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protocol: fix horribly thinko, keep own secrets.

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I had each side using the other side's hash secret.  That's a very
dumb idea, since it means you can steal from a unilateral close!

A's secret applies to A's commit transaction: it needs the
secret and B's final signature to steal funds, and that should
never happen (since A doesn't have the B's final signature, and
once A has given B the secret, they never broadcast the commit tx).

This makes the update a 4 step dance, since you need the new
revocation hash to make the other side's TX to sign.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This commit is contained in:
Rusty Russell
2015-06-10 20:32:43 +09:30
parent 9caf2c71e8
commit ed3f0115d6
18 changed files with 457 additions and 213 deletions
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17
pkt.c
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@@ -161,27 +161,34 @@ struct pkt *close_channel_complete_pkt(const tal_t *ctx,
struct pkt *update_pkt(const tal_t *ctx,
const struct sha256 *revocation_hash,
s64 delta, struct signature *sig)
s64 delta)
{
Update u = UPDATE__INIT;
u.revocation_hash = sha256_to_proto(ctx, revocation_hash);
u.delta = delta;
u.sig = signature_to_proto(ctx, sig);
return to_pkt(ctx, PKT__PKT_UPDATE, &u);
}
struct pkt *update_accept_pkt(const tal_t *ctx,
struct signature *sig,
const struct sha256 *revocation_hash,
const struct sha256 *revocation_preimage)
const struct sha256 *revocation_hash)
{
UpdateAccept ua = UPDATE_ACCEPT__INIT;
ua.sig = signature_to_proto(ctx, sig);
ua.revocation_hash = sha256_to_proto(ctx, revocation_hash);
ua.revocation_preimage = sha256_to_proto(ctx, revocation_preimage);
return to_pkt(ctx, PKT__PKT_UPDATE_ACCEPT, &ua);
}
struct pkt *update_signature_pkt(const tal_t *ctx,
const struct signature *sig,
const struct sha256 *revocation_preimage)
{
UpdateSignature us = UPDATE_SIGNATURE__INIT;
us.sig = signature_to_proto(ctx, sig);
us.revocation_preimage = sha256_to_proto(ctx, revocation_preimage);
return to_pkt(ctx, PKT__PKT_UPDATE_SIGNATURE, &us);
}
struct pkt *update_complete_pkt(const tal_t *ctx,
const struct sha256 *revocation_preimage)
{