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protocol: fix horribly thinko, keep own secrets.

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I had each side using the other side's hash secret.  That's a very
dumb idea, since it means you can steal from a unilateral close!

A's secret applies to A's commit transaction: it needs the
secret and B's final signature to steal funds, and that should
never happen (since A doesn't have the B's final signature, and
once A has given B the secret, they never broadcast the commit tx).

This makes the update a 4 step dance, since you need the new
revocation hash to make the other side's TX to sign.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This commit is contained in:
Rusty Russell
2015-06-10 20:32:43 +09:30
parent 9caf2c71e8
commit ed3f0115d6
18 changed files with 457 additions and 213 deletions
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4
check-commit-sig.c
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@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
anchor_txid(anchor, argv[5], argv[6], inmap, &txid);
/* Now create our commitment tx. */
proto_to_sha256(o2->revocation_hash, &rhash);
proto_to_sha256(o1->revocation_hash, &rhash);
commit = create_commit_tx(ctx, o1, o2, &rhash, 0, &txid, outmap[0]);
/* If contributions don't exceed fees, this fails. */
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
sig1.stype = SIGHASH_ALL;
subscript = bitcoin_redeem_2of2(ctx, &pubkey1, &pubkey2);
sign_tx_input(ctx, commit, 0, subscript, tal_count(subscript),
privkey, &sig1.sig);
privkey, &pubkey1, &sig1.sig);
/* Signatures well-formed? */
if (!proto_to_signature(cs2->sig, &sig2.sig))