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struct secret: use everywhere.

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We alternated between using a sha256 and using a privkey, but there are
numerous places where we have a random 32 bytes which are neither.

This fixes many of them (plus, struct privkey is now defined in terms of
struct secret).

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This commit is contained in:
Rusty Russell
2017-05-06 11:49:44 +09:30
parent 42601c29d7
commit b99c5620ef
39 changed files with 250 additions and 215 deletions
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22
lightningd/sphinx.c
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@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ bool onion_shared_secret(
const struct privkey *privkey)
{
return create_shared_secret(secret, &packet->ephemeralkey,
privkey->secret);
privkey->secret.data);
}
void pubkey_hash160(
@@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ struct onionpacket *create_onionpacket(
const u8 *sessionkey,
const u8 *assocdata,
const size_t assocdatalen,
struct sha256 **path_secrets
struct secret **path_secrets
)
{
struct onionpacket *packet = talz(ctx, struct onionpacket);
@@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ struct onionpacket *create_onionpacket(
u8 nexthmac[SECURITY_PARAMETER];
u8 stream[ROUTING_INFO_SIZE];
struct hop_params *params = generate_hop_params(ctx, sessionkey, path);
struct sha256 *secrets = tal_arr(ctx, struct sha256, num_hops);
struct secret *secrets = tal_arr(ctx, struct secret, num_hops);
if (!params)
return NULL;
@@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ struct route_step *process_onionpacket(
return step;
}
u8 *create_onionreply(const tal_t *ctx, const u8 *shared_secret,
u8 *create_onionreply(const tal_t *ctx, const struct secret *shared_secret,
const u8 *failure_msg)
{
size_t msglen = tal_len(failure_msg);
@@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ u8 *create_onionreply(const tal_t *ctx, const u8 *shared_secret,
towire_pad(&payload, padlen);
assert(tal_len(payload) == ONION_REPLY_SIZE + 4);
generate_key(key, "um", 2, shared_secret);
generate_key(key, "um", 2, shared_secret->data);
compute_hmac(hmac, payload, tal_len(payload), key, KEY_LEN);
towire(&reply, hmac, sizeof(hmac));
@@ -495,19 +495,21 @@ u8 *create_onionreply(const tal_t *ctx, const u8 *shared_secret,
return reply;
}
u8 *wrap_onionreply(const tal_t *ctx, const u8 *shared_secret, const u8 *reply)
u8 *wrap_onionreply(const tal_t *ctx,
const struct secret *shared_secret, const u8 *reply)
{
u8 key[KEY_LEN];
size_t streamlen = tal_len(reply);
u8 stream[streamlen];
u8 *result = tal_arr(ctx, u8, streamlen);
generate_key(key, "ammag", 5, shared_secret);
generate_key(key, "ammag", 5, shared_secret->data);
generate_cipher_stream(stream, key, streamlen);
xorbytes(result, stream, reply, streamlen);
return result;
}
struct onionreply *unwrap_onionreply(const tal_t *ctx, u8 **shared_secrets,
struct onionreply *unwrap_onionreply(const tal_t *ctx,
const struct secret *shared_secrets,
const int numhops, const u8 *reply)
{
tal_t *tmpctx = tal_tmpctx(ctx);
@@ -528,11 +530,11 @@ struct onionreply *unwrap_onionreply(const tal_t *ctx, u8 **shared_secrets,
for (int i = 0; i < numhops; i++) {
/* Since the encryption is just XORing with the cipher
* stream encryption is identical to decryption */
msg = wrap_onionreply(tmpctx, shared_secrets[i], msg);
msg = wrap_onionreply(tmpctx, &shared_secrets[i], msg);
/* Check if the HMAC matches, this means that this is
* the origin */
generate_key(key, "um", 2, shared_secrets[i]);
generate_key(key, "um", 2, shared_secrets[i].data);
compute_hmac(hmac, msg + sizeof(hmac),
tal_len(msg) - sizeof(hmac), key, KEY_LEN);
if (memcmp(hmac, msg, sizeof(hmac)) == 0) {