. Go
up the stairs next to the dish, which are the back stairs into the
Cygnus office space. We'll prop the door (or you can bang on it if we
forget).
Or, you can find the guard who's wandering around the complex, who
knows there's a meeting happening and will let you in. They can be
beeped at 965 5250, though you'll have trouble finding a phone.
Don't forget to eat first, or bring food at noon! I recommend hitting
the burrito place on Rengstorff (La Costen~a) at about 11:45. To get
there, when you get off 101, take Rengstorff (toward the hills) rather
than Amphitheatre (toward the bay). Follow it about ten blocks until
the major intersection at Middlefield Road. La Costen~a is the store
on your left at the corner. You can turn left into the narrow lane
behind the store, which leads to a parking lot, and enter by the front
door, which faces the intersection. To get to the meeting from there,
just retrace your route on Rengstorff, go straight over the freeway,
and turn right at the stoplight onto Charleston; see above.
See you there!
John Gilmore
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-10 (Sat, 10 Oct 92 02:43:25 PDT) - Better directions to the meeting on Saturday at noon - _gnu@cygnus.com_

48
_emails/1992/10/469abb614c7863da4b08c8492ddedd9268dc6c9ee9e116c72675887290677963.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-09 - Re: New feature of the remailer
## Header Data
From: Peter Shipley \<shipley@tfs.COM\><br>
To: Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
Message Hash: 469abb614c7863da4b08c8492ddedd9268dc6c9ee9e116c72675887290677963<br>
Message ID: \<9210090721.AA09749@edev0.TFS\><br>
Reply To: \<9210090703.AA26448@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-09 07:14:13 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Fri, 9 Oct 92 00:14:13 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: Peter Shipley <shipley@tfs.COM>
Date: Fri, 9 Oct 92 00:14:13 PDT
To: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Re: New feature of the remailer
In-Reply-To: <9210090703.AA26448@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9210090721.AA09749@edev0.TFS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Now what is needed is a user interface/script for submitting mail.
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-09 (Thu, 8 Oct 92 23:56:11 PDT) - [New feature of the remailer](/years/1992/10/07ae1782d78a668866ed682f440cba74ebbd27148657ab8bcb66f1a7d5c36516) - _Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\>_
+ 1992-10-09 (Fri, 9 Oct 92 00:14:13 PDT) - Re: New feature of the remailer - _Peter Shipley \<shipley@tfs.COM\>_

44
_emails/1992/10/47f75618579e176e33b68fa8db4a67f40b80a2f50bba439002ae5d2f7151e4ba.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-17 - game items
## Header Data
From: wixer!pacoid@cs.utexas.edu (Paco Xander Nathan)<br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 47f75618579e176e33b68fa8db4a67f40b80a2f50bba439002ae5d2f7151e4ba<br>
Message ID: \<9210170316.AA05655@wixer\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-17 05:31:21 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Fri, 16 Oct 92 22:31:21 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: wixer!pacoid@cs.utexas.edu (Paco Xander Nathan)
Date: Fri, 16 Oct 92 22:31:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: game items
Message-ID: <9210170316.AA05655@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
For that matter, vibrators are illegal now for sale in Texas. Most all sex toys have to be renamed as "personal enhancement devices" or sumsuch in retail outlets to avoid seizure.
Also, drug testing decoy materials - like powdered fake urine - are illegal in TX.
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-17 (Fri, 16 Oct 92 22:31:21 PDT) - game items - _wixer!pacoid@cs.utexas.edu (Paco Xander Nathan)_

114
_emails/1992/10/4819c24f105df5961c3b7abe09a69ebbe8477c9adee58cbaa1c345e6f3cd9503.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-29 - drugs for sale
## Header Data
From: tom.jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (tom jennings)<br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 4819c24f105df5961c3b7abe09a69ebbe8477c9adee58cbaa1c345e6f3cd9503<br>
Message ID: \<3373.2AF03157@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-29 21:26:42 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Thu, 29 Oct 92 14:26:42 PPE<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: tom.jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (tom jennings)
Date: Thu, 29 Oct 92 14:26:42 PPE
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: drugs for sale
Message-ID: <3373.2AF03157@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
A cross posting from FidoNet PUBLIC_KEYS. It would be nice if some
other cypherpunks could join the PUBLIC_KEYS echo.
;Date 29 Oct 92 11:28:07
From: Jesse David Hollington@1:125/33
To: Arol Ambler@1:125/111
Subject: Test
>----------------------- Do not change this line -----------------------------<
AA> Anyway, anyone who is concerned can always use some method that hides the
AA> fact that any secret content is even being communicated. (Variations on
AA> read every fifth word to see the real message, or other standard
AA> methods).
It's funny you should bring that up. One of the major proponents of
encryption here in Region 12 posted the following in the Regional Sysop Echo
some time ago...
=============================================================================
Having said that, I also wonder whether this insistence upon having
everything in plain text isn't fostered by some sysops as a means of
receiving information that they otherwise wouldn't be privy to. If
one is truly paranoid ( *not* that I would fall into that category
in anyone's wildest dreams...ahem), one should worry about why some
netmail is read so assiduosly by passthrough systems in the first place.
Fortunately, even mail that I send direct to nodes is quoted back and
often passes through a whole variety of systems for their inspection and
review.
Since almost all of my netmail is incredibly innocent there might
always be the possibility that some of it will come back to hover
like a bad dream in some creative complaint. In broader legal terms,
every other communication system avoids eavesdropping on mail.
P.S. To understand how powerless you are to prevent encrypted text, read
the leftmost letter of each sentence in the last three paragraghs
downwards...ahem.
===========================================================================
He raises a valid point. Sysops who are so paranoid about encrypted mail
being sent through their systems should realize that they are really powerless
to prevent it if somebody is determined enough to send a coded message to
somebody else.
I've sought legal opinions in Canadian law (I don't know how it is in the
U.S.) and I've discovered that the less I know about mail passing through my
system, the safer I am. If I keep every message on my system, and read them
all, then I can be held liable if somebody routes something illegal through my
system and it slips by me. If I kill all passthrough mail, and read nothing
except what is addressed to me, I am operating under common carrier status,
and can't be held liable any more than Federal Express or UPS could.
As a result, it's actually better to *encourage* people to send encrypted
mail through your system. The belief that if people are sending encrypted
mail they're doing something wrong is a fallacy... then again, I'm preaching
to the converted here.
Cheers,
Jesse.
--- Maximus 2.01wb
* Origin: On a Clear Disk You Can Seek Forever (1:225/1)
--
tom jennings - via FidoNet node 1:125/555
UUCP: ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!111!tom.jennings
INTERNET: tom.jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-29 (Thu, 29 Oct 92 14:26:42 PPE) - drugs for sale - _tom.jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (tom jennings)_

47
_emails/1992/10/49e2a322f784875ed7aff0927bade4a23461f8d0b4577c3665c1452ebb6a1d7b.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-02 - Re: Secure IRC
## Header Data
From: George A. Gleason \<gg@well.sf.ca.us\><br>
To: postmastuh@dawkmastuh.guv<br>
Message Hash: 49e2a322f784875ed7aff0927bade4a23461f8d0b4577c3665c1452ebb6a1d7b<br>
Message ID: \<199210020800.AA21035@well.sf.ca.us\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-02 07:53:02 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Fri, 2 Oct 92 00:53:02 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: George A. Gleason <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Fri, 2 Oct 92 00:53:02 PDT
To: postmastuh@dawkmastuh.guv
Subject: Re: Secure IRC
Message-ID: <199210020800.AA21035@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Interesting ideas so far... Hey, anyone see the Quantum Crypto article in
October Scientific AMerican? Of course the approach isn't practical at this
point, and doing it over fiber optics won't be any better since the
amplification along the way would raise the quantum process to the classical
level and destroy its value... but even so, interesting as theory...
-gg
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-02 (Fri, 2 Oct 92 00:53:02 PDT) - Re: Secure IRC - _George A. Gleason \<gg@well.sf.ca.us\>_

67
_emails/1992/10/4ac131a44b9a1890122ffbba123034be4eff191a4476e1986383eedf0ea3c413.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-16 - Who uses ethernet (Mr Squirrel?)
## Header Data
From: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)<br>
To: shipley@tfs.com<br>
Message Hash: 4ac131a44b9a1890122ffbba123034be4eff191a4476e1986383eedf0ea3c413<br>
Message ID: \<9210161803.AA15862@newsu.shearson.com\><br>
Reply To: \<9210160112.AA06320@edev0.TFS\><br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-16 18:34:23 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Fri, 16 Oct 92 11:34:23 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Fri, 16 Oct 92 11:34:23 PDT
To: shipley@tfs.com
Subject: Who uses ethernet (Mr Squirrel?)
In-Reply-To: <9210160112.AA06320@edev0.TFS>
Message-ID: <9210161803.AA15862@newsu.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
>From: Peter Shipley <shipley@tfs.com>
>>
>>Who uses ethernet?! :-)
>>
>I do at home, want to tap it? simple. just crawl under my house and
>pug in to any jack, don't owrry about bringing batteies there are plenty
>of 120V outlets.
> -Pete
>PS: and soon I plan on using ISDN to bridge by home ethernet backbone
> onto the internet
Old hat -- I still remember the days of yore (only about five years
ago, but it seems like an eternity) when I worked at bellcore and
Phil Karn revealed to me that his home network was on the internet.
All I've got from home is a wimpy little UUCP link to this very day.
Perry
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-14 (Tue, 13 Oct 92 22:45:57 PDT) - [re: Re: Mr. Squirrel](/years/1992/10/7e499c6a0ad8c00016756be087eed59e5468584faa0524d693043c0e0b32bba9) - _Tom.Jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (Tom Jennings)_
+ 1992-10-14 (Wed, 14 Oct 92 11:11:49 PDT) - [Re: Mr. Squirrel](/years/1992/10/9894f672507495f4713359bc2ebc73e36ca07ccfd88543541a4e7184b7746c3a) - _Eric Hollander \<hh@soda.berkeley.edu\>_
+ 1992-10-16 (Thu, 15 Oct 92 18:13:10 PDT) - [Who uses ethernet (Mr Squirrel?)](/years/1992/10/704ce56d2f4067d0cdc37a26e31ddbefffd3edd65ca38ff8ee81d27247ee473a) - _Peter Shipley \<shipley@tfs.COM\>_
+ 1992-10-16 (Fri, 16 Oct 92 11:34:23 PDT) - Who uses ethernet (Mr Squirrel?) - _pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)_
+ 1992-10-16 (Fri, 16 Oct 92 11:47:34 PDT) - [Re: Who uses ethernet (Mr Squirrel?)](/years/1992/10/cddc36f8c672bf9bb89b6149942bfd28939f85f5395dd7bcffef31c0a29e8e96) - _Peter Shipley \<shipley@tfs.COM\>_

65
_emails/1992/10/4b028509a502332d7eb20d667f19c0822f161f636956254fb21a228f7050899b.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-22 - Keystone
## Header Data
From: Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 4b028509a502332d7eb20d667f19c0822f161f636956254fb21a228f7050899b<br>
Message ID: \<9210220541.AA13526@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
Reply To: \<9210220333.AA009m7@fnordbox.UUCP\><br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-22 05:35:21 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Wed, 21 Oct 92 22:35:21 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Wed, 21 Oct 92 22:35:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Keystone
In-Reply-To: <9210220333.AA009m7@fnordbox.UUCP>
Message-ID: <9210220541.AA13526@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Ah. A small PGP subset. You hadn't mentioned this. When you said
you weren't requiring the user to run PGP, I assumed key generation
must occur on the board.
As for your fatal flaw I hadn't spotted, I had spotted it, and the
location of the private key was the critical point. If the key is on
the BBS, the message goes out in the clear.
Look, it boils down to this. If the message traffic to the BBS is to
be encrypted, then the user has to generate a key on his own machine
and decrypt it on his own machine. There's no way around that.
But the user interface problem can be solved. Just make a bunch of
.com files which do nothing but spawn pgp by invoking the correct
arguments. Very simple; a few lines of C is all. Even the PGPPATH
can be set before the spawn. It's an easy encapsulation. It will run
a bit slower for load time, but not appreciably. And you won't have
to recompile PGP from the distributed executables.
Eric
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-22 (Wed, 21 Oct 92 22:35:21 PDT) - Keystone - _Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\>_
+ 1992-10-22 (Wed, 21 Oct 92 23:35:44 PDT) - [Re: Keystone](/years/1992/10/fb6cd513252375d40032e5c92dc6f0e2a944525554d20788331d097d9233143d) - _gnu@cygnus.com_
+ 1992-10-22 (Thu, 22 Oct 92 10:09:30 PDT) - [Re: Keystone](/years/1992/10/2414b4e9749952e702f40e3ab08b5c8c4f13ba6c41f4fd2ddcc01ba85e3079c8) - _sdw@meaddata.com (Stephen Williams)_

59
_emails/1992/10/4b7db885ad2f8c9b50f47b7e01dff5dcd4bf4f8c93d38b54b2450802d2b96240.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-09 - +-=*^
## Header Data
From: Secret_Squirrel@Treehouse.COM<br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 4b7db885ad2f8c9b50f47b7e01dff5dcd4bf4f8c93d38b54b2450802d2b96240<br>
Message ID: \<9210091712.AA27717@atdt.org\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-09 17:05:09 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Fri, 9 Oct 92 10:05:09 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: Secret_Squirrel@Treehouse.COM
Date: Fri, 9 Oct 92 10:05:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: +-=*^
Message-ID: <9210091712.AA27717@atdt.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
re: Interface for re-mailer; why not hitch it to emacs or something?
re: problem with key distribution; right, OK, I hadn't thought that
there might be a security problem with casually giving someone your
key
without them being able to authenticate that it came from you. Good
point.
Here's my public key. If you feel it is not secure enough, we can
always use the cone of silence:
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.0
23l1t34u
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-09 (Fri, 9 Oct 92 10:05:09 PDT) - +-=*^ - _Secret_Squirrel@Treehouse.COM_
+ 1992-10-09 (Fri, 9 Oct 92 11:16:24 PDT) - [Re: +-=*^](/years/1992/10/aca914116e261da03e08977616fac44612be493b810335fb01c85b9597d7a534) - _Peter Shipley \<shipley@tfs.COM\>_

65
_emails/1992/10/4c67e79a2ec7344d27550db884c628f037f2077d684ba8190ca763a77730d2bc.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-13 - Mr. Squirrel? Just who is whom here?
## Header Data
From: hugh@domingo.teracons.com (Hugh Daniel)<br>
To: CYPHERPUNKS@TOAD.COM<br>
Message Hash: 4c67e79a2ec7344d27550db884c628f037f2077d684ba8190ca763a77730d2bc<br>
Message ID: \<9210131201.AA12086@domingo.teracons.com\><br>
Reply To: \<921010180751_74076.1041_DHJ61-1@CompuServe.COM\><br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-13 12:02:06 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Tue, 13 Oct 92 05:02:06 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: hugh@domingo.teracons.com (Hugh Daniel)
Date: Tue, 13 Oct 92 05:02:06 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@TOAD.COM
Subject: Mr. Squirrel? Just who is whom here?
In-Reply-To: <921010180751_74076.1041_DHJ61-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9210131201.AA12086@domingo.teracons.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Hal is somewhat right, anyone can use 'Secret Squirrel' and anyone
can use any public key they want also. So, in a many-to-one scope (as
in a maillist) where the sender can not use the one-on-one signed
signiture method how do we have proff of who the sender really is?
Maybe public forums are just not places where it is easy to verify
the identity of a speaker?
A second thing that Hal's comments bring up is that we were reading
the From: headders and ignoreing the keys. In good crypto-mail
readers the key ought to be checked against our own data base of
others keys and the result added to the hedders as say:
KeyCheck: FooBar Bazoid holds this key in XXX database
or some such rot. I wonder what is more important, who I claim to be
in a random message or what key I include...
New keys ought for an ID (or new ID's for the same key) should be
added to the data base as well.
But all this needs to be done automaticly by the mailers and
interfaces, else the system will be mis-used and folks will tire of
the extra work that gets them little advantage.
||ugh Daniel
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-10 (Sat, 10 Oct 92 11:04:58 PDT) - [Mr. Squirrel?](/years/1992/10/a7deae21289e64af8c4c457307bdf1c62cbeb469f75b1613a3ed1a9dfa73b939) - _Hal \<74076.1041@CompuServe.COM\>_
+ 1992-10-13 (Tue, 13 Oct 92 05:02:06 PDT) - Mr. Squirrel? Just who is whom here? - _hugh@domingo.teracons.com (Hugh Daniel)_
+ 1992-10-13 (Tue, 13 Oct 92 08:58:32 PDT) - [Mr. Squirrel? Just who is whom here?](/years/1992/10/b522b87517a2d84b579f40e313b2fa857de956c060f703f320fd96498bfcfd60) - _pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)_

173
_emails/1992/10/4ca87779428bbf54ceb61e5789afa6cddb59f6abb001b6b2f5ff15428f981342.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-26 - Alpha Particles and One Time Pads
## Header Data
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)<br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 4ca87779428bbf54ceb61e5789afa6cddb59f6abb001b6b2f5ff15428f981342<br>
Message ID: \<9210260530.AA00679@netcom2.netcom.com\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-26 06:32:00 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Sun, 25 Oct 92 23:32:00 PPE<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sun, 25 Oct 92 23:32:00 PPE
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Alpha Particles and One Time Pads
Message-ID: <9210260530.AA00679@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Fellow Cypherpunks,
Here's a posting I just sent to sci.crypt, dealing with using alpha
particle sources as noise sources for generating one-time pads.
Ordinarily I wouldn't bother you folks with this, especially since
you're all reading sci.crypt (aren't you? Only the FidoNetters have a
good excuse not to.).
But this thread ties together two aspects of my life, cryptography and
alpha particle errors in chips.
--Tim
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Path: netcom.com!tcmay
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Hardware random number generators compatible with PCs?
Message-ID: <1992Oct26.051612.29869@netcom.com>
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest)
X-Newsreader: Tin 1.1 PL5
References: <1992Oct25.224554.1853@fasttech.com>
Date: Mon, 26 Oct 1992 05:16:12 GMT
Bohdan Tashchuk (zeke@fasttech.com) wrote:
: The recent post on building a random number generator using a zener diode got
: me to thinking once again about commercial alternatives.
:
: I haven't seen any commercial alternatives discussed here recently. And since
: the market is so specialized, they may well exist but I'm simply not aware of
: them.
:
: The ideal product would have the following features:
:
: * cost less than $100
: * use a radioactive Alpha ray emitter as the source
It's a small world! In my earlier incarnation as a physicist for
Intel, I discovered the alpha particle "soft error" effect in memory
chips. By 1976 chips, especially dynamic RAMs, were storing less than
half a million electrons as the difference between a "1" and a "0". A
several MeV alpha could generate more than a million electron-hole
pairs, thus flipping some bits.
(Obviously the effect of alphas on particle detectors was
known, and smoke detectors were in wide use, but nobody prior to 1977
knew that memory bits could be flipped by alphas, coming from uranium
and thorium in the package materials. It's a long story, so I won't
say any more about it here.)
: * connect to an IBM PC serial or parallel port
: * be "dongle" sized, ie be able to plug directly onto the port, and
: not have a cable from an external box to the port
: * be powered directly from the port
: * generate at least 1000 "highly random" bits per second
This should be feasible by placing a small (sub-microcurie) amount of
Americium-241 on a small DRAM chip that is known to be alpha-sensitive
(and not all of them are, due to processing tricks). Errors would
occur at random intervals, depending on which bits got hit. Getting
1000 errors a second would be tough, though, as such high intensities
would also tend to eventually destroy the chip (through longterm
damage to the silicon, threshold voltage shifts, etc.). If you really
want to pursue this seriously, I can help with the calculations, etc.
: Details:
:
: Certainly in high volume these things can be made cheaply. Smoke detectors
: often sell for under $10, and have a radioactive source, an IC, a case, etc.
Yes, but smoke detectors use ionization in a chamber (the smoke from a
fire makes ionization easier). That is, no real ICs. But ICs, and even
RAM chips, are cheap, so your $10 figure is almost certainly in the ballpark.
A bigger concern is safety, or the _perceived_ safety. Smoke detectors
have, I understand, moved away from alpha particle-based detectors to
photoelectric detectors (smoke obscures beam of light). Don't
underestimate the public's fear of radioactivity, even at low levels.
: Using a well-designed circuit based on Alpha decay should mean that the
: randomness is pretty darn good.
But not necessarily any better than noise from a Zener. With the
higher bit rate from diode noise, more statistical tricks can be done.
The relatively low bit rate from alpha decay gives less flexibility.
On the other hand, alpha hits are undeniably quite random, with
essentially no way to skew the odds (unlike with diode noise).
: Everyone these days has either a serial or parallel port available, either
: directly or thru a switch box.
:
: The tiny "dongle" size is a convenience. If it is small and powered directly
: from the port, there are no cables to get in the way. There is enough power
: available from the signal lines on these ports to power simple devices. E.g.
: most mice don't require an external power supply.
:
: For most applications 1000 bits per second should be adequate. For example,
: it would be quite adequate for session keys. For generating pseudo
: one-time-pads, an overnight run should generate plenty of values. Continuously
: generating values for a month would produce about 300 MB, which should be
: enough to exchange new CD-ROM key disks once a month.
One time pads are complicated to use. Only very high security
applications that can also afford them use them. For example, some
diplomatic traffic. I can't conceive of a case where 300 MB a month
could be used.
And _theft_ (or copying) of the CD-ROM one time pads has got to be a
much bigger issue that whether alpha particle noise sources are better
than diode noise sources! By about 10 orders of magnitude I would say.
Black bag jobs on the sites holding the keys will be the likeliest
attack, not trying to analyze how random the noise is (even a fairly
crummy noise source will not yield enough information to a
cryptanalyst trying to break a one-time pad).
Having said all this, I'm glad you gave some thought to alphas. For a
time in the late 1970s this was the chip industry's number one
headache...it was definitely the most exciting time of my life.
--Tim
--
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay@netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | PGP 2.0 and MailSafe keys by arrangement.
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-26 (Sun, 25 Oct 92 23:32:00 PPE) - Alpha Particles and One Time Pads - _tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)_
+ 1992-10-26 (Mon, 26 Oct 92 12:47:45 PPE) - [Re: Alpha Particles and One Time Pads](/years/1992/10/bb4a49d7659a5c58389bf70574ecfa3693eb62b1952698da3e844d6829c85135) - _Peter Shipley \<shipley@tfs.COM\>_
+ 1992-10-26 (Mon, 26 Oct 92 14:09:43 PPE) - [Alpha Particles and One Time Pads](/years/1992/10/f9cc5c6d8ba5bdb505c75decc71a4fbd1c865e5e4a2322f842ff044c8dde44af) - _pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)_

61
_emails/1992/10/4d3c0b68b446f11f664d02d6696ac26026c7e92e0e14c93cbc6235b7eb4495c3.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-21 - TEMPEST, Eavesdropping
## Header Data
From: Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 4d3c0b68b446f11f664d02d6696ac26026c7e92e0e14c93cbc6235b7eb4495c3<br>
Message ID: \<9210211711.AA11833@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
Reply To: \<9210202224.AA28714@netcom2.netcom.com\><br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-21 17:11:42 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Wed, 21 Oct 92 10:11:42 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Wed, 21 Oct 92 10:11:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: TEMPEST, Eavesdropping
In-Reply-To: <9210202224.AA28714@netcom2.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9210211711.AA11833@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
>Their chief concern doesn't seem to be folks like us, but rather
>concerns about vans parking outside high tech and defense contractors
>and slurping up what they can [...]
When banks start signing with private keys, then we get an even more
interesting monitoring problem.
>And someone asked about building Faraday cages. Don't even try!
Sometimes it is cheaper to build a whole building to be tempest-spec
than to buy all tempest-spec electronics. What I have heard about
such stuff is solid copper walls and no windows. No exacly your
classical Faraday cage; more like your classical Gaussian surface. :->
TEMPEST is an acronym. I don't remember for what.
Eric
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-21 (Wed, 21 Oct 92 10:11:42 PDT) - TEMPEST, Eavesdropping - _Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\>_
+ 1992-10-21 (Wed, 21 Oct 92 14:07:37 PDT) - [TEMPEST, Eavesdropping](/years/1992/10/041ccd8442454608e3dec5534526a715161e63caf6d81ac5e2f5ea068bf6c330) - _pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)_

55
_emails/1992/10/4dda48fae2f6e862d1a35aa019c82ecee26503b544f80ca323cc75f6238d3c42.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-08 - Subscribe
## Header Data
From: hughes (Eric Hughes)<br>
To: whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk<br>
Message Hash: 4dda48fae2f6e862d1a35aa019c82ecee26503b544f80ca323cc75f6238d3c42<br>
Message ID: \<9210081541.AA03134@toad.com\><br>
Reply To: \<1480@eternity.demon.co.uk\><br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-08 15:41:35 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Thu, 8 Oct 92 08:41:35 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: hughes (Eric Hughes)
Date: Thu, 8 Oct 92 08:41:35 PDT
To: whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk
Subject: Subscribe
In-Reply-To: <1480@eternity.demon.co.uk>
Message-ID: <9210081541.AA03134@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
You are subscribed.
Next time, please use the cypherpunks-request@toad.com address for
administrative matters. Tell your friends this as well. Your request
got sent out to the whole list, not a tragedy, but an annoyance.
I met Max More at a party about a month ago. I suspect he might be
interested in the list. Do you have an e-mail address for him?
Eric
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-08 (Thu, 8 Oct 92 07:04:56 PDT) - [Subscribe](/years/1992/10/454afdeccfcfc12faec4a1c95227823ccd2317215802fba5cb077de5bba38b1f) - _whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk (Russell E. Whitaker)_
+ 1992-10-08 (Thu, 8 Oct 92 08:41:35 PDT) - Subscribe - _hughes (Eric Hughes)_
+ 1992-10-08 (Thu, 8 Oct 92 08:57:23 PDT) - [Subscriptions, etc.](/years/1992/10/20afd4cea4d9e2d57280c5afce0c3f16abf843ef65658c20b5cd90f7b78a1070) - _Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\>_

54
_emails/1992/10/4e2d68b1b438d44805f4da04f132ea6afbc6804413a7808e5a4966e63ef11f13.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-26 - Re: Registering Keys with Big Brother
## Header Data
From: George A. Gleason \<gg@well.sf.ca.us\><br>
To: tcmay@netcom.com<br>
Message Hash: 4e2d68b1b438d44805f4da04f132ea6afbc6804413a7808e5a4966e63ef11f13<br>
Message ID: \<199210260853.AA20086@well.sf.ca.us\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-26 08:54:38 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Mon, 26 Oct 92 01:54:38 PPE<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: George A. Gleason <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Mon, 26 Oct 92 01:54:38 PPE
To: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: Re: Registering Keys with Big Brother
Message-ID: <199210260853.AA20086@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Tim's summary of Denning raises some interesting points, and no doubt this
will end up in the courts in due time. Some angles of attack which might be
pursued include 2nd amendment (original grounds: protection against tyrrany)
and 1st amendment. Re the latter, a lawyer I spoke with some years ago,
proposed the idea that freedom of speech in some cases depends on the
ability for the speaker to determine who will and who will not receive what
is said.
Then of course there is always good oldfashioned civil disobedience. If
enough people conscientiously violate the regulation, it will become
unenforceable and all the more likely to be overturned.
-gg
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-26 (Mon, 26 Oct 92 01:54:38 PPE) - Re: Registering Keys with Big Brother - _George A. Gleason \<gg@well.sf.ca.us\>_
+ 1992-10-26 (Mon, 26 Oct 92 09:38:01 PPE) - [Registering Keys with Big Brother](/years/1992/10/51213736f60c1e2796c2efeb25d8bc8604e98cac27e3dbb72131f18007d74363) - _Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\>_

59
_emails/1992/10/4e5fbb8165043de2724fa04e92f0ab99ed97bc40a4bc063185c8a2e6d719999f.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-21 - Re: Home security...
## Header Data
From: George A. Gleason \<gg@well.sf.ca.us\><br>
To: mark@coombs.anu.edu.au<br>
Message Hash: 4e5fbb8165043de2724fa04e92f0ab99ed97bc40a4bc063185c8a2e6d719999f<br>
Message ID: \<199210210815.AA06441@well.sf.ca.us\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-21 08:16:08 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Wed, 21 Oct 92 01:16:08 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: George A. Gleason <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Wed, 21 Oct 92 01:16:08 PDT
To: mark@coombs.anu.edu.au
Subject: Re: Home security...
Message-ID: <199210210815.AA06441@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Tempest: there are companies which make cages for Macs and PCs, I don't have
addresses but they can probably be found with some searching of ads. The
main application it would seem, is not the individual home user (unless
s/he's a notorious digital dissident) but rather the encrypted BBS,
particularly one which decrypts and re-encrypts or retransmits messages.
Consider the labor cost of monitoring a computer, and you can see it would
be reserved for the ones that are "significant."
Keeping your computer off the phones and AC while doing crypto processing,
can be fairly easy. Unplug the darn modem from the phone socket. (Gee that
was simple, wasn't it?) Use a laptop and run it entirely on the batteries
while doing crypto processing. You can go buy an old laptop pretty cheaply
these days... Or get an uninterruptable power supply for your main
computer; cost will vary from $600 to $1500 depending on how much time you
need to be running on the large batteries which are converted into AC to run
the computer.
-gg
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-21 (Wed, 21 Oct 92 01:16:08 PDT) - Re: Home security... - _George A. Gleason \<gg@well.sf.ca.us\>_

56
_emails/1992/10/4eeee33db706827275e7187c82882825658b0861bfe99b00cfe2ef651e9e14c1.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-10 - a key
## Header Data
From: marc@kg6kf.ampr.org (Marc de Groot - KG6KF)<br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 4eeee33db706827275e7187c82882825658b0861bfe99b00cfe2ef651e9e14c1<br>
Message ID: \<9210100755.AA05427@kg6kf.ampr.org\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-10 10:07:47 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Sat, 10 Oct 92 03:07:47 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: marc@kg6kf.ampr.org (Marc de Groot - KG6KF)
Date: Sat, 10 Oct 92 03:07:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: a key
Message-ID: <9210100755.AA05427@kg6kf.ampr.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
A key...
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.0
mQA9AirWaLMAAAEBgMlJILifxrXH8fkJwJbeSHXAY1Q9/AzPybGVy0Dx/q70Fr3d
KhM6XoSEgaw2Ezzn2QAFEbQWTWFyYyBkZSBHcm9vdCAoY2FzdWFsKbQjTWFyYyBk
ZSBHcm9vdCA8bWFyY0BrZzZrZi5hbXByLm9yZz4=
=LL6T
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
This is a casual key for me. Perhaps a causal key for me too.
-Marc de Groot <marc@kg6kf.ampr.org>
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-10 (Sat, 10 Oct 92 03:07:47 PDT) - a key - _marc@kg6kf.ampr.org (Marc de Groot - KG6KF)_

78
_emails/1992/10/503c3b8d260c9d277fec543d1511e53afe6d139974194bbc24df6f7f32462d72.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-20 - Re: Keystone
## Header Data
From: fnordbox!loydb@cs.utexas.edu (Loyd Blankenship)<br>
To: soda.berkeley.edu!hughes@cs.utexas.edu<br>
Message Hash: 503c3b8d260c9d277fec543d1511e53afe6d139974194bbc24df6f7f32462d72<br>
Message ID: \<9210201753.AA009kv@fnordbox.UUCP\><br>
Reply To: _N/A_<br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-20 21:43:30 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Tue, 20 Oct 92 14:43:30 PDT<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: fnordbox!loydb@cs.utexas.edu (Loyd Blankenship)
Date: Tue, 20 Oct 92 14:43:30 PDT
To: soda.berkeley.edu!hughes@cs.utexas.edu
Subject: Re: Keystone
Message-ID: <9210201753.AA009kv@fnordbox.UUCP>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
:I would be hesitant to implement a system that _only_ required a user
:to generate a key pair. This, for the users, is too much provided
:privacy. It will not teach the users how privacy really works, nor
:will it give them any good idea how their privacy is being maintained.
I take the opposite view -- I dare *not* supply such a system. Any user that
is interested enough in 100% privacy will be encouraged -- both from the
email prompt and through the message bases/file areas -- to d/l a copy of
PGP. I'll probably write a tutorial on using it as well.
But many users do not have the interest/time/ability to set up PGP on their
home system. For them, I want to provide the best possible privacy given the
ease with which anyone who can find their local LMOS can tap (voice or data)
a line...
:Defended privacy does not need to be difficult. I would spend effort,
:instead of modifying BBS software, to make it easier for users to
:handle encrypted email with their own terminal programs.
I don't have my user's terminal program -- I *do* have the bbs software.
:Again, trusted systems can turn into provided privacy. If there is a
:distributed solution you can think up, use it.
I don't know any way to maintain an up-to-date, central keyring without
someone being in charge of regular updates. I'd make it available via
Fido, FTP, BMS and regular d/l.
Loyd
***************************************************************************
* loydb@fnordbox.UUCP Once you pull the pin, * Loyd Blankenship *
* GEnie: SJGAMES Mr. Grenade is no longer * PO Box 18957 *
* Compu$erve: [73407,515] your friend! * Austin, TX 78760 *
* cs.utexas.edu!dogface!fnordbox!loydb * 512/447-7866 *
***************************************************************************
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-20 (Tue, 20 Oct 92 14:43:30 PDT) - Re: Keystone - _fnordbox!loydb@cs.utexas.edu (Loyd Blankenship)_
+ 1992-10-21 (Wed, 21 Oct 92 09:43:25 PDT) - [Keystone](/years/1992/10/2ff29505951a381077a03c5daef44ec830ba5b90cf48eb6abe31bc094aeaee28) - _Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\>_

84
_emails/1992/10/51213736f60c1e2796c2efeb25d8bc8604e98cac27e3dbb72131f18007d74363.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
---
layout: default
---
# 1992-10-26 - Registering Keys with Big Brother
## Header Data
From: Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com<br>
Message Hash: 51213736f60c1e2796c2efeb25d8bc8604e98cac27e3dbb72131f18007d74363<br>
Message ID: \<9210261637.AA12485@soda.berkeley.edu\><br>
Reply To: \<199210260853.AA20086@well.sf.ca.us\><br>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-26 16:38:01 UTC<br>
Raw Date: Mon, 26 Oct 92 09:38:01 PPE<br>
## Raw message
```
{% raw %}From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Mon, 26 Oct 92 09:38:01 PPE
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Registering Keys with Big Brother
In-Reply-To: <199210260853.AA20086@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9210261637.AA12485@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Re: Some angles of attack
George:
>2nd amendment (original grounds: protection against tyrrany)
I've thought for a year or so now that if the State Department was
going to class cryptography as munitions, then they have _de jure_
acknowledged that civilian use of cryptography is protected under the
Second Amendment. Cryptography is not a weapon and should not be
restricted for public safety reasons.
>1st amendment. Re the latter, a lawyer I spoke with some years ago,
>proposed the idea that freedom of speech in some cases depends on the
>ability for the speaker to determine who will and who will not
>receive what is said.
This criterion may be valid, but I don't think it's needed. As I
understand it, the restrictions on speech that do exist restrict 1)
certain contents, not speech as such, and 2) speech which is public,
not private. Encrypted text, by the fact that it is encrypted, is
intended to be removed from the public domain. And restricting the
transmission of encrypted text based on some assumed content is prior
restraint.
I'm not sure that any of these arguments really touch a key
registration proposal, unfortunately. Guns may be sold, but also
registered. It is not the speech that is restricted, but the privacy
from the Justice Dept. which is restricted.
What I suspect may be more effective is to argue, based on the Tenth
(or Ninth? I get them confused) Amendment, that the Federal Government
has not been granted specific power to require the registration of key
material under any of its other powers.
>Then of course there is always good oldfashioned civil disobedience.
But the percentage of users of cryptography for communications is a
small percentage of the total population as of yet.
Eric
{% endraw %}
```
## Thread
+ Return to [October 1992](/years/1992/10)
+ 1992-10-26 (Mon, 26 Oct 92 01:54:38 PPE) - [Re: Registering Keys with Big Brother](/years/1992/10/4e2d68b1b438d44805f4da04f132ea6afbc6804413a7808e5a4966e63ef11f13) - _George A. Gleason \<gg@well.sf.ca.us\>_
+ 1992-10-26 (Mon, 26 Oct 92 09:38:01 PPE) - Registering Keys with Big Brother - _Eric Hughes \<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu\>_

Some files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff Show More