diff --git a/channeld/channeld.c b/channeld/channeld.c
index 5e5eeb4a8..7849a24a8 100644
--- a/channeld/channeld.c
+++ b/channeld/channeld.c
@@ -2321,6 +2321,7 @@ static void peer_in(struct peer *peer, const u8 *msg)
 	case WIRE_WARNING:
 	case WIRE_ERROR:
 	case WIRE_OBS2_ONION_MESSAGE:
+	case WIRE_ONION_MESSAGE:
 		abort();
 	}
 
diff --git a/common/blindedpath.c b/common/blindedpath.c
index 9e8569811..7994813b7 100644
--- a/common/blindedpath.c
+++ b/common/blindedpath.c
@@ -58,12 +58,12 @@ static bool blind_node(const struct privkey *blinding,
 	return true;
 }
 
-static u8 *enctlv_from_encmsg(const tal_t *ctx,
-			      const struct privkey *blinding,
-			      const struct pubkey *node,
-			      const struct tlv_obs2_encmsg_tlvs *encmsg,
-			      struct privkey *next_blinding,
-			      struct pubkey *node_alias)
+static u8 *enctlv_from_encmsg_raw(const tal_t *ctx,
+				  const struct privkey *blinding,
+				  const struct pubkey *node,
+				  const u8 *raw_encmsg TAKES,
+				  struct privkey *next_blinding,
+				  struct pubkey *node_alias)
 {
 	/* https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/route-blinding/proposals/route-blinding.md */
 	struct secret ss, rho;
@@ -87,9 +87,7 @@ static u8 *enctlv_from_encmsg(const tal_t *ctx,
 	if (!blind_node(blinding, &ss, node, node_alias, next_blinding))
 		return NULL;
 
-	/* Marshall */
-	ret = tal_arr(ctx, u8, 0);
-	towire_obs2_encmsg_tlvs(&ret, encmsg);
+	ret = tal_dup_talarr(ctx, u8, raw_encmsg);
 	SUPERVERBOSE("\t\"encmsg_hex\": \"%s\",\n", tal_hex(tmpctx, ret));
 
 	/*
@@ -115,6 +113,32 @@ static u8 *enctlv_from_encmsg(const tal_t *ctx,
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static u8 *enctlv_from_obs2_encmsg(const tal_t *ctx,
+				   const struct privkey *blinding,
+				   const struct pubkey *node,
+				   const struct tlv_obs2_encmsg_tlvs *encmsg,
+				   struct privkey *next_blinding,
+				   struct pubkey *node_alias)
+{
+	u8 *encmsg_raw = tal_arr(NULL, u8, 0);
+	towire_obs2_encmsg_tlvs(&encmsg_raw, encmsg);
+	return enctlv_from_encmsg_raw(ctx, blinding, node, take(encmsg_raw),
+				      next_blinding, node_alias);
+}
+
+static u8 *enctlv_from_encmsg(const tal_t *ctx,
+			      const struct privkey *blinding,
+			      const struct pubkey *node,
+			      const struct tlv_encrypted_data_tlv *encmsg,
+			      struct privkey *next_blinding,
+			      struct pubkey *node_alias)
+{
+	u8 *encmsg_raw = tal_arr(NULL, u8, 0);
+	towire_encrypted_data_tlv(&encmsg_raw, encmsg);
+	return enctlv_from_encmsg_raw(ctx, blinding, node, take(encmsg_raw),
+				      next_blinding, node_alias);
+}
+
 bool unblind_onion(const struct pubkey *blinding,
 		   void (*ecdh)(const struct pubkey *point, struct secret *ss),
 		   struct pubkey *onion_key,
@@ -136,16 +160,13 @@ bool unblind_onion(const struct pubkey *blinding,
 					     hmac.data) == 1;
 }
 
-static struct tlv_obs2_encmsg_tlvs *decrypt_encmsg(const tal_t *ctx,
-						   const struct pubkey *blinding,
-						   const struct secret *ss,
-						   const u8 *enctlv)
+static u8 *decrypt_encmsg_raw(const tal_t *ctx,
+			      const struct pubkey *blinding,
+			      const struct secret *ss,
+			      const u8 *enctlv)
 {
 	struct secret rho;
 	u8 *dec;
-	const u8 *cursor;
-	size_t maxlen;
-	struct tlv_obs2_encmsg_tlvs *encmsg;
 	/* All-zero npub */
 	static const unsigned char npub[crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_ietf_NPUBBYTES];
 
@@ -161,7 +182,7 @@ static struct tlv_obs2_encmsg_tlvs *decrypt_encmsg(const tal_t *ctx,
 	if (tal_bytelen(enctlv) < crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_ietf_ABYTES)
 		return NULL;
 
-	dec = tal_arr(tmpctx, u8, tal_bytelen(enctlv)
+	dec = tal_arr(ctx, u8, tal_bytelen(enctlv)
 		      - crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_ietf_ABYTES);
 	if (crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_ietf_decrypt(dec, NULL,
 						      NULL,
@@ -169,10 +190,19 @@ static struct tlv_obs2_encmsg_tlvs *decrypt_encmsg(const tal_t *ctx,
 						      NULL, 0,
 						      npub,
 						      rho.data) != 0)
-		return NULL;
+		return tal_free(dec);
 
-	cursor = dec;
-	maxlen = tal_bytelen(dec);
+	return dec;
+}
+
+static struct tlv_obs2_encmsg_tlvs *decrypt_obs2_encmsg(const tal_t *ctx,
+							const struct pubkey *blinding,
+							const struct secret *ss,
+							const u8 *enctlv)
+{
+	struct tlv_obs2_encmsg_tlvs *encmsg;
+	const u8 *cursor = decrypt_encmsg_raw(tmpctx, blinding, ss, enctlv);
+	size_t maxlen = tal_bytelen(cursor);
 
 	/* BOLT-onion-message #4:
 	 *
@@ -187,6 +217,156 @@ static struct tlv_obs2_encmsg_tlvs *decrypt_encmsg(const tal_t *ctx,
 	return encmsg;
 }
 
+static struct tlv_encrypted_data_tlv *decrypt_encmsg(const tal_t *ctx,
+						     const struct pubkey *blinding,
+						     const struct secret *ss,
+						     const u8 *enctlv)
+{
+	struct tlv_encrypted_data_tlv *encmsg;
+	const u8 *cursor = decrypt_encmsg_raw(tmpctx, blinding, ss, enctlv);
+	size_t maxlen = tal_bytelen(cursor);
+
+	/* BOLT-onion-message #4:
+	 *
+	 * - if the `enctlv` is not a valid TLV...
+	 *   - MUST drop the message.
+	 */
+	encmsg = tlv_encrypted_data_tlv_new(ctx);
+	if (!fromwire_encrypted_data_tlv(&cursor, &maxlen, encmsg)
+	    || !tlv_fields_valid(encmsg->fields, NULL, NULL))
+		return tal_free(encmsg);
+
+	return encmsg;
+}
+
+bool decrypt_enctlv(const struct pubkey *blinding,
+		    const struct secret *ss,
+		    const u8 *enctlv,
+		    struct pubkey *next_node,
+		    struct pubkey *next_blinding)
+{
+	struct tlv_encrypted_data_tlv *encmsg;
+
+	encmsg = decrypt_encmsg(tmpctx, blinding, ss, enctlv);
+	if (!encmsg)
+		return false;
+
+	/* BOLT-onion-message #4:
+	 *
+	 * The reader:
+	 *  - if it is not the final node according to the onion encryption:
+	 *...
+	 *    - if the `enctlv` ... does not contain
+	 *      `next_node_id`:
+	 *      - MUST drop the message.
+	 */
+	if (!encmsg->next_node_id)
+		return false;
+
+	/* BOLT-onion-message #4:
+	 * The reader:
+	 *  - if it is not the final node according to the onion encryption:
+	 *...
+	 *    - if the `enctlv` contains `path_id`:
+	 *      - MUST drop the message.
+	 */
+	if (encmsg->path_id)
+		return false;
+
+	/* BOLT-onion-message #4:
+	 * The reader:
+	 *  - if it is not the final node according to the onion encryption:
+	 *...
+	 *    - if `blinding` is specified in the `enctlv`:
+	 *       - MUST pass that as `blinding` in the `onion_message`
+	 *    - otherwise:
+	 *       - MUST pass `blinding` derived as in
+	 *         [Route Blinding][route-blinding] (i.e.
+	 *         `E(i+1) = H(E(i) || ss(i)) * E(i)`).
+	 */
+	*next_node = *encmsg->next_node_id;
+	if (encmsg->next_blinding_override)
+		*next_blinding = *encmsg->next_blinding_override;
+	else {
+		/* E(i-1) = H(E(i) || ss(i)) * E(i) */
+		struct sha256 h;
+		blinding_hash_e_and_ss(blinding, ss, &h);
+		blinding_next_pubkey(blinding, &h, next_blinding);
+	}
+	return true;
+}
+
+bool decrypt_final_enctlv(const tal_t *ctx,
+			  const struct pubkey *blinding,
+			  const struct secret *ss,
+			  const u8 *enctlv,
+			  const struct pubkey *my_id,
+			  struct pubkey *alias,
+			  struct secret **path_id)
+{
+	struct tlv_encrypted_data_tlv *encmsg;
+	struct secret node_id_blinding;
+
+	/* Repeat the tweak to get the alias it was using for us */
+	subkey_from_hmac("blinded_node_id", ss, &node_id_blinding);
+	*alias = *my_id;
+	if (secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul(secp256k1_ctx,
+					  &alias->pubkey,
+					  node_id_blinding.data) != 1)
+		return false;
+
+	encmsg = decrypt_encmsg(tmpctx, blinding, ss, enctlv);
+	if (!encmsg)
+		return false;
+
+	if (tal_bytelen(encmsg->path_id) == sizeof(**path_id)) {
+		*path_id = tal(ctx, struct secret);
+		memcpy(*path_id, encmsg->path_id, sizeof(**path_id));
+	} else
+		*path_id = NULL;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+u8 *create_enctlv(const tal_t *ctx,
+		  const struct privkey *blinding,
+		  const struct pubkey *node,
+		  const struct pubkey *next_node,
+		  size_t padlen,
+		  const struct pubkey *next_blinding_override,
+		  struct privkey *next_blinding,
+		  struct pubkey *node_alias)
+{
+	struct tlv_encrypted_data_tlv *encmsg = tlv_encrypted_data_tlv_new(tmpctx);
+	if (padlen)
+		encmsg->padding = tal_arrz(encmsg, u8, padlen);
+	encmsg->next_node_id = cast_const(struct pubkey *, next_node);
+	encmsg->next_blinding_override = cast_const(struct pubkey *, next_blinding_override);
+
+	return enctlv_from_encmsg(ctx, blinding, node, encmsg,
+				  next_blinding, node_alias);
+}
+
+u8 *create_final_enctlv(const tal_t *ctx,
+			const struct privkey *blinding,
+			const struct pubkey *final_node,
+			size_t padlen,
+			const struct secret *path_id,
+			struct pubkey *node_alias)
+{
+	struct tlv_encrypted_data_tlv *encmsg = tlv_encrypted_data_tlv_new(tmpctx);
+	struct privkey unused_next_blinding;
+
+	if (padlen)
+		encmsg->padding = tal_arrz(encmsg, u8, padlen);
+	if (path_id)
+		encmsg->path_id = (u8 *)tal_dup(encmsg, struct secret, path_id);
+
+	return enctlv_from_encmsg(ctx, blinding, final_node, encmsg,
+				  &unused_next_blinding, node_alias);
+}
+
+/* Obsolete variants */
 bool decrypt_obs2_enctlv(const struct pubkey *blinding,
 			 const struct secret *ss,
 			 const u8 *enctlv,
@@ -195,7 +375,7 @@ bool decrypt_obs2_enctlv(const struct pubkey *blinding,
 {
 	struct tlv_obs2_encmsg_tlvs *encmsg;
 
-	encmsg = decrypt_encmsg(tmpctx, blinding, ss, enctlv);
+	encmsg = decrypt_obs2_encmsg(tmpctx, blinding, ss, enctlv);
 	if (!encmsg)
 		return false;
 
@@ -263,7 +443,7 @@ bool decrypt_obs2_final_enctlv(const tal_t *ctx,
 					  node_id_blinding.data) != 1)
 		return false;
 
-	encmsg = decrypt_encmsg(tmpctx, blinding, ss, enctlv);
+	encmsg = decrypt_obs2_encmsg(tmpctx, blinding, ss, enctlv);
 	if (!encmsg)
 		return false;
 
@@ -291,8 +471,8 @@ u8 *create_obs2_enctlv(const tal_t *ctx,
 	encmsg->next_node_id = cast_const(struct pubkey *, next_node);
 	encmsg->next_blinding = cast_const(struct pubkey *, override_blinding);
 
-	return enctlv_from_encmsg(ctx, blinding, node, encmsg,
-				  next_blinding, node_alias);
+	return enctlv_from_obs2_encmsg(ctx, blinding, node, encmsg,
+				       next_blinding, node_alias);
 }
 
 u8 *create_obs2_final_enctlv(const tal_t *ctx,
@@ -310,6 +490,6 @@ u8 *create_obs2_final_enctlv(const tal_t *ctx,
 	if (self_id)
 		encmsg->self_id = (u8 *)tal_dup(encmsg, struct secret, self_id);
 
-	return enctlv_from_encmsg(ctx, blinding, final_node, encmsg,
-				  &unused_next_blinding, node_alias);
+	return enctlv_from_obs2_encmsg(ctx, blinding, final_node, encmsg,
+				       &unused_next_blinding, node_alias);
 }
diff --git a/common/blindedpath.h b/common/blindedpath.h
index a207c316d..f34159395 100644
--- a/common/blindedpath.h
+++ b/common/blindedpath.h
@@ -17,18 +17,18 @@ struct secret;
  * @node: the pubkey of the node to encrypt for
  * @next_node: the pubkey of the next node, to place in enctlv
  * @padlen: if non-zero, the bytes of padding to add (also adds 2 byte padding hdr)
- * @override_blinding: the optional blinding point to place in enctlv
+ * @next_blinding_override: the optional blinding point to place in enctlv
  * @next_blinding: (out) e(i+1), the next blinding secret.
  * @node_alias: (out) the blinded pubkey of the node to tell the recipient.
  *
  * Returns the enctlv blob, or NULL if the secret is invalid.
  */
-u8 *create_obs2_enctlv(const tal_t *ctx,
+u8 *create_enctlv(const tal_t *ctx,
 		  const struct privkey *blinding,
 		  const struct pubkey *node,
 		  const struct pubkey *next_node,
 		  size_t padlen,
-		  const struct pubkey *override_blinding,
+		  const struct pubkey *next_blinding_override,
 		  struct privkey *next_blinding,
 		  struct pubkey *node_alias)
 	NON_NULL_ARGS(2, 3, 4, 7, 8);
@@ -39,16 +39,16 @@ u8 *create_obs2_enctlv(const tal_t *ctx,
  * @blinding: e(i), the blinding secret
  * @final_node: the pubkey of the node to encrypt for
  * @padlen: if non-zero, the bytes of padding to add (also adds 2 byte padding hdr)
- * @self_id: secret to include in enctlv, if not NULL.
+ * @path_id: secret to include in enctlv, if not NULL.
  * @node_alias: (out) the blinded pubkey of the node to tell the recipient.
  *
  * If it fails, it means one of the privkeys is bad.
  */
-u8 *create_obs2_final_enctlv(const tal_t *ctx,
+u8 *create_final_enctlv(const tal_t *ctx,
 			const struct privkey *blinding,
 			const struct pubkey *final_node,
 			size_t padlen,
-			const struct secret *self_id,
+			const struct secret *path_id,
 			struct pubkey *node_alias)
 	NON_NULL_ARGS(2, 3, 6);
 
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ bool unblind_onion(const struct pubkey *blinding,
  *
  * Returns false if decryption failed or encmsg was malformed.
  */
-bool decrypt_obs2_enctlv(const struct pubkey *blinding,
+bool decrypt_enctlv(const struct pubkey *blinding,
 		    const struct secret *ss,
 		    const u8 *enctlv,
 		    struct pubkey *next_node,
@@ -86,23 +86,55 @@ bool decrypt_obs2_enctlv(const struct pubkey *blinding,
 
 /**
  * decrypt_final_enctlv - Decrypt an encmsg to form an enctlv.
- * @ctx: tal context for @self_id
+ * @ctx: tal context for @path_id
  * @blinding: E(i), the blinding pubkey the previous peer gave us.
  * @ss: the blinding secret from unblind_onion().
  * @enctlv: the enctlv from the onion (tal, may be NULL).
  * @my_id: the pubkey of this node.
  * @alias: (out) the node_id this was addressed to.
- * @self_id: (out) the secret contained in the enctlv, if any.
+ * @path_id: (out) the secret contained in the enctlv, if any (NULL if invalid or unset)
  *
  * Returns false if decryption failed or encmsg was malformed.
  */
-bool decrypt_obs2_final_enctlv(const tal_t *ctx,
+bool decrypt_final_enctlv(const tal_t *ctx,
 			  const struct pubkey *blinding,
 			  const struct secret *ss,
 			  const u8 *enctlv,
 			  const struct pubkey *my_id,
 			  struct pubkey *alias,
-			  struct secret **self_id)
+			  struct secret **path_id)
+	NON_NULL_ARGS(1, 2, 4, 5);
+
+/* Obsolete variants */
+u8 *create_obs2_enctlv(const tal_t *ctx,
+		       const struct privkey *blinding,
+		       const struct pubkey *node,
+		       const struct pubkey *next_node,
+		       size_t padlen,
+		       const struct pubkey *override_blinding,
+		       struct privkey *next_blinding,
+		       struct pubkey *node_alias)
+	NON_NULL_ARGS(2, 3, 4, 7, 8);
+u8 *create_obs2_final_enctlv(const tal_t *ctx,
+			     const struct privkey *blinding,
+			     const struct pubkey *final_node,
+			     size_t padlen,
+			     const struct secret *self_id,
+			     struct pubkey *node_alias)
+	NON_NULL_ARGS(2, 3, 6);
+bool decrypt_obs2_enctlv(const struct pubkey *blinding,
+			 const struct secret *ss,
+			 const u8 *enctlv,
+			 struct pubkey *next_node,
+			 struct pubkey *next_blinding)
+	NON_NULL_ARGS(1, 2, 4, 5);
+bool decrypt_obs2_final_enctlv(const tal_t *ctx,
+			       const struct pubkey *blinding,
+			       const struct secret *ss,
+			       const u8 *enctlv,
+			       const struct pubkey *my_id,
+			       struct pubkey *alias,
+			       struct secret **self_id)
 	NON_NULL_ARGS(1, 2, 4, 5);
 
 #endif /* LIGHTNING_COMMON_BLINDEDPATH_H */
diff --git a/common/json_helpers.c b/common/json_helpers.c
index 0fa2233c9..ee7f23531 100644
--- a/common/json_helpers.c
+++ b/common/json_helpers.c
@@ -164,12 +164,48 @@ json_to_obs2_reply_path(const tal_t *ctx, const char *buffer, const jsmntok_t *t
 	rpath->path = tal_arr(rpath, struct onionmsg_path *, hops->size);
 	json_for_each_arr(i, t, hops) {
 		rpath->path[i] = tal(rpath->path, struct onionmsg_path);
-		err = json_scan(tmpctx, buffer, t, "{id:%,enctlv:%}",
+		err = json_scan(tmpctx, buffer, t, "{id:%,encrypted_recipient_data:%}",
 				JSON_SCAN(json_to_pubkey,
 					  &rpath->path[i]->node_id),
 				JSON_SCAN_TAL(rpath->path[i],
 					      json_tok_bin_from_hex,
-					      &rpath->path[i]->enctlv));
+					      &rpath->path[i]->encrypted_recipient_data));
+		if (err)
+			return tal_free(rpath);
+	}
+
+	return rpath;
+}
+
+struct tlv_onionmsg_payload_reply_path *
+json_to_reply_path(const tal_t *ctx, const char *buffer, const jsmntok_t *tok)
+{
+	struct tlv_onionmsg_payload_reply_path *rpath;
+	const jsmntok_t *hops, *t;
+	size_t i;
+	const char *err;
+
+	rpath = tal(ctx, struct tlv_onionmsg_payload_reply_path);
+	err = json_scan(tmpctx, buffer, tok, "{blinding:%,first_node_id:%}",
+			JSON_SCAN(json_to_pubkey, &rpath->blinding),
+			JSON_SCAN(json_to_pubkey, &rpath->first_node_id),
+			NULL);
+	if (err)
+		return tal_free(rpath);
+
+	hops = json_get_member(buffer, tok, "hops");
+	if (!hops || hops->size < 1)
+		return tal_free(rpath);
+
+	rpath->path = tal_arr(rpath, struct onionmsg_path *, hops->size);
+	json_for_each_arr(i, t, hops) {
+		rpath->path[i] = tal(rpath->path, struct onionmsg_path);
+		err = json_scan(tmpctx, buffer, t, "{id:%,encrypted_recipient_data:%}",
+				JSON_SCAN(json_to_pubkey,
+					  &rpath->path[i]->node_id),
+				JSON_SCAN_TAL(rpath->path[i],
+					      json_tok_bin_from_hex,
+					      &rpath->path[i]->encrypted_recipient_data));
 		if (err)
 			return tal_free(rpath);
 	}
diff --git a/common/json_helpers.h b/common/json_helpers.h
index c6febd343..3e1064240 100644
--- a/common/json_helpers.h
+++ b/common/json_helpers.h
@@ -80,6 +80,10 @@ bool split_tok(const char *buffer, const jsmntok_t *tok,
 				jsmntok_t *b);
 
 /* Extract reply path from this JSON */
+struct tlv_onionmsg_payload_reply_path *
+json_to_reply_path(const tal_t *ctx, const char *buffer, const jsmntok_t *tok);
+
+/* Obsolete version! */
 struct tlv_obs2_onionmsg_payload_reply_path *
 json_to_obs2_reply_path(const tal_t *ctx, const char *buffer, const jsmntok_t *tok);
 
diff --git a/common/onion.c b/common/onion.c
index 4743117da..aeab17de1 100644
--- a/common/onion.c
+++ b/common/onion.c
@@ -82,8 +82,8 @@ u8 *onion_nonfinal_hop(const tal_t *ctx,
 		tlv->short_channel_id = cast_const(struct short_channel_id *,
 						   scid);
 #if EXPERIMENTAL_FEATURES
-		tlv->blinding_seed = cast_const(struct pubkey *, blinding);
-		tlv->enctlv = cast_const(u8 *, enctlv);
+		tlv->blinding_point = cast_const(struct pubkey *, blinding);
+		tlv->encrypted_recipient_data = cast_const(u8 *, enctlv);
 #endif
 		return make_tlv_hop(ctx, tlv);
 	} else {
@@ -135,8 +135,8 @@ u8 *onion_final_hop(const tal_t *ctx,
 			tlv->payment_data = &tlv_pdata;
 		}
 #if EXPERIMENTAL_FEATURES
-		tlv->blinding_seed = cast_const(struct pubkey *, blinding);
-		tlv->enctlv = cast_const(u8 *, enctlv);
+		tlv->blinding_point = cast_const(struct pubkey *, blinding);
+		tlv->encrypted_recipient_data = cast_const(u8 *, enctlv);
 #endif
 		return make_tlv_hop(ctx, tlv);
 	} else {
@@ -362,10 +362,10 @@ struct onion_payload *onion_decode(const tal_t *ctx,
 #if EXPERIMENTAL_FEATURES
 		if (!p->blinding) {
 			/* If we have no blinding, it could be in TLV. */
-			if (tlv->blinding_seed) {
+			if (tlv->blinding_point) {
 				p->blinding =
 					tal_dup(p, struct pubkey,
-						tlv->blinding_seed);
+						tlv->blinding_point);
 				ecdh(p->blinding, &p->blinding_ss);
 			}
 		} else
@@ -377,12 +377,12 @@ struct onion_payload *onion_decode(const tal_t *ctx,
 			if (rs->nextcase == ONION_FORWARD) {
 				struct tlv_tlv_payload *ntlv;
 
-				if (!tlv->enctlv)
+				if (!tlv->encrypted_recipient_data)
 					goto fail;
 
 				ntlv = decrypt_tlv(tmpctx,
 						   &p->blinding_ss,
-						   tlv->enctlv);
+						   tlv->encrypted_recipient_data);
 				if (!ntlv)
 					goto fail;
 
diff --git a/common/test/run-blindedpath_enctlv.c b/common/test/run-blindedpath_enctlv.c
index 867b8c82f..477220765 100644
--- a/common/test/run-blindedpath_enctlv.c
+++ b/common/test/run-blindedpath_enctlv.c
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 
 	/* We output the JSON test vectors. */
 	printf("[{");
-	json_strfield("test name", "Simple enctlv for Alice, next is Bob");
+	json_strfield("test name", "Simple encrypted_recipient_data for Alice, next is Bob");
 	json_strfield("node_privkey",
 		      type_to_string(tmpctx, struct privkey, &alice));
 	json_strfield("node_id",
@@ -145,14 +145,14 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 		      type_to_string(tmpctx, struct privkey, &blinding));
 	json_strfield("blinding",
 		      type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey, &blinding_pub));
-	printf("\t\"encmsg\": {\n"
+	printf("\t\"encrypted_data_tlv\": {\n"
 	       "\t\t\"next_node_id\": \"%s\"\n"
 	       "\t},\n",
 	       type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey, &bob_id));
 
 	enctlv = create_obs2_enctlv(tmpctx, &blinding, &alice_id, &bob_id,
 				    0, NULL, &blinding, &alias);
-	printf("\t\"enctlv_hex\": \"%s\"\n"
+	printf("\t\"encrypted_recipient_data_hex\": \"%s\"\n"
 	       "},\n",
 	       tal_hex(tmpctx, enctlv));
 
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 
 	printf("{");
 	json_strfield("test name",
-		      "Blinding-key-override enctlv for Bob, next is Carol");
+		      "Blinding-key-override encrypted_recipient_data for Bob, next is Carol");
 	json_strfield("node_privkey",
 		      type_to_string(tmpctx, struct privkey, &bob));
 	json_strfield("node_id",
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 		      type_to_string(tmpctx, struct privkey, &blinding));
 	json_strfield("blinding",
 		      type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey, &blinding_pub));
-	printf("\t\"encmsg\": {\n"
+	printf("\t\"encrypted_data_tlv\": {\n"
 	       "\t\t\"next_node_id\": \"%s\",\n"
 	       "\t\t\"blinding\": \"%s\"\n"
 	       "\t},\n",
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 
 	enctlv = create_obs2_enctlv(tmpctx, &blinding, &bob_id, &carol_id,
 				    0, &override_blinding_pub, &blinding, &alias);
-	printf("\t\"enctlv_hex\": \"%s\"\n"
+	printf("\t\"encrypted_recipient_data_hex\": \"%s\"\n"
 	       "},\n",
 	       tal_hex(tmpctx, enctlv));
 
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 	blinding_pub = override_blinding_pub;
 
 	printf("{");
-	json_strfield("test name", "Padded enctlv for Carol, next is Dave");
+	json_strfield("test name", "Padded encrypted_recipient_data for Carol, next is Dave");
 	json_strfield("node_privkey",
 		      type_to_string(tmpctx, struct privkey, &carol));
 	json_strfield("node_id",
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 		      type_to_string(tmpctx, struct privkey, &blinding));
 	json_strfield("blinding",
 		      type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey, &blinding_pub));
-	printf("\t\"encmsg\": {\n"
+	printf("\t\"encrypted_data_tlv\": {\n"
 	       "\t\t\"next_node_id\": \"%s\",\n"
 	       "\t\t\"padding\": \"%s\"\n"
 	       "\t},\n",
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 
 	enctlv = create_obs2_enctlv(tmpctx, &blinding, &carol_id, &dave_id,
 				    35, NULL, &blinding, &alias);
-	printf("\t\"enctlv_hex\": \"%s\"\n"
+	printf("\t\"encrypted_recipient_data_hex\": \"%s\"\n"
 	       "}]\n",
 	       tal_hex(tmpctx, enctlv));
 
diff --git a/devtools/blindedpath.c b/devtools/blindedpath.c
index 57d320894..3e46662ab 100644
--- a/devtools/blindedpath.c
+++ b/devtools/blindedpath.c
@@ -269,11 +269,11 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 
 		/* Look for enctlv */
 		if (!outer->enctlv)
-			errx(1, "No enctlv field");
+			errx(1, "No encrypted_recipient_data field");
 
 		if (tal_bytelen(outer->enctlv)
 		    < crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_ietf_ABYTES)
-			errx(1, "enctlv field too short");
+			errx(1, "encrypted_recipient_data field too short");
 
 		dec = tal_arr(tmpctx, u8,
 			      tal_bytelen(outer->enctlv)
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 								npub,
 								rho.data);
 		if (ret != 0)
-			errx(1, "Failed to decrypt enctlv field");
+			errx(1, "Failed to decrypt encrypted_recipient_data field");
 
 		printf("Contents: %s\n", tal_hex(tmpctx, dec));
 
diff --git a/devtools/bolt12-cli.c b/devtools/bolt12-cli.c
index aa4dbf2bb..4e63c13be 100644
--- a/devtools/bolt12-cli.c
+++ b/devtools/bolt12-cli.c
@@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ static bool print_blindedpaths(struct blinded_path **paths,
 			printf(" %s:%s",
 			       type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
 					      &p[j]->node_id),
-			       tal_hex(tmpctx, p[j]->enctlv));
+			       tal_hex(tmpctx, p[j]->encrypted_recipient_data));
 			if (blindedpay) {
 				if (bp_idx < tal_count(blindedpay))
 					printf("fee=%u/%u,cltv=%u,features=%s",
diff --git a/doc/PLUGINS.md b/doc/PLUGINS.md
index 752b41233..07e045374 100644
--- a/doc/PLUGINS.md
+++ b/doc/PLUGINS.md
@@ -1542,7 +1542,7 @@ The payload for a call follows this format:
         "reply_first_node": "02df5ffe895c778e10f7742a6c5b8a0cefbe9465df58b92fadeb883752c8107c8f",
         "reply_blinding": "02df5ffe895c778e10f7742a6c5b8a0cefbe9465df58b92fadeb883752c8107c8f",
 		"reply_path": [ {"id": "02df5ffe895c778e10f7742a6c5b8a0cefbe9465df58b92fadeb883752c8107c8f",
-                         "enctlv": "0a020d0d",
+                         "encrypted_recipient_data": "0a020d0d",
                          "blinding": "02df5ffe895c778e10f7742a6c5b8a0cefbe9465df58b92fadeb883752c8107c8f"} ],
         "invoice_request": "0a020d0d",
 		"invoice": "0a020d0d",
diff --git a/doc/lightning-decode.7.md b/doc/lightning-decode.7.md
index 6708071ed..81d8a62b9 100644
--- a/doc/lightning-decode.7.md
+++ b/doc/lightning-decode.7.md
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ If **type** is "bolt12 offer", and **valid** is *true*:
     - **blinding** (pubkey): blinding factor for this path
     - **path** (array of objects): an individual path:
       - **node_id** (pubkey): node_id of the hop
-      - **enctlv** (hex): encrypted TLV entry for this hop
+      - **encrypted_recipient_data** (hex): encrypted TLV entry for this hop
   - **quantity_min** (u64, optional): the minimum quantity
   - **quantity_max** (u64, optional): the maximum quantity
   - **recurrence** (object, optional): how often to this offer should be used:
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ If **type** is "bolt12 invoice", and **valid** is *true*:
     - **blinding** (pubkey): blinding factor for this path
     - **path** (array of objects): an individual path:
       - **node_id** (pubkey): node_id of the hop
-      - **enctlv** (hex): encrypted TLV entry for this hop
+      - **encrypted_recipient_data** (hex): encrypted TLV entry for this hop
   - **quantity** (u64, optional): the quantity ordered
   - **recurrence_counter** (u32, optional): the 0-based counter for a recurring payment
   - **recurrence_start** (u32, optional): the optional start period for a recurring payment
@@ -180,4 +180,4 @@ RESOURCES
 
 Main web site: <https://github.com/ElementsProject/lightning>
 
-[comment]: # ( SHA256STAMP:cd4a18d07c23b6a995f8db7cac25344e340e512c786b8cf743f56ecceeb84960)
+[comment]: # ( SHA256STAMP:d05b5fc1bf230b3bbd03e2023fb0c6bbefb700f7c3cfb43512da48dbce45f005)
diff --git a/doc/schemas/decode.schema.json b/doc/schemas/decode.schema.json
index 9e12c1588..808ef8f43 100644
--- a/doc/schemas/decode.schema.json
+++ b/doc/schemas/decode.schema.json
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@
                     "type": "object",
                     "required": [
                       "node_id",
-                      "enctlv"
+                      "encrypted_recipient_data"
                     ],
                     "additionalProperties": false,
                     "properties": {
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@
                         "type": "pubkey",
                         "description": "node_id of the hop"
                       },
-                      "enctlv": {
+                      "encrypted_recipient_data": {
                         "type": "hex",
                         "description": "encrypted TLV entry for this hop"
                       }
@@ -388,7 +388,7 @@
                     "type": "object",
                     "required": [
                       "node_id",
-                      "enctlv"
+                      "encrypted_recipient_data"
                     ],
                     "additionalProperties": false,
                     "properties": {
@@ -396,7 +396,7 @@
                         "type": "pubkey",
                         "description": "node_id of the hop"
                       },
-                      "enctlv": {
+                      "encrypted_recipient_data": {
                         "type": "hex",
                         "description": "encrypted TLV entry for this hop"
                       }
diff --git a/gossipd/gossipd.c b/gossipd/gossipd.c
index b9e07a353..419ed2ca1 100644
--- a/gossipd/gossipd.c
+++ b/gossipd/gossipd.c
@@ -520,6 +520,13 @@ static struct io_plan *onionmsg_req(struct io_conn *conn, struct daemon *daemon,
 	return daemon_conn_read_next(conn, daemon->master);
 }
 
+/* Peer sends an onion msg. */
+static u8 *handle_onion_message(struct peer *peer, const u8 *msg)
+{
+	/* FIXME! */
+	return NULL;
+}
+
 /*~ This is where the per-peer daemons send us messages.  It's either forwarded
  * gossip, or a request for information.  We deliberately use non-overlapping
  * message types so we can distinguish them. */
@@ -556,6 +563,9 @@ static struct io_plan *peer_msg_in(struct io_conn *conn,
 	case WIRE_OBS2_ONION_MESSAGE:
 		err = handle_obs2_onion_message(peer, msg);
 		goto handled_relay;
+	case WIRE_ONION_MESSAGE:
+		err = handle_onion_message(peer, msg);
+		goto handled_relay;
 
 	/* These are non-gossip messages (!is_msg_for_gossipd()) */
 	case WIRE_WARNING:
diff --git a/lightningd/onion_message.c b/lightningd/onion_message.c
index 1a0de05e9..9d5ef23ab 100644
--- a/lightningd/onion_message.c
+++ b/lightningd/onion_message.c
@@ -37,7 +37,8 @@ static void json_add_blindedpath(struct json_stream *stream,
 	for (size_t i = 0; i < tal_count(path); i++) {
 		json_object_start(stream, NULL);
 		json_add_pubkey(stream, "id", &path[i]->node_id);
-		json_add_hex_talarr(stream, "enctlv", path[i]->enctlv);
+		json_add_hex_talarr(stream, "encrypted_recipient_data",
+				    path[i]->encrypted_recipient_data);
 		json_object_end(stream);
 	};
 	json_array_end(stream);
@@ -327,7 +328,7 @@ static struct command_result *json_blindedpath(struct command *cmd,
 
 	for (size_t i = 0; i < nhops - 1; i++) {
 		path[i] = tal(path, struct onionmsg_path);
-		path[i]->enctlv = create_obs2_enctlv(path[i],
+		path[i]->encrypted_recipient_data = create_obs2_enctlv(path[i],
 						     &blinding_iter,
 						     &ids[i],
 						     &ids[i+1],
@@ -340,7 +341,7 @@ static struct command_result *json_blindedpath(struct command *cmd,
 
 	/* FIXME: Add padding! */
 	path[nhops-1] = tal(path, struct onionmsg_path);
-	path[nhops-1]->enctlv = create_obs2_final_enctlv(path[nhops-1],
+	path[nhops-1]->encrypted_recipient_data = create_obs2_final_enctlv(path[nhops-1],
 							 &blinding_iter,
 							 &ids[nhops-1],
 							 /* FIXME: Pad? */
diff --git a/lightningd/pay.c b/lightningd/pay.c
index 6f4db608f..c6f414f2e 100644
--- a/lightningd/pay.c
+++ b/lightningd/pay.c
@@ -1392,7 +1392,7 @@ static struct command_result *param_route_hops(struct command *cmd,
 			   p_opt("direction", param_number, &direction),
 			   p_opt("style", param_route_hop_style, &style),
 			   p_opt("blinding", param_pubkey, &blinding),
-			   p_opt("enctlv", param_bin_from_hex, &enctlv),
+			   p_opt("encrypted_recipient_data", param_bin_from_hex, &enctlv),
 			   NULL))
 			return command_param_failed();
 
diff --git a/openingd/dualopend.c b/openingd/dualopend.c
index 903aaa7f2..795fce83c 100644
--- a/openingd/dualopend.c
+++ b/openingd/dualopend.c
@@ -1286,6 +1286,7 @@ static u8 *opening_negotiate_msg(const tal_t *ctx, struct state *state)
 		case WIRE_ANNOUNCEMENT_SIGNATURES:
 		case WIRE_GOSSIP_TIMESTAMP_FILTER:
 		case WIRE_OBS2_ONION_MESSAGE:
+		case WIRE_ONION_MESSAGE:
 		case WIRE_ACCEPT_CHANNEL2:
 		case WIRE_TX_ADD_INPUT:
 		case WIRE_TX_REMOVE_INPUT:
@@ -1632,6 +1633,7 @@ static bool run_tx_interactive(struct state *state,
 		case WIRE_ANNOUNCEMENT_SIGNATURES:
 		case WIRE_GOSSIP_TIMESTAMP_FILTER:
 		case WIRE_OBS2_ONION_MESSAGE:
+		case WIRE_ONION_MESSAGE:
 		case WIRE_TX_SIGNATURES:
 		case WIRE_OPEN_CHANNEL2:
 		case WIRE_ACCEPT_CHANNEL2:
@@ -3685,6 +3687,7 @@ static u8 *handle_peer_in(struct state *state)
 	case WIRE_ANNOUNCEMENT_SIGNATURES:
 	case WIRE_GOSSIP_TIMESTAMP_FILTER:
 	case WIRE_OBS2_ONION_MESSAGE:
+	case WIRE_ONION_MESSAGE:
 	case WIRE_ACCEPT_CHANNEL2:
 	case WIRE_TX_ADD_INPUT:
 	case WIRE_TX_REMOVE_INPUT:
diff --git a/plugins/offers.c b/plugins/offers.c
index 0de0718a9..4a9f98889 100644
--- a/plugins/offers.c
+++ b/plugins/offers.c
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ send_onion_reply(struct command *cmd,
 		json_add_pubkey(req->js, "id", &reply_path->path[i]->node_id);
 
 		omp = tlv_obs2_onionmsg_payload_new(tmpctx);
-		omp->enctlv = reply_path->path[i]->enctlv;
+		omp->enctlv = reply_path->path[i]->encrypted_recipient_data;
 
 		/* Put payload in last hop. */
 		if (i == nhops - 1) {
@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ static void json_add_onionmsg_path(struct json_stream *js,
 {
 	json_object_start(js, fieldname);
 	json_add_pubkey(js, "node_id", &path->node_id);
-	json_add_hex_talarr(js, "enctlv", path->enctlv);
+	json_add_hex_talarr(js, "encrypted_recipient_data", path->encrypted_recipient_data);
 	if (payinfo) {
 		json_add_u32(js, "fee_base_msat", payinfo->fee_base_msat);
 		json_add_u32(js, "fee_proportional_millionths",
diff --git a/wire/extracted_onion_exp_enctlv.patch b/wire/extracted_onion_exp_enctlv.patch
index 59d5b08c6..1897193b8 100644
--- a/wire/extracted_onion_exp_enctlv.patch
+++ b/wire/extracted_onion_exp_enctlv.patch
@@ -1,13 +1,15 @@
 --- wire/extracted_onion_wire_csv	2020-02-25 05:52:39.612291156 +1030
 +++ -	2020-03-20 15:11:55.763880895 +1030
-@@ -8,6 +8,10 @@ tlvdata,tlv_payload,short_channel_id,short_channel_id,short_channel_id,
+--- wire/onion_exp_wire.csv.~1~	2021-11-17 10:56:59.947630815 +1030
++++ wire/onion_exp_wire.csv	2021-11-17 10:59:39.304581244 +1030
+@@ -8,6 +8,10 @@
  tlvtype,tlv_payload,payment_data,8
  tlvdata,tlv_payload,payment_data,payment_secret,byte,32
  tlvdata,tlv_payload,payment_data,total_msat,tu64,
-+tlvtype,tlv_payload,enctlv,10
-+tlvdata,tlv_payload,enctlv,enctlv,byte,...
-+tlvtype,tlv_payload,blinding_seed,12
-+tlvdata,tlv_payload,blinding_seed,blinding_seed,pubkey,
++tlvtype,tlv_payload,encrypted_recipient_data,10
++tlvdata,tlv_payload,encrypted_recipient_data,encrypted_data,byte,...
++tlvtype,tlv_payload,blinding_point,12
++tlvdata,tlv_payload,blinding_point,blinding,point,
  tlvtype,obs2_onionmsg_payload,reply_path,2
  tlvdata,obs2_onionmsg_payload,reply_path,first_node_id,point,
  tlvdata,obs2_onionmsg_payload,reply_path,blinding,point,
diff --git a/wire/extracted_peer_05_newonion.patch b/wire/extracted_peer_05_newonion.patch
index ed35699aa..b14d5471e 100644
--- a/wire/extracted_peer_05_newonion.patch
+++ b/wire/extracted_peer_05_newonion.patch
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 --- peer_wire.csv	2021-08-25 12:41:02.876254003 +0930
 +++ peer_wire.csv.raw	2021-08-25 13:42:31.991693809 +0930
-@@ -320,3 +210,7 @@
+@@ -320,3 +210,11 @@
  msgdata,gossip_timestamp_filter,chain_hash,chain_hash,
  msgdata,gossip_timestamp_filter,first_timestamp,u32,
  msgdata,gossip_timestamp_filter,timestamp_range,u32,
@@ -8,3 +8,7 @@
 +msgdata,obs2_onion_message,blinding,point,
 +msgdata,obs2_onion_message,len,u16,
 +msgdata,obs2_onion_message,onionmsg,byte,len
++msgtype,onion_message,513,option_onion_messages
++msgdata,onion_message,blinding,point,
++msgdata,onion_message,len,u16,
++msgdata,onion_message,onionmsg,byte,len
diff --git a/wire/onion_wire.csv b/wire/onion_wire.csv
index ca41fd885..2ac0c4cff 100644
--- a/wire/onion_wire.csv
+++ b/wire/onion_wire.csv
@@ -28,10 +28,36 @@ tlvtype,obs2_encmsg_tlvs,next_blinding,12
 tlvdata,obs2_encmsg_tlvs,next_blinding,blinding,point,
 tlvtype,obs2_encmsg_tlvs,self_id,14
 tlvdata,obs2_encmsg_tlvs,self_id,data,byte,...
+tlvtype,tlv_payload,encrypted_recipient_data,10
+tlvdata,tlv_payload,encrypted_recipient_data,encrypted_data,byte,...
+tlvtype,tlv_payload,blinding_point,12
+tlvdata,tlv_payload,blinding_point,blinding,point,
+tlvtype,encrypted_data_tlv,padding,1
+tlvdata,encrypted_data_tlv,padding,padding,byte,...
+tlvtype,encrypted_data_tlv,short_channel_id,2
+tlvdata,encrypted_data_tlv,short_channel_id,short_channel_id,short_channel_id,
+tlvtype,encrypted_data_tlv,next_node_id,4
+tlvdata,encrypted_data_tlv,next_node_id,node_id,point,
+tlvtype,encrypted_data_tlv,path_id,6
+tlvdata,encrypted_data_tlv,path_id,data,byte,...
+tlvtype,encrypted_data_tlv,next_blinding_override,8
+tlvdata,encrypted_data_tlv,next_blinding_override,blinding,point,
+tlvtype,onionmsg_payload,reply_path,2
+tlvdata,onionmsg_payload,reply_path,first_node_id,point,
+tlvdata,onionmsg_payload,reply_path,blinding,point,
+tlvdata,onionmsg_payload,reply_path,path,onionmsg_path,...
+tlvtype,onionmsg_payload,encrypted_data_tlv,4
+tlvdata,onionmsg_payload,encrypted_data_tlv,encrypted_data_tlv,byte,...
+tlvtype,onionmsg_payload,invoice_request,64
+tlvdata,onionmsg_payload,invoice_request,invoice_request,byte,...
+tlvtype,onionmsg_payload,invoice,66
+tlvdata,onionmsg_payload,invoice,invoice,byte,...
+tlvtype,onionmsg_payload,invoice_error,68
+tlvdata,onionmsg_payload,invoice_error,invoice_error,byte,...
 subtype,onionmsg_path
 subtypedata,onionmsg_path,node_id,point,
 subtypedata,onionmsg_path,enclen,u16,
-subtypedata,onionmsg_path,enctlv,byte,enclen
+subtypedata,onionmsg_path,encrypted_recipient_data,byte,enclen
 msgtype,invalid_realm,PERM|1
 msgtype,temporary_node_failure,NODE|2
 msgtype,permanent_node_failure,PERM|NODE|2
diff --git a/wire/peer_wire.c b/wire/peer_wire.c
index 1a259da3f..aa3f3133e 100644
--- a/wire/peer_wire.c
+++ b/wire/peer_wire.c
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ static bool unknown_type(enum peer_wire t)
 	case WIRE_REPLY_CHANNEL_RANGE:
 	case WIRE_GOSSIP_TIMESTAMP_FILTER:
 	case WIRE_OBS2_ONION_MESSAGE:
+	case WIRE_ONION_MESSAGE:
 	case WIRE_TX_ADD_INPUT:
 	case WIRE_TX_REMOVE_INPUT:
 	case WIRE_TX_ADD_OUTPUT:
@@ -63,6 +64,7 @@ bool is_msg_for_gossipd(const u8 *cursor)
 	case WIRE_QUERY_CHANNEL_RANGE:
 	case WIRE_REPLY_CHANNEL_RANGE:
 	case WIRE_OBS2_ONION_MESSAGE:
+	case WIRE_ONION_MESSAGE:
 		return true;
 	case WIRE_WARNING:
 	case WIRE_INIT:
diff --git a/wire/peer_wire.csv b/wire/peer_wire.csv
index 0a28459fa..4043c6350 100644
--- a/wire/peer_wire.csv
+++ b/wire/peer_wire.csv
@@ -332,3 +332,7 @@ msgtype,obs2_onion_message,387,option_onion_messages
 msgdata,obs2_onion_message,blinding,point,
 msgdata,obs2_onion_message,len,u16,
 msgdata,obs2_onion_message,onionmsg,byte,len
+msgtype,onion_message,513,option_onion_messages
+msgdata,onion_message,blinding,point,
+msgdata,onion_message,len,u16,
+msgdata,onion_message,onionmsg,byte,len