mirror of
https://github.com/aljazceru/lightning.git
synced 2025-12-22 08:34:20 +01:00
This sets the nLockTime to the tip (and accordingly each input's nSequence to 0xfffffffe) for withdrawal transactions. Even if the anti fee-sniping argument might not be valid until some time yet, this makes our regular wallet transactions far less distinguishable from bitcoind's ones since it now defaults to using native Segwit transactions (like us). Moreover other wallets are likely to implement this (if they haven't already). Changelog-Added: wallet: withdrawal transactions now sets nlocktime to the current tip.
244 lines
6.6 KiB
C
244 lines
6.6 KiB
C
#include <bitcoin/script.h>
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#include <bitcoin/tx.h>
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#include <ccan/endian/endian.h>
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#include <common/initial_commit_tx.h>
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#include <common/keyset.h>
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#include <common/permute_tx.h>
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#include <common/status.h>
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#include <common/type_to_string.h>
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#include <inttypes.h>
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/* BOLT #3:
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*
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* The 48-bit commitment number is obscured by `XOR` with the lower 48 bits of:
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*
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* SHA256(payment_basepoint from open_channel || payment_basepoint from accept_channel)
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*/
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u64 commit_number_obscurer(const struct pubkey *opener_payment_basepoint,
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const struct pubkey *accepter_payment_basepoint)
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{
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u8 ders[PUBKEY_CMPR_LEN * 2];
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struct sha256 sha;
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be64 obscurer = 0;
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pubkey_to_der(ders, opener_payment_basepoint);
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pubkey_to_der(ders + PUBKEY_CMPR_LEN, accepter_payment_basepoint);
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sha256(&sha, ders, sizeof(ders));
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/* Lower 48 bits */
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memcpy((u8 *)&obscurer + 2, sha.u.u8 + sizeof(sha.u.u8) - 6, 6);
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return be64_to_cpu(obscurer);
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}
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bool try_subtract_fee(enum side funder, enum side side,
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struct amount_sat base_fee,
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struct amount_msat *self,
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struct amount_msat *other)
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{
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struct amount_msat *funder_amount;
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if (funder == side)
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funder_amount = self;
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else
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funder_amount = other;
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if (amount_msat_sub_sat(funder_amount, *funder_amount, base_fee))
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return true;
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*funder_amount = AMOUNT_MSAT(0);
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return false;
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}
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u8 *to_self_wscript(const tal_t *ctx,
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u16 to_self_delay,
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const struct keyset *keyset)
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{
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return bitcoin_wscript_to_local(ctx, to_self_delay,
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&keyset->self_revocation_key,
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&keyset->self_delayed_payment_key);
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}
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struct bitcoin_tx *initial_commit_tx(const tal_t *ctx,
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const struct bitcoin_txid *funding_txid,
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unsigned int funding_txout,
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struct amount_sat funding,
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enum side funder,
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u16 to_self_delay,
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const struct keyset *keyset,
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u32 feerate_per_kw,
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struct amount_sat dust_limit,
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struct amount_msat self_pay,
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struct amount_msat other_pay,
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struct amount_sat self_reserve,
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u64 obscured_commitment_number,
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enum side side,
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char** err_reason)
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{
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struct amount_sat base_fee;
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struct bitcoin_tx *tx;
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size_t n, untrimmed;
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struct amount_msat total_pay;
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struct amount_sat amount;
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u32 sequence;
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if (!amount_msat_add(&total_pay, self_pay, other_pay))
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abort();
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assert(!amount_msat_greater_sat(total_pay, funding));
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/* BOLT #3:
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*
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* 1. Calculate which committed HTLCs need to be trimmed (see
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* [Trimmed Outputs](#trimmed-outputs)).
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*/
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untrimmed = 0;
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/* BOLT #3:
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*
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* 2. Calculate the base [commitment transaction
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* fee](#fee-calculation).
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*/
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base_fee = commit_tx_base_fee(feerate_per_kw, untrimmed);
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/* BOLT #3:
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*
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* 3. Subtract this base fee from the funder (either `to_local` or
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* `to_remote`), with a floor of 0 (see [Fee Payment](#fee-payment)).
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*/
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if (!try_subtract_fee(funder, side, base_fee, &self_pay, &other_pay)) {
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/* BOLT #2:
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*
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* The receiving node MUST fail the channel if:
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*...
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* - it considers `feerate_per_kw` too small for timely
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* processing or unreasonably large.
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*/
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*err_reason = "Funder cannot afford fee on initial commitment transaction";
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status_unusual("Funder cannot afford fee"
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" on initial commitment transaction");
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return NULL;
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}
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/* FIXME, should be in #2:
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*
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* The receiving node MUST fail the channel if:
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*...
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* - both `to_local` and `to_remote` amounts for the initial
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* commitment transaction are less than or equal to
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* `channel_reserve_satoshis`.
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*/
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if (!amount_msat_greater_sat(self_pay, self_reserve)
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&& !amount_msat_greater_sat(other_pay, self_reserve)) {
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*err_reason = "Neither self amount nor other amount exceed reserve on "
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"initial commitment transaction";
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status_unusual("Neither self amount %s"
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" nor other amount %s"
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" exceed reserve %s"
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" on initial commitment transaction",
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type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_msat,
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&self_pay),
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type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_msat,
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&other_pay),
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type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_sat,
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&self_reserve));
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return NULL;
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}
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/* Worst-case sizing: both to-local and to-remote outputs. */
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tx = bitcoin_tx(ctx, chainparams, 1, untrimmed + 2, 0);
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/* This could be done in a single loop, but we follow the BOLT
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* literally to make comments in test vectors clearer. */
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n = 0;
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/* BOLT #3:
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*
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* 3. For every offered HTLC, if it is not trimmed, add an
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* [offered HTLC output](#offered-htlc-outputs).
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*/
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/* BOLT #3:
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*
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* 4. For every received HTLC, if it is not trimmed, add an
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* [received HTLC output](#received-htlc-outputs).
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*/
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/* BOLT #3:
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*
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* 5. If the `to_local` amount is greater or equal to
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* `dust_limit_satoshis`, add a [`to_local`
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* output](#to_local-output).
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*/
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if (amount_msat_greater_eq_sat(self_pay, dust_limit)) {
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u8 *wscript = to_self_wscript(tmpctx, to_self_delay, keyset);
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amount = amount_msat_to_sat_round_down(self_pay);
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int pos = bitcoin_tx_add_output(
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tx, scriptpubkey_p2wsh(tx, wscript), amount);
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assert(pos == n);
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n++;
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}
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/* BOLT #3:
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*
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* 6. If the `to_remote` amount is greater or equal to
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* `dust_limit_satoshis`, add a [`to_remote`
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* output](#to_remote-output).
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*/
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if (amount_msat_greater_eq_sat(other_pay, dust_limit)) {
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/* BOLT #3:
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*
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* #### `to_remote` Output
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*
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* This output sends funds to the other peer and thus is a simple
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* P2WPKH to `remotepubkey`.
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*/
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amount = amount_msat_to_sat_round_down(other_pay);
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int pos = bitcoin_tx_add_output(
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tx, scriptpubkey_p2wpkh(tx, &keyset->other_payment_key),
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amount);
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assert(pos == n);
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n++;
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}
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assert(n <= tx->wtx->num_outputs);
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/* BOLT #3:
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*
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* 7. Sort the outputs into [BIP 69+CLTV
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* order](#transaction-input-and-output-ordering)
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*/
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permute_outputs(tx, NULL, NULL);
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/* BOLT #3:
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*
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* ## Commitment Transaction
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*
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* * version: 2
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*/
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assert(tx->wtx->version == 2);
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/* BOLT #3:
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*
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* * locktime: upper 8 bits are 0x20, lower 24 bits are the
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* lower 24 bits of the obscured commitment number
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*/
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tx->wtx->locktime =
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(0x20000000 | (obscured_commitment_number & 0xFFFFFF));
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/* BOLT #3:
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*
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* * txin count: 1
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* * `txin[0]` outpoint: `txid` and `output_index` from
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* `funding_created` message
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* * `txin[0]` sequence: upper 8 bits are 0x80, lower 24 bits are upper 24 bits of the obscured commitment number
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* * `txin[0]` script bytes: 0
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*/
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sequence = (0x80000000 | ((obscured_commitment_number>>24) & 0xFFFFFF));
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bitcoin_tx_add_input(tx, funding_txid, funding_txout, sequence, funding, NULL);
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elements_tx_add_fee_output(tx);
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assert(bitcoin_tx_check(tx));
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return tx;
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}
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